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At	  the	  end	  of	  the	  First	  World	  War,	  new	  states	  were	  created	  in	  the	  former	  domains	  
of	  the	  Ottoman	  Empire.	  In	  the	  region	  between	  the	  Tigris	  and	  Euphrates	  rivers,	  Britain	  
and	  France	  obtained	  through	  conquest	  and	  international	  writ	  new	  “mandate”	  territories	  
in	  Iraq	  and	  Syria,	  while	  in	  1923	  a	  new	  Turkish	  republic	  was	  founded	  on	  the	  Anatolian	  
peninsula.	  During	  the	  next	  two	  decades,	  governments	  in	  these	  states	  planned	  a	  series	  of	  
water	  control	  projects	  on	  the	  two	  rivers	  as	  part	  of	  broad	  economic	  development	  efforts.	  
Many	  of	  these	  projects	  were	  eventually	  constructed	  after	  the	  Second	  World	  War,	  
shaping	  the	  environment	  of	  the	  river	  basin	  with	  dams,	  flood	  control	  and	  irrigation	  
works,	  and	  hydroelectric	  power	  stations.	  By	  comparing	  these	  states'	  efforts	  to	  exploit	  
natural	  resources	  and	  manage	  the	  environment	  of	  the	  basin,	  this	  study	  considers	  the	  
environmental	  function	  in	  the	  shift	  from	  empire	  to	  independent	  nation-­‐state	  and	  in	  the	  
diverse	  processes	  of	  modern	  state	  formation.	  Through	  water	  resource	  exploitation,	  Iraq,	  
Syria	  and	  Turkey	  founded	  modern	  bureaucracies,	  centralized	  control	  over	  natural	  
resources,	  and	  justified	  new	  techniques	  to	  manage	  populations.	  However,	  the	  intentions	  
of	  Baghdad,	  Ankara	  and	  Damascus,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  results	  obtained,	  differed	  in	  significant	  
ways,	  providing	  insight	  not	  only	  into	  the	  nature	  of	  these	  states,	  but	  also	  the	  political	  
dimensions	  of	  managing	  a	  critical	  natural	  resource.	  This	  dissertation	  is	  based	  on	  
analysis	  of	  archival	  records	  in	  Arabic,	  English,	  French	  and	  Turkish,	  collected	  from	  
institutions	  in	  England,	  France,	  the	  United	  States,	  India	  and	  Turkey.	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   1	  
INTRODUCTION	  
	  
The	  human	  handling	  and	  exploitation	  of	  the	  water	  of	  the	  Tigris	  and	  Euphrates	  
Rivers	  has	  had	  a	  profound	  impact	  on	  the	  formation	  of	  political	  communities	  in	  the	  
rivers'	  basin	  for	  millennia.	  This	  is	  no	  less	  the	  case	  with	  the	  three	  new	  states—Turkey,	  
Iraq	  and	  Syria—that	  emerged	  in	  the	  river	  basin	  after	  the	  First	  World	  War.	  This	  assertion	  
frames	  the	  forthcoming	  chapters,	  which	  describe	  the	  myriad	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  
interaction	  between	  government	  and	  environment	  produced	  the	  modern	  state,	  or	  more	  
accurately,	  the	  modern	  effects	  of	  stateness.	  The	  following	  chapters	  describe	  the	  range	  of	  
means—legal,	  institutional,	  economic,	  social,	  cultural,	  and	  diplomatic—that	  were	  
brought	  to	  bear	  in	  shaping	  the	  relationship	  of	  state	  and	  society	  to	  the	  environment	  of	  
the	  basin.	  These	  efforts	  helped	  to	  define	  the	  action	  of	  modern	  state	  power	  and	  the	  
creation	  of	  its	  objects,	  society	  and	  environment.	  	  
This	  research	  demonstrates	  how	  the	  framing	  and	  in	  some	  measure	  achieving	  of	  
centralized	  control	  over	  water	  allowed	  for	  the	  definition	  and	  penetration	  of	  state	  power	  
into	  new	  spheres	  of	  social	  and	  political	  life.	  Several	  chapters	  discuss	  how	  institutions	  for	  
managing	  the	  environment	  were	  built	  (and	  not	  built)	  and	  how	  these	  institutions	  
structured	  the	  functions	  of	  the	  state	  and	  the	  methods	  whereby	  political	  power	  might	  be	  
exerted.	  The	  dissertation	  also	  discusses	  how	  the	  interaction	  of	  government	  and	  
environment	  worked	  at	  multiple	  levels,	  examining	  in	  close	  detail	  how	  popular	  support	  
for	  new	  and	  invasive	  infrastructure	  relied	  on	  certain	  myths	  and	  ideas	  about	  space	  and	  
place.	  Finally,	  the	  dissertation	  examines	  how	  governments	  in	  Ankara,	  Damascus	  and	  
Baghdad	  negotiated	  geopolitics	  and	  international	  relations	  to	  secure	  financing	  and	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expertise	  in	  their	  various	  bids	  to	  turn	  recalcitrant,	  powerful	  rivers	  into	  valuable	  state-­‐
building	  resources.	  
This	  study	  begins	  with	  the	  period	  just	  after	  World	  War	  I	  and	  traces	  a	  history	  of	  
flood	  and	  flood	  control,	  of	  waterpower	  and	  water	  as	  power,	  through	  1975,	  a	  year	  that	  
marks	  the	  completion	  of	  the	  first	  two	  massive	  dams	  on	  the	  Euphrates	  River	  in	  Turkey	  
and	  Syria.	  Though	  parts	  of	  this	  dissertation	  will	  range	  outside	  those	  dates,	  ending	  the	  
study	  with	  the	  completion	  of	  the	  dams	  is	  representative	  of	  the	  ultimate	  claim	  of	  this	  
research.	  The	  construction	  of	  these	  dam	  projects	  represents	  the	  achievement	  of	  certain	  
capabilities	  and	  arrangements	  of	  bureaucratic	  state	  power	  and	  the	  (attempted	  in	  some	  
cases)	  production	  of	  political	  legitimacy	  through	  water	  management.	  This	  approach	  
stands	  in	  counterpoint	  to	  the	  current	  studies	  of	  the	  Tigris	  and	  Euphrates	  Rivers	  in	  the	  
twentieth	  century,	  which	  generally	  begin	  after	  the	  Second	  World	  War.	  Such	  studies	  of	  
the	  rivers	  investigate	  the	  ramifications	  of	  the	  major	  engineering	  works	  built	  to	  control	  
and	  distribute	  water.	  This	  dissertation,	  however,	  argues	  that	  a	  longer	  history	  of	  the	  
relationship	  between	  water	  management	  and	  state	  formation	  is	  vital	  to	  understanding	  
the	  importance	  of	  the	  rivers	  in	  the	  formation	  of	  these	  states	  and	  the	  contemporary	  
significance	  of	  these	  massive	  projects.	  
	  
An	  Ottoman	  Vision	  for	  Mesopotamia	  and	  the	  New	  Post-­‐War	  States	  
Before	  embarking	  on	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  emergence	  of	  these	  states	  after	  the	  First	  
World	  War,	  the	  geographical	  and	  political	  context	  in	  which	  both	  modern	  engineering	  
and	  modern	  states	  appeared	  in	  the	  Tigris-­‐Euphrates	  basin	  must	  be	  considered.	  This	  
section	  will	  describe	  the	  problems	  faced	  by	  the	  Ottoman	  Empire	  in	  its	  bid	  to	  control	  the	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rivers	  and	  the	  first	  set	  of	  plans	  for	  modern	  works	  meant	  to	  solve	  those	  problems.	  It	  will	  
also	  describe	  the	  creation	  of	  Iraq,	  Syria	  and	  Turkey,	  the	  new	  states	  that	  inherited	  
Ottoman	  water	  management	  efforts	  as	  well	  as	  the	  views	  and	  ideas	  that	  legitimized	  and	  
supported	  those	  efforts.	  
The	  Tigris	  and	  Euphrates	  rivers	  rise	  in	  the	  Tarsus	  Mountains	  of	  eastern	  Anatolia.	  
Both	  flow	  more	  than	  a	  thousand	  miles;	  the	  Euphrates	  is	  the	  longest	  river	  in	  Asia	  west	  of	  
the	  Indus.	  In	  the	  mountains	  of	  eastern	  Anatolia,	  the	  rivers	  have	  cut	  deep	  gorges,	  
eventually	  emerging	  into	  the	  Syrian	  Desert	  in	  southeastern	  Anatolia.	  The	  Tigris	  and	  
Euphrates	  enter	  their	  common	  delta	  within	  the	  borders	  of	  the	  modern	  state	  of	  Iraq,	  well	  
before	  Baghdad.	  Then,	  unlike	  most	  other	  rivers	  at	  their	  delta,	  the	  Tigris	  and	  Euphrates	  
merge	  into	  a	  single	  channel	  near	  the	  city	  of	  Basra,	  the	  Shatt	  al-­‐Arab,	  through	  which	  their	  
combined	  waters	  empty	  into	  the	  Persian	  Gulf.	  (See	  Illustration	  1).	  
The	  Tigris	  and	  Euphrates	  exhibit	  extreme	  seasonal	  variability.	  While	  a	  normal	  
high	  water	  period	  generally	  occurs	  from	  March	  to	  early	  May,	  severe	  floods	  occurred	  
(and	  still	  occur)	  as	  early	  as	  November	  and	  as	  late	  as	  early	  June,	  sometimes	  lasting	  only	  
days	  but	  at	  other	  times	  a	  couple	  of	  months	  or	  more.	  This	  variance	  has	  meant	  that	  floods	  
have	  often	  struck	  at	  the	  worst	  possible	  time	  for	  the	  cultivator,	  either	  too	  early,	  causing	  
the	  destruction	  of	  the	  winter	  harvest	  or	  too	  late,	  disrupting	  the	  spring	  sowing	  season.	  In	  
an	  effort	  to	  cope	  with	  the	  variance	  of	  the	  two	  rivers,	  Mesopotamian	  rulers	  and	  
landholders	  have	  for	  centuries	  constructed	  dykes,	  called	  bunds,	  along	  the	  river’s	  course	  
to	  protect	  their	  crops.	  	  
Cities	  along	  the	  way	  also	  needed	  protection	  from	  the	  floods.	  Baghdad,	  positioned	  
along	  the	  Tigris	  near	  its	  confluence	  with	  another	  river,	  the	  Diyala,	  has	  throughout	  its	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history	  been	  periodically	  threatened	  with	  inundation.	  Baghdad	  was	  equipped	  with	  
multiple	  redundant	  dykes	  and	  floodwalls,	  such	  that	  an	  opening	  or	  breach	  in	  one	  would	  
not	  overwhelm	  the	  entire	  city.	  As	  a	  last	  resort,	  intentional	  breaches	  might	  be	  made	  in	  
the	  flood	  protection	  north	  of	  Baghdad	  in	  order	  to	  reduce	  the	  height	  of	  the	  flood	  at	  the	  
city	  and	  lessen	  the	  danger	  to	  the	  population.	  The	  tension	  then	  in	  flood	  protection	  in	  the	  
river	  basin	  has	  for	  centuries	  been	  how	  to	  use	  the	  normal	  high	  water	  period	  to	  the	  
benefit	  of	  agriculture	  while	  minimizing	  the	  risk	  from	  severe	  floods.	  	  
Nineteenth-­‐century	  Ottoman	  governors	  in	  Baghdad	  were	  among	  those	  leaders	  
who	  had	  struggled	  with	  this	  tension.	  Administrators	  such	  as	  Mehmet	  Reşit	  (1852-­‐1857),	  
Namık	  (1861-­‐1868)	  and	  Midhat	  (1869-­‐1871)	  all	  worked	  to	  control	  the	  rivers	  and	  
improve	  navigation	  and	  irrigation.1	  It	  was	  not	  until	  the	  early	  twentieth	  century	  that	  
Ottoman	  authorities	  made	  a	  more	  concerted	  effort	  to	  regulate	  the	  rivers	  with	  the	  new,	  
modern	  engineering	  methods	  that	  had	  already	  been	  demonstrated	  in	  India	  and	  Egypt.	  
The	  man	  responsible	  for	  some	  of	  the	  most	  prominent	  engineering	  works	  in	  the	  latter	  
country,	  Sir	  William	  Willcocks,	  became	  the	  key	  figure	  in	  Ottoman	  efforts	  to	  remake	  the	  
Tigris	  and	  Euphrates.	  
Willcocks’s	  plans	  represented	  the	  first	  comprehensive	  effort	  to	  manage	  the	  
flooding	  of	  the	  rivers	  and	  regulate	  the	  use	  of	  water	  for	  irrigation.	  Willcocks’s	  scheme	  
occurred	  within	  a	  broader	  strategic	  context	  that	  also	  involved	  the	  construction	  of	  a	  
railroad	  connecting	  the	  Persian	  Gulf	  with	  the	  imperial	  center	  at	  Istanbul.	  His	  plans	  were	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  For	  more	  on	  their	  efforts,	  see	  Roger	  Owen,	  The	  Middle	  East	  in	  the	  World	  Economy,	  
1800-­‐1914	  (London:	  Methuen,	  1981),	  180-­‐188;	  and	  Ebubekir	  Ceylan,	  The	  Ottoman	  
Origins	  of	  Modern	  Iraq:	  Political	  Reform,	  Modernization	  and	  Development	  in	  the	  
Nineteenth-­‐Century	  Middle	  East	  (London:	  I.B.	  Tauris,	  2011),	  68-­‐100.	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explicitly	  connected	  to	  the	  projection	  of	  Ottoman	  power	  into	  the	  empire’s	  Arab	  
provinces	  and	  the	  effort	  to	  increase	  state	  revenues	  to	  pay	  for	  the	  Baghdad	  railway	  and	  
other	  development	  projects.	  In	  this	  way,	  water	  management	  was	  very	  much	  connected	  
to	  long-­‐term	  efforts	  at	  economic	  development	  meant	  to	  protect	  the	  Ottoman	  state	  from	  
European	  encroachment.2	  	  
By	  the	  late	  nineteenth	  century,	  Willcocks	  had	  made	  a	  name	  for	  himself	  working	  
on	  water	  management	  projects	  in	  India	  and	  Egypt.	  Born	  in	  India	  in	  1852	  to	  a	  British	  
military	  officer	  and	  engineer,	  Willcocks	  attended	  the	  British	  civil	  engineering	  college	  at	  
Roorkee.	  After	  graduating	  in	  1872,	  he	  entered	  the	  Irrigation	  Department	  of	  the	  Indian	  
North-­‐West	  Provinces	  where	  he	  worked	  for	  eleven	  years.	  He	  then	  transferred	  to	  
Egyptian	  service	  in	  1883	  and	  ten	  years	  later	  he	  designed	  and	  supervised	  work	  on	  the	  
Aswan	  Dam	  as	  Egypt’s	  Director-­‐General	  of	  Reservoirs.3	  
After	  his	  work	  on	  the	  Aswan	  Dam,	  Willcocks	  turned	  his	  attention	  to	  irrigation	  
projects	  in	  other	  parts	  of	  the	  world.	  He	  traveled	  to	  South	  Africa	  in	  1901	  and	  paid	  a	  short	  
visit	  to	  Mesopotamia	  in	  1903.	  In	  1905,	  Willcocks	  drew	  up	  several	  schemes	  for	  expanding	  
irrigation	  on	  the	  Tigris	  and	  Euphrates	  rivers.4	  At	  that	  time,	  Willcocks’s	  ideas	  received	  
little	  support	  from	  his	  own	  government,	  while	  the	  Ottoman	  government	  in	  Istanbul	  was	  
focused	  on	  the	  relatively	  simpler	  task	  of	  constructing	  a	  barrage	  across	  the	  Euphrates	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  Erik	  J.	  Zürcher,	  The	  Young	  Turk	  Legacy	  and	  Nation	  Building:	  From	  the	  Ottoman	  Empire	  
to	  Atatürk’s	  Turkey	  (London:	  I.B.	  Tauris,	  2010),	  59-­‐67.	  
3	  Frank	  Unlandherm,	  “Sir	  William	  Willcocks:	  A	  Victorian	  in	  the	  Middle	  East,”	  
Unpublished	  thesis,	  Princeton	  University,	  1959,	  7-­‐8.	  
4	  Robert	  I.	  Money,	  “The	  Hindiya	  Barrage,	  Mesopotamia,”	  The	  Geographical	  Journal	  50	  
(1917):	  219.	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south	  of	  Museyib.	  During	  this	  period,	  British	  concerns	  for	  German	  commercial	  
penetration	  into	  Mesopotamia	  and	  the	  Persian	  Gulf	  had	  been	  steadily	  mounting	  as	  a	  
result	  of	  the	  construction	  of	  the	  Berlin-­‐Baghdad	  railway.	  When	  the	  Ottoman	  government	  
accepted	  in	  1907	  the	  designs	  of	  a	  French	  engineer	  for	  the	  Euphrates	  barrage,	  known	  as	  
the	  Hindiyya,	  London	  took	  note.5	  The	  Hindiyya	  barrage	  was	  a	  critical	  component	  of	  
Willcocks’s	  recommendations,	  and	  the	  British	  saw	  the	  engineer’s	  ideas	  as	  a	  potential	  
way	  to	  shore	  up	  British	  influence.	  London	  therefore	  began	  to	  seek	  advantage	  in	  
Mesopotamia	  through	  the	  implementation	  of	  Willcocks’s	  schemes.6	  British	  officials	  
hurried	  to	  capture	  the	  contract	  for	  the	  Hindiyya	  barrage,	  stating	  that	  the	  project	  would	  
be	  “of	  great	  utility	  as	  a	  foundation	  for	  British	  enterprise	  in	  Mesopotamia.”7	  	  
For	  both	  the	  Ottomans	  and	  the	  British,	  the	  strategic	  game	  over	  the	  Baghdad	  
railway	  now	  included	  a	  new	  prize:	  a	  greatly	  expanded	  Mesopotamian	  agriculture.	  The	  
Ottomans	  moved	  quickly	  after	  the	  Young	  Turk	  revolution	  in	  the	  summer	  of	  1908	  to	  
secure	  Willcocks’s	  cooperation	  in	  implementing	  a	  broad	  scheme	  of	  development.	  
Ottoman	  Grand	  Vizier	  Kamil	  Pasha	  invited	  the	  British	  irrigation	  engineer	  to	  Istanbul	  in	  
the	  early	  autumn.	  Willcocks	  accepted	  a	  five-­‐year	  contract	  from	  the	  new	  Ottoman	  
government	  to	  generate	  a	  detailed	  plan	  and	  survey	  to	  restore	  the	  ancient	  irrigation	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  The	  dam	  was	  meant	  to	  correct	  problems	  with	  the	  Hindiyya	  canal,	  completed	  in	  1803,	  
which	  by	  the	  mid-­‐1800s	  had	  become	  the	  main	  channel	  of	  the	  Euphrates	  River.	  See	  
Yitzhak	  Nakash,	  The	  Shi’is	  of	  Iraq	  (Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  1994),	  30-­‐31.	  
6	  Stuart	  A.	  Cohen,	  British	  Policy	  in	  Mesopotamia,	  1903-­‐1914	  (Reading:	  Ithaca	  Press,	  
1976),	  44.	  
7	  O’Conor	  to	  Grey,	  FO	  371/356/41058,	  as	  quoted	  in	  Cohen,	  Mesopotamia,	  45.	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works	  of	  Mesopotamia.8	  	  
Willcocks	  only	  spent	  two-­‐and-­‐a-­‐half	  years	  in	  the	  territory	  that	  would	  later	  
become	  Iraq,	  resigning	  halfway	  through	  his	  contract.	  Conditions	  in	  Mesopotamia	  were	  
difficult.	  The	  Ottoman	  governor,	  Nazim	  Pasha,	  siphoned	  off	  funds	  that	  Willcocks	  
expected	  to	  be	  used	  for	  his	  projects	  to	  support	  other	  parts	  of	  the	  strapped	  Ottoman	  
administration.	  There	  was	  also	  an	  ongoing	  problem	  of	  access	  and	  safety.	  Willcocks’s	  
survey	  involved	  a	  sizable	  staff,	  which	  moved	  ponderously	  across	  a	  country	  that	  was	  
under	  only	  tenuous	  government	  control.	  Willcocks’s	  work	  thus	  moved	  slowly	  and,	  by	  
1911,	  the	  engineer	  gave	  up	  and	  submitted	  a	  program	  of	  works	  that	  included	  detailed	  
plans	  and	  drawings	  only	  for	  a	  project	  on	  the	  Euphrates.	  While	  his	  program	  included	  
several	  projects	  on	  the	  Tigris	  and	  its	  tributaries,	  Willcocks	  complained	  that	  a	  detailed	  
survey	  of	  these	  sites	  could	  not	  be	  conducted	  under	  the	  political	  conditions	  existing	  north	  
of	  Baghdad.9	  
Willcocks’s	  program	  called	  for	  two	  flood	  escapes,	  one	  on	  each	  river,	  both	  of	  
which	  would	  serve	  a	  dual	  function.	  First,	  the	  escapes	  would	  protect	  cities	  and	  valuable	  
agriculture	  from	  the	  annual	  floods.	  Second,	  the	  excess	  flood	  captured	  in	  the	  escape	  
reservoirs	  could	  then	  be	  used	  during	  the	  summer	  months	  to	  increase	  cultivation.	  
Willcocks	  also	  strongly	  supported	  a	  project	  that	  had	  been	  on	  the	  agenda	  of	  nearly	  every	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  William	  Willcocks,	  Sixty	  Years	  in	  the	  East	  (Edinburgh:	  W.	  Blackwood,	  1935),	  232.	  
Mesopotamia	  was	  not	  the	  only	  object	  for	  irrigation	  development	  under	  the	  	  Young	  
Turks.	  Works	  by	  the	  Deutsche	  Bank	  also	  went	  forward	  for	  an	  expansion	  of	  irrigation	  
around	  Adana	  and	  Konya.	  Feroz	  Ahmad,	  “The	  Agrarian	  Policy	  of	  the	  Young	  Turks,	  1908-­‐
1918,”	  From	  Empire	  to	  Republic:	  Essays	  on	  the	  Late	  Ottoman	  Empire	  and	  Modern	  Turkey,	  
vol.	  1	  (Istanbul:	  İstanbul	  Bilgi	  University	  Press,	  2008),	  77.	  
9	  Unlandherm,	  “Sir	  William	  Willcocks,”	  21.	  
	  
	   8	  
Ottoman	  governor	  in	  Baghdad	  for	  sixty	  years:	  the	  construction	  of	  a	  barrage	  at	  Hindiyya	  
in	  order	  to	  rectify	  a	  bifurcation	  in	  the	  Euphrates	  that	  had	  desolated	  prime	  agricultural	  
areas.	  As	  for	  the	  flood	  escapes,	  Willcocks	  identified	  a	  depression	  south	  of	  the	  city	  of	  
Ramadi,	  Habbaniyya,	  which	  could	  serve	  as	  a	  reservoir	  for	  the	  Euphrates.	  As	  Habbaniyya	  
was	  not	  large	  enough	  to	  absorb	  an	  exceptionally	  high	  Euphrates	  flood,	  Willcocks	  
proposed	  an	  additional	  escape	  into	  a	  depression	  further	  south,	  the	  Abu	  Dhibbis.	  On	  the	  
Tigris,	  Willcocks	  meant	  to	  channel	  the	  river’s	  floodwaters	  into	  a	  depression	  known	  as	  
Wadi	  Tharthar,	  some	  thirty	  miles	  southwest	  of	  Samarra.10	  	  
Willcocks’s	  plans	  were	  ambitious	  and	  controversial,	  but	  the	  Committee	  of	  Union	  
and	  Progress	  government	  in	  Istanbul	  had	  emphasized	  public	  works	  and	  moved	  forward	  
with	  his	  plans.	  In	  December	  1913,	  Istanbul	  hired	  the	  British	  firm	  of	  Sir	  J.	  Jackson,	  Ltd.,	  of	  
London,	  to	  start	  construction	  on	  the	  Hindiyya	  barrage	  and	  the	  Habbaniyya	  flood	  escape	  
channel.	  The	  barrage	  was	  completed	  before	  the	  start	  of	  the	  First	  World	  War,	  but	  the	  
channel	  was	  left	  unfinished,	  a	  fact	  that	  nearly	  led	  to	  disaster	  in	  1919	  when	  a	  sizable	  
flood	  on	  the	  Euphrates	  almost	  destroyed	  the	  facility.11	  
After	  the	  First	  World	  War,	  a	  new	  Iraqi	  administration	  staffed	  by	  former	  Ottoman	  
military	  officers	  not	  only	  inherited	  Willcocks’s	  plans	  and	  an	  impressive	  piece	  of	  water	  
infrastructure:	  they	  brought	  with	  them	  firsthand	  knowledge	  of	  Ottoman	  struggles	  to	  
maintain	  and	  achieve	  political	  independence	  and	  economic	  sovereignty.	  Political	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  Sir	  William	  Willcocks,	  Irrigation	  in	  Mesopotamia	  (London:	  E.	  &	  F.	  N.	  Spon,	  1911),	  12-­‐
20.	  
11	  John	  Jackson,	  “Engineering	  Problems	  of	  Mesopotamia	  and	  the	  Euphrates	  Valley,”	  
Empire	  Review	  29	  (1915):	  193-­‐199.	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independence	  for	  Iraq’s	  inhabitants	  was	  a	  far-­‐off	  dream,	  however.	  By	  the	  end	  of	  the	  First	  
World	  War,	  British	  forces	  controlled	  the	  three	  Ottoman	  provinces	  of	  Basra,	  Baghdad	  and	  
Mosul	  that	  in	  large	  part	  now	  constitute	  the	  modern	  state	  of	  Iraq.	  The	  Egyptian	  
Expeditionary	  Force	  under	  the	  command	  of	  General	  Edmund	  Allenby	  defeated	  Ottoman	  
forces	  in	  the	  Levant	  in	  September	  1918	  and	  advanced	  to	  capture	  the	  major	  Syrian	  cities	  
of	  Damascus	  and	  Aleppo	  that	  October.	  	  
By	  December,	  the	  British	  and	  French	  prime	  ministers,	  David	  Lloyd	  George	  and	  
Georges	  Clemenceau,	  had	  agreed	  to	  the	  disposition	  of	  Syria	  and	  Iraq,	  making	  small	  
modifications	  to	  secret	  wartime	  agreements	  undertaken	  by	  diplomats	  Mark	  Sykes	  and	  
François	  Georges-­‐Picot.	  However,	  under	  pressure	  from	  American	  President	  Woodrow	  
Wilson	  and	  a	  significant	  upwelling	  of	  public	  opinion	  against	  outright	  annexation,	  France	  
and	  Britain	  agreed	  to	  govern	  their	  newly	  won	  territories	  as	  “mandates”	  under	  the	  
supervision	  of	  the	  League	  of	  Nations.	  Syria	  and	  Iraq	  were	  designated	  as	  “A”	  mandates,	  a	  
classification	  that	  conferred	  a	  responsibility	  for	  guiding	  the	  two	  countries	  toward	  
independence.12	  	  
While	  this	  arrangement	  served	  the	  interests	  of	  Great	  Powers,	  the	  imposition	  of	  
the	  mandates	  system	  in	  Syria	  and	  Iraq	  led	  to	  uprisings	  in	  both	  countries.	  An	  Arab	  
government	  in	  Damascus	  headed	  by	  the	  leader	  of	  the	  Arab	  Revolt,	  Amir	  Faysal	  ibn	  
Hussein,	  (crowned	  king),	  declared	  the	  independence	  of	  a	  Greater	  Syria	  in	  March	  1920,	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  For	  more	  on	  the	  mandates	  system,	  see	  William	  Roger	  Louis,	  Ends	  of	  British	  
Imperialism:	  The	  Scramble	  for	  Empire,	  Suez	  and	  Decolonization	  (London:	  I.B.	  Tauris,	  
2006),	  251-­‐292.	  See	  also	  Erez	  Manela,	  The	  Wilsonian	  Moment:	  Self-­‐Determination	  and	  
the	  International	  Origins	  of	  Anticolonial	  Nationalism	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  
2007).	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month	  before	  the	  Allies	  met	  in	  San	  Remo	  to	  officially	  allocate	  the	  mandates	  for	  Syria	  and	  
Iraq	  to	  France	  and	  Britain,	  respectively.	  French	  military	  forces	  dispatched	  Faysal’s	  
nascent	  government	  in	  July	  1920	  and	  the	  king	  went	  into	  exile.	  Upon	  assumption	  of	  their	  
mandate	  in	  Syria,	  the	  French	  promptly	  adopted	  a	  policy	  of	  political	  fragmentation,	  
dividing	  the	  country	  into	  semi-­‐autonomous	  political	  units.13	  
The	  rebellion	  in	  Iraq	  was	  more	  difficult	  to	  control.	  British	  forces	  spent	  several	  
months	  quelling	  an	  uprising	  among	  the	  tribes	  of	  the	  Euphrates;	  the	  struggle	  cost	  
thousands	  of	  lives	  and	  millions	  of	  British	  pounds.	  The	  revolt	  also	  initiated	  a	  re-­‐
evaluation	  of	  British	  policy	  and	  strategy	  in	  Iraq.	  British	  officials	  decided	  to	  establish	  a	  
constitutional	  monarchy	  in	  Iraq.	  They	  created	  a	  parliament	  in	  Baghdad	  and	  wooed	  the	  
erstwhile	  King	  of	  Syria,	  Faysal	  ibn	  Hussein,	  installing	  him	  as	  the	  new	  King	  of	  Iraq.14	  	  
Meanwhile,	  in	  the	  Anatolian	  heartland	  of	  the	  former	  Ottoman	  Empire,	  military	  
action	  continued	  unabated.	  Though	  the	  Ottoman	  Sultan	  Mehmet	  VI	  Vahideddin	  had	  
accepted	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  Treaty	  of	  Sèvres,	  experienced	  Ottoman	  field	  commanders	  
including	  Mustafa	  Kemal	  were	  already	  moving	  to	  organize	  resistance	  to	  the	  treaty.	  The	  
landing	  of	  a	  Greek	  force,	  assisted	  by	  Allied	  naval	  power,	  at	  Izmir	  in	  May	  1919	  catalyzed	  
Mustafa	  Kemal’s	  nascent	  national	  movement.	  In	  April	  1920,	  an	  assembly	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  For	  more	  on	  this	  period	  of	  Syrian	  history,	  see	  Philip	  S.	  Khoury,	  Syria	  and	  the	  French	  
Mandate:	  The	  Politics	  of	  Arab	  Nationalism	  (Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  1987);	  
James	  Gelvin,	  Divided	  Loyalties:	  Nationalism	  and	  Mass	  Politics	  in	  Syria	  at	  the	  Close	  of	  
Empire	  (Berkeley:	  University	  of	  California	  Press,	  1998);	  and	  Albert	  Hourani,	  Syria	  and	  
Lebanon:	  A	  Political	  Essay	  (London:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1946).	  
14	  For	  more	  on	  Iraq,	  see	  Peter	  Sluglett,	  Britain	  in	  Iraq:	  Contriving	  King	  and	  Country	  (New	  
York:	  Columbia	  University	  Press,	  2007);	  Charles	  Tripp,	  A	  History	  of	  Iraq	  (Cambridge:	  
Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2000);	  and	  Ghassan	  Attiyah,	  Iraq	  1908-­‐1921:	  A	  Socio-­‐
Political	  Study	  (Beirut:	  Arab	  Institute	  for	  Research	  and	  Publication,	  1973).	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representatives	  in	  Ankara	  named	  Mustafa	  Kemal	  president	  and	  in	  autumn	  1920,	  Turkey	  
and	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  invaded	  the	  Armenian	  state	  created	  by	  the	  Treaty	  of	  Sèvres	  and	  
divided	  it	  between	  them.	  In	  1921,	  France	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  recognized	  Mustafa	  
Kemal’s	  assembly	  as	  the	  legitimate	  government,	  and	  the	  following	  year	  Turkish	  armed	  
forces	  succeeded	  in	  routing	  Greek	  forces	  in	  Anatolia.	  Negotiations	  beginning	  in	  1922	  
avoided	  military	  confrontation	  over	  Istanbul	  and	  the	  two	  straits	  connecting	  the	  Black	  
Sea	  to	  the	  Aegean.	  The	  negotiations	  recognized	  Turkish	  sovereignty	  over	  most	  of	  the	  
areas	  demanded	  by	  Ankara,	  with	  the	  exception	  of	  Mosul	  in	  northern	  Iraq.	  With	  the	  
signing	  of	  the	  Treaty	  of	  Lausanne	  in	  1923,	  Mustafa	  Kemal	  became	  the	  first	  president	  of	  a	  
Turkey	  that	  was	  depopulated,	  wrecked	  by	  war,	  and	  facing	  serious	  resistance	  in	  eastern	  
Anatolia	  from	  its	  Kurdish	  citizens.15	  	  
As	  a	  result	  of	  post-­‐war	  conflict,	  Iraq,	  Syria,	  and	  Turkey	  emerged	  after	  the	  First	  
World	  War	  with	  weak,	  impoverished	  and	  contested	  governments.	  In	  Syria,	  a	  succession	  
of	  French	  orders	  made	  and	  unmade	  local	  councils,	  and	  shuffled	  the	  newly	  created	  
“states”	  into	  and	  out	  of	  various	  federations.	  In	  Iraq,	  the	  government	  in	  Baghdad	  
struggled	  against	  its	  British	  overseers	  for	  some	  measure	  of	  independence	  even	  as	  its	  
existence	  depended	  on	  British	  power.	  Turkey,	  the	  only	  state	  to	  successfully	  overturn	  the	  
treaty	  imposed	  upon	  it,	  grappled	  with	  four	  hundred	  thousand	  Turkish	  migrants	  forced	  
from	  Greece	  and	  a	  Kurdish	  insurgency	  in	  eastern	  Anatolia.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  For	  more	  on	  Turkey	  during	  this	  period,	  see	  Feroz	  Ahmad,	  The	  Making	  of	  Modern	  
Turkey	  (London:	  Routledge,	  1993);	  Erik	  J.	  Zürcher,	  Turkey:	  A	  Modern	  History	  (London:	  
I.B.	  Tauris,	  1993).	  For	  more	  on	  Mustafa	  Kemal	  Atatürk,	  see	  Andrew	  Mango,	  Atatürk:	  The	  
Biography	  of	  the	  Founder	  of	  Modern	  Turkey	  (Woodstock:	  Overlook	  Press,	  2000)	  and	  M.	  
Şükrü	  Hanioğlu,	  Atatürk:	  An	  Intellectual	  Biography	  (Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  
Press,	  2011).	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As	  full	  command	  of	  many	  state	  functions	  was	  notional	  or	  insecure	  after	  the	  war,	  
full	  command	  of	  the	  environment	  was	  generally	  imagined	  as	  a	  future	  goal.	  Emerging	  
from	  the	  turmoil	  of	  nearly	  four	  additional	  years	  of	  war,	  Turkey	  was	  unable	  to	  marshal	  
the	  resources	  necessary	  to	  implement	  the	  massive	  modern	  works	  necessary	  to	  achieve	  
centralized	  control	  over	  the	  two	  rivers.	  Syria	  and	  Iraq’s	  mandatory	  overlords	  were	  
reluctant	  to	  make	  significant	  investments	  on	  the	  rivers.	  I	  argue	  that,	  as	  a	  result,	  these	  
states	  were	  compelled	  during	  their	  first	  half-­‐century	  of	  existence	  to	  find	  other	  
administrative	  and	  institutional	  means	  to	  politically	  manage,	  rather	  than	  physically	  
manage,	  the	  changing	  environment	  of	  the	  basin.	  Though	  some	  small	  infrastructure	  
projects	  were	  completed,	  political	  leaders	  in	  each	  country	  adjusted	  the	  administrative	  or	  
legal	  apparatus	  of	  the	  state	  to	  manage	  political	  and	  economic	  threats	  emanating	  from	  
environmental	  change	  and	  to	  capitalize	  on	  such	  gains	  as	  might	  occur	  when	  nature	  
cooperated	  with	  state	  goals.	  Governments	  in	  Ankara,	  Damascus	  and	  Baghdad	  
formulated	  new	  land	  and	  water	  policies,	  transferred	  public	  rights	  to	  private	  and	  vice-­‐
versa,	  and	  created	  and	  modified	  institutional	  structures	  and	  financing	  to	  advance	  
specific	  political	  aims	  and,	  most	  importantly	  for	  Middle	  Eastern	  states	  at	  this	  time,	  to	  
protect	  and	  enhance	  their	  legitimacy.	  The	  first	  two	  chapters	  of	  this	  dissertation	  detail	  
these	  administrative	  and	  legal	  methods.	  	  
The	  administrative	  management	  of	  the	  environment	  during	  the	  interwar	  period	  
affected	  later	  developments	  with	  respect	  to	  both	  the	  state	  and	  the	  environment,	  
influencing	  the	  character	  of	  state	  institutions	  and	  the	  political	  context	  of	  water	  
engineering	  works	  after	  1945.	  After	  the	  Second	  World	  War,	  all	  three	  states	  obtained	  the	  
financial	  and	  technological	  means,	  often	  from	  foreign	  powers,	  to	  construct	  large	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engineering	  works	  to	  control	  the	  rivers.	  The	  interwar	  management	  of	  water	  still	  
retained	  an	  influence,	  shaping	  perceptions	  regarding	  the	  political,	  social	  and	  economic	  
costs	  and	  benefits	  of	  centralized	  control	  over	  water.	  The	  processes	  involved	  in	  securing	  
financing	  and	  expertise	  from	  outside	  powers—without	  sacrificing	  too	  much	  in	  terms	  of	  
political	  independence—are	  the	  focus	  of	  the	  final	  three	  chapters.	  
	  
Water	  Management	  and	  Legitimacy	  in	  the	  Tigris-­‐Euphrates	  Basin	  
Environmental	  histories	  considering	  water	  management	  in	  other	  parts	  of	  the	  
world—such	  as	  the	  American	  West,	  Egypt	  and	  India—in	  the	  nineteenth	  and	  twentieth	  
centuries	  discuss	  the	  development	  of	  water	  management	  within	  relatively	  strong	  and	  
secure	  states.	  Powerful	  bureaucracies	  were	  involved	  in	  the	  creation	  of	  modern	  hydraulic	  
landscapes	  in	  the	  Punjab,	  in	  California,	  and	  along	  the	  Nile.	  Historians	  have	  ascribed	  
different	  motives	  to	  the	  production	  of	  these	  landscapes.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Donald	  Worster	  
and	  the	  American	  West,	  the	  primary	  motive	  was	  the	  extension	  of	  modern	  capitalism.	  For	  
David	  Gilmartin	  and	  Terje	  Tvedt,	  the	  irrigation	  canals	  of	  India	  and	  hydrological	  stations	  
along	  the	  Nile	  represented	  British	  attempts	  to	  assert	  control	  over	  greater	  swathes	  of	  
territory.16	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  Donald	  Worster,	  Rivers	  of	  Empire:	  Water,	  Aridity	  and	  the	  Growth	  of	  the	  American	  West	  
(New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1985),	  48-­‐60;	  David	  Gilmartin,	  "Imperial	  Rivers:	  
Irrigation	  and	  British	  Visions	  of	  Empire,"	  in	  Dane	  Kennedy	  and	  Durba	  Ghosh,	  eds.,	  
Decentring	  Empire:	  Britain,	  India	  and	  the	  Transcolonial	  World	  (New	  Delhi:	  Orient	  
Longman,	  2006),	  76-­‐103;	  and	  “Models	  of	  the	  Hydraulic	  Environment:	  Colonial	  Irrigation,	  
State	  Power	  and	  Community	  in	  the	  Indus	  Basin,"	  in	  David	  Arnold	  and	  Ram	  Guha,	  eds.,	  
Nature,	  Culture	  and	  Imperialism:	  Essays	  on	  the	  Environmental	  History	  of	  South	  Asia	  
(Delhi:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1995),	  210-­‐236;	  Terje	  Tvedt,	  The	  River	  Nile	  in	  the	  Age	  of	  
the	  British:	  Political	  Ecology	  and	  the	  Quest	  for	  Economic	  Power	  (London:	  I.B.	  Tauris,	  
2004),	  19-­‐53.	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While	  economic	  ambitions	  and	  a	  desire	  to	  exert	  control	  over	  territory	  were	  
certainly	  at	  work	  in	  the	  Tigris-­‐Euphrates	  basin,	  I	  argue	  that	  these	  concerns	  were	  always	  
secondary	  to	  a	  more	  important	  underlying	  pursuit:	  political	  legitimacy.	  The	  connection	  
between	  political	  legitimacy	  and	  water	  management	  was,	  and	  had	  been	  for	  centuries,	  of	  
particular	  importance	  in	  the	  arid	  and	  semi-­‐arid	  regions	  of	  Mesopotamia,	  where	  the	  
political	  standing	  of	  any	  leader—whether	  local	  sheikh	  or	  constitutional	  monarch—
depended	  on	  the	  control	  and	  supply	  of	  water	  and	  land	  for	  agriculture	  and	  other	  
economic	  uses.17	  With	  the	  advent	  of	  the	  Ottoman	  tanzimat	  reforms,	  the	  control	  of	  
resources	  took	  on	  an	  additional	  meaning,	  as	  the	  reform	  movement	  saw	  economic	  
development	  as	  the	  key	  to	  resisting	  European	  power.	  	  
In	  this	  way,	  the	  impetus	  for	  controlling	  the	  two	  rivers	  better	  resembled	  water	  
management	  on	  the	  Arabian	  Peninsula.	  Toby	  Craig	  Jones’s	  assertion	  that	  the	  Saudis’	  
“pursuit	  of	  freshwater…was,	  foremost,	  a	  political	  enterprise,	  one	  that	  served	  to	  secure	  
political	  authority,”	  captures	  to	  a	  certain	  extent	  the	  dynamic	  at	  work	  along	  the	  Tigris	  and	  
Euphrates.18	  Still,	  there	  are	  key	  differences	  between	  the	  two	  cases.	  First,	  the	  
environmental	  and	  technical	  quandary	  facing	  governments	  in	  Turkey,	  Iraq	  and	  Syria	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17	  This	  is	  particularly	  apparent	  in	  Robert	  Fernea’s	  anthropological	  study	  of	  a	  tribe	  in	  
southern	  Iraq.	  Water	  was	  a	  key	  input	  in	  the	  social	  and	  political	  relations.	  Robert	  Fernea,	  
Shaykh	  and	  Effendi:	  Changing	  Patterns	  of	  Local	  Authority	  Among	  the	  El	  Shabana	  in	  
Southern	  Iraq	  (Cambridge:	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  1970),	  118-­‐149.	  Yitzhak	  Nakash’s	  
description	  of	  efforts	  to	  supply	  the	  Shi’i	  holy	  cities	  of	  Karbala	  and	  Najaf	  is	  rife	  with	  
political	  overtones.	  See	  Nakash,	  Shi’is	  of	  Iraq,	  18-­‐43.	  During	  the	  nineteenth	  century,	  as	  a	  
part	  of	  the	  tanzimat	  reforms,	  the	  Ottoman	  state	  began	  taking	  over	  functions	  from	  
religious	  endowments	  (evkaf)	  whereupon	  public	  infrastructure	  became	  a	  significant	  
concern	  of	  the	  provincial	  governors	  in	  Baghdad.	  See	  Ceylan,	  Ottoman	  Origins,	  175-­‐176.	  
18	  Toby	  Craig	  Jones,	  Desert	  Kingdom:	  How	  Oil	  and	  Water	  Forged	  Modern	  Saudi	  Arabia	  
(Cambridge:	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  2010),	  5.	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was	  not	  the	  lack	  of	  water	  and	  the	  technological	  problem	  of	  finding	  and	  harnessing	  it.	  The	  
problem	  was	  in	  fact	  the	  opposite.	  There	  was	  often	  too	  much	  water,	  and	  the	  question	  was	  
how	  to	  control	  two	  powerful	  rivers	  and	  for	  what	  ends.	  Moreover,	  though	  coping	  with	  the	  
kinds	  of	  infringements	  characteristic	  of	  weak,	  independent	  states,	  Saudi	  Arabia	  was	  
never	  occupied	  by	  a	  foreign	  power	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  Syria	  and	  Iraq.	  The	  colonial	  
experience	  colored	  the	  political	  arrangements	  and	  meanings	  associated	  with	  water	  
management	  in	  both	  states.	  	  
As	  a	  result	  of	  the	  longstanding	  connection	  between	  political	  legitimacy	  and	  water	  
management	  in	  the	  Middle	  East,	  early	  choices	  about	  the	  best	  way	  to	  manage	  the	  
environment	  affected	  the	  political	  development	  of	  Turkey,	  Iraq	  and	  Syria.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  
Turkey,	  the	  central	  government’s	  emphasis	  on	  the	  autarkic	  development	  of	  the	  country’s	  
resources,	  a	  mode	  inherited	  from	  the	  Young	  Turk	  regime	  of	  the	  late	  Ottoman	  Empire,	  led	  
to	  several	  institutional	  changes	  and	  investments	  that	  eventually	  produced	  an	  indigenous	  
class	  of	  well-­‐trained	  engineers.	  These	  engineers	  over	  time	  rose	  to	  prominent	  positions	  
in	  the	  bureaucracy	  and	  then	  to	  the	  highest	  rungs	  of	  political	  power.	  Syria	  and	  Iraq,	  on	  
the	  other	  hand,	  dominated	  as	  they	  were	  by	  British	  and	  French	  commissioners	  and	  
advisers,	  relied	  more	  heavily	  on	  foreign	  funding	  and	  expertise.	  The	  pervasiveness	  of	  
foreign	  control	  and	  influence	  in	  Iraq	  was	  a	  major	  factor	  in	  the	  revolution	  of	  1958,	  in	  
which	  military	  officers	  overthrew	  the	  British-­‐backed	  monarchy	  and	  government,	  seizing	  
economic	  and	  political	  control.	  
	  
Dams	  and	  Development	  After	  the	  Second	  World	  War	  
The	  other	  literature	  this	  dissertation	  engages	  is	  that	  of	  dams	  and	  development.	  Of	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the	  “forty	  five	  thousand	  large	  dams”	  that	  were	  built	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century,	  
the	  “overwhelming	  majority	  of	  these,	  around	  forty	  thousand,	  were	  constructed	  after	  
1945.”19	  As	  a	  result,	  virtually	  all	  of	  the	  studies	  about	  the	  explosion	  in	  dam	  building	  in	  
developing	  countries	  begin	  with	  the	  era	  after	  the	  Second	  World	  War.	  Some	  refer	  to	  the	  
interwar	  era,	  but	  only	  to	  demonstrate	  how	  developing	  nations	  borrowed	  models	  from	  
the	  more	  developed	  countries,	  particularly	  the	  example	  of	  the	  Tennessee	  Valley	  
Authority	  in	  the	  United	  States.20	  Indeed,	  there	  are	  important	  new	  developments	  
occurring	  after	  1945	  as	  these	  studies	  illustrate.	  The	  process	  of	  decolonization,	  
intensifying	  economic	  integration,	  and	  the	  advent	  of	  international	  development	  aid	  and	  
economic	  assistance	  programs	  are	  indicative	  of	  the	  new	  historical	  trajectories	  of	  the	  
post-­‐1945	  world.	  But	  the	  overwhelming	  predilection	  to	  trace	  these	  projects	  from	  1945,	  
or	  to	  seek	  their	  roots	  in	  other	  parts	  of	  the	  world,	  has	  obscured	  the	  influence	  of	  earlier	  
eras	  and	  the	  complexity	  of	  indigenous	  influences	  and	  impetuses.	  
Connections	  across	  not	  one	  but	  two	  wars	  have	  been	  important	  in	  shaping	  the	  
political,	  social	  and	  economic	  dimension	  of	  post-­‐1945	  engineering	  works	  in	  the	  Tigris-­‐
Euphrates	  basin.	  As	  noted	  above,	  William	  Willcocks	  generated	  modern	  plans	  for	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  Klingensmith,	  One	  Valley,	  1.	  
20	  These	  studies	  include	  Daniel	  Klingensmith,	  ‘One	  Valley	  and	  a	  Thousand’	  :	  Dams,	  
Nationalism	  and	  Development	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2007);	  Allen	  F.	  Isaacman	  
and	  Barbara	  S.	  Isaacman,	  Dams,	  Displacement,	  and	  the	  Delusion	  of	  Development:	  Cahora	  
Bassa	  and	  Its	  Legacies	  in	  Mozambique,	  1965-­‐2007	  (Athens:	  Ohio	  University	  Press,	  2013);	  
Sanjeev	  Khagram,	  Dams	  and	  Development:	  Transnational	  Struggles	  for	  Water	  and	  Power	  
(Ithaca:	  Cornell	  University	  Press,	  2004);	  Hussein	  M.	  Fahim,	  Dams,	  People	  and	  
Development:	  The	  Aswan	  High	  Dam	  Case	  (New	  York:	  Pergamon	  Press,	  1981);	  Judith	  
Shapiro,	  Mao’s	  War	  Against	  Nature:	  Politics	  and	  the	  Environment	  in	  Revolutionary	  China	  
(Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2001).	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irrigation	  and	  flood	  control	  in	  the	  region	  around	  Baghdad	  prior	  to	  the	  First	  World	  War.	  
After	  1945,	  the	  British	  sought	  to	  reintroduce	  William	  Willcocks’s	  schemes.	  However,	  
these	  discussions	  about	  the	  two	  rivers	  occurred	  within	  the	  context	  of	  dissension	  over	  
Britain’s	  role	  in	  the	  country.	  When	  Iraqi	  military	  officers	  in	  1958	  upset	  British	  efforts	  to	  
shape	  Iraq’s	  trajectory	  through	  development	  projects,	  the	  British	  then	  sought	  to	  frame	  
Iraqi	  development	  as	  a	  failure.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  British	  sought	  to	  blame	  the	  removal	  
of	  Iraq’s	  regime	  on	  the	  country’s	  failure	  to	  develop	  according	  to	  British	  parameters,	  
rather	  than	  attributing	  the	  regime’s	  demise	  to	  their	  own	  increasingly	  untenable	  position	  
in	  the	  Middle	  East.	  This	  framing	  of	  Iraq’s	  development	  was	  in	  fact	  not	  a	  new	  tactic	  on	  the	  
part	  of	  the	  British,	  having	  been	  an	  important	  part	  of	  the	  campaign	  to	  convince	  the	  
League	  of	  Nations	  to	  grant	  Iraq	  a	  nominal	  independence	  during	  the	  period	  between	  the	  
wars.	  
For	  Turkey,	  there	  is	  in	  fact	  a	  two-­‐fold	  problem.	  Two	  of	  the	  texts	  most	  illustrative	  
of	  the	  connections	  across	  world	  wars—Erik	  Zürcher’s	  The	  Young	  Turk	  Legacy	  and	  Uğur	  
Ümit	  Üngör’s	  The	  Making	  of	  Modern	  Turkey—essentially	  end	  their	  analysis	  before	  1950.	  
Meanwhile,	  the	  texts	  contending	  with	  Turkey’s	  dams	  on	  the	  Euphrates	  and	  the	  origins	  of	  
the	  Southeast	  Anatolia	  Project	  generally	  begin	  in	  the	  1960s.21	  There	  is	  therefore	  a	  gap	  to	  
be	  bridged	  in	  thinking	  about	  the	  relationship	  between	  Ottoman	  visions	  for	  Mesopotamia	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21	  A	  wrangle	  over	  the	  progenitor	  of	  the	  original	  idea	  and	  reach	  back	  to	  the	  1930s	  but	  few	  
consider	  the	  long-­‐term	  ideological	  ramifications.	  The	  Southeast	  Anatolia	  Project	  is	  a	  
vast,	  planned	  development	  program	  on	  the	  Tigris	  and	  Euphrates	  Rivers	  that	  relies	  on	  
the	  construction	  of	  fifteen	  major	  dams.	  Many	  of	  the	  dams	  on	  the	  Euphrates	  are	  already	  
operational,	  while	  several	  on	  the	  Tigris,	  including	  the	  Ilısu,	  are	  quite	  controversial	  and	  
still	  under	  construction.	  For	  more,	  see	  John	  F.	  Kolars	  and	  William	  A.	  Mitchell,	  The	  
Euphrates	  River	  and	  the	  Southeast	  Anatolia	  Development	  Project	  (Carbondale:	  Southern	  
Illinois	  University	  Press,	  1991),	  18-­‐45.	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prior	  to	  the	  First	  World	  War	  and	  the	  Turkish	  Republic’s	  version	  after.	  To	  what	  extent	  is	  
it	  possible	  to	  see	  the	  Willcocks	  project	  and	  the	  Southeast	  Anatolia	  project	  as	  the	  same	  
venture,	  somewhat	  geographically	  and	  temporally	  removed?	  An	  affirmative	  answer	  
suggests	  that	  one	  need	  not	  seek	  the	  origins	  of	  the	  Southeast	  Anatolia	  Project	  in	  
America’s	  Boulder	  Dam	  or	  Tennessee	  Valley	  Authority.	  Nor	  is	  the	  “dams	  as	  aid”	  mantra	  
of	  the	  post-­‐1945	  period	  sufficient	  explanation.	  
Considering	  these	  two	  plans	  for	  developing	  the	  rivers	  as	  linked	  connects	  the	  
problems	  (and	  supposed	  solutions)	  of	  the	  late	  Ottoman	  Empire	  to	  the	  issues	  faced	  by	  
Turkey	  in	  the	  post-­‐Second	  World	  War	  era.	  Such	  a	  link	  reinforces	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  
Ottoman	  doctrine	  of	  economic	  sovereignty	  continued	  to	  play	  a	  role	  in	  Turkish	  thinking	  
about	  development	  projects.	  Moreover,	  with	  the	  advent	  of	  the	  Cold	  War,	  it	  was	  clear	  to	  
Turkish	  leaders	  that	  full	  independence	  could	  not	  be	  achieved	  solely	  through	  statehood	  
and	  membership	  in	  the	  United	  Nations.	  Along	  with	  other	  important	  measures,	  water	  
development	  projects—even	  those	  built	  with	  the	  assistance	  of	  foreign	  powers—were	  
viewed	  as	  important	  to	  economic	  self-­‐determination	  and	  territorial	  integrity.	  The	  
resonance	  of	  such	  claims	  may	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  ways	  these	  projects	  were	  justified	  to	  and	  
received	  by	  Turkish	  society.	  
	  
The	  Tigris-­‐Euphrates	  Basin	  and	  Geopolitics	  
Overlapping	  somewhat	  with	  the	  “dam”	  literature	  are	  the	  extant	  studies	  of	  the	  
Tigris-­‐Euphrates	  basin	  during	  the	  twentieth	  century.	  The	  current	  literature	  about	  the	  
basin	  may	  be	  divided	  into	  two	  realms.	  	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  there	  are	  the	  texts	  that	  present	  
“hyperbolic	  claims	  about	  past,	  present	  and	  coming	  ‘water	  wars’”.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	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there	  are	  studies	  that	  may	  be	  conceived	  as	  “liberal-­‐technical”	  in	  their	  discourse.22	  The	  
“water	  wars”	  texts	  about	  the	  Tigris-­‐Euphrates	  basin	  generally	  emanate	  from	  the	  fields	  of	  
international	  relations	  or	  strategic	  studies.	  Studies	  of	  this	  nature	  usually	  begin	  by	  noting	  
that	  an	  arid	  climate	  encompasses	  roughly	  eighty	  percent	  of	  the	  land	  area	  of	  the	  Middle	  
East	  and	  the	  region	  includes	  some	  of	  the	  most	  water-­‐stressed	  countries	  in	  the	  world.	  
The	  region	  faces	  a	  host	  of	  threats	  to	  its	  meager	  water	  supplies:	  population	  pressures,	  
climate	  change,	  urbanization,	  pollution,	  and	  salinization.	  The	  great	  modern	  water	  
projects	  built	  on	  the	  rivers,	  though	  meant	  to	  respond	  to	  such	  pressures,	  often	  spawned	  
interstate	  political	  and	  military	  conflict.	  Studies	  in	  this	  category	  generally	  view	  water	  
problems	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  as	  a	  “crisis”	  with	  manifold	  geopolitical	  consequences	  for	  
peace	  in	  the	  region.23	  
The	  second	  category	  of	  “liberal-­‐technical”	  studies	  in	  Jan	  Selby’s	  very	  useful	  
categorization	  pertains	  to	  studies	  that	  see	  water	  scarcity	  as	  a	  result	  of:	  
Technological,	  economic	  and	  institutional	  inefficiencies;	  these,	  for	  most	  
international	  finance	  and	  development	  organisations,	  and	  international	  
water	  experts,	  are	  the	  essential	  causes	  of	  water	  problems.	  And	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22	  Jan	  Selby,	  “The	  Geopolitics	  of	  Water	  in	  the	  Middle	  East:	  Fantasies	  and	  Realities,”	  Third	  
World	  Quarterly	  26	  (2005):	  329-­‐333.	  
23	  Studies	  in	  this	  category	  include	  John	  Bulloch	  and	  Adel	  Darwish,	  Water	  Wars:	  Coming	  
Conflicts	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  (London:	  Victor	  Gallancz,	  1993);	  Andrew	  Langer,	  “Hydro	  
Wars	  The	  Struggle	  for	  Water	  and	  Survival	  in	  the	  Euphrates-­‐Tigris	  River	  Basin,”	  Journal	  
of	  Politics	  and	  Society	  (2009):	  1-­‐19.	  Frederick	  M.	  Lorenz	  and	  Edward	  J.	  Erickson,	  The	  
Euphrates	  Triangle:	  Security	  Implications	  of	  the	  Southeastern	  Anatolia	  Project	  
(Washington,	  DC:	  National	  Defense	  University	  Press,	  1999).	  Lorenz	  and	  Erickson	  begin	  
their	  report	  by	  quoting	  R.	  Z.	  Chesnoff’s	  November	  21,	  1988	  article	  in	  U.S.	  News	  &	  World	  
Report	  which	  painted	  this	  frightening	  scenario,	  expected	  to	  occur	  in	  1993:	  “War	  erupted	  
throughout	  the	  Middle	  East	  today	  in	  a	  desperate	  struggle	  for	  dwindling	  water	  supplies.	  
Iraqi	  forces,	  attempting	  to	  smash	  a	  Syrian	  blockade,	  launched	  massive	  attacks	  on	  the	  
Euphrates	  River	  valley.	  Syria	  answered	  with	  missile	  attacks	  on	  Baghdad.”	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solutions,	  or	  at	  least	  the	  necessary	  responses,	  follow	  directly	  from	  them:	  
to	  turn	  these	  inefficiencies	  into	  efficiencies—usually,	  it	  must	  be	  said,	  by	  
doing	  what	  is	  recommended	  by	  neoliberal	  experts	  and	  institutions.24	  
In	  terms	  of	  the	  Tigris	  and	  Euphrates	  Rivers,	  studies	  of	  the	  basin	  and	  its	  politics	  in	  this	  
category	  generally	  emanate	  from	  the	  fields	  of	  hydrology	  or	  environmental	  studies.	  
These	  texts	  recommend	  a	  raft	  of	  new	  measures,	  including	  better	  infrastructure,	  more	  
technology,	  enhanced	  technical	  cooperation,	  holistic	  and	  integrated	  planning,	  new	  legal	  
mechanisms,	  et	  cetera.	  They	  often	  also	  make	  a	  request	  of	  Middle	  Easterners:	  the	  history	  
of	  conflict	  over	  the	  rivers	  must	  be	  overcome.	  The	  recommended	  method	  is	  to	  just	  forget	  
about	  it.	  One	  author	  asserts,	  “It	  is	  necessary	  to	  forget	  past	  history	  and	  cultural	  
differences	  and,	  Arab	  and	  Turk	  alike,	  strive	  for	  rational	  management…in	  an	  overarching	  
regional	  peace.”25	  Another	  writes,	  “Rather	  than	  remain	  imprisoned	  by	  the	  past,	  the	  
people	  of	  the	  region	  need	  to	  set	  their	  sights	  on	  a	  more	  promising	  future.”26	  The	  answer	  
to	  water	  problems	  in	  the	  basin	  is	  additional	  infrastructure	  and	  a	  forgotten	  history.	  
As	  scholars	  in	  several	  social	  science	  disciplines	  have	  shown,	  none	  of	  the	  political	  
or	  technological	  measures	  advocated	  by	  these	  studies	  are	  in	  fact	  without	  a	  historical	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24	  Jan	  Selby,	  “Geopolitics,”	  332-­‐333.	  
25	  John	  Kolars,	  “Problems	  of	  International	  River	  Management:	  The	  Case	  of	  the	  
Euphrates,”	  in	  International	  Waters	  of	  the	  Middle	  East,	  ed.	  Asit	  K.	  Biswas	  (London:	  
Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1994),	  91.	  
26	  Daniel	  Hillel,	  Rivers	  of	  Eden:	  The	  Struggle	  for	  Water	  and	  the	  Quest	  for	  Peace	  in	  the	  
Middle	  East	  (London:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1994),	  18-­‐19.	  Other	  studies	  of	  the	  
“liberal-­‐technical”	  bent	  include	  Peter	  H.	  Gleick,	  “Reducing	  the	  Risks	  of	  Conflict	  over	  
Fresh	  Water	  Resources	  in	  the	  Middle	  East,”	  in	  Water	  and	  Peace	  in	  the	  Middle	  East,	  eds.	  
Jad	  Isaac	  and	  Hillel	  Shuval	  (Amsterdam:	  Elsevier,	  1994);	  World	  Bank,	  From	  Scarcity	  to	  
Security:	  Averting	  a	  Water	  Crisis	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  North	  Africa	  (Washington,	  DC:	  
World	  Bank,	  1995).	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context.27	  This	  dissertation	  demonstrates	  that	  basic	  technologies,	  such	  as	  the	  diesel	  
irrigation	  pump,	  are	  embedded	  in	  a	  network	  of	  social,	  political	  and	  economic	  relations.	  
My	  research	  also	  goes	  one	  step	  further	  to	  show	  the	  amalgamation	  of	  pump	  and	  river	  in	  
shaping	  history.	  
To	  be	  fair,	  these	  studies	  seek	  ways	  to	  avoid	  future	  conflict	  over	  water.	  But	  I	  
would	  argue	  that	  they	  lead	  us	  down	  the	  wrong	  path,	  into	  thinking	  that	  water	  may	  
somehow	  be	  depoliticized	  or	  dehistoricized.28	  Such	  an	  attitude	  is	  not	  a	  sensible	  way	  to	  
defuse	  conflict.	  I	  advocate	  a	  different	  approach,	  that	  of	  uncovering	  the	  deeper	  history	  of	  
these	  projects	  and	  tracing	  the	  interaction	  between	  human	  and	  nonhuman	  in	  order	  to	  
understand	  how	  water	  management	  became	  linked	  to	  a	  broad	  range	  of	  political	  
objectives.	  This	  dissertation	  demonstrates	  how	  water	  has	  become	  involved	  in	  both	  
building	  and	  demolishing	  regimes,	  supporting	  and	  undermining	  political	  legitimacy,	  and	  
empowering	  and	  disempowering	  social	  groups.	  Rather	  than	  suggesting	  that	  technology,	  
infrastructure	  and	  legal	  norms	  can	  remove	  water	  from	  politics,	  I	  instead	  argue	  that	  the	  
environmental	  history	  of	  water	  management	  in	  the	  Tigris-­‐Euphrates	  basin	  may	  help	  us	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27	  Much	  of	  this	  work	  is	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  science	  and	  technology	  studies,	  sociology,	  
anthropology	  and	  the	  history	  of	  science.	  See	  for	  instance	  the	  work	  of	  Bruno	  Latour,	  in	  
particular,	  The	  Pasteurization	  of	  France	  (Cambridge:	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  1993);	  
and	  Science	  in	  Action:	  How	  to	  Follow	  Scientists	  and	  Engineers	  through	  Society	  
(Cambridge:	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  1987);	  Rudolf	  Mrázek,	  Engineers	  of	  Happy	  Land:	  
Technology	  and	  Nationalism	  in	  a	  Colony	  (Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  2002);	  
Michael	  Adas,	  Machines	  as	  the	  Measure	  of	  Men:	  Science,	  Technology,	  and	  Ideologies	  of	  
Western	  Dominance	  (Ithaca:	  Cornell	  University	  Press,	  1989).	  
28	  Even	  Jan	  Selby,	  who	  does	  such	  a	  fine	  job	  of	  characterizing	  these	  “water	  crisis”	  studies,	  
suggests	  that	  the	  history	  of	  water	  management	  has	  little	  political	  or	  historical	  
significance	  at	  an	  international	  level.	  I	  will	  spend	  more	  time	  with	  that	  argument	  in	  this	  
dissertation’s	  conclusion.	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better	  understand,	  and	  potentially	  redirect,	  the	  historical	  forces	  involved	  in	  trajectories	  
of	  crisis	  and	  conflict.	  
	  
Sources	  and	  Fieldwork	  
With	  the	  goal	  of	  melding	  both	  environmental	  and	  political	  analysis	  of	  the	  Tigris-­‐
Euphrates	  basin	  in	  the	  twentieth	  century,	  I	  assembled	  a	  broad	  range	  of	  source	  material.	  
An	  inventive	  and	  eclectic	  approach	  was	  required	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  both	  Iraq	  and	  Syria	  
were	  off-­‐limits	  to	  extensive	  archival	  research	  because	  of	  political	  unrest	  and	  civil	  war.	  In	  
terms	  of	  unpublished	  material,	  this	  history	  relies	  on	  records	  from	  government	  archives	  
in	  Britain,	  France,	  India,	  Turkey,	  and	  the	  United	  States.	  For	  Syria	  and	  Iraq,	  these	  
records—which	  include	  a	  broad	  range	  of	  material	  including	  maps,	  reports,	  
communiqués	  between	  governments,	  and	  official	  reports—provide	  considerable	  insight	  
into	  the	  environmental	  management	  practices	  of	  mandatory	  powers	  and	  subject	  
governments	  during	  the	  interwar	  period.	  After	  the	  Second	  World	  War,	  these	  records	  
detail	  British,	  French	  and	  American	  involvement	  in	  water	  projects,	  and	  provide	  
observations	  about	  the	  activities	  of	  other	  countries,	  such	  as	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  
Germany.	  
In	  the	  case	  of	  Turkey,	  the	  Republican	  era	  archive	  in	  Ankara	  contained	  some	  
useful	  material,	  while	  the	  archives	  and	  libraries	  of	  government	  institutions	  in	  both	  
Ankara	  and	  Istanbul	  proved	  very	  fruitful	  for	  this	  study.	  In	  Ankara,	  the	  Turkish	  
parliament	  (TBMM)	  library	  and	  the	  library	  of	  the	  State	  Water	  Works	  (Devlet	  Su	  İşleri)	  
were	  the	  most	  significant	  sources.	  Both	  institutions	  hold	  considerable	  material	  on	  
government	  activities	  related	  to	  water	  management;	  this	  included	  government	  reports,	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maps,	  memoirs	  of	  involved	  officials,	  parliamentary	  minutes	  and	  memoranda,	  and	  
research	  conducted	  for	  parliamentary	  committees.	  In	  Istanbul,	  the	  newspaper	  
collections	  at	  the	  Beyazit	  State	  Library	  (Beyazıt	  Devlet	  Kütüphanesi)	  and	  Atatürk	  
Library	  (Atatürk	  Kitaplığı)	  proved	  invaluable	  in	  reconstructing	  local	  concerns	  in	  the	  
Elazığ	  province,	  the	  location	  of	  Turkey’s	  first	  major	  dam	  on	  the	  Euphrates.	  
For	  published	  and	  unpublished	  material	  on	  Iraq	  and	  Syria,	  the	  British	  Library’s	  
holdings	  as	  well	  as	  those	  of	  the	  Middle	  East	  Centre	  Archive	  and	  Library	  at	  St.	  Antony’s	  
College	  were	  vital	  to	  this	  research.	  At	  the	  British	  Library,	  I	  investigated	  India	  Office	  
records,	  which	  are	  a	  particularly	  valuable	  source	  for	  the	  British	  occupation	  of	  Iraq	  
during	  and	  just	  after	  the	  First	  World	  War.	  The	  British	  Library	  also	  holds	  a	  number	  of	  
Arabic-­‐language	  newspapers	  for	  Syria	  and	  Iraq,	  as	  well	  as	  British	  government	  reports	  
related	  to	  irrigation	  and	  development.	  At	  Oxford	  University,	  the	  Middle	  East	  Centre	  
Archive	  and	  Library	  and	  the	  Bodleian	  Library	  hold	  private	  papers	  of	  involved	  officials	  
and	  journalists,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  number	  of	  Arabic-­‐language	  reports	  on	  irrigation	  
development	  in	  Iraq.	  The	  Sudan	  Archive	  in	  Durham	  holds	  a	  number	  of	  personal	  journals	  
by	  Walter	  Ferguson	  Crawford,	  the	  head	  of	  the	  British	  Middle	  East	  Office	  Development	  
Division,	  which	  provided	  a	  candid	  view	  of	  British	  development	  efforts	  in	  all	  three	  
countries	  after	  the	  Second	  World	  War.	  Finally,	  the	  Institution	  of	  Civil	  Engineers	  in	  
London	  has	  a	  magnificent	  library	  with	  an	  archive	  full	  of	  maps	  from	  William	  Willcocks’s	  
travels	  as	  well	  as	  a	  number	  of	  engineering	  reports	  about	  projects	  on	  the	  two	  rivers.	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Illustration	  1.	  Map	  of	  Iraq,	  Syria	  and	  Turkey.29	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29	  Map	  courtesy	  of	  the	  Perry-­‐Castañeda	  Library	  Map	  Collection	  at	  the	  University	  of	  
Texas-­‐Austin.	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CHAPTER	  ONE	  
Founded	  on	  Disaster	  
Enough,	  O	  waterfall	  rushing	  over	  the	  valley,	  
	   	   	   Do	  you	  not	  care	  for	  Mesopotamia	  and	  Iraq?	  
The	  waters	  overflowed	  the	  valley	  like	  the	  people	  who	  confined	  them,	  
	   	   	   So	  what	  disgrace	  does	  it	  carry,	  what	  lack	  of	  control?	  
	  
-­‐Muhammad	  Riḍa	  al-­‐Shabibi30	  
	  
In	  the	  spring	  of	  1919,	  as	  peace	  delegates	  in	  Paris	  struggled	  to	  reach	  terms,	  a	  great	  
flood	  struck	  three	  former	  Ottoman	  provinces—Mosul,	  Baghdad	  and	  Basra—under	  
British	  military	  occupation.	  The	  British	  referred	  to	  the	  area	  as	  Mesopotamia,	  a	  
designation	  that	  set	  aside	  Iraq’s	  Ottoman	  and	  Islamic	  history	  and	  instead	  heralded	  
British	  pretensions	  of	  resurrecting	  the	  region’s	  ancient	  status	  as	  a	  center	  of	  human	  
civilization.	  In	  1919,	  however,	  what	  civilization	  remained	  in	  Mesopotamia	  was	  greatly	  
menaced	  by	  its	  two	  great	  rivers,	  the	  Tigris	  and	  Euphrates.	  The	  rivers,	  swollen	  with	  
snowmelt	  from	  the	  Tarsus	  mountains,	  arrived	  in	  the	  lowlands	  of	  what	  would	  soon	  
become	  the	  state	  of	  Iraq	  and	  surged	  over	  their	  banks,	  ripped	  through	  protective	  works	  
and	  wrecked	  irrigation	  canals.	  The	  two	  rivers	  inundated	  thousands	  of	  square	  miles	  and	  
destroyed	  over	  one	  hundred	  square	  miles	  of	  prime	  cropland.	  A	  breach	  in	  the	  Tigris	  flood	  
protection	  banks,	  known	  as	  bunds,	  north	  of	  Baghdad	  brought	  floodwaters	  within	  four	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30	  Poem	  by	  Muhammad	  Rida	  al-­‐Shabibi	  about	  the	  1926	  flood	  as	  quoted	  in	  Ahmad	  Sousa,	  
Fayaḍanat	  Baghdad	  fi	  al-­‐tarikh:	  baḥth	  fi	  tarikh	  fayaḍanat	  anhur	  al-­‐ʻIraq	  wa-­‐taʼthiruha	  bi-­‐
l-­‐nisbah	  li-­‐madinat	  Baghdad	  [The	  Floods	  of	  Baghdad	  in	  History:	  Report	  on	  the	  History	  of	  
the	  Floods	  of	  the	  Rivers	  of	  Iraq	  and	  Their	  Influence	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  City	  of	  Baghdad]	  
(Baghdad:	  Al-­‐Adib	  Press,	  1963-­‐1965),	  535.	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miles	  of	  the	  city.	  Southern	  Iraq	  was	  not	  so	  lucky	  and	  “the	  countryside	  and	  the	  river	  
combined	  to	  form	  a	  huge	  lake.”31	  
Floods	  of	  this	  and	  greater	  magnitude	  imperiled	  the	  region	  several	  times	  in	  the	  
1920s	  as	  Britain	  consolidated	  power	  in	  Iraq.	  Another	  flood	  in	  1923	  devastated	  large	  
parts	  of	  the	  country.	  This	  was	  followed	  by	  the	  great	  flood	  of	  1926	  when	  the	  Tigris	  nearly	  
wiped	  out	  the	  city	  of	  Baghdad.	  In	  1929,	  it	  was	  the	  Euphrates	  that	  wreaked	  havoc	  on	  the	  
countryside;	  the	  river	  overflowed	  its	  banks	  to	  such	  an	  extent	  that	  it	  started	  flowing	  into	  
the	  Tigris	  near	  Baghdad,	  rather	  than	  in	  its	  usual	  spot	  some	  250	  miles	  to	  the	  south.	  
The	  floods	  of	  the	  1920s	  are	  barely	  mentioned	  in	  the	  several	  texts	  devoted	  to	  the	  
history	  of	  Britain’s	  tenure	  in	  Iraq.	  These	  works	  primarily	  deal	  with	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  
Iraqi	  state,	  the	  administration	  of	  the	  League	  of	  Nations	  “mandate,”	  the	  causes	  of	  the	  
1920	  uprising,	  and	  the	  formation	  of	  an	  Iraqi	  national	  identity.32	  Of	  the	  major	  historical	  
studies	  of	  Iraq,	  only	  Hanna	  Batatu’s	  Old	  Social	  Classes	  suggests	  that	  these	  recurrent	  
natural	  disasters	  had	  any	  significance	  in	  Iraq’s	  social	  and	  political	  organization,	  though	  
his	  analysis	  aims	  more	  at	  explicating	  certain	  features	  of	  Iraq’s	  social	  structure.33	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31	  TNA,	  WO	  95/4993,	  H.	  Walton,	  “Tigris	  Floods,	  1919,”	  in	  Irrigation	  Directorate,	  
“Administration	  Report	  for	  the	  period	  from	  the	  constitution	  of	  the	  Directorate	  (6th	  
February,	  1918)	  to	  31st	  March,	  1919,”	  7.	  
32	  See	  for	  example	  Toby	  Dodge,	  Inventing	  Iraq:	  The	  Failure	  of	  Nation	  Building	  and	  a	  
History	  Denied	  (New	  York:	  Columbia	  University	  Press,	  2003);	  Peter	  Sluglett,	  Britain	  in	  
Iraq:	  Contriving	  King	  and	  Country	  (New	  York:	  Columbia	  University	  Press,	  2007);	  Ghassan	  
Attiyah,	  Iraq:	  1908-­‐1921:	  A	  Socio-­‐Political	  Study	  (Beirut:	  The	  Arab	  Institute	  for	  Research	  
and	  Publishing,	  1973);	  Orit	  Bashkin,	  The	  Other	  Iraq:	  Pluralism	  and	  Culture	  in	  Hashemite	  
Iraq	  (Stanford:	  Stanford	  University	  Press,	  2009).	  
33	  Hanna	  Batatu,	  The	  Old	  Social	  Classes	  and	  the	  Revolutionary	  Movements	  of	  Iraq:	  A	  Study	  
of	  Iraq's	  Old	  Landed	  and	  Commercial	  Classes	  and	  of	  Its	  Communists,	  Baʻthists,	  and	  Free	  
Officers	  (Saqi	  Books,	  2004),	  33,	  69-­‐71,	  132,	  145-­‐147,	  151.	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Recently,	  some	  attention	  has	  been	  paid	  to	  Iraqi	  geography,	  its	  environment	  and	  
economic	  development.	  Priya	  Satia’s	  research,	  for	  instance,	  describes	  British	  ideas	  about	  
Mesopotamian	  nature,	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  particular	  “environmental	  imaginary”	  that	  
“inspired	  an	  understanding	  of	  colonialism	  as	  a	  vehicle	  for	  technocratic	  
developmentalism.”34	  Still,	  Satia	  focuses	  on	  British	  cultural	  notions	  of	  Iraq’s	  
environment,	  saying	  very	  little	  about	  Mesopotamia’s	  most	  salient	  geographical	  feature:	  
its	  two	  major	  rivers.	  	  
The	  fact	  that	  the	  floods	  are	  hardly	  mentioned	  in	  these	  histories	  suggests	  that	  the	  
rivers	  were	  of	  little	  importance	  in	  shaping	  the	  nation-­‐state	  that	  materialized	  in	  this	  part	  
of	  the	  Middle	  East.	  Other	  actors—Iraq’s	  kings,	  politicians,	  British	  high	  commissioners,	  
union	  members,	  activists	  and	  military	  men—constituted,	  contested	  and	  molded	  the	  
government	  and	  society	  that,	  with	  the	  destruction	  of	  the	  Ottoman	  Empire,	  came	  to	  orbit	  
around	  a	  center	  at	  Baghdad.	  In	  these	  histories,	  Britain’s	  “mandate”	  experiment	  appears	  
to	  take	  place	  on	  a	  blank	  stage	  filled	  with	  particular	  characters,	  but	  without	  a	  particular	  
setting.	  	  Yet,	  year	  after	  year	  the	  rivers	  flooded,	  destroying	  much	  of	  what	  the	  British	  (and	  
the	  Ottomans	  before	  them)	  had	  built	  to	  “join	  this	  biblical	  land	  to	  the	  modern	  world.”35	  A	  
sizable	  flood	  could	  literally	  paralyze	  the	  country	  for	  months	  at	  a	  time,	  cutting	  rail	  and	  
telegraph	  lines,	  rendering	  roads	  impassable	  and	  surrounding	  cities	  with	  colossal	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34	  Priya	  Satia,	  "’A	  Rebellion	  of	  Technology?’	  :	  The	  British	  Arabian	  Imaginary,"	  in	  
Environmental	  Imaginaries	  of	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  North	  Africa,	  ed.	  Diana	  K.	  Davis	  and	  
Edmund	  Burke,	  III(Athens,	  OH:	  Ohio	  University	  Press,	  2011),	  43.	  See	  also	  Priya	  Satia,	  
"Developing	  Iraq:	  Britain,	  India	  and	  the	  Redemption	  of	  Empire	  and	  Technology	  in	  the	  
First	  World	  War,"	  Past	  and	  Present,	  197	  (2007):	  211-­‐255.	  
35	  Satia,	  "’A	  Rebellion	  of	  Technology?’”	  36-­‐43.	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moats.36	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  while	  the	  floods	  may	  have	  had	  pernicious	  effects	  on	  modern	  
techniques	  of	  government,	  they	  brought	  many	  benefits	  in	  terms	  of	  agriculture	  and	  
ecology.	  Too	  little	  water	  in	  the	  spring	  meant	  that	  by	  the	  hot	  summer	  months	  the	  rivers	  
were	  too	  low	  for	  effective	  irrigation,	  particularly	  imperiling	  the	  lucrative	  rice	  plantings	  
in	  southern	  Iraq.	  The	  fertility	  of	  the	  Mesopotamian	  soil	  was	  a	  function	  of	  the	  floods,	  
which	  spread	  nutrient-­‐rich	  silt	  far	  from	  the	  rivers’	  banks.	  Consequently,	  managing	  the	  
variability	  of	  the	  Tigris	  and	  Euphrates	  rivers	  was	  a	  dilemma	  for	  any	  ruler,	  whether	  
British,	  Ottoman	  or	  Abbasid,	  seeking	  to	  make	  of	  Mesopotamia	  a	  productive	  realm.37	  
So	  even	  as	  new	  research	  suggests	  that	  the	  environment	  was	  an	  important	  factor	  
in	  British	  conceptions	  of	  Iraq	  as	  a	  particular	  kind	  of	  place,	  this	  work	  seeks	  only	  to	  
explicate	  “imaginings”	  of	  that	  space,	  rather	  than	  the	  complex	  interaction	  between	  
imagination	  and	  reality.	  As	  an	  example,	  Priya	  Satia	  shows	  how	  British	  imaginings	  of	  Iraq	  
as	  the	  birthplace	  of	  civilization	  and	  agriculture	  influenced	  a	  particular	  developmentalist	  
justification	  for	  empire.38	  After	  the	  declaration	  of	  the	  mandate,	  Satia	  argues	  that	  this	  
view	  of	  Mesopotamian	  nature	  metamorphosed	  into	  a	  justification	  not	  for	  development	  
but	  for	  surveillance	  and	  control	  through	  the	  technology	  of	  the	  airplane.	  Yet,	  the	  idea	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36	  See	  Figure	  4	  at	  the	  end	  of	  this	  chapter.	  
37	  For	  more	  information	  on	  early	  Mesopotamian	  irrigation,	  see	  Peter	  Christensen,	  The	  
Decline	  of	  Iranshahr:	  Irrigation	  and	  Environments	  in	  the	  History	  of	  the	  Middle	  East	  500	  
B.C.	  to	  A.D.	  1500	  (Copenhagen:	  Museum	  Tusculanum	  Press,	  1993).	  
38	  Satia	  declares	  that	  Iraq	  was	  the	  site	  where	  twentieth-­‐century	  notions	  of	  economic	  
development	  were	  born.	  Considering	  the	  very	  little	  that	  the	  British	  accomplished	  in	  
terms	  of	  economic	  development	  in	  the	  country,	  it	  is	  much	  more	  likely	  that	  these	  ideas	  
were	  born	  in	  India	  or	  Egypt	  and	  then	  exported	  to	  Iraq.	  As	  there	  was	  only	  a	  very	  small	  
window	  of	  time	  in	  which	  such	  ideas	  might	  have	  evolved	  there,	  her	  argument	  is	  not	  
entirely	  convincing.	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nature	  complicit	  in	  Britain’s	  imperial	  aims,	  whether	  Mesopotamia	  as	  a	  place	  of	  
boundless	  wealth	  or	  unlimited	  surveillance,	  is	  only	  part	  of	  the	  equation.	  Satia	  has	  little	  
to	  say	  about	  the	  actual	  environment,	  suggesting	  that	  orientalist	  ideas	  about	  nature	  and	  
history	  function	  almost	  solely	  as	  cultural	  constructions,	  rather	  than	  existing	  in	  concert	  
with	  the	  actual	  environment	  and	  as	  a	  component	  of	  particular	  material	  practices,	  
policies	  and	  actions.	  While	  British	  soldiers’	  experience	  of	  “mirages”	  and	  feelings	  of	  
otherworldliness	  in	  Iraq	  may	  have	  been	  informed	  by	  an	  aggrandizement	  of	  ancient	  
cultures	  and	  a	  fetish	  for	  the	  exotic	  east,	  it	  should	  be	  remembered	  that	  these	  soldiers	  
were	  encountering	  a	  real	  space.	  This	  real	  space	  included	  incredible	  heat,	  humidity	  and	  
diseases	  such	  as	  typhus	  and	  cholera.39	  Should	  we	  understand	  British	  soldiers’	  
interpretations	  of	  Mesopotamia	  as	  simply	  emanating	  from	  a	  European	  cultural	  approach	  
to	  “the	  East”	  or	  as	  equally	  a	  reaction	  to	  a	  specific,	  unfamiliar	  environment	  that	  is	  then	  
filtered	  through	  a	  cultural	  vernacular?	  To	  analyze	  only	  the	  cultural	  approach	  is	  to	  tell	  
only	  half	  the	  story.	  The	  “environmental	  imaginary”	  does	  not	  exist	  alongside	  or	  even	  
superimposed	  on	  the	  “real	  world,”	  but	  is	  at	  once	  constituted	  by	  and	  constitutive	  of	  the	  
complex	  interaction	  between	  human	  and	  nonhuman.	  	  
Toby	  Dodge	  in	  his	  book,	  Inventing	  Iraq,	  approaches	  the	  history	  of	  the	  mandate	  in	  
a	  similar	  fashion	  as	  Satia.	  The	  title	  itself	  gives	  a	  clue	  as	  to	  the	  orientation	  of	  Dodge’s	  
argument:	  Iraq	  was	  “invented,”	  made	  real	  out	  of	  the	  British	  imagination.	  While	  the	  
modern	  state	  of	  Iraq’s	  political	  existence	  was	  certainly	  a	  result	  of	  British	  imaginings,	  
Iraq	  as	  a	  specific	  space,	  with	  a	  people	  and	  history,	  was	  not.	  Moreover,	  the	  British	  were	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39	  Charles	  Townshend,	  Desert	  Hell:	  The	  British	  Invasion	  of	  Mesopotamia	  (Cambridge,	  MA:	  
Belknap	  Press,	  2011),	  7-­‐8.	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not	  the	  only	  ones	  with	  a	  concept	  of	  Iraq;	  one	  need	  only	  examine	  Ottoman	  maps	  of	  that	  
part	  of	  Western	  Asia.	  Dodge’s	  text	  is	  based	  on	  detailed	  archival	  research	  and	  is	  a	  well-­‐
written	  history	  of	  British	  policy.	  However,	  creation	  tales	  with	  such	  a	  focus	  diminish	  the	  
breadth	  of	  historical	  agency	  in	  Iraq	  as	  a	  real	  place,	  rendering	  British	  culture	  and	  history	  
as	  practically	  the	  sole	  motive	  force	  in	  shaping	  this	  part	  of	  Western	  Asia.	  In	  his	  chapter	  
most	  directly	  related	  to	  Iraq’s	  environment,	  titled	  “The	  Social	  Meaning	  of	  Land,”	  Dodge	  
analyzes	  an	  important	  policy	  debate	  between	  British	  officials.	  This	  debate,	  Dodge	  
asserts,	  reveals	  “the	  fault	  lines	  within	  the	  British	  social	  conceptions	  informing	  the	  
making	  of	  Iraq.”40	  Yet,	  the	  actual	  “making”	  is	  left	  out	  of	  the	  story;	  Dodge	  does	  not	  explain	  
how	  these	  ideas	  altered	  the	  Iraqi	  landscape	  or	  how	  the	  intersection	  of	  Iraqi	  and	  British	  
concepts	  of	  land	  tenure	  played	  out	  in	  practice.	  A	  better	  understanding	  of	  the	  motivating	  
beliefs	  of	  policymakers	  is	  important.	  However,	  it	  is	  a	  primary	  argument	  of	  this	  
dissertation	  that,	  in	  the	  parlance	  of	  Dodge,	  a	  history	  is	  also	  “denied”	  when	  material	  
practices	  remain	  outside	  the	  analysis,	  particularly	  when	  the	  animating	  ideas	  have	  been	  
imported	  to,	  and	  brought	  into	  interaction	  with,	  a	  foreign	  landscape.	  This	  is	  true	  not	  only	  
in	  this	  discussion	  of	  the	  history	  of	  Iraq,	  but	  in	  a	  broader	  understanding	  of	  how	  this	  part	  
of	  Western	  Asia	  fits	  into	  the	  history	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century.	  
It	  is	  in	  the	  interaction	  between	  idea	  and	  practice,	  nonmaterial	  and	  material,	  that	  
human	  and	  nonhuman	  actors	  produce	  the	  world	  in	  which	  they	  exist,	  and	  indeed,	  
produce	  history.41	  This	  chapter	  focuses	  on	  one	  such	  interaction	  in	  analyzing	  not	  only	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  Dodge,	  Inventing	  Iraq,	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41	  For	  a	  more	  detailed	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  of	  this	  problem,	  see	  Timothy	  Mitchell,	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British	  ideas	  about	  Iraq’s	  rivers,	  but	  how	  these	  produced	  and	  were	  produced	  by	  
interactions	  with	  the	  Iraqi	  environment.	  From	  these	  interactions,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  
rivers	  themselves	  and	  human	  efforts	  to	  manage,	  harness,	  and	  direct	  their	  waters	  played	  
a	  significant	  role	  in	  the	  creation	  and	  development	  of	  the	  modern	  state	  of	  Iraq.	  Hanna	  
Batatu,	  in	  a	  discussion	  of	  his	  Old	  Social	  Classes,	  remarked	  that	  “it	  is	  in	  moments	  of	  great	  
upheaval	  that	  societies	  are	  best	  studied.”42	  I	  would	  argue	  the	  same	  for	  a	  discussion	  of	  
Iraq’s	  environmental	  history.	  It	  is	  in	  the	  disturbances	  caused	  by	  the	  rivers’	  great	  floods	  
that	  one	  may	  learn	  about	  the	  practice	  of	  empire	  and	  government	  in	  Iraq	  during	  this	  
formative	  period.	  	  
How	  British	  officials	  sought	  to	  cope	  with	  the	  rivers’	  floods	  reveals	  much	  about	  
the	  character	  of	  the	  state	  they	  created	  in	  Mesopotamia.	  According	  to	  Toby	  Dodge,	  a	  
radical	  shift	  in	  the	  international	  system	  following	  the	  First	  World	  War,	  embodied	  in	  the	  
League	  of	  Nations	  and	  the	  mandate	  system,	  led	  to	  the	  British	  goal	  of	  creating	  a	  “modern,	  
liberal	  state”	  in	  Iraq.	  Yet,	  because	  of	  certain	  contradictions	  between	  British	  interests	  and	  
goals,	  the	  great	  but	  declining	  empire	  failed	  in	  that	  effort.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  there	  were	  
British	  strategic	  interests	  in	  maintaining	  control	  of	  Iraq	  in	  order	  to	  dominate	  the	  Persian	  
Gulf	  and	  protect	  the	  air	  route	  to	  India.	  On	  the	  other,	  there	  was	  the	  need	  to	  create	  viable,	  
independent	  institutions	  of	  rule.43	  The	  British	  were	  prevented	  from	  attaining	  these	  two	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  East	  and	  North	  Africa,	  ed.	  Diana	  K.	  Davis	  and	  Edmund	  Burke,	  III	  (Athens,	  OH:	  
Ohio	  University	  Press,	  2011),	  265-­‐273.	  
42	  Hanna	  Batatu,	  “The	  Old	  Social	  Classes	  Revisited,”	  in	  The	  Iraqi	  Revolution	  of	  1958:	  The	  
Old	  Social	  Classes	  Revisited,	  Robert	  Fernea	  and	  William	  Roger	  Louis,	  eds.	  (London:	  I.B.	  
Tauris,	  1991),	  211.	  
43	  Dodge,	  Inventing	  Iraq,	  30-­‐41.	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aims	  because	  of	  a	  number	  of	  factors.	  Blinded	  by	  an	  ignorant	  racism	  toward	  the	  
Ottomans	  and	  Iraq’s	  history,	  they	  failed	  to	  understand	  the	  extant	  social	  and	  political	  
terrain.44	  A	  lack	  of	  proper	  investigation	  into	  social,	  economic	  and	  geographic	  conditions	  
in	  the	  country	  hamstrung	  policy	  makers.45	  Ideas	  imported	  from	  Britain	  and	  India	  
regarding	  the	  nature	  of	  democracy	  and	  the	  relationship	  of	  the	  tribe	  to	  the	  population	  
distorted	  British	  understanding	  of	  the	  new	  country.46	  In	  Dodge’s	  narrative,	  the	  British	  
were	  well	  intentioned	  but	  naïve.	  They	  were	  competent	  administrators	  but	  lacking	  
resources,	  imperial	  creatures	  and	  products	  of	  their	  time	  but	  committed	  to	  Iraqi	  
democracy	  nonetheless.	  The	  failure	  of	  British	  nation	  building	  in	  Iraq	  should	  therefore	  be	  
understood	  more	  as	  a	  problem	  of	  good	  intentions	  run	  aground	  rather	  than	  outright	  
manipulation	  and	  distortion.	  
However,	  we	  must	  not	  mistake	  rhetoric	  and	  a	  new	  internationalized	  juridical	  
basis	  for	  political	  organization	  as	  a	  shift	  in	  underlying	  relations	  of	  political	  and	  economic	  
domination.	  Fundamentally,	  for	  the	  continuance	  of	  their	  political,	  social	  and	  economic	  
systems,	  modern,	  liberal	  states	  depended	  on	  extracting	  resources	  from	  “less	  developed”	  
regions.47	  Under	  the	  new	  international	  system	  of	  the	  post-­‐war	  era,	  this	  could	  no	  longer	  
be	  accomplished	  by	  outright	  annexation.	  Successful	  extraction	  required	  some	  new	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  Ibid.,	  43-­‐61.	  
45	  Ibid.,	  63,	  73-­‐74.	  
46	  Ibid.,	  75-­‐100.	  
47	  Timothy	  Mitchell,	  Carbon	  Democracy:	  Political	  Power	  in	  the	  Age	  of	  Oil	  (New	  York:	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approaches	  to	  political	  and	  economic	  domination,	  but	  also	  prescribed	  some	  older	  
approaches.48	  	  
Consequently,	  in	  respect	  to	  the	  case	  of	  Iraq,	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  British	  to	  create	  a	  
modern,	  liberal	  state	  in	  Mesopotamia	  was	  not	  at	  root	  a	  result	  of	  “the	  way	  the	  British	  
understood	  Iraqi	  society.”49	  Moreover,	  the	  “quasi-­‐state”	  that	  the	  British	  constructed	  in	  
Iraq	  was	  not	  designed	  to	  allow	  the	  British	  to	  “disengage.”50	  It	  was	  designed	  to	  enable	  
British	  control	  and	  extraction	  of	  resources	  (natural	  and	  political)	  in	  order	  to	  ensure	  the	  
continuance	  of	  the	  modern,	  liberal	  state	  of	  Britain.	  If	  there	  was	  indeed	  any	  failure	  of	  
understanding	  on	  the	  part	  of	  British	  officials,	  it	  was	  in	  their	  perspicacity	  of	  the	  project	  of	  
which	  they	  were	  a	  vital	  component.	  
This	  observation	  leads	  to	  the	  second	  aim	  of	  this	  chapter,	  which	  is	  to	  further	  our	  
understanding	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  water	  as	  a	  natural	  resource	  and	  changing	  
forms	  of	  governance.	  The	  literature	  linking	  empire	  to	  water	  management	  by	  and	  large	  
argues	  that	  the	  scientific	  domination	  of	  the	  environment	  played	  a	  key	  role	  in	  extending	  
imperial	  control	  over	  land	  and	  population.	  The	  character	  and	  evolution	  of	  that	  
domination	  varied	  by	  case.	  Donald	  Worster,	  in	  his	  history	  of	  the	  American	  West,	  states	  
that	  “the	  purpose	  of	  irrigation	  was	  to	  induce	  settlement	  in	  an	  empty	  land,	  to	  fabricate	  an	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48	  For	  more	  on	  how	  British	  rule	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  was	  informed	  by	  earlier	  experiments	  
in	  autonomy	  and	  sovereignty,	  see	  Aimee	  Genell,	  “Empire	  by	  Law:	  Ottoman	  Sovereignty	  
and	  the	  British	  Occupation	  of	  Egypt”	  (Ph.D.	  Diss.,	  Columbia	  University,	  2013).	  
49	  Dodge,	  Inventing	  Iraq,	  158.	  
50	  Ibid.,	  10.	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empire	  de	  novo	  out	  of	  yeoman	  farmers,	  miners	  and	  manufacturers.”51	  According	  to	  
Worster,	  this	  empire	  was	  founded	  on	  a	  “capitalist	  state	  mode”	  of	  hydraulic	  society,	  
wherein	  the	  private	  and	  public	  sectors	  of	  the	  capitalist	  state	  “agree	  to	  work	  together	  to	  
achieve	  a	  control	  over	  nature.”52	  Meanwhile,	  Daniel	  Gilmartin	  takes	  up	  the	  question	  of	  
the	  colonial	  state,	  placing	  it	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  modern,	  capitalist	  state	  in	  Worster’s	  Rivers	  
of	  Empire.	  Gilmartin	  describes	  the	  rise	  of	  a	  cadre	  of	  professional	  water	  engineers	  within	  
the	  British	  Empire.	  Allied	  with	  the	  colonial	  state,	  these	  engineers’	  aims	  differed	  from	  the	  
capitalists	  in	  Worster’s	  story,	  who	  sought	  to	  maximize	  profit.	  Instead,	  the	  irrigation	  
engineers	  of	  the	  British	  Empire	  built	  water	  control	  projects	  to	  bring	  “a	  maximum	  
quantity	  of	  land—and	  people—under	  water’s	  command.”53	  These	  engineers	  were	  
motivated	  by	  a	  “contradictory	  mixture	  of	  scientific	  professionalism	  and	  colonial	  
idealism”	  where	  “nature	  was…a	  critical,	  disciplining	  partner	  in	  the	  spread	  of	  imperial	  
civilisation.”54	  
The	  history	  of	  the	  British	  Empire	  in	  Iraq	  does	  not	  fit	  well	  into	  either	  of	  these	  
categories.	  The	  debacle	  of	  the	  1920	  revolt,	  a	  changed	  international	  climate	  after	  the	  First	  
World	  War,	  and	  economic	  exigencies	  pushed	  Britain	  toward	  a	  political	  relationship	  with	  
Iraq	  founded	  on	  a	  program	  of	  informal	  control.	  Instead	  of	  directly	  managing	  Iraqi	  affairs,	  
London	  sought	  to	  protect	  British	  interests	  by	  creating	  a	  pliant,	  dependent	  local	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51	  Worster,	  Rivers	  of	  Empire,	  150.	  
52	  Ibid.,	  51.	  
53	  Gilmartin,	  “Imperial	  Rivers,”	  103.	  
54	  Ibid.,	  102.	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government	  permeated	  by	  a	  steady	  stream	  of	  British	  “advisers,”	  who	  reported	  every	  
government	  decision	  and	  political	  intrigue	  back	  to	  the	  High	  Commissioner.	  As	  a	  result	  of	  
British	  experience	  in	  India	  and	  in	  response	  to	  the	  1920	  revolt,	  Great	  Britain	  also	  sought	  
to	  alter	  the	  structure	  of	  Iraqi	  society	  to	  facilitate	  their	  rule.	  This	  form	  of	  governance,	  and	  
the	  social	  and	  political	  changes	  that	  emanated	  from	  it,	  produced	  a	  very	  different	  
relationship	  between	  the	  Iraqi	  state	  and	  the	  environment.	  Rather	  than	  seeking	  to	  
dominate	  Iraq’s	  people	  through	  the	  control	  of	  water,	  Great	  Britain	  opted	  to	  resituate	  
environmental	  risks	  away	  from	  the	  imperial	  power	  and	  direct	  environmental	  gains	  
toward	  it.	  As	  I	  argued	  above	  against	  a	  particular	  framing	  of	  an	  “environmental	  
imaginary,”	  the	  human	  relationship	  with	  nature	  is	  not	  a	  one-­‐way	  interaction.	  The	  
orienting	  of	  the	  state	  toward	  the	  environment	  in	  this	  way	  produced	  long-­‐term	  effects	  for	  
Iraqi	  government	  and	  society.	  Some	  of	  those	  will	  be	  discussed	  below.	  A	  fuller	  
exploration	  of	  the	  long-­‐term	  implications	  will	  be	  dealt	  with	  in	  later	  chapters.	  	  
	  
The	  Floods	  of	  1919:	  From	  Wreckage	  to	  Regeneration	  
As	  Ottoman	  officials	  fled	  southern	  Iraq	  with	  the	  approach	  of	  Britain’s	  Indian	  
Expeditionary	  Force	  “D”,	  British	  officials	  established	  a	  military	  administration	  to	  govern	  
the	  expanding	  region	  under	  their	  control.	  The	  initial	  advance	  into	  Ottoman	  territory	  in	  
1914	  brought	  the	  British	  to	  al-­‐Qurna,	  the	  point	  at	  which	  the	  two	  rivers	  join	  to	  form	  the	  
Shatt	  al-­‐Arab.	  Fighting	  in	  1915	  and	  1916	  ended	  with	  a	  British	  surrender	  at	  Kut,	  but	  in	  
1917	  a	  new	  campaign	  under	  General	  Sir	  Stanley	  Maude	  ended	  with	  the	  capture	  of	  
Baghdad.	  Military	  administration	  during	  this	  period	  focused	  primarily	  on	  using	  the	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rivers	  as	  a	  means	  to	  facilitate	  resupply.55	  However,	  after	  the	  capture	  of	  Baghdad	  in	  
March	  1917,	  a	  sense	  that	  the	  Mesopotamian	  campaign	  was	  turning	  in	  Britain’s	  direction	  
provoked	  a	  discussion	  of	  what	  should	  become	  of	  this	  part	  of	  Western	  Asia	  after	  the	  war.	  
British	  officials	  in	  Baghdad,	  many	  of	  whom	  had	  extensive	  experience	  in	  India,	  viewed	  
Iraq	  as	  a	  potential	  breadbasket	  for	  the	  Trucial	  States	  and	  a	  solution	  for	  India’s	  
population	  problems.	  In	  this	  scenario,	  the	  port	  city	  of	  Basra	  in	  southern	  Iraq	  was	  to	  
become	  a	  dependency	  of	  India,	  while	  Baghdad	  was	  destined	  to	  be	  the	  center	  of	  an	  Arab	  
state	  under	  the	  protection	  of	  Great	  Britain.56	  	  
It	  is	  difficult	  to	  overstate	  the	  fluidity	  of	  the	  political	  situation	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  
after	  the	  conclusion	  of	  the	  armistice	  at	  Mudros	  on	  October	  30,	  1918.	  The	  disposition	  of	  
the	  Ottoman	  Empire	  was	  an	  open	  question,	  one	  that	  would	  not	  be	  resolved	  for	  five	  more	  
years,	  with	  the	  signing	  of	  the	  Treaty	  of	  Lausanne	  in	  1923.57	  While	  the	  Treaty	  of	  
Versailles	  confirmed	  British	  and	  French	  designs	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  as	  embodied	  in	  the	  
Sykes-­‐Picot	  Agreement,	  American	  President	  Woodrow	  Wilson	  and	  the	  global	  embrace	  of	  
a	  concept	  of	  self-­‐determination	  forced	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  League	  of	  Nations.	  The	  victorious	  
powers	  acceded	  to	  a	  system	  of	  “mandates”	  administered	  by	  the	  League	  and	  at	  the	  San	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55	  For	  more	  on	  the	  war,	  see	  Charles	  Townshend,	  Desert	  Hell:	  The	  British	  Invasion	  of	  
Mesopotamia	  (Cambridge,	  MA:	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  2011).	  
56	  Dodge,	  Inventing	  Iraq,	  10-­‐11.	  
57	  As	  an	  indication	  of	  post-­‐war	  fluidity,	  the	  British	  captured	  the	  city	  of	  Mosul	  after	  the	  
Mudros	  armistice.	  Turkey	  contested	  British	  control	  over	  Mosul	  and	  the	  dispute	  nearly	  
upset	  the	  signing	  of	  the	  Lausanne	  treaty.	  The	  treaty,	  not	  ratified	  until	  1924,	  left	  the	  
dispute	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  League	  of	  Nations	  Council.	  The	  contest	  ended	  with	  a	  treaty	  
between	  Turkey	  and	  Iraq,	  signed	  in	  1926,	  which	  allocated	  the	  territory	  to	  Iraq	  but	  gave	  
Turkey	  a	  portion	  of	  Iraqi	  oil	  royalties.	  
	  
	   37	  
Remo	  Conference	  in	  April	  1920	  allocated	  to	  themselves	  the	  “mandate”	  territories	  won	  in	  
the	  recent	  war.58	  Even	  then,	  the	  mandate	  system	  did	  not	  come	  into	  legal	  force	  until	  
1924.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Iraq,	  a	  full-­‐fledged	  revolt	  in	  1920	  and	  continued	  political	  unrest	  
against	  the	  mandate	  resulted	  in	  a	  bilateral	  treaty	  between	  Great	  Britain	  and	  a	  newly	  
constituted	  Iraqi	  government.59	  During	  this	  period	  of	  flux,	  military	  and	  later	  civil	  
administrators	  in	  the	  early	  years	  of	  British	  occupation	  modeled	  the	  governance	  of	  Iraq	  
on	  British	  practices	  in	  India.60	  British	  officials	  introduced	  legal	  codes	  borrowed	  from	  
Indian	  practice,	  assigned	  British	  Political	  Officers	  to	  administer	  each	  province,	  and	  
created	  a	  series	  of	  British-­‐staffed	  agencies	  to	  supervise	  functions	  ranging	  from	  
sanitation	  to	  irrigation.61	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58	  Dodge	  notes	  that	  the	  League	  of	  Nations	  “awarded”	  Iraq	  to	  Great	  Britain,	  but	  this	  is	  a	  
distortion	  of	  how	  the	  Great	  Powers	  reached	  agreement	  on	  both	  the	  League	  and	  the	  
mandates.	  See	  Inventing	  Iraq,	  5.	  For	  a	  more	  detailed	  discussion	  of	  how	  the	  mandate	  
system	  came	  into	  existence,	  see	  William	  Roger	  Louis,	  Ends	  of	  British	  Imperialism:	  The	  
Scramble	  for	  Empire,	  Suez	  and	  Decolonization	  (London:	  I.B	  Tauris,	  2006)	  251-­‐278.	  
59	  The	  treaty	  was	  signed	  on	  October	  10,	  1922	  and	  adopted	  by	  the	  League	  Council	  on	  
September	  27,	  1924	  as	  fulfilling	  the	  terms	  of	  Article	  22	  of	  the	  League	  Covenant.	  For	  
more	  on	  the	  treaty,	  see	  Luther	  Harris	  Evans,	  “The	  Emancipation	  of	  Iraq	  from	  the	  
Mandates	  System,”	  The	  American	  Political	  Science	  Review	  26	  (1932):	  1024-­‐1049;	  Susan	  
Pedersen,	  “Getting	  Out	  of	  Iraq–in	  1932:	  The	  League	  of	  Nations	  and	  the	  Road	  to	  
Normative	  Statehood,”	  American	  Historical	  Review	  115	  (2010):	  975-­‐1000	  and	  Sluglett,	  
Britain	  in	  Iraq,	  42-­‐64.	  
60	  Sir	  Percy	  Cox	  served	  in	  the	  Indian	  Staff	  Corps	  and	  held	  minor	  positions	  in	  the	  Indian	  
states	  of	  Kolhapur	  and	  Savantvadi.	  Arnold	  Wilson	  was	  appointed	  to	  the	  32nd	  Sikh	  
pioneers	  after	  graduating	  from	  the	  Royal	  Military	  College	  in	  1903.	  In	  1909,	  he	  was	  
transferred	  to	  the	  Indian	  political	  department.	  See	  Robert	  Pearce,	  "Cox,	  Sir	  Percy	  
Zachariah	  (1864-­‐1937),"	  in	  Oxford	  Dictionary	  of	  National	  Biography	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  
University	  Press,	  2004);	  Robert	  Pearce,	  "Wilson,	  Sir	  Arnold	  Talbot	  (1884-­‐1940),"	  in	  
Oxford	  Dictionary	  of	  National	  Biography	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2004).	  
61	  These	  actions	  included	  implementing	  the	  controversial	  Tribal	  Criminal	  and	  Civil	  
Disputes	  Regulations.	  See	  Sluglett,	  Britain	  in	  Iraq,	  8-­‐12	  and	  169-­‐181.	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   A	  new	  Irrigation	  Directorate	  was	  at	  the	  center	  of	  British	  plans	  to	  rehabilitate	  
Mesopotamia	  for	  the	  good	  of	  its	  Persian	  Gulf	  protectorates	  and	  Indian	  possession.	  The	  
Directorate	  was	  established	  in	  February	  1918	  to	  centralize	  irrigation	  and	  flood	  control	  
efforts,	  which	  until	  then	  had	  been	  the	  purview	  of	  the	  appointed	  provincial	  Political	  
Officers.	  The	  new	  Irrigation	  Directorate	  included	  very	  few	  Iraqis	  on	  its	  staff,	  even	  though	  
many	  of	  the	  Political	  Officers	  had	  relied	  on	  local	  expertise	  when	  it	  came	  to	  irrigation	  
matters.	  Instead,	  the	  department	  imported	  expertise,	  direction	  and	  labor	  from	  the	  
Indian	  subcontinent.62	  In	  March,	  the	  Inspector-­‐General	  of	  Irrigation	  in	  India,	  T.	  R.	  J.	  
Ward,	  appeared	  in	  Baghdad	  to	  assist	  in	  the	  planning	  of	  works	  to	  increase	  cultivation.63	  
Within	  a	  few	  months	  of	  Ward’s	  visits,	  the	  department	  increased	  its	  professional	  staff	  
from	  twenty-­‐nine	  to	  fifty-­‐two,	  with	  three	  deputy	  directors,	  one	  for	  each	  river	  and	  
another	  for	  special	  projects.	  Nineteen	  districts	  were	  created	  for	  the	  Euphrates	  and	  
eighteen	  for	  the	  Tigris.	  British	  officers	  made	  up	  virtually	  the	  entire	  professional	  staff.	  By	  
the	  end	  of	  December	  1918,	  the	  Irrigation	  Directorate	  had	  recruited	  another	  1,000	  
workers,	  almost	  entirely	  from	  India,	  to	  fill	  all	  subordinate	  positions.64	  In	  shape	  and	  
scope,	  the	  Irrigation	  Directorate	  created	  in	  Mesopotamia	  mirrored	  British	  efforts	  to	  
remake	  the	  river	  valleys	  of	  India.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62	  Eugene	  Rogan,	  The	  Arabs:	  A	  History	  (New	  York:	  Basic	  Books,	  2009),	  171	  
63	  This	  was	  not	  T.R.J.	  Ward’s	  first	  trip	  to	  Mesopotamia.	  He	  visited	  the	  country	  before	  the	  
war	  and	  witnessed	  the	  construction	  of	  the	  Hindiyya	  Barrage	  on	  the	  Euphrates	  in	  1913.	  
The	  National	  Archives,	  London	  [hereafter	  TNA],	  War	  Office	  [WO]	  95/4993,	  Irrigation	  
Directorate,	  “Administration	  Report	  for	  the	  Period	  from	  the	  Constitution	  of	  the	  
Directorate	  (6th	  February,	  1918)	  to	  31st	  March,”	  1919,	  1.	  
64	  Irrigation	  Directorate	  (1919),	  2-­‐3,	  15-­‐18.	  
	  
	   39	  
The	  primary	  focus	  of	  the	  Irrigation	  Directorate	  in	  its	  first	  year	  of	  existence	  was	  to	  
obtain	  as	  much	  grain	  from	  Mesopotamia	  in	  the	  shortest	  amount	  of	  time	  possible.65	  To	  
that	  end,	  irrigation	  officers	  and	  their	  retinue	  of	  Indian	  subordinates	  fanned	  out	  across	  
Mesopotamia	  to	  survey	  land,	  dredge	  canals,	  and	  reinforce	  flood	  embankments.	  These	  
efforts	  met	  a	  host	  of	  obstacles.	  Everywhere	  local	  laborers	  were	  difficult	  to	  find	  and	  the	  
local	  population	  was	  more	  dispersed	  than	  originally	  imagined.	  A	  small	  dam	  built	  
annually	  on	  the	  Diyala	  River,	  a	  major	  tributary	  of	  the	  Tigris,	  to	  feed	  canals	  could	  not	  be	  
built	  because	  Ottoman	  and	  British	  soldiers	  had	  cut	  down	  all	  the	  nearby	  trees	  during	  the	  
conflict.	  Infighting	  over	  land	  ownership	  ended	  the	  building	  of	  new	  canal	  works	  on	  the	  
right	  bank	  of	  the	  Diyala.	  South	  of	  Baghdad,	  speedy	  construction	  of	  the	  railway	  to	  
facilitate	  the	  invasion	  had	  cut	  numerous	  irrigation	  channels.	  New	  culverts	  would	  have	  to	  
be	  constructed	  to	  bring	  about	  potential	  gains	  in	  production.66	  There	  were	  some	  
successes	  in	  bringing	  more	  land	  into	  cultivation,	  but	  overall,	  the	  results	  were	  dismal.	  
Rather	  than	  the	  normal	  yield	  of	  90,000	  tons,	  in	  1917	  rice	  production	  in	  Iraq’s	  district	  of	  
Shamiyya	  was	  some	  600	  tons	  gross,	  while	  in	  1918	  it	  was	  still	  less	  than	  a	  quarter	  of	  the	  
normal	  amount.67	  
The	  Directorate’s	  difficulties	  went	  beyond	  a	  simple	  lack	  of	  manpower	  and	  
experience.	  After	  all,	  by	  1919	  the	  British	  had	  controlled	  much	  of	  southern	  Iraq	  for	  nearly	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65	  Ahmad	  Sousa,	  Tatawwur	  al-­‐Rayy	  fi-­‐l-­‐Iraq	  [The	  Development	  of	  Irrigation	  in	  Iraq]	  
(Baghdad:	  Matba'a	  al-­‐Ma'arif,	  1946),	  78-­‐79.	  
66	  Irrigation	  Directorate	  (1919),	  3.	  
67	  “Annual	  Administration	  Report,	  Shamiyyah	  Division,	  from	  1st	  January	  to	  31st	  
December	  1918,”	  Reports	  of	  Administration	  for	  1918,	  I,	  78,	  as	  quoted	  in	  Batatu,	  Old	  Social	  
Classes,	  174.	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five	  years	  and	  throughout	  much	  of	  the	  nineteenth	  century	  there	  was	  a	  British	  presence	  
in	  both	  Baghdad	  and	  Basra.	  It	  seems	  rather	  as	  if	  the	  Irrigation	  Directorate	  expected	  to	  
find	  in	  Iraq	  a	  small	  version	  of	  India,	  and	  instead	  discovered	  a	  country	  apparently	  
denuded	  of	  trees,	  people	  and	  government.	  Such	  a	  place	  was	  incommensurate	  with	  the	  
project	  of	  irrigation	  as	  understood	  by	  Britain’s	  engineers,	  a	  project	  perfected	  in	  the	  river	  
valleys	  of	  the	  Indus	  and	  Nile.	  	  
This	  erroneous	  idea	  of	  the	  Mesopotamian	  environment	  was	  quickly	  confronted	  
by	  the	  real	  thing.	  In	  the	  winter	  of	  1919	  the	  “Indianized”	  Irrigation	  Directorate	  
encountered	  a	  more	  significant	  and	  dangerous	  problem:	  a	  very	  early,	  very	  large	  winter	  
flood.	  The	  topography	  of	  Iraq	  makes	  flood	  protection	  a	  difficult	  business.	  Well	  before	  
Baghdad,	  the	  Tigris	  and	  Euphrates	  leave	  the	  confines	  of	  well-­‐defined	  gorges	  and	  valleys	  
and	  begin	  to	  flow	  on	  beds	  with	  an	  elevation	  above	  the	  surrounding	  countryside.	  The	  rich	  
agricultural	  land	  on	  the	  banks	  gradually	  slopes	  away	  from	  the	  rivers.	  This	  feature	  was	  a	  
boon	  for	  canal	  builders.	  It	  was	  a	  relatively	  easy	  matter	  to	  cut	  a	  gap	  in	  the	  rivers’	  banks	  to	  
bring	  water	  onto	  nearby	  fields.	  There	  was	  a	  downside,	  however.	  Cultivated	  land	  near	  the	  
riverbanks	  was	  also	  in	  greater	  danger	  of	  being	  inundated	  during	  flood	  season.	  These	  
floods	  often	  struck	  at	  the	  worst	  possible	  time	  for	  the	  cultivator,	  either	  early	  enough	  to	  
destroy	  the	  winter	  harvest	  or	  late	  enough	  to	  disrupt	  the	  spring	  sowing	  season.	  
Landholders	  had	  for	  centuries	  constructed	  bunds,	  large	  earthen	  embankments,	  along	  
the	  river’s	  course	  to	  protect	  their	  crops.	  
Building	  flood	  protection	  works	  in	  Iraq	  prior	  to	  modern	  engineering	  techniques	  
involved	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  time	  and	  labor.	  With	  the	  advent	  of	  modern	  engineering,	  flood	  
protection	  also	  required	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  money.	  William	  Willcocks’	  pre-­‐World	  War	  I	  plan	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for	  flood	  protection	  involved	  the	  construction	  of	  several	  escapes	  whereby	  excess	  
floodwater	  could	  be	  channeled	  into	  large,	  unproductive	  depressions	  in	  the	  desert.68	  By	  
reducing	  the	  volume	  of	  water,	  Willcocks	  hoped	  to	  decrease	  the	  height	  and	  volume	  of	  the	  
flood,	  which	  would	  then	  reduce	  the	  labor	  and	  material	  required	  to	  build	  protective	  
embankments	  downstream	  of	  his	  escapes.	  In	  1919,	  however,	  the	  Euphrates	  escape	  
suggested	  by	  Willcocks	  was	  only	  partially	  functional	  and	  even	  the	  newest	  and	  strongest	  
flood	  embankments	  collapsed	  before	  the	  rivers’	  onslaught.	  On	  the	  Tigris,	  the	  floods	  
peaked	  on	  February	  15.	  By	  pressing	  military	  brigades	  into	  service,	  the	  Irrigation	  
Directorate	  maintained	  the	  bunds	  protecting	  the	  military	  camps	  in	  and	  around	  the	  city	  
of	  Baghdad,	  but	  breaches	  developed	  above	  and	  below	  the	  city,	  inundating	  over	  five	  
thousand	  acres	  of	  cropland.	  Damage	  on	  the	  Euphrates	  was	  significantly	  greater.	  
Breaches	  in	  flood	  protection	  on	  this	  river	  flooded	  much	  of	  the	  town	  of	  Tuwairij	  (today’s	  
al-­‐Hindiyya),	  damaged	  the	  Beni	  Hassan	  and	  several	  other	  important	  irrigation	  canals,	  
and	  inundated	  60,000	  acres	  of	  crops	  in	  the	  Middle	  Euphrates	  region	  alone.	  If	  the	  
partially	  functional	  Euphrates	  flood	  escape	  had	  not	  been	  used,	  the	  Directorate	  warned	  
that	  “the	  whole	  of	  the	  country	  downstream	  of	  the	  [Hindiyya]	  Barrage	  would	  have	  been	  
flooded.”69	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68	  See	  the	  Introduction	  for	  further	  information	  on	  Willcocks’	  scheme.	  
69	  To	  put	  this	  in	  perspective,	  the	  Hindiyya	  Barrage	  is	  five	  hundred	  kilometers	  
(approximately	  three	  hundred	  miles)	  from	  the	  Persian	  Gulf.	  Irrigation	  Directorate	  
(1919),	  10.	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   For	  the	  British,	  the	  devastation	  demonstrated	  the	  need	  for	  a	  modern,	  
comprehensive	  river	  management	  plan.70	  If	  even	  the	  newest	  and	  strongest	  flood	  
protection	  built	  by	  British	  engineers	  could	  be	  overcome,	  some	  other	  way	  of	  controlling	  
the	  rivers	  must	  be	  found.	  As	  with	  the	  initial	  program	  of	  works	  undertaken	  by	  the	  
Directorate,	  the	  proposed	  management	  plans	  encountered	  considerable	  difficulties	  and	  
provoked	  controversy.	  In	  the	  eleven	  months	  following	  the	  devastating	  February	  floods,	  
imperial	  irrigation	  departments	  from	  India	  to	  Egypt	  squabbled	  over	  the	  question	  of	  
what	  to	  do	  to	  mitigate	  these	  natural	  disasters.	  	  
Underlying	  this	  techno-­‐scientific	  controversy	  over	  river	  management	  was	  a	  
broader	  question.	  The	  troubles	  faced	  by	  the	  Irrigation	  Directorate	  in	  its	  program	  of	  
works	  and	  the	  disastrous	  winter	  floods	  had	  underlined	  the	  amorphous	  and	  precarious	  
state	  of	  British	  administration	  in	  Iraq.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  British	  management	  plan	  for	  the	  
Tigris	  and	  Euphrates	  Rivers	  was	  not	  simply	  about	  the	  rivers.	  It	  was	  also	  a	  management	  
plan	  for	  Iraq.	  	  
The	  dispute	  emanated	  from	  the	  only	  comprehensive	  river	  management	  plan	  the	  
British	  had	  on	  hand,	  that	  of	  William	  Willcocks.	  According	  to	  Willcocks’s	  report	  to	  the	  
Ottoman	  government,	  the	  two	  rivers	  entered	  their	  delta	  above	  Baghdad,	  a	  fact	  that	  
heavily	  influenced	  his	  ideas	  about	  how	  to	  control	  them:	  	  
The	  Tigris-­‐Euphrates	  delta	  is	  strangely	  flat.	  Baghdad,	  removed	  some	  500	  
miles	  from	  the	  sea	  is	  only	  120	  feet	  above	  sea-­‐level…a	  very	  serious	  breach	  
on	  the	  Tigris	  or	  the	  Euphrates	  has	  been	  followed	  by	  the	  river	  completely	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70	  Iraqis	  had	  for	  centuries	  met	  the	  rivers’	  floods	  with	  adaptations	  such	  as	  a	  flexible	  social	  
structure	  that	  emphasized	  mobility,	  common	  efforts	  toward	  flood	  protection	  and	  
collective	  ownership	  of	  land.	  For	  more	  on	  this,	  see	  Robert	  Fernea,	  Shaykh	  and	  Effendi	  
and	  Batatu,	  Old	  Social	  Classes,	  8-­‐12.	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leaving	  its	  channel	  and	  forming	  a	  new	  one	  miles	  away,	  after	  inundating	  
the	  whole	  country.	  Such	  was	  Noah’s	  flood	  in	  the	  early	  days	  of	  the	  World’s	  
history.71	  
Willcocks	  maintained	  that	  the	  only	  way	  to	  provide	  security	  from	  this	  kind	  of	  flooding	  in	  
a	  region	  so	  “strangely	  flat”	  was	  to	  build	  escapes	  in	  the	  banks	  of	  the	  rivers	  and	  divert	  
floodwater	  into	  nearby	  depressions.	  
	   Baghdad’s	  Deputy	  Director	  of	  Irrigation,	  H.	  Walton,	  thought	  Willcocks	  wrong.	  The	  
policy	  of	  building	  flood	  escapes	  was,	  he	  wrote,	  “nothing	  less	  than	  a	  most	  dangerous	  
delusion.”72	  Escapes	  such	  as	  those	  proposed	  by	  Willcocks	  may	  have	  saved	  the	  rich	  
agricultural	  region	  below	  the	  Hindiyya	  Barrage	  from	  even	  greater	  disaster,	  but	  missed	  
the	  overall	  picture.	  The	  water	  lost	  to	  these	  escapes	  reduced	  the	  volume	  of	  water	  passing	  
downstream.	  According	  to	  Walton,	  this	  meant	  that	  the	  river	  downstream	  remained	  
narrow	  and	  shallow,	  threatening	  navigation,	  complicating	  drainage	  and	  creating	  worse	  
flooding.	  Walton	  did	  not	  believe	  the	  rivers	  entered	  their	  delta	  above	  Baghdad	  but	  
somewhere	  far	  below	  it,	  near	  Basra.	  Since	  Willcocks’s	  plan	  was	  “nothing	  more	  than	  
‘delta’	  treatment,”	  it	  would	  be	  a	  mistake	  to	  implement	  it.	  To	  Walton,	  the	  main	  problem	  
with	  managing	  the	  rivers	  was	  not	  topography,	  but	  human	  beings:	  
For	  the	  last	  6,000	  years—or	  may	  be	  more—since	  irrigation	  of	  any	  sort	  
was	  practised	  in	  the	  country	  the	  hand	  of	  man	  has	  been	  applied,	  not	  
scientifically	  but	  very	  unscientifically,	  to	  the	  rivers.	  ...It	  has	  been	  the	  
unwillingness	  to	  admit	  failure	  and	  the	  steady	  pursuit	  of	  success	  over	  
centuries	  that	  is	  the	  root	  of	  the	  evil;	  and	  such	  success	  as	  was	  attained—
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71	  Willcocks,	  Irrigation	  in	  Mesopotamia,	  xii.	  
72	  H.	  Walton,	  “Tigris	  Floods	  1919,”	  7.	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being	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  the	  rivers—has	  made	  subsequent	  success	  a	  
steadily	  diminishing	  quantity	  up	  to	  the	  present	  time.73	  
Walton’s	  aim	  was	  to	  return	  the	  rivers	  to	  their	  “natural”	  state.	  Tampering	  with	  the	  rivers’	  
true	  nature	  had	  resulted	  in	  such	  damage	  that	  the	  Tigris	  and	  Euphrates	  were	  now	  
menaces	  to	  life	  and	  property	  and	  no	  longer	  useful	  and	  productive	  as	  rivers.	  From	  
Walton’s	  perspective,	  Willcocks’s	  “scientific”	  tampering,	  which	  in	  his	  opinion	  did	  
nothing	  to	  right	  the	  wrongs	  of	  the	  past,	  could	  be	  just	  as	  bad.	  	  
To	  bring	  the	  rivers	  back	  into	  balance,	  Walton	  suggested	  that	  the	  Irrigation	  
Directorate	  follow	  a	  program	  involving	  “the	  regeneration	  of	  the	  rivers.”	  Walton	  asserted	  
that	  regeneration	  would	  make	  it	  possible	  to	  pass	  the	  entirety	  of	  the	  annual	  floodwaters	  
to	  the	  sea.	  Under	  his	  proposal,	  the	  irrigation	  department	  should	  focus	  on	  confining	  the	  
rivers	  to	  their	  banks	  by	  closing	  breaches	  in	  the	  riverbanks	  and	  other	  unmonitored	  
watercourses.	  Many	  of	  these	  breaches	  were	  wasteful	  and	  should	  be	  replaced	  with	  
controlled	  methods	  of	  obtaining	  irrigation	  water.	  Plugging	  these	  openings	  would,	  
Walton	  surmised,	  increase	  the	  volume	  and	  velocity	  of	  the	  water,	  causing	  the	  river	  to	  
scour	  out	  deposited	  silt.	  The	  resultant	  deepening	  of	  the	  riverbed	  would	  then	  allow	  the	  
rivers	  to	  carry	  more	  water.	  Rather	  than	  building	  a	  series	  of	  escapes	  in	  the	  rivers’	  upper	  
reaches	  to	  control	  flooding	  downstream,	  Walton	  advanced	  a	  plan	  to	  work	  from	  the	  
lower	  reaches	  of	  the	  river,	  in	  essence	  “to	  build	  up	  an	  irrigation	  system	  in	  the	  reverse	  
order	  of	  that	  usually	  adopted.”74	  Only	  then	  would	  the	  rivers	  “sink	  themselves	  into	  their	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beds”	  and	  act	  as	  rivers	  rather	  than	  marsh	  makers.75	  Once	  the	  rivers’	  lower	  sections	  were	  
made	  capable	  of	  handling	  more	  water,	  work	  could	  begin	  on	  the	  upper	  reaches.	  Walton’s	  
arguments	  convinced	  his	  superiors,	  who	  had	  seen	  the	  problems	  created	  in	  that	  year’s	  
floods.	  	  
Baghdad’s	  new	  policy	  nettled	  Willcocks’s	  colleagues	  at	  the	  Egyptian	  Irrigation	  
Department.	  Engineers	  there	  complained	  that	  Walton’s	  ideas	  would	  lead	  to	  disaster.	  
They	  agreed	  with	  Willcocks	  that	  the	  two	  rivers	  were	  in	  their	  delta	  for	  most	  of	  their	  
journey	  through	  Iraq	  and	  therefore	  could	  not	  be	  controlled	  in	  the	  ways	  envisioned.76	  	  
British	  engineers	  in	  Cairo	  thought	  “Walton’s	  ideas	  to	  be	  impracticable”	  and	  they	  hinted	  
“that	  regeneration	  and	  rubbish	  are	  synonymous	  terms.”77	  Back	  in	  Baghdad,	  Walton	  
retorted	  that	  the	  rivers	  exhibited	  “deltaic”	  features,	  but	  should	  not	  actually	  be	  in	  their	  
delta	  until	  Basra.	  
After	  nearly	  a	  year	  of	  discussion,	  in	  late	  1919	  Evelyn	  Howell,	  the	  Revenue	  
Secretary	  and	  assistant	  to	  Civil	  Commissioner	  Arnold	  Wilson,	  responded	  to	  the	  
arguments,	  asking	  in	  exasperation,	  “When	  is	  a	  delta	  not	  a	  delta?”78	  Howell	  regarded	  this	  
question	  as	  “the	  prime	  riddle	  of	  Mesopotamian	  irrigation	  and	  on	  the	  solution	  to	  it	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75	  TNA,	  FO	  141/668/6,	  R.G.	  Garrow	  to	  A.T.	  Wilson,	  “Irrigation	  Policy	  in	  Mesopotamia	  in	  
the	  immediate	  future,”	  4	  February	  1919,	  2.	  
76	  Buckley	  noted,	  “In	  all	  deltaic	  rivers	  the	  flood	  waters	  command	  the	  country	  and	  are	  
frequently	  well	  above	  it	  for	  the	  reason	  that	  the	  land	  is	  a	  creation	  of	  the	  river	  and	  the	  silt	  
which	  it	  deposits.”	  A.	  Burton	  Buckley,	  “Note	  on	  Irrigation	  in	  Mesopotamia,”	  Baghdad	  
Government	  Press,	  1919.	  
77	  Howell,	  “Note	  on	  Irrigation,”	  5.	  
78	  TNA,	  Foreign	  Office	  [FO]	  141/668/6,	  Evelyn	  Berkeley	  Howell,	  “Note	  on	  Irrigation	  in	  
Mesopotamia,”	  December	  1919,	  1.	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large	  measure	  depends	  the	  future	  prosperity	  of	  the	  country.”79	  Howell	  was	  left	  with	  the	  
unenviable	  task	  of	  separating	  fact	  from	  fiction	  and	  crafting	  a	  compromise	  that	  would	  
satisfy	  his	  masters	  in	  Baghdad,	  India	  and	  London.	  	  
Part	  of	  Howell’s	  quandary	  had	  to	  do	  with	  Walton’s	  description	  of	  the	  rivers.	  His	  
account	  departed	  from	  the	  story	  of	  neglect	  that	  characterized	  British	  impressions	  of	  
Mesopotamia.	  Recall	  General	  Sir	  Stanley	  Maude’s	  declaration	  on	  entering	  Baghdad,	  
which	  asserted	  that	  “since	  the	  days	  of	  Midhat,	  the	  Turks	  have	  talked	  of	  reforms,	  yet	  do	  
not	  the	  ruins	  and	  wastes	  of	  today	  testify	  to	  the	  vanity	  of	  those	  promises?”80	  Rather	  than	  
“talk	  of	  reforms,”	  Walton	  instead	  suggested	  that	  a	  surfeit	  of	  interference	  afflicted	  the	  
rivers.	  Whereas	  others	  imagined	  Mesopotamia	  in	  its	  supposed	  golden	  age,	  Walton	  saw	  
only	  six	  millennia	  of	  counterproductive	  intervention.	  Still,	  Walton’s	  determination	  of	  the	  
problem	  found	  a	  supporter	  in	  Howell,	  who	  saw	  in	  this	  characterization	  the	  potential	  for	  
extending	  the	  state’s	  control.	  Howell	  dismissed	  Ottoman	  attempts	  to	  control	  the	  rivers	  
as	  ineffectual	  and	  characterized	  Mesopotamia’s	  population	  as	  driven	  more	  by	  greed	  than	  
a	  sound	  understanding	  of	  the	  local	  environment:	  
If,	  as	  was	  the	  fact,	  the	  Turks	  could	  not	  prevent	  the	  Arab	  tribesmen	  from	  
murdering	  their	  provincial	  governors,	  when	  they	  chose,	  what	  chance	  had	  
they	  of	  successful	  interference	  with	  the	  same	  tribesmens’	  [sic]	  methods	  of	  
cultivation?	  Consequently	  man,	  armed	  with	  the	  little	  knowledge	  that	  is	  so	  
proverbially	  dangerous,	  and	  animated	  by	  true	  Semitic	  desire	  for	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79	  Howell	  “Note	  on	  Irrigation,”	  1.	  
80	  Sir	  Stanley	  Maude,	  "Freedom	  for	  the	  Arabs:	  The	  Baghdad	  of	  the	  Future,"	  The	  Times,	  
March	  19,	  1917,	  7.	  The	  proclamation	  also	  included	  this	  description	  of	  Iraq’s	  condition,	  
“Since	  the	  days	  of	  Halaka	  your	  city	  and	  your	  lands	  have	  been	  subject	  to	  the	  tyranny	  of	  
strangers,	  your	  palaces	  have	  fallen	  into	  ruins,	  your	  gardens	  have	  sunk	  in	  desolation,	  and	  
your	  forefathers	  and	  yourselves	  have	  groaned	  in	  bondage…”	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immediately	  profitable,	  no	  matter	  at	  what	  cost	  to	  his	  neighbor	  or	  to	  
posterity,	  had	  his	  wicked	  will	  of	  the	  river.81	  
Howell’s	  comment	  underlined	  a	  key	  implication	  of	  Walton’s	  verdict.	  Whereas	  Willcocks	  
and	  the	  Ottomans	  saw	  the	  rivers’	  floods	  as	  a	  recurring	  natural	  event	  that	  could	  be	  
mitigated	  with	  manmade	  engineering	  works,	  Walton	  and	  Howell	  resituated	  the	  
question.	  The	  problems	  in	  Iraq’s	  environment	  no	  longer	  had	  to	  do	  with	  topography,	  but	  
with	  its	  people,	  whose	  “wicked	  will”	  had	  brought	  about	  the	  rivers’	  demise.	  	  	  
By	  redefining	  the	  puzzle	  of	  managing	  Iraq’s	  rivers,	  Walton’s	  river	  “regeneration”	  
plan	  solved	  two	  related	  predicaments.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  regeneration	  scheme	  
provided	  a	  vision	  for	  handling	  the	  difficult	  issues	  faced	  by	  the	  Irrigation	  Directorate	  in	  
its	  first	  foray	  into	  the	  Iraqi	  countryside.	  Rather	  than	  Willcocks’s	  pinpoint	  intervention	  in	  
the	  rivers’	  flow,	  which	  would	  have	  centralized	  control	  over	  only	  excess	  floodwater,	  
Walton	  proposed	  regulating	  the	  entirety	  of	  both	  rivers,	  giving	  the	  state	  control	  over	  not	  
only	  the	  floods,	  but	  also	  every	  other	  method	  of	  water	  use.	  Irrigation	  officers	  would	  be	  
charged	  with	  monitoring	  and	  maintaining	  every	  canal,	  ditch	  and	  embankment	  along	  the	  
rivers’	  course.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  now	  that	  the	  problem	  of	  managing	  the	  rivers	  was	  
framed	  as	  including	  a	  social	  problem,	  Walton’s	  plan	  linked	  the	  “natural	  state”	  of	  the	  
rivers	  to	  proper	  control	  over	  Iraq’s	  people,	  all	  of	  which	  was	  to	  be	  achieved	  by	  extending	  
the	  power	  of	  the	  state.	  The	  nineteenth-­‐century	  marriage	  between	  state	  and	  engineer	  in	  
India,	  noted	  by	  Gilmartin,	  was	  reborn	  in	  Iraq	  as	  “regeneration.”	  This	  idea	  provided	  the	  
critical	  justification	  for	  extending	  British	  control	  over	  a	  region	  where	  Britain’s	  position	  
and	  legitimacy	  was	  precarious	  and	  unstable.	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  “Note	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In	  this	  context,	  it	  is	  interesting	  to	  note	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  British	  engineers	  
outside	  Baghdad	  prevailed	  upon	  Howell.	  The	  Revenue	  Secretary	  expressed	  doubts	  as	  to	  
whether	  Walton’s	  diagnosis	  was	  based	  in	  fact,	  even	  if	  his	  management	  plan	  seemed	  the	  
most	  favorable	  to	  British	  aims	  in	  Iraq,	  “So	  then,	  while	  we	  agree	  with	  Major	  Walton	  that	  
land	  which	  was	  once	  delta	  may	  cease	  to	  be	  so,	  we	  will	  reserve	  the	  opinion	  that	  deltaic	  
merges	  into	  non-­‐deltaic	  by	  a	  gradual	  process.”	  Howell,	  the	  layman,	  viewed	  the	  
distinction	  between	  delta	  and	  non-­‐delta	  as	  not	  merely	  a	  scientific	  definition,	  but	  also	  a	  
philosophical	  one,	  a	  matter	  of	  man’s	  propensity	  to	  determine	  a	  fixed	  point	  in	  a	  dynamic	  
system:	  
The	  truth	  is	  that	  in	  nature	  there	  is	  no	  solution	  of	  continuity	  and	  hard	  and	  
fast	  distinctions	  do	  not	  occur.	  White	  always	  shades	  into	  black	  through	  the	  
medium	  of	  grey,	  as	  day	  fades	  through	  twilight	  into	  darkness.	  The	  human	  
mind,	  which	  can	  only	  act	  upon	  definitions,	  makes	  abstractions	  for	  its	  own	  
purposes,	  thereby	  rendering	  the	  acquisition	  of	  knowledge	  possible.82	  
For	  Howell,	  attuned	  to	  the	  changing	  political	  tides	  after	  the	  war,	  the	  lack	  of	  “hard	  and	  
fast	  distinctions”	  called	  for	  a	  hybrid	  policy,	  an	  acknowledgment	  that	  an	  indeterminate	  
problem	  required	  a	  flexible	  response.	  Howell	  therefore	  proclaimed	  his	  approach	  
“modified	  Waltonism”	  and	  enacted	  a	  policy	  of	  restricting	  the	  rivers	  to	  their	  banks	  only	  in	  
those	  areas	  clearly	  suffering	  from	  “man’s	  interference.”83	  How	  exactly	  such	  interference	  
was	  to	  be	  determined	  was	  not	  defined,	  but	  the	  implication	  was	  clear.	  There	  was	  no	  need	  
to	  waste	  resources	  fixing	  nature	  everywhere,	  only	  in	  those	  areas	  where	  Iraq’s	  
inhabitants	  were	  actively	  wreaking	  havoc.	  Howell	  ordered	  unregulated,	  manmade	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withdrawals	  from	  the	  river	  “muzzled,”	  as	  if	  the	  canals	  sustaining	  Iraqi	  agriculture	  were	  
in	  fact	  truculent	  dogs	  that	  should	  be	  brought	  to	  heel.	  The	  river	  was	  then	  to	  be	  given	  time	  
to	  return	  to	  its	  supposed	  natural	  state.	  In	  late	  1919,	  this	  modified	  program	  of	  
regeneration	  became	  official	  British	  policy	  toward	  the	  management	  of	  the	  two	  rivers.	  
Meanwhile,	  senior	  officials	  at	  the	  India	  Office	  in	  London	  reacted	  in	  alarm.	  They	  
brought	  Howell’s	  judgments	  to	  the	  attention	  of	  civil	  engineer	  Francis	  J.E.	  Spring,	  a	  
former	  Chief	  Engineer	  of	  the	  Madras	  port.	  With	  no	  trace	  of	  hyperbole,	  Spring	  exclaimed,	  
“Nothing	  is	  easier,	  in	  such	  conditions	  as	  those	  apparently	  there	  prevailing,	  than	  to	  make	  
an	  error	  of	  policy	  which	  it	  may	  take	  millions	  of	  generations	  to	  correct.”	  According	  to	  
Spring,	  there	  was	  simply	  no	  way	  to	  tell	  who	  was	  right	  in	  this	  situation,	  “Pending	  the	  
production	  of	  a	  contour	  plan	  of	  the	  entire	  country…all	  advice	  as	  to	  what	  to	  do	  with	  the	  
rivers	  can	  be	  little	  better	  than	  intelligent	  guess	  work.”84	  The	  intent	  of	  the	  contour	  plan	  
was	  to	  make	  Iraq’s	  topography	  visible	  to	  engineers	  in	  other	  parts	  of	  the	  world,	  so	  that	  
Walton’s	  plan	  might	  be	  scientifically	  evaluated.	  Spring	  could	  not	  see	  what	  Walton	  and	  
Howell	  could	  see:	  a	  vast	  country,	  recently	  invaded	  and	  full	  of	  obstacles	  to	  effective	  
administration,	  of	  which	  the	  most	  prominent	  were	  two	  mischievous	  rivers	  and	  some	  
millions	  of	  people	  “animated	  by	  true	  Semitic	  desire.”	  To	  Walton	  and	  Howell,	  the	  
regeneration	  plan	  was	  not	  only	  a	  topographical	  problem,	  it	  was	  also	  a	  topographical	  
solution	  to	  a	  sociopolitical	  problem.	  It	  was	  thus	  no	  surprise	  that	  British	  officials	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84	  British	  Library	  [hereafter	  BL],	  India	  Office	  Records	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  J.E.	  
Spring,	  “Irrigation	  in	  Mesopotamia:	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  note	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Baghdad	  happily	  received	  Spring’s	  suggestion	  of	  a	  contour	  plan.	  Such	  a	  plan	  would	  be	  
quite	  useful	  to	  the	  “modified	  Waltonism”	  policy	  already	  enacted.	  	  
In	  the	  end,	  neither	  “modified	  Waltonism”	  nor	  a	  contour	  plan	  came	  to	  be.	  By	  the	  
time	  Spring’s	  comments	  reached	  the	  Irrigation	  Directorate,	  Britain’s	  post-­‐war	  financial	  
situation	  diminished	  interest	  in	  a	  full	  remaking	  of	  Mesopotamia	  and	  precipitated	  a	  
rethinking	  of	  the	  British	  position	  in	  Iraq.	  In	  April	  1919,	  the	  British	  transformed	  their	  
military-­‐led	  government	  into	  a	  full-­‐fledged	  civil	  administration.	  Even	  as	  Howell	  sorted	  
out	  the	  continent-­‐spanning	  quarrel	  over	  a	  new	  river	  management	  plan,	  the	  civil	  
administration	  began	  slashing	  the	  budget	  and	  personnel	  of	  Iraq’s	  irrigation	  department.	  
Demobilization	  and	  reassignments	  claimed	  much	  of	  the	  officer-­‐level	  staff,	  many	  of	  
whom	  were	  sent	  back	  to	  their	  original	  posts	  in	  India.	  The	  department	  eliminated	  three	  
irrigation	  districts	  and	  abolished	  separate	  deputy	  directorates	  for	  the	  Tigris	  and	  
Euphrates,	  including	  Walton’s	  own	  position,	  and	  replaced	  them	  with	  a	  single	  deputy	  
director	  in	  Baghdad.	  The	  subordinate	  staff,	  mostly	  of	  Indian	  origin,	  was	  cut	  by	  fifteen	  
percent.85	  
Walton’s	  idea	  of	  regenerating	  the	  river	  fell	  by	  the	  wayside	  and	  its	  progenitor	  was	  
reassigned.	  Howell	  described	  the	  work	  completed	  by	  the	  department	  in	  the	  latter	  half	  of	  
1919	  as	  a:	  
small	  and	  unambitious	  programme	  of	  minor	  works…forced	  upon	  us	  by	  the	  
facts	  that	  we	  have	  not	  as	  yet	  collected	  sufficient	  data	  to	  make	  it	  safe	  to	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  TNA,	  WO	  95/4993,	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  Berkeley	  Howell,	  “Administration	  Report	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Directorate,	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  31st	  December	  1919,”	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embark	  upon	  large	  and	  comprehensive	  schemes	  and	  also	  by	  the	  still	  
sterner	  fact	  that,	  even	  if	  we	  had	  the	  data,	  we	  have	  not	  the	  money.86	  	  
Even	  worse	  for	  the	  river	  plan,	  the	  data	  necessary	  was	  not	  even	  being	  collected	  at	  this	  
point,	  as	  the	  civil	  administration	  instructed	  the	  Irrigation	  Directorate	  to	  shed	  more	  of	  its	  
local	  staff	  and	  cease	  irrigation	  measurements.	  Rather	  than	  building	  on	  the	  engineering	  
and	  surveying	  work	  undertaken	  before	  and	  after	  the	  war,	  the	  new	  Iraqi	  administration	  
abandoned	  data	  collection	  altogether.	  In	  May	  1920,	  a	  cynical	  Howell	  commented:	  	  
The	  discontinuance	  of	  Irrigation	  measurements	  in	  most	  divisions	  might	  be	  
regarded	  as	  a	  retrograde	  step.	  But…	  it	  is	  not	  likely	  that,	  for	  many	  years	  to	  
come,	  if	  ever,	  the	  people	  of	  this	  country	  will	  be	  ripe	  for	  a	  detailed	  control	  
by	  extraneous	  agency	  of	  the	  water-­‐supply	  on	  their	  fields.87	  
Again,	  the	  Iraqi	  people	  were	  at	  fault.	  Not	  only	  would	  Walton’s	  plan	  have	  been	  too	  costly	  
to	  implement,	  but	  the	  river-­‐destroying	  people	  of	  Iraq	  were	  simply	  not	  ready	  for	  such	  
extraordinary	  state	  intervention	  on	  their	  behalf.	  
	   Britain’s	  abandonment	  of	  a	  river	  management	  plan	  was	  not	  simply	  a	  change	  from	  
a	  military	  administration	  modeled	  on	  the	  British-­‐Indian	  experience	  to	  a	  financially	  
strapped	  civil	  one	  doing	  its	  best	  to	  create	  a	  “modern,	  liberal	  state.”	  Rather,	  it	  was	  a	  shift	  
away	  from	  an	  imperial	  vision	  of	  Iraq’s	  resources	  to	  one	  of	  “quasi-­‐state”	  extraction,	  a	  
decision	  with	  dire	  implications	  for	  Iraq’s	  environment	  and	  population.	  Once	  the	  British	  
succeeded	  in	  putting	  down	  the	  1920	  rebellion	  against	  its	  “mandate,”	  administrators	  in	  
Baghdad	  focused	  on	  obtaining	  as	  much	  revenue	  from	  the	  country	  as	  possible	  to	  offset	  
the	  costs	  of	  occupying	  and	  ruling	  Iraq,	  while	  also	  maintaining	  British	  control	  over	  key	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  Ibid.,	  1.	  
87	  Ibid.,	  2.	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components	  of	  state	  power.	  The	  devolution	  of	  power	  to	  the	  Iraqi	  government	  was	  
piecemeal	  and	  calculated	  to	  leave	  the	  most	  important	  reins	  in	  British	  hands.	  In	  terms	  of	  
water	  resources,	  the	  goal	  then	  was	  to	  invest	  as	  little	  money	  as	  possible	  in	  flood	  and	  
other	  works,	  but	  to	  emphasize	  agricultural	  production	  and	  trade	  to	  generate	  revenue.	  
These	  policies	  were	  designed	  to	  facilitate	  Britain’s	  particular	  designs	  in	  Iraq,	  but	  had	  
deleterious	  effects	  on	  the	  country’s	  social	  framework,	  a	  system	  of	  social	  and	  political	  
relations	  that	  was	  peculiarly	  suited	  to	  dealing	  with	  Iraq’s	  environment.	  Moreover,	  the	  
intensification	  of	  agriculture	  undertaken	  by	  Baghdad	  had	  a	  decidedly	  negative	  effect	  on	  
the	  two	  rivers	  and	  the	  land	  they	  irrigated,	  leading	  to	  significant	  wastage	  and	  longer-­‐
term	  effects	  such	  as	  salinization,	  which	  further	  exacerbated	  the	  rural	  social	  changes	  
already	  in	  motion.	  In	  this	  shift	  away	  from	  the	  nineteenth-­‐century	  mode	  of	  imperial	  
domination,	  the	  British	  were	  indeed	  building	  a	  modern,	  liberal	  state,	  just	  not	  one	  in	  Iraq.	  
They	  were	  building	  their	  own.	  
	  
The	  Floods	  of	  the	  1920s:	  Modernity	  and	  Disaster	  in	  Mesopotamia	  
Postwar	  strains	  on	  the	  British	  Treasury	  and	  the	  process	  of	  demobilization,	  
combined	  with	  the	  Iraqi	  revolt	  of	  1920	  against	  the	  colonial	  government,	  compelled	  
British	  leaders	  to	  consider	  abandoning	  Mesopotamia	  altogether.88	  In	  the	  end,	  the	  British	  
settled	  on	  a	  method	  whereby	  Iraq’s	  people	  would	  bear	  the	  expense	  of	  creating	  a	  
government	  that,	  while	  attempting	  at	  times	  to	  wring	  more	  power	  from	  London,	  was	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  Sluglett,	  Britain	  in	  Iraq,	  39.	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always	  a	  creation	  of	  and	  utterly	  dependent	  on	  Great	  Britain.	  In	  its	  first	  report	  to	  the	  
League	  of	  Nations,	  the	  Colonial	  Office	  declared	  that:	  	  
The	  situation,	  therefore,	  at	  the	  outset	  of	  the	  new	  Government,	  with	  these	  
serious	  losses,	  and	  with	  the	  new	  burden	  of	  increased	  military	  expenditure	  
impending,	  made	  it	  necessary	  for	  them	  at	  once	  to	  retrench	  in	  every	  
possible	  direction	  until	  they	  were	  able	  to	  discover	  fresh	  sources	  of	  
revenue.89	  
This	  burden,	  whereby	  Iraq’s	  new	  government	  began	  its	  existence	  already	  in	  financial	  
stress,	  was	  only	  increased	  as	  Britain	  demanded	  that	  Iraq	  not	  only	  pay	  for	  its	  share	  of	  the	  
Ottoman	  debt,	  but	  also	  for	  the	  various	  “improvements”	  the	  British	  had	  built	  when	  they	  
invaded	  the	  country.	  	  Charges	  against	  Iraq	  for	  these	  items	  “meant	  that	  the	  country	  began	  
its	  existence	  in	  1921	  with	  an	  immediate	  deficit	  of	  95	  lakhs	  of	  rupees	  (about	  £63,000).”90	  
This	  indebtedness	  served	  several	  purposes.	  Though	  it	  complicated	  British	  officials’	  
vision	  for	  creating	  a	  civilization	  in	  Iraq	  rivaling	  ancient	  Babylon,	  it	  made	  those	  items,	  
such	  as	  a	  large	  conscript	  army,	  that	  might	  complicate	  or	  diminish	  Britain’s	  position	  in	  
Iraq	  unaffordable.	  	  	  
	   For	  Iraq’s	  new	  Irrigation	  Department,	  founded	  in	  1921	  as	  part	  of	  a	  new	  Ministry	  
of	  Communications	  and	  Public	  Works,	  the	  country’s	  financial	  position	  meant	  that	  
arguably	  the	  government’s	  most	  important	  department	  was	  significantly	  reduced	  in	  
responsibilities	  and	  scope,	  even	  when	  considering	  the	  reductions	  of	  1919.	  The	  British	  
government	  reported	  that	  the	  Department	  “ceased	  to	  exercise	  any	  control	  over	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89	  Colonial	  Office,	  Report	  on	  ‘Iraq	  Administration,	  October,	  1920	  –	  March,	  1922	  (London:	  
His	  Majesty’s	  Stationery	  Office),	  38.	  
90	  These	  improvements	  included	  the	  railways	  built	  by	  the	  British	  to	  facilitate	  the	  
invasion,	  many	  of	  which	  had	  no	  commercial	  value.	  Sluglett,	  Britain	  in	  Iraq,	  62	  and	  87-­‐91.	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water	  distribution	  of	  canals,	  the	  maintenance	  of	  canals	  and	  the	  construction	  of	  bunds	  on	  
the	  Euphrates.”	  While	  the	  Irrigation	  Department	  remained	  responsible	  for	  flood	  control	  
on	  the	  Tigris	  because	  of	  the	  river’s	  potential	  threat	  to	  the	  capital,	  on	  the	  Euphrates	  it	  
retained	  responsibility	  only	  for	  technically	  complex	  constructions,	  such	  as	  the	  masonry	  
heads	  of	  canals	  and	  maintenance	  of	  the	  Hindiyya	  barrage.	  Despite	  complaints	  from	  
cultivators,	  who	  requested	  the	  renewal	  of	  irrigation	  control	  to	  determine	  a	  fair	  
distribution	  of	  water,	  “due	  to	  the	  reduced	  establishment	  under	  the	  new	  organization	  
these	  requests	  could	  not	  be	  entertained.”91	  	  
In	  1923,	  the	  problem	  of	  meager	  budgets	  for	  river	  control	  became	  apparent.	  
Prolonged	  floods	  greater	  than	  in	  1919	  wreaked	  havoc	  along	  the	  Euphrates,	  with	  high	  
water	  at	  Ramadi	  lasting	  over	  a	  month.	  The	  flood	  inundated	  335	  square	  miles	  in	  the	  
Baghdad	  province	  alone.92	  On	  the	  morning	  of	  March	  23,	  1923,	  a	  floating	  bridge	  across	  
the	  Tigris	  at	  Baghdad,	  named	  for	  the	  city’s	  “liberator”	  General	  Sir	  Stanley	  Maude,	  
collapsed	  under	  the	  strain.	  The	  Times	  reported	  that	  “the	  steel	  girders	  were	  twisted	  all	  
shapes,	  and	  the	  fifteen	  pontoons	  are	  now	  dashing	  downstream	  in	  the	  direction	  of	  
Basra.”93	  The	  Royal	  Air	  Force,	  ever	  the	  government’s	  savior,	  was	  sent	  to	  locate	  them	  
before	  they	  could	  damage	  river	  steamers	  and	  other	  vessels.	  As	  for	  Baghdad	  itself,	  the	  
city	  was	  saved	  only	  because	  of	  a	  breach	  in	  a	  flood	  embankment	  north	  of	  the	  city,	  which	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91	  Colonial	  Office,	  Report	  on	  ‘Iraq	  Administration	  1920-­‐1922,	  88.	  
92	  Ahmad	  Sousa,	  Fayaḍanat	  Baghdad,	  531-­‐533.	  For	  reference	  sake,	  the	  total	  land	  area	  of	  
New	  York	  City	  is	  305	  square	  miles.	  The	  Euphrates	  at	  Ramadi	  crested	  at	  49.67	  meters	  
and	  remained	  above	  49	  meters	  from	  29	  April	  to	  31	  May.	  
93	  "Baghdad	  in	  Danger	  from	  Floods:	  Maude	  Bridge	  Carried	  Away,"	  The	  Times,	  March	  24,	  
1923,	  10.	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flooded	  200	  square	  miles.	  The	  damage	  done	  by	  the	  flood	  was	  still	  quite	  noticeable	  six	  
months	  later,	  when	  Gertrude	  Bell	  noted:	  
On	  Saturday	  I	  rode	  out	  to	  see	  the	  Arab	  Army	  play	  polo…	  But	  it's	  sad	  to	  ride	  
out	  over	  that	  great	  stretch	  of	  desert	  which	  had	  been	  converted	  first	  by	  our	  
army	  into	  a	  wonderful	  farm	  and	  was	  then	  taken	  over	  by	  the	  King.	  The	  
floods	  of	  last	  spring	  have	  sent	  it	  back	  to	  desert,	  the	  roads	  are	  blotted	  out,	  
the	  irrigation	  channels	  half	  filled	  in	  and	  the	  young	  trees	  which	  the	  King	  
planted	  in	  hundreds,	  all	  killed	  or	  uprooted.	  And	  all	  the	  desert	  which	  was	  
under	  water	  is	  horrid	  to	  ride	  on,	  covered	  with	  a	  cracked	  mud	  surface	  and	  
full	  of	  holes.94	  	  
Despite	  the	  flooding	  in	  1923,	  little	  was	  done	  to	  meet	  future	  natural	  disasters.	  In	  1925,	  
the	  Colonial	  Office	  sent	  two	  members	  of	  its	  Middle	  East	  department,	  E.	  Hilton	  Young	  and	  
R.	  V.	  Vernon,	  to	  sort	  out	  Iraq’s	  perennially	  overextended	  finances.	  The	  two	  officials	  
recommended	  that	  the	  government	  cut	  positions	  and	  salaries	  in	  its	  Ministries	  of	  Health,	  
Education,	  Agriculture	  and	  Irrigation.95	  Accordingly,	  the	  Iraqi	  government	  slashed	  the	  
Irrigation	  Department’s	  already	  meager	  budget	  allotment	  for	  protective	  works	  by	  more	  
than	  sixty	  percent,	  reduced	  the	  officer	  staff	  to	  a	  single	  man	  and	  cut	  the	  subordinate	  staff	  
by	  sixty-­‐five	  percent.	  The	  department	  only	  had	  enough	  money	  and	  manpower	  to	  
strengthen	  flood	  protection	  in	  an	  area	  north	  of	  Baghdad,	  leaving	  much	  of	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  
city	  unprotected,	  not	  to	  mention	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  country.	  Mere	  days	  before	  the	  arrival	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94	  Gertrude	  Bell,	  The	  Letters	  of	  Gertrude	  Bell	  (New	  York:	  Boni	  and	  Liveright,	  1927),	  letter	  
of	  11	  September	  1923.	  
95	  Sluglett,	  Britain	  in	  Iraq,	  89.	  Sluglett	  goes	  on	  to	  mention	  a	  May	  1925	  article	  in	  the	  
newspaper	  al-­‐‘Iraq	  which	  noted	  [Sluglett’s	  words]:	  “since	  irrigation	  was	  the	  chief	  means	  
by	  which	  the	  government	  might	  hope	  to	  increase	  its	  resources,	  it	  was	  sheer	  madness	  to	  
restrict	  that	  ministry’s	  activities.”	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the	  1926	  floods,	  the	  government	  recognized	  the	  danger	  and	  allocated	  twenty-­‐one	  
additional	  temporary	  staff.96	  
On	  April	  6,	  Baghdad	  received	  word	  from	  Mosul	  that	  a	  very	  serious	  flood	  on	  the	  
Tigris	  would	  reach	  the	  city	  within	  the	  next	  forty-­‐eight	  hours.	  Irrigation	  officers	  in	  Iraq	  
commenced	  their	  flood	  preparations	  and	  ordered	  the	  closure	  of	  all	  culverts,	  the	  
channels	  through	  the	  protective	  embankments	  (bunds)	  that	  brought	  irrigation	  water	  
from	  the	  river	  to	  the	  fields.97	  While	  an	  irrigation	  officer	  generally	  oversaw	  construction	  
of	  the	  embankments,	  the	  culverts	  were	  built	  and	  owned	  by	  private	  individuals.	  They	  
constituted	  a	  considerable	  danger	  during	  a	  high	  flood	  as	  they	  weakened	  the	  
embankment	  and,	  with	  enough	  water	  pressure,	  could	  lead	  to	  a	  serious	  breach.	  Due	  to	  
the	  nature	  of	  the	  surrounding	  land,	  a	  serious	  breach	  often	  involved	  the	  flooding	  of	  
hundreds	  of	  square	  miles.	  	  
On	  April	  8,	  an	  employee	  of	  King	  Faysal	  requested	  permission	  from	  the	  British	  
Adviser	  in	  the	  Irrigation	  Department,	  L.E.	  Bury,	  to	  open	  a	  culvert	  near	  the	  royal	  palace	  
north	  of	  Baghdad.	  A	  pump	  system	  normally	  serviced	  the	  king’s	  land,	  but	  it	  was	  out	  of	  
commission	  due	  to	  high	  water.	  Permission	  was	  denied	  and	  when	  an	  irrigation	  officer	  
later	  discovered	  the	  culvert	  open,	  he	  ordered	  it	  closed	  and	  asked	  the	  police	  to	  fine	  the	  
culvert	  owner.98	  On	  the	  morning	  of	  April	  9,	  agents	  working	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  
Administrator	  of	  the	  King’s	  Estate,	  Tawfiq	  Beg,	  opened	  the	  culvert	  again	  and	  within	  a	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  TNA,	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  Office	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  Report	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97	  Bury,	  “Tigris	  Flood	  Report,”	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98	  The	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  was	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  culvert	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  connections	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few	  hours	  the	  embankment	  collapsed	  and	  the	  resulting	  breach	  grew	  so	  large	  that	  it	  
could	  not	  be	  repaired	  (see	  Illustration	  2).99	  Water	  drowned	  the	  palace,	  forcing	  the	  
evacuation	  of	  the	  royal	  family,	  and	  rushed	  toward	  Baghdad,	  following	  the	  palace	  road	  
toward	  the	  next	  line	  of	  defense,	  the	  Sarrafiyah	  dyke,	  built	  in	  1918	  by	  British	  troops,	  
which	  protected	  the	  northern	  part	  of	  the	  city.	  	  
On	  the	  other	  side	  of	  this	  dyke	  stood	  the	  Baghdad	  North	  Gate	  Rail	  Station	  and	  a	  
hospital.	  By	  5:45pm	  that	  evening,	  the	  water	  reached	  its	  full	  height	  along	  the	  Sarrafiyah,	  
at	  which	  point	  a	  twenty-­‐five	  foot	  wide	  breach	  opened	  literally	  under	  the	  feet	  of	  local	  
workers.	  Floodwater	  then	  met	  another	  barrier,	  the	  main	  road,	  which	  the	  railway	  
engineers	  and	  staff	  thought	  solid	  enough	  to	  protect	  the	  rail	  station	  from	  any	  serious	  
flooding.	  Rather	  than	  evacuate	  the	  station,	  they	  went	  about	  preparing	  the	  night	  train	  for	  
Khanaqin,	  a	  city	  to	  the	  northeast	  of	  Baghdad	  on	  the	  Persian	  frontier.	  	  	  
A	  few	  hours	  later,	  with	  water	  lapping	  at	  the	  edges	  of	  the	  road,	  the	  station	  
received	  a	  call	  to	  also	  ready	  a	  troop	  train	  to	  collect	  two	  thousand	  men,	  one	  thousand	  
horses	  and	  one	  hundred	  transport	  wagons	  from	  Baqubah	  to	  help	  in	  protecting	  Baghdad	  
from	  the	  ever-­‐rising	  Tigris.	  By	  8:30pm,	  the	  water	  was	  rising	  in	  the	  goods	  yard	  of	  the	  
station	  and	  by	  9:45pm	  the	  water	  was	  knee-­‐deep.	  The	  station	  staff	  managed	  to	  evacuate	  
the	  troop	  train,	  but	  about	  thirty	  minutes	  later,	  the	  floodwaters	  were	  “rising	  round	  the	  
quarters	  of	  the	  staff,	  houses	  were	  collapsing	  and	  it	  became	  difficult	  for	  officials	  to	  keep	  
control	  over	  the	  workmen	  who	  were	  naturally	  anxious	  for	  the	  safety	  of	  their	  families.”	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By	  midnight	  the	  Tigris	  had	  inundated	  the	  entirety	  of	  the	  Baghdad	  North	  Gate	  rail	  station,	  
destroying	  over	  320	  wagons	  of	  goods	  and	  80,000	  parcels	  (see	  Figure	  3).	  	  
The	  flooding	  was	  also	  far	  from	  over.	  Several	  days	  later,	  Gertrude	  Bell	  reported	  
her	  own	  experience	  of	  the	  flood:	  
Our	  chief	  preoccupation	  during	  the	  past	  week	  has	  been	  water…	  On	  Friday	  
the	  Tigris	  dyke	  broke	  on	  the	  left	  bank—my	  bank—above	  the	  King's	  palace	  
which	  it	  flooded….from	  then	  until	  now	  we	  have	  never	  been	  sure	  that	  it	  
would	  not	  break	  through	  and	  flood	  the	  low	  lying	  parts	  of	  the	  town,	  which	  
include	  my	  quarter!	  I	  think	  that	  risk	  is	  over	  now,	  unless	  the	  Tigris	  again	  
does	  something	  very	  perverse,	  but	  the	  possibility	  of	  having	  6ft.	  of	  water	  in	  
one's	  house	  hasn't	  been	  pleasant.	  How	  dreadfully	  annoyed	  I	  should	  have	  
been,	  to	  be	  sure.	  It	  has	  been	  difficult	  to	  think	  of	  anything	  else.	  They	  have	  
brought	  in	  thousands	  of	  peasants	  and	  propped	  the	  banks	  with	  reed	  mats	  
and	  sand	  bags,	  but	  the	  worst	  is	  when	  the	  water	  begins	  to	  drip	  in	  through	  
rotten	  places	  in	  the	  lower	  parts	  of	  the	  dyke.	  They	  have	  electric	  light	  all	  
along	  and	  people	  watching	  and	  looking	  night,	  and	  day.	  	  
The	  Arabs	  are	  so	  incurably	  careless;	  they	  won't	  shut	  their	  channels	  when	  
the	  flood	  is	  coming	  down	  and	  then	  it	  finds	  a	  way	  in	  and	  breaks	  through.	  ...	  
This	  is	  a	  country	  of	  extremes.	  It's	  either	  dying	  of	  thirst	  or	  it's	  dying	  of	  
being	  drowned.	  Bagdad	  can	  never	  be	  made	  really	  safe,	  it	  lies	  in	  such	  low	  
ground;	  but	  I	  expect	  that	  after	  this	  experience,	  following	  on	  that	  of	  1923,	  
they	  will	  do	  a	  great	  deal	  to	  make	  it	  safer.	  The	  whole	  desert	  to	  the	  east	  is	  
under	  water	  for	  miles	  and	  miles;	  now	  the	  Euphrates	  is	  beginning	  and	  it's	  
to	  be	  hoped	  that	  it	  won't	  lay	  under	  water	  the	  whole	  desert	  to	  the	  west!	  
Anyhow	  it	  can't	  destroy	  my	  house,	  which	  is	  something.100	  
As	  Bell	  noted,	  the	  Euphrates	  began	  by	  the	  middle	  of	  April	  to	  add	  to	  the	  misery.	  The	  
valleys	  of	  the	  Middle	  and	  Lower	  Euphrates	  flooded	  to	  create	  a	  river	  fifty	  miles	  wide,	  
slowly	  working	  its	  way	  to	  the	  Persian	  Gulf.101	  However,	  this	  experience	  did	  not	  produce	  
the	  kind	  of	  response	  that	  Bell	  imagined.	  Baghdad	  did	  not	  become	  safe	  from	  floods	  for	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another	  three	  decades,	  though	  the	  1926	  disaster	  did	  initiate	  a	  debate	  as	  to	  what	  could	  be	  
done.	  	  
	  	   L.	  E.	  Bury’s	  report	  on	  the	  flood	  contained	  a	  number	  of	  prescriptions.	  The	  proposal	  
he	  most	  forcefully	  advocated,	  however,	  he	  knew	  would	  be	  seen	  as	  radical.	  Bury	  declared	  
that	  the	  only	  way	  to	  defend	  Baghdad	  from	  the	  Tigris	  was	  to	  move	  the	  entire	  city	  to	  a	  
safer	  location:	  
Possibly	  the	  cheapest	  in	  the	  long	  run	  and	  certainly	  the	  safest	  proposal	  for	  
the	  safety	  of	  the	  city	  would	  be	  to	  rebuild	  it	  on	  the	  high	  land	  near	  Tel	  
Mohammed…laying	  out	  a	  fine	  modern	  city…connected	  to	  the	  old	  city	  and	  
to	  a	  fresh	  port	  on	  the	  Diyala	  by	  a	  double	  or	  quadruple	  line	  of	  Tramways.	  
It	  would	  be	  a	  city	  capable	  of	  being	  served	  with	  all	  the	  modern	  
requirements	  such	  as	  roads,	  water,	  light	  and	  sewerage	  in	  a	  manner	  that	  it	  
will	  never	  be	  possible	  to	  obtain	  in	  Baghdad…102	  
Bury’s	  romantic	  vision	  of	  a	  new	  Baghdad	  that,	  instead	  of	  lurching	  from	  the	  perils	  of	  one	  
flood	  season	  to	  another,	  provided	  every	  modern	  convenience	  to	  its	  citizens	  hearkened	  
back	  to	  earlier	  British	  ideas	  about	  how	  to	  revivify	  Mesopotamia.	  Still,	  this	  vision	  
deviated	  from	  the	  more	  common	  trope	  of	  returning	  Iraq	  to	  its	  former	  glory.	  Moving	  the	  
ancient	  city	  from	  its	  current	  site	  would	  have	  struck	  advocates	  of	  a	  revitalized	  Babylon	  or	  
Abassid	  caliphate	  as	  heresy.	  
	  	   Bury,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  was	  well	  aware	  that	  the	  Baghdad	  of	  1926	  already	  
differed	  substantially	  from	  the	  ancient	  circular	  metropolis.	  To	  reinforce	  understanding	  
of	  the	  difficulties	  facing	  the	  city,	  Bury	  introduced	  a	  familiar	  source,	  William	  Willcocks’s	  
“Irrigation	  in	  Mesopotamia.”	  Willcocks	  imagined	  a	  floodwater	  escape	  from	  the	  Tigris	  
into	  a	  depression	  near	  Samarra	  (the	  Wadi	  Tharthar),	  but	  knew	  it	  would	  be	  a	  costly	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endeavor	  and	  provided	  no	  detailed	  construction	  plans.103	  He	  therefore	  proposed	  
another	  solution	  to	  protect	  Baghdad,	  one	  that	  was	  used	  “in	  ancient	  times”	  to	  send	  
floodwater	  around	  the	  city.	  Baghdad’s	  original	  flood	  protections	  involved	  huge	  earthen	  
walls	  on	  the	  right	  bank	  above	  the	  city	  to	  protect	  cultivation	  there,	  while	  eastern	  
Baghdad	  was	  protected	  by	  fortifications	  that	  doubled	  as	  flood	  embankments.	  Excess	  
floodwater	  was	  funneled	  around	  the	  city	  to	  the	  east	  and	  then	  through	  a	  wide	  depression	  
between	  these	  fortifications	  and	  higher	  land.	  The	  water	  then	  rejoined	  the	  river	  farther	  
downstream,	  leaving	  the	  inhabited	  parts	  of	  the	  city,	  now	  effectively	  living	  on	  an	  island	  in	  
the	  middle	  of	  the	  Tigris,	  unscathed.104	  
There	  was	  only	  one	  problem	  with	  the	  implementation	  of	  Willcocks’s	  scheme:	  
modern	  Baghdad.	  Postwar	  additions	  to	  the	  city,	  including	  the	  Baghdad	  North	  Gate	  rail	  
station	  and	  hospital	  facilities,	  occupied	  this	  escape	  route	  and	  British-­‐built	  embankments	  
along	  the	  river	  blocked	  access.	  With	  the	  Wadi	  Tharthar	  escape	  unstudied	  and	  expensive,	  
and	  large	  sections	  of	  the	  new	  city	  blocking	  the	  only	  other	  safe	  method	  for	  diverting	  
floodwater,	  Bury	  was	  left	  with	  just	  two	  other	  options.	  The	  first	  involved	  using	  a	  
potentially	  hazardous	  flood	  escape	  in	  an	  area	  west	  of	  Baghdad,	  the	  Aqqar	  Quf,	  which	  if	  it	  
failed	  would	  destroy	  the	  western	  city	  (where	  the	  British	  High	  Commission	  offices	  were	  
located)	  and	  valuable	  cultivation.	  The	  second	  option	  was	  to	  continue	  current	  policies	  to	  
strengthen	  the	  embankments	  on	  the	  river’s	  edge.	  Bury	  noted	  that	  continuing	  current	  
policies	  made	  even	  less	  sense	  than	  a	  wholesale	  rebuilding	  of	  Baghdad	  somewhere	  else:	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  The	  project	  would	  require	  the	  construction	  of	  a	  barrage	  and	  lengthy	  channel.	  
104	  William	  Willcocks,	  The	  Restoration	  of	  the	  Ancient	  Irrigation	  Works	  on	  the	  Tigris,	  or,	  
the	  Re-­‐Creation	  of	  Chaldea.	  (Cairo:	  National	  Printing	  Department,	  1903).	  
	  
	   61	  
But,	  if	  we	  make	  the	  left	  bank	  safe	  and	  thereby	  keep	  Baghdad	  City…safe	  we	  
still	  have	  the	  right	  bank	  to	  consider….	  And	  if	  we	  make	  the	  right	  bank	  safe,	  
we	  shall	  then	  have	  caused	  the	  whole	  of	  the	  flood	  to	  reach	  Baghdad	  and	  it	  
will	  have	  to	  pass	  through	  the	  narrows	  between	  the	  two	  halves	  of	  the	  town,	  
a	  thing	  that	  it	  has	  never	  done	  in	  history.105	  
Bury	  was	  hemmed	  in	  by	  an	  unfortunate	  array	  of	  circumstances	  and	  he	  knew	  that	  
his	  proposal	  would	  meet	  resistance,	  which	  even	  if	  shown	  to	  be	  “in	  the	  long	  
run…advantageous	  and	  not	  more	  costly	  than	  some	  others,	  it	  would	  be	  difficult	  to	  get	  it	  
taken	  seriously.”106	  Beyond	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  Iraqi	  government	  could	  not	  afford	  to	  build	  
any	  major	  works	  to	  protect	  Baghdad,	  taking	  Bury	  seriously	  would	  have	  required	  the	  
nascent	  Iraqi	  government	  to	  concoct	  and	  follow	  through	  on	  a	  long-­‐term	  plan.	  King	  
Faysal	  was	  reluctant	  to	  pursue	  such	  long-­‐term	  capital	  projects	  because,	  as	  he	  viewed	  it,	  
Iraq	  could	  not	  protect	  any	  of	  its	  investments	  without	  a	  functioning	  military.	  A	  
functioning	  military	  would	  give	  Faysal	  leverage	  against	  the	  British	  and	  perhaps	  speed	  
the	  country	  toward	  real	  independence,	  something	  decidedly	  not	  in	  British	  interests.107	  	  
	   Officials	  in	  London	  offered	  Bury	  little	  in	  the	  way	  of	  help.	  One	  Colonial	  Office	  
official	  seemed	  willfully	  ignorant	  of	  Bury’s	  recommendations,	  “It	  is	  not	  clear	  from	  the	  
last	  chapter	  of	  the	  report	  precisely	  what	  steps	  he	  recommends	  should	  be	  taken	  to	  
protect	  Baghdad	  against	  the	  danger	  of	  a	  recurrence	  of	  this	  year’s	  floods.”	  He	  derided	  the	  
report	  as	  “a	  poor	  production”	  and	  “not	  very	  informative.”	  Another	  official,	  though,	  
succinctly	  captured	  Bury’s	  situation,	  “Indeed	  if	  Baghdad	  is	  to	  be	  made	  at	  all	  safe,	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  Bury,	  “Tigris	  Flood	  Report,”	  38.	  
106	  Ibid.	  
107	  Batatu,	  Old	  Social	  Classes,	  26.	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considerable	  expenditure	  is	  inevitable.	  Iraq,	  however,	  is	  not	  at	  present	  able	  to	  afford	  to	  
make	  Baghdad	  safe.”108	  Neither,	  it	  goes	  almost	  without	  saying,	  was	  the	  powerful	  
“advanced	  nation”	  that	  “by	  reason	  of	  [its]	  resources”	  was	  entrusted	  with	  helping	  Iraq	  
stand	  by	  itself	  “under	  the	  strenuous	  conditions	  of	  the	  modern	  world.”109	  
	   Foregoing	  Bury’s	  radical	  suggestions,	  the	  British	  High	  Commissioner	  was	  left	  
with	  only	  one	  response:	  finding	  a	  way	  to	  avoid	  the	  blame.	  The	  swamping	  of	  the	  railway	  
station	  caused	  enough	  destruction	  to	  commercial	  property	  to	  bring	  a	  formal	  complaint	  
and	  a	  demand	  for	  an	  enquiry	  from	  the	  British	  Chamber	  of	  Commerce.110	  Officials	  in	  
Baghdad	  and	  London	  were	  understandably	  concerned	  that	  the	  government	  would	  be	  
held	  liable	  for	  the	  damage.	  The	  King’s	  own	  agents,	  after	  all,	  had	  caused	  the	  breach	  that	  
liquidated	  an	  entire	  railway	  station	  and	  nearby	  markets.	  In	  addition,	  the	  Sarrafiyah	  
dyke,	  built	  by	  the	  British	  and	  maintained	  by	  the	  government,	  was	  meant	  to	  protect	  the	  
city	  against	  just	  such	  a	  disaster.	  So	  it	  was	  that,	  after	  the	  river	  receded	  and	  the	  flood	  
danger	  passed,	  the	  involved	  ministries	  rushed	  to	  demonstrate	  their	  adherence	  to	  
protocols	  and	  procedures.	  British	  advisors	  to	  the	  Iraqi	  government	  submitted	  reports	  on	  
properly	  executed	  flood	  preparations.	  Armed	  with	  these	  justifications	  of	  efficient	  
government,	  High	  Commissioner	  Henry	  Dobbs	  asserted	  to	  London:	  
I	  do	  not	  consider	  that	  a	  charge	  of	  negligence	  can	  be	  held	  to	  lie	  against	  any	  
of	  the	  Government	  Departments	  concerned.	  To	  my	  mind	  the	  enclosed	  
report	  shows	  that	  with	  their	  depleted	  funds	  and	  staff	  the	  officials	  of	  the	  
Irrigation	  Department	  responsible	  for	  the	  banks	  and	  dykes	  could	  not	  have	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  TNA,	  CO	  730/94,	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  Office	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  League	  of	  Nations,	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prevented	  a	  serious	  breach	  occurring	  somewhere	  or	  other,	  nor	  could	  they	  
have	  closed	  the	  breach	  when	  it	  did	  occur.	  
In	  other	  words,	  the	  Iraqi	  government	  could	  not	  be	  held	  negligent	  if	  it	  was	  not	  competent	  
in	  the	  first	  place.	  So	  long	  as	  flood	  protection	  was	  defined	  in	  a	  certain	  way,	  such	  that	  
money	  and	  effort	  would	  not	  be	  spent	  on	  prevention	  but	  only	  at	  times	  of	  direst	  
emergency,	  and	  then	  without	  any	  real	  hope	  of	  success,	  then	  the	  government	  was	  not	  
derelict	  in	  its	  duty.	  
The	  flood	  and	  the	  actions	  taken	  in	  its	  aftermath	  revealed	  the	  underlying	  logic	  at	  
work	  in	  British	  rule	  in	  Iraq.	  The	  waters	  of	  the	  Tigris	  had,	  in	  swamping	  the	  seat	  of	  
Britain’s	  client	  king	  and	  sending	  the	  royal	  family	  scurrying	  to	  Baghdad,	  exposed	  the	  
weakness	  and	  incapacity	  of	  Iraq’s	  government.	  The	  submerging	  of	  a	  railway	  station	  
underlined	  the	  rivers’	  power	  to	  disrupt	  Iraq’s	  communications	  and	  connections	  to	  the	  
outside	  world,	  demonstrating	  the	  fragility	  of	  so-­‐called	  modern	  development	  in	  the	  
country.	  Behind	  the	  justifications	  of	  economy	  and	  independent	  government,	  the	  British	  
were	  in	  fact	  working	  to	  establish	  a	  system	  of	  governance	  in	  Iraq	  that	  would	  minimize	  
risk	  and	  maximize	  gain,	  not	  for	  Iraq	  and	  its	  people,	  but	  for	  Great	  Britain.	  
Protecting	  the	  British	  administration	  and	  Iraqi	  regime	  from	  blame	  was	  important	  
not	  only	  within	  Iraq,	  but	  also	  because	  of	  the	  country’s	  international	  status.	  The	  
involvement	  of	  the	  British	  Chamber	  of	  Commerce	  suggested	  that	  harm	  to	  business	  
interests	  in	  Iraq,	  either	  British	  companies	  themselves	  or	  agents	  with	  ties	  to	  British	  firms,	  
could	  create	  problems	  for	  London	  before	  both	  the	  British	  public	  and	  the	  international	  
auditors	  at	  the	  League.	  The	  most	  important	  thing	  for	  Dobbs	  as	  High	  Commissioner	  was	  
to	  resituate	  responsibility	  away	  from	  the	  British	  colonial	  administration	  and,	  if	  possible,	  
the	  client	  government,	  though	  placing	  blame	  on	  local	  authorities	  was	  the	  next	  best	  thing.	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Most	  importantly,	  British	  officials	  needed	  a	  way	  to	  manage	  Iraq’s	  water	  resources	  in	  
such	  a	  way	  as	  to	  minimize	  expenditure	  and	  international	  exposure	  but	  still	  reap	  the	  
gains	  in	  revenue	  and	  stability	  that	  could	  potentially	  result.	  It	  is	  quite	  telling	  that	  Dobbs	  
did	  not	  follow	  his	  comments	  above	  with	  any	  specific	  recommendations	  for	  what	  the	  
British	  government	  might	  do	  to	  improve	  upon	  Baghdad’s	  flood	  protection.	  He	  did	  not	  
advocate	  any	  of	  the	  solutions	  proposed	  by	  the	  British	  advisor	  in	  charge,	  L.	  E.	  Bury,	  in	  his	  
report	  on	  the	  government’s	  response	  to	  the	  flood.	  The	  British	  came	  to	  rely	  upon	  several	  
other	  approaches,	  of	  both	  a	  technological	  and	  administrative	  nature,	  to	  manage	  water	  
and	  disaster	  in	  Iraq.	  
	   None	  of	  these	  approaches,	  however,	  emanated	  from	  the	  government’s	  own	  
Irrigation	  Department.	  Because	  Dobbs	  refused	  to	  countenance	  any	  options	  that	  would	  
result	  in	  greater	  expenditure	  or	  potential	  liability,	  the	  Irrigation	  Department	  could	  not	  
as	  Bury	  advocated	  assume	  the	  oversight	  and	  construction	  of	  the	  menacing	  culverts.	  It	  
could	  not	  receive	  additional	  monies	  to	  pursue	  potential	  flood	  escapes.	  There	  would	  be	  
no	  discussion	  of	  moving	  all	  or	  part	  of	  Baghdad.	  The	  only	  tangible	  policy	  that	  Britain	  and	  
its	  Iraqi	  government	  adopted	  in	  direct	  response	  to	  the	  1926	  flood	  was	  to	  raise	  fines	  on	  
those	  who	  did	  not	  properly	  maintain	  their	  culverts	  during	  a	  flood.111	  This	  act,	  along	  with	  
Dobbs’	  strong	  denial	  of	  responsibility,	  was	  the	  first	  step	  in	  a	  concerted	  strategy	  to	  
resituate	  the	  risks	  of	  water	  management	  from	  the	  purview	  of	  the	  state	  and	  place	  it	  in	  
private	  hands.	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  Ibid.	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A	  shift	  toward	  emphasizing	  private	  ownership	  and	  responsibility	  had	  been	  
facilitated	  by	  previous	  actions,	  while	  the	  full	  force	  of	  the	  effort	  came	  in	  1926.	  The	  budget	  
cuts	  of	  1919	  forced	  the	  Irrigation	  Department	  to	  stop	  all	  measurements	  at	  canals	  for	  
revenue	  purposes.	  No	  longer	  did	  landowners	  pay	  for	  the	  water	  they	  received	  through	  
government-­‐built	  canals.	  As	  state	  investments	  in	  such	  projects	  declined,	  the	  government	  
encouraged	  private	  parties	  to	  directly	  invest	  in	  large-­‐scale	  water	  projects.	  As	  an	  
example,	  a	  prominent	  merchant	  in	  Arabistan	  (present-­‐day	  Khuzestan	  Province,	  Iran)	  
donated	  300,000	  rupees	  in	  November	  1923	  to	  implement	  a	  canal	  project	  that	  would	  
bring	  irrigation	  water	  to	  the	  Shi’a	  holy	  city	  of	  Najaf.112	  	  
The	  largest	  and	  most	  far-­‐reaching	  changes	  in	  water	  policy	  came	  in	  1926	  just	  after	  
the	  flood	  disaster,	  when	  the	  Iraqi	  government	  made	  it	  possible	  for	  investors	  to	  claim	  
public	  lands	  by	  building	  irrigation	  pumps.113	  Until	  this	  time,	  state-­‐controlled	  lands	  had	  
been	  held	  by	  custom	  for	  grazing	  and	  cultivation	  by	  local	  tribes.	  The	  pump	  law	  meant	  a	  
significant	  shift	  in	  water	  use	  and	  land	  ownership	  along	  the	  rivers’	  banks,	  and	  most	  
significantly,	  resulted	  in	  an	  important	  collaboration	  that	  served	  British	  interests.	  	  
Constructing	  an	  irrigation	  pump	  required	  capital	  and	  access.	  Such	  accumulations	  
of	  capital	  as	  could	  be	  found	  in	  Iraq	  were	  primarily	  controlled	  by	  merchant	  interests	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112	  The	  project	  involved	  connecting	  an	  intermittent	  stream	  to	  the	  Beni	  Hassan	  canal.	  
Local	  workers	  depended	  on	  British	  experts	  for	  technical	  drawings,	  which	  were	  poorly	  
done	  and	  the	  project	  was	  eventually	  abandoned	  at	  considerable	  cost	  to	  the	  Iraqi	  
government.	  See	  Muḥammad	  ʻAbd	  al-­‐Majiid	  Ḥassuun	  Zubaydi,	  al-­‐‘Amn	  al-­‐Mā’ī	  al-­‐ʻIrāqī:	  
Dirāsah	  ʻan	  Sayr	  al-­‐Mufāwaḍāt	  Qassamat	  al-­‐Miyāh	  al-­‐Iqlīmīyah	  [Iraq’s	  Water	  Security:	  A	  
Study	  on	  the	  Progress	  of	  Negotiations	  of	  Shared	  Territorial	  Waters]	  (Baghdād:	  Dār	  al-­‐
Shuʾūn	  al-­‐Thaqāfīyah	  al-­‐ʻĀmmah,	  2008),	  42-­‐43.	  
113	  Sousa,	  Tatawwur	  al-­‐Rayy,	  80.	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the	  country’s	  largest	  cities,	  especially	  Baghdad.114	  The	  capitalist	  also	  required	  access	  to	  
the	  rivers’	  banks	  in	  order	  to	  construct	  the	  pump	  and,	  once	  constructed,	  some	  way	  of	  
protecting	  his	  investment,	  both	  physically	  and	  financially.	  Such	  means	  could	  be	  found	  in	  
Iraq’s	  newly	  empowered	  shaykhs	  and	  tribal	  leaders.	  During	  its	  conquest	  of	  Iraq,	  Great	  
Britain	  enacted	  legislation	  that	  altered	  the	  relationship	  between	  agricultural	  laborers	  
and	  tribal	  leaders.	  While	  the	  Ottoman	  state	  had	  sought	  to	  limit	  the	  latter’s	  control	  over	  
the	  population,	  Britain,	  through	  the	  Tribal	  Criminal	  and	  Civil	  Disputes	  Regulations	  and	  
application	  of	  the	  Ottoman	  Land	  Code	  of	  1858,	  effectively	  reinvigorated	  the	  system.	  The	  
tribal	  regulations	  limited	  peasants’	  means	  of	  legal	  recourse	  to	  their	  own	  tribal	  leaders.	  
The	  Ottoman	  Land	  Code	  allowed	  these	  same	  tribal	  leaders	  to	  register	  all	  tribal	  domains	  
under	  their	  own	  name.115	  Of	  course,	  while	  direct	  ownership	  of	  land	  was	  an	  extremely	  
important	  facet	  of	  the	  shaykh’s	  power,	  his	  domains	  meant	  nothing	  without	  the	  ability	  to	  
obtain	  and	  control	  water.116	  The	  pump	  provided	  that	  means,	  the	  capitalist	  provided	  the	  
pump,	  and	  the	  state,	  through	  special	  legislation,	  provided	  ever	  more	  public	  land	  for	  the	  
expansion	  of	  the	  system.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114	  Batatu,	  Old	  Social	  Classes,	  224-­‐318.	  
115	  For	  more	  on	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  Land	  Code	  under	  the	  Ottomans,	  see	  Ceylan,	  
Ottoman	  Origins,	  132-­‐174.	  
116	  Historians	  have	  examined	  such	  policies,	  but	  have	  focused	  mainly	  on	  issues	  of	  land	  
distribution	  and	  tenure.	  There	  has	  been	  less	  attention	  paid	  to	  the	  rivers	  and	  the	  effect	  of	  
policies	  on	  water	  management.	  See,	  for	  instance,	  Doreen	  Warriner,	  Land	  Reform	  and	  
Development	  in	  the	  Middle	  East:	  A	  Study	  of	  Egypt,	  Syria,	  and	  Iraq,	  2nd	  ed.	  (Westport:	  
Greenwood	  Press,	  1962)	  and	  Land	  and	  Poverty	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  (London:	  Royal	  
Institute	  of	  International	  Affairs,	  1948);	  and	  Marion	  Farouk-­‐Sluglett	  and	  Peter	  Sluglett,	  
“The	  Transformation	  of	  Land	  Tenure	  and	  Rural	  Social	  Structure	  in	  Central	  and	  Southern	  
Iraq,	  c.	  1870-­‐1958,”	  International	  Journal	  of	  Middle	  East	  Studies	  15	  (1983):	  491-­‐505.	  
	  
	   67	  
Through	  the	  technological	  medium	  of	  the	  irrigation	  pump,	  Britain	  and	  its	  
partners	  in	  the	  pliable	  Iraqi	  government	  connected	  the	  capitalists	  in	  Iraq’s	  cities	  to	  the	  
tribal	  leaders	  in	  the	  countryside	  and,	  in	  so	  doing,	  increased	  both	  groups’	  dependence	  on	  
the	  beneficence	  of	  the	  state.	  The	  pump	  investors	  needed	  British	  suppliers	  and	  know-­‐
how	  to	  install	  the	  pumping	  stations.	  Tribal	  leaders,	  who	  were	  already	  dependent	  on	  the	  
state	  for	  their	  position,	  could	  now	  reap	  even	  more	  benefits	  through	  the	  grant	  of	  state	  
land.117	  Meanwhile,	  the	  irrigation	  pumps	  obviated	  the	  need	  for	  large	  irrigation	  projects,	  
which	  could	  only	  be	  undertaken	  with	  state	  funds.	  As	  for	  flood	  protection,	  the	  very	  
parties	  who	  would	  be	  most	  effective	  in	  calling	  for	  government	  action	  were	  those	  
benefiting	  from	  the	  pump	  legislation	  whereby	  they	  were	  gobbling	  up	  most	  of	  the	  land	  
and	  water.	  Moreover,	  the	  only	  sensible	  way	  to	  fund	  such	  projects	  would	  have	  been	  a	  tax	  
on	  either	  land	  or	  water,	  as	  those	  controlling	  these	  resources	  stood	  to	  gain	  the	  most	  from	  
a	  comprehensive	  plan	  of	  flood	  control.	  The	  “interference”	  of	  taxes	  was	  something	  most	  
tribal	  leaders	  sought	  to	  avoid	  at	  all	  costs.118	  On	  top	  of	  that,	  the	  British	  had	  no	  stake	  in	  
protecting	  investments	  in	  water	  management	  because	  they	  were	  not	  making	  any.	  
The	  environmental	  ramifications	  of	  these	  policies	  were	  severe,	  a	  topic	  that	  will	  
receive	  more	  attention	  in	  later	  chapters.	  For	  now,	  it	  is	  enough	  to	  note	  that	  pump	  
installations	  increased	  from	  143	  in	  1921	  to	  over	  5,000	  by	  the	  late	  1950s.119	  The	  addition	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117	  Colonial	  Office,	  Report	  on	  ‘Iraq	  Administration	  for	  the	  Year	  1927	  (London:	  His	  
Majesty’s	  Stationery	  Office,	  1928),	  173-­‐174.	  
118	  Warriner,	  Land	  Reform	  and	  Development,	  144-­‐145.	  
119	  Doreen	  Warriner,	  Land	  and	  Poverty,	  106-­‐107;	  Batatu,	  Old	  Social	  Classes,	  150.	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of	  so	  many	  pumps	  on	  the	  river	  threatened	  agriculture	  in	  southern	  Iraq,	  such	  that	  a	  
British	  administrative	  inspector	  complained:	  
It	  is	  unthinkable	  that	  the	  government	  should	  allow	  a	  situation	  to	  develop	  
whereby	  one	  of	  its	  richest	  provinces	  may	  be	  ruined	  and	  that	  expensive	  
pump	  irrigation	  should	  be	  encouraged	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  natural	  free	  flow	  
canals.120	  
The	  government,	  however,	  was	  not	  interested	  in	  generating	  common	  goods	  such	  as	  
“natural	  free	  flow	  canals.”	  A	  lack	  of	  regulation	  led	  to	  a	  degradation	  of	  Iraq’s	  soil	  
resources	  as	  landowners	  used	  water	  profligately	  and	  without	  proper	  drainage.	  The	  
effects	  of	  this	  abuse	  took	  time	  to	  appear.	  A	  study	  conducted	  in	  1952	  estimated	  that	  
nearly	  one-­‐third	  of	  cultivated	  land	  in	  Iraq	  had	  been	  abandoned	  over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  
previous	  three	  decades	  because	  of	  salinization	  caused	  by	  poor	  drainage	  and	  
overwatering.121	  
	   As	  a	  result	  of	  British	  policies,	  landowners	  gained	  ever	  greater	  control	  over	  both	  
water	  and	  land	  resources.	  The	  loss	  of	  control	  over	  these	  natural	  resources	  meant	  a	  loss	  
of	  state	  revenue,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  loss	  of	  capacity	  and	  experience.	  However,	  in	  exchange,	  
Britain	  obtained	  the	  loyalty	  of	  two	  major	  social	  groups	  and	  secured	  their	  adherence	  to	  
British	  aims.	  Unlike	  in	  India,	  Iraq’s	  experience	  showed	  that	  it	  was	  not	  necessary	  for	  the	  
state	  to	  directly	  manipulate	  the	  environment	  in	  order	  to	  secure	  its	  control	  over	  land	  and	  
people.	  By	  virtue	  of	  setting	  key	  parameters	  regarding	  the	  acquisition	  and	  exploitation	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
120	  Unpublished	  monthly	  report	  for	  March	  1930	  of	  the	  British	  administrative	  inspector	  
of	  ‘Amarah,	  dated	  20	  April	  1930,	  as	  quoted	  in	  Batatu,	  Old	  Social	  Classes,	  150-­‐151.	  
121	  International	  Bank	  for	  Reconstruction	  and	  Development,	  The	  Economic	  Development	  
of	  Iraq:	  Report	  of	  a	  Mission	  Organized	  by	  the	  International	  Bank	  for	  Reconstruction	  and	  
Development	  at	  the	  Request	  of	  the	  Government	  of	  Iraq	  (Baltimore:	  Johns	  Hopkins	  Press,	  
1952),	  17.	  
	  
	   69	  
natural	  resources,	  the	  British	  colonial	  state	  in	  Iraq	  was	  able	  to	  effectively	  arrange	  human	  
efforts	  at	  environmental	  management	  so	  as	  to	  minimize	  risk	  and	  protect	  its	  own	  limited	  
interests	  in	  the	  country.	  	  
A	  Postscript	  on	  Mandate	  Syria	  
During	  the	  interwar	  period,	  the	  French	  were	  primarily	  interested	  in	  
developments	  in	  western	  Syria	  and	  Mt.	  Lebanon.	  Though	  the	  French	  in	  1925	  sent	  a	  
survey	  expedition	  up	  the	  Euphrates	  River,	  water	  management	  in	  the	  French	  mandate	  
focused	  primarily	  on	  rivers	  in	  the	  west,	  including	  the	  Orontes	  and	  Litani.	  Still,	  the	  1925	  
expedition	  had	  an	  influence,	  cementing	  the	  view	  that	  the	  lands	  east	  of	  the	  Euphrates,	  an	  
area	  known	  as	  al-­‐Jazira,	  were	  under	  populated.	  The	  French	  considered	  the	  region	  empty	  
territory	  and	  a	  blank	  slate	  for	  the	  kinds	  of	  political	  and	  social	  engineering	  characteristic	  
of	  the	  French	  mandate.	  	  
	   Though	  modern	  water	  management	  techniques	  on	  the	  Euphrates	  in	  Syria	  did	  not	  
appear	  until	  after	  the	  Second	  World	  War,	  there	  were	  efforts	  to	  promote	  irrigation	  
development	  on	  the	  Euphrates’	  main	  tributary	  in	  Syria,	  the	  Khabur.	  In	  1933,	  a	  dispute	  
between	  Assyrian	  Christians	  in	  northern	  Iraq	  and	  the	  Iraqi	  government	  in	  Baghdad	  
became	  an	  international	  scandal.	  British	  officials	  in	  the	  early	  years	  of	  the	  mandate	  had	  
settled	  the	  Christian	  Assyrian	  population	  in	  northern	  Iraq	  in	  order	  to	  solidify	  Iraq's	  (and	  
Britain's)	  claim	  to	  control	  the	  northern	  province	  of	  Mosul.122	  Later,	  the	  British	  armed	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122	  The	  Assyrian	  (Nestorian)	  Christians	  of	  Iraq	  had	  lived	  in	  the	  Hakkâri	  mountain	  
country	  of	  present-­‐day	  Turkey.	  When	  they	  rebelled	  against	  the	  Ottomans	  in	  1915,	  they	  
were	  driven	  into	  Persia	  where	  they	  eventually	  came	  into	  contact	  with	  British	  forces.	  The	  
British	  encouraged	  the	  Assyrians	  to	  settle	  at	  Ba'quba,	  but	  then	  later	  moved	  them	  north	  
to	  Mosul	  in	  order	  to	  produce	  a	  favorable	  settlement	  at	  the	  League	  of	  Nations.	  Khaldun	  S.	  
Husry,	  "The	  Assyrian	  Affair	  of	  1933	  (I)"	  International	  Journal	  of	  Middle	  East	  Studies	  5	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Assyrians	  and	  recruited	  them	  as	  mercenary	  troops	  to	  put	  down	  local,	  primarily	  Kurdish,	  
revolts.	  
	   In	  June	  1932,	  as	  Britain	  ushered	  Iraq	  toward	  independence,	  Assyrian	  officers	  
issued	  a	  manifesto	  accusing	  the	  British	  of	  failing	  to	  ensure	  the	  Assyrian	  population's	  
safety	  and	  autonomy	  within	  the	  borders	  of	  Iraq.	  During	  the	  rest	  of	  1932	  and	  1933,	  the	  
dispute	  escalated.	  Assyrian	  leaders	  drew	  up	  a	  national	  pact	  and	  a	  petition	  for	  a	  "national	  
home"	  in	  Iraq.	  In	  July	  1933,	  an	  Assyrian	  contingent	  of	  1,200	  men	  crossed	  the	  Tigris	  into	  
Syria.	  Later	  that	  month,	  they	  returned	  and	  attacked	  Iraqi	  forces	  at	  Dayrbaun.	  This	  
military	  escalation	  had	  dire	  consequences	  for	  the	  Assyrians	  remaining	  in	  Iraq.	  Kurdish	  
and	  Arab	  tribesmen	  looted	  Assyrian	  communities	  and	  on	  August	  11,	  a	  detachment	  of	  
Iraqi	  forces	  systematically	  massacred	  the	  men	  of	  Summayl,	  a	  village	  some	  eight	  miles	  
from	  Dakho.	  Over	  three	  hundred	  men	  were	  killed	  in	  the	  massacre,	  along	  with	  four	  
women	  and	  six	  children.123	  	  
	   The	  massacre	  led	  to	  the	  transfer	  of	  the	  Assyrian	  population	  to	  Syria	  and	  their	  
settlement	  along	  the	  Khabur	  River.	  French	  officials	  viewed	  the	  Assyrians	  in	  much	  the	  
same	  light	  as	  the	  British	  had	  years	  before.	  The	  French	  had	  struggled	  to	  maintain	  a	  
government	  presence	  in	  the	  Jazira	  for	  years.124	  Resettlement	  of	  a	  martial	  Assyrian	  
population	  in	  the	  area	  was	  another	  way	  to	  reinforce	  French	  power	  in	  the	  region.	  The	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(1974):	  161.	  See	  also	  John	  Joseph,	  "The	  Assyrian	  Affair:	  A	  Historical	  Perspective,"	  
International	  Journal	  of	  Middle	  East	  Studies	  6	  (1975):	  115-­‐117.	  
123	  Khaldun	  S.	  Husry,	  "The	  Assyrian	  Affair	  of	  1933	  (II),"	  International	  Journal	  of	  Middle	  
East	  Studies	  5	  (1974):	  344.	  
124	  Louis	  Dilleman,	  "Les	  Français	  en	  Haute-­‐Djezireh,"	  Revue	  française	  d'histoire	  d'outre-­‐
mer	  66,	  (1979):	  33-­‐52.	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French	  planned	  and	  executed	  a	  series	  of	  irrigation	  projects	  along	  the	  Khabur	  to	  support	  
this	  settlement.	  The	  minority	  groups	  of	  al-­‐Jazira	  then	  became	  a	  useful	  source	  of	  
manpower	  for	  the	  French	  armed	  forces	  and	  a	  means	  for	  maintaining	  order	  in	  a	  remote	  
part	  of	  the	  country.	  The	  land	  between	  the	  two	  rivers	  became	  the	  region	  of	  Syria	  where	  
irrigation	  engineering	  and	  social	  engineering	  converged.	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Chapter	  One	  Illustrations125	  
	  
Illustration	  2.	  Aerial	  view	  of	  the	  main	  Tigris	  breach	  north	  of	  Baghdad,	  1926.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125	  Illustrations	  found	  in	  TNA,	  CO	  730/94.	  Subject	  to	  Crown	  Copyright,	  which	  authorizes	  
reproduction	  “for	  purposes	  of	  private	  study,	  non-­‐commercial	  research	  or	  education	  
without	  limitation.”	  See	  The	  National	  Archives,	  “Using	  Materials	  from	  The	  National	  
Archives,”	  2013.	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Illustration	  3.	  View	  of	  flooded	  Baghdad	  North	  Gate	  station	  and	  nearby	  markets,	  1926	  
	  
Illustration	  4.	  Aerial	  view	  of	  the	  city	  of	  Baqubah	  surrounded	  by	  floodwaters,	  1926.	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CHAPTER	  TWO	  	  
The	  Rise	  of	  the	  Technocratic	  State	  
	  
While	  British	  interests	  in	  mandatory	  Iraq	  brought	  about	  a	  private	  system	  of	  
water	  management	  in	  that	  country,	  the	  new	  Turkish	  Republic	  adopted	  a	  different	  
course.	  Ankara	  instead	  built	  upon	  the	  Ottoman	  bureaucratic	  tradition,	  creating	  a	  series	  
of	  government	  agencies	  to	  manage	  and	  exploit	  the	  country’s	  natural	  resources.	  The	  state	  
also	  became	  increasingly	  involved	  in	  shaping	  and	  planning	  the	  country’s	  economy	  
throughout	  the	  1930s.	  It	  was	  during	  this	  period	  that	  Turkish	  engineers	  first	  began	  to	  
imagine	  a	  dam	  on	  the	  Euphrates	  River	  near	  a	  village	  named	  Keban.	  
Completed	  in	  1974,	  the	  Keban	  Dam	  on	  the	  Euphrates	  River	  was,	  at	  nearly	  680	  
feet,	  the	  tallest	  dam	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  at	  the	  time	  of	  its	  construction.	  Though	  not	  as	  
massive	  as	  Egypt’s	  Aswan	  High	  Dam	  on	  the	  Nile	  River,	  the	  Keban	  created	  Turkey’s	  third	  
largest	  lake,	  its	  reservoir	  covering	  nearly	  675	  square	  kilometers,	  an	  area	  slightly	  larger	  
than	  the	  city	  of	  Chicago.	  The	  dam	  represented	  a	  significant	  intervention	  in	  the	  
environment	  of	  eastern	  Anatolia	  and	  profoundly	  changed	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  Euphrates	  
River.	  	  
By	  tracing	  the	  genealogy	  of	  the	  Keban	  project,	  this	  chapter	  will	  examine	  the	  
contexts	  in	  which	  the	  dam	  was	  imagined,	  re-­‐imagined	  and	  executed,	  demonstrating	  in	  
the	  process	  the	  relationship	  between	  natural	  resource	  development	  and	  ideologies	  of	  
economic	  and	  social	  development	  in	  the	  formation	  of	  the	  Turkish	  state.	  To	  that	  end,	  this	  
chapter	  will	  begin	  by	  describing	  the	  interwar	  period,	  the	  rise	  of	  etatism	  and	  the	  initial	  
proposals	  for	  developing	  the	  Euphrates	  River.	  The	  key	  argument	  in	  this	  section	  is	  that	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the	  Keban	  dam	  emanated	  not	  simply	  from	  emulation	  of	  dam	  projects	  in	  the	  United	  
States	  such	  as	  the	  Tennessee	  Valley	  Authority,	  but	  from	  the	  creation	  of	  bureaucratic	  
institutions	  in	  the	  1930s	  that	  could	  undertake	  the	  requirements	  of	  etatism.	  Just	  as	  the	  
Tennessee	  Valley	  Authority	  was	  part	  of	  the	  New	  Deal	  expansion	  of	  U.S.	  federal	  
government	  authority,	  the	  Keban	  dam	  was	  first	  conceived	  within	  the	  context	  of	  
expanding	  Ankara’s	  role	  in	  planning	  and	  shaping	  the	  economy.	  	  
The	  analysis	  then	  moves	  to	  examine	  the	  period	  of	  the	  1950s	  and	  changing	  
conceptions	  of	  state	  involvement	  in	  the	  economy.	  Because	  the	  Keban	  project	  was	  not	  
initiated	  during	  the	  interwar	  period,	  but	  in	  the	  1960s,	  there	  was	  a	  shift	  in	  the	  project’s	  
supposed	  purpose	  from	  an	  economic	  engine	  for	  industry	  to	  a	  public	  good	  designed	  not	  
only	  to	  enhance	  economic	  development,	  but	  also	  human	  development.	  Within	  the	  
political	  climate	  of	  the	  1960s	  and	  to	  secure	  financing	  from	  overseas,	  the	  dam	  had	  to	  be	  
justified	  as	  an	  improver	  of	  people’s	  lives.	  The	  chapter	  will	  conclude	  with	  analyses	  of	  the	  
two	  documents	  that	  brought	  the	  Keban	  project	  close	  to	  realization.	  The	  first	  was	  the	  
First	  Five-­‐Year	  Development	  Plan	  of	  1963,	  which	  after	  some	  political	  wrangling	  
eventually	  included	  initial	  surveys	  for	  the	  dam	  project,	  and	  the	  feasibility	  report	  that	  
was	  necessary	  to	  secure	  international	  funding.	  	  Both	  documents	  demonstrate	  how	  the	  
dam	  project	  relied	  on	  peculiar	  visions	  of	  the	  Turkish	  economy	  and	  society.	  Finally,	  I	  
argue	  that	  the	  development	  of	  a	  new	  way	  of	  framing	  the	  country’s	  economy,	  society	  and	  
environment	  not	  only	  helped	  justify	  a	  new	  dam	  in	  the	  Euphrates	  river	  basin,	  but	  also	  
played	  a	  key	  role	  in	  transforming	  the	  basis	  of	  political	  power	  in	  the	  Turkish	  Republic	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The	  Concept	  of	  Devletçilik	  (Etatism)	  and	  the	  Formation	  of	  a	  Bureaucracy	  
In	  1923,	  after	  nearly	  eight	  years	  of	  war,	  the	  Turkish	  Republic	  emerged	  from	  its	  
struggle	  for	  independence	  with	  a	  wrecked	  economy	  and	  depopulated	  countryside.	  Six	  
years	  later,	  in	  1929,	  the	  global	  economy	  collapsed	  and	  the	  Great	  Depression	  began.	  The	  
Turkish	  government	  faced	  an	  array	  of	  difficult	  economic	  questions	  and	  much	  of	  1929	  
and	  1930	  was	  spent	  looking	  for	  answers.126	  Though	  Turkey’s	  president,	  Mustafa	  Kemal	  
Atatürk,	  clearly	  oriented	  the	  country	  toward	  Western	  Europe	  and	  its	  liberal	  economies,	  
Turkish	  authorities	  after	  1929	  sought	  a	  different	  economic	  model.	  The	  Soviet	  Union	  
appeared	  to	  be	  one	  of	  the	  few	  countries	  making	  progress	  despite	  the	  economic	  
depression	  afflicting	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  globe.	  Moreover,	  its	  state-­‐driven	  push	  for	  
industrialization	  resembled	  an	  Ottoman	  model	  of	  direct	  government	  intervention	  in	  
economic	  development,	  which	  would	  have	  been	  familiar	  to	  Turkey’s	  leadership.127	  	  
In	  1931,	  the	  dominant	  Republican	  People’s	  Party	  (Cumhuriyet	  Halk	  Partisi)	  
announced	  a	  new	  economic	  policy,	  that	  of	  etatism	  (devletçilik),	  which	  placed	  a	  strong	  
emphasis	  on	  state	  activity	  to	  spur	  development,	  but	  maintained	  the	  system	  of	  private	  
ownership.	  In	  practical	  terms,	  it	  meant	  that	  the	  Turkish	  state	  became	  a	  producer	  and	  
investor	  in	  several	  sectors	  of	  the	  economy.	  Monopolies	  established	  by	  the	  state	  and	  until	  
this	  time	  administered	  by	  private	  companies	  were	  transferred	  back	  to	  public	  ownership.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126	  Berch	  Berberoğlu,	  Turkey	  in	  Crisis:	  From	  State	  Capitalism	  to	  Neo-­‐Colonialism	  (London:	  
Zed	  Press,	  1982),	  pp.	  28-­‐31.	  
127	  Erik	  J.	  Zürcher,	  Turkey,	  197.	  See	  also	  Osman	  Okyar,	  "The	  Concept	  of	  Étatism,"	  The	  
Economic	  Journal	  75,	  no.	  297	  (1965):	  99-­‐100.	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The	  state	  also	  founded	  a	  number	  of	  holding	  companies,	  called	  state	  economic	  
enterprises,	  to	  further	  industrialization.128	  
The	  advent	  of	  etatism	  also	  meant	  the	  beginning	  of	  centralized	  planning.	  The	  
Soviet	  Union,	  which	  completed	  its	  own	  five-­‐year	  plan	  in	  1927,	  sent	  advisers	  to	  Istanbul	  
to	  assess	  the	  Turkish	  economy.	  The	  Turkish	  government	  took	  these	  recommendations	  
seriously	  and	  included	  many	  in	  its	  First	  Five-­‐Year	  Industrial	  Plan,	  which	  came	  into	  force	  
in	  1934.129	  That	  same	  year,	  Turkey	  accepted	  assistance	  from	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  in	  the	  
form	  of	  an	  eight	  million	  dollar	  loan.	  This	  assistance	  did	  not	  entail	  a	  Turkish	  move	  toward	  
Soviet-­‐style	  collectivization.	  The	  Industrial	  Plan	  was	  limited	  in	  scope,	  involving	  a	  set	  of	  
investment	  plans	  in	  various	  industries,	  but	  there	  was	  no	  comprehensive	  assessment	  of,	  
or	  growth	  plan	  for,	  the	  economy	  as	  in	  the	  Soviet	  case.130	  Still,	  the	  Industrial	  Plan	  did	  
signify	  a	  shift	  toward	  acceptance	  of	  direct	  state	  planning	  of	  the	  economy.	  Turkey’s	  
leaders	  were	  not	  alone	  in	  making	  this	  shift.	  Developed	  economies	  in	  Europe	  and	  North	  
America	  intervened	  in	  their	  economies	  in	  unprecedented	  ways	  in	  the	  1930s.131	  The	  
implementation	  of	  the	  first	  Industrial	  Plan	  succeeded	  in	  improving	  the	  economy	  and,	  as	  
Carter	  Findley	  argues,	  may	  have	  saved	  Turkey	  from	  the	  type	  of	  regime	  crisis	  
experienced	  at	  this	  time	  by	  other	  developing	  nations	  such	  as	  Brazil,	  Argentina	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
128	  Zürcher,	  Turkey,	  198.	  
129	  Ibid.,	  197.	  	  
130	  William	  Hale,	  "Ideology	  and	  Economic	  Development	  in	  Turkey	  1930-­‐1945,"	  Bulletin	  
(British	  Society	  for	  Middle	  Eastern	  Studies)	  7,	  no.	  2	  (1980):	  101.	  
131	  Zvi	  Yehuda	  Hershlag,	  Turkey:	  The	  Challenge	  of	  Growth,	  2d,	  completely	  rev.	  ed.	  
(Leiden,:	  E.J.	  Brill,	  1968),	  62-­‐65.	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Japan.132	  The	  Turkish	  government	  drew	  up	  a	  Second	  Five-­‐Year	  Industrial	  Plan,	  but	  
World	  War	  II	  interrupted	  its	  implementation.	  	  
The	  full	  exploitation	  of	  natural	  resources	  was	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  etatist	  drive	  
toward	  economic	  development.	  New	  industries	  and	  economic	  enterprises	  established	  at	  
this	  time	  were	  aimed	  at	  extraction,	  particularly	  in	  agriculture	  and	  mining.133	  Building	  a	  
new	  dam	  and	  power	  plant	  at	  Keban,	  a	  location	  known	  for	  its	  natural	  resources	  for	  
centuries,	  fit	  into	  such	  a	  program.	  1935	  was	  a	  critical	  year	  in	  this	  regard,	  as	  the	  Turkish	  
government	  established	  a	  number	  of	  important	  institutions	  designed	  to	  expand	  and	  
support	  extractive	  industries.	  The	  Electric	  Works	  Study	  Administration	  (Elektrik	  İşleri	  
Etüt	  İdaresi)	  was	  founded	  to	  evaluate	  and	  study	  options	  for	  generating	  electricity,	  with	  a	  
focus	  on	  providing	  power	  for	  large-­‐scale	  industrial	  operations.	  Turkey	  at	  this	  time	  did	  
not	  have	  a	  national	  grid	  and	  electric	  service	  was	  rare	  outside	  of	  larger	  urban	  centers.134	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
132	  Carter	  Vaughn	  Findley,	  Turkey,	  Islam,	  Nationalism,	  and	  Modernity:	  A	  History,	  1789-­‐
2007	  (New	  Haven:	  Yale	  University	  Press,	  2010),	  259.	  Turkey’s	  agricultural	  and	  industrial	  
growth	  during	  this	  period	  indicate	  that	  etatism	  had	  an	  overall	  positive	  effect	  on	  the	  
economy.	  See	  Bent	  Hansen,	  Egypt	  and	  Turkey:	  The	  Political	  Economy	  of	  Poverty,	  Equity,	  
and	  Growth	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1991),	  322-­‐335.	  
133	  Hershlag,	  The	  Challenge	  of	  Growth,	  74.	  Hansen,	  Egypt	  and	  Turkey,	  329.	  For	  more	  on	  
the	  extractive	  character	  of	  modern	  economic	  development,	  see	  J.B.	  Foster,	  B.	  Clark,	  and	  
R.	  York,	  The	  Ecological	  Rift:	  Capitalism's	  War	  on	  the	  Earth	  (Monthly	  Review	  Press,	  2010);	  
J.R.	  McNeill,	  Something	  New	  under	  the	  Sun:	  An	  Environmental	  History	  of	  the	  Twentieth-­‐
Century	  World	  (W.W.	  Norton	  &	  Company,	  2000);	  Timothy	  Mitchell,	  Carbon	  Democracy:	  
Political	  Power	  in	  the	  Age	  of	  Oil	  (Verso,	  2011);	  James	  C.	  Scott,	  Seeing	  Like	  a	  State	  How	  
Certain	  Schemes	  to	  Improve	  the	  Human	  Condition	  Have	  Failed	  (New	  Haven:	  Yale	  
University	  Press,	  1998).	  
134	  Erik	  J.	  Zürcher,	  The	  Young	  Turk	  Legacy	  and	  Nation	  Building:	  From	  the	  Ottoman	  Empire	  
to	  Atatürk’s	  Turkey	  (London:	  I.B.	  Tauris,	  2010),	  264-­‐265.	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The	  Electric	  Works	  Study	  Administration	  (EİE)	  took	  a	  strong	  interest	  in	  the	  
Euphrates	  River	  from	  its	  founding.	  Within	  months,	  the	  EİE	  established	  measuring	  
stations	  at	  various	  points	  along	  the	  river	  and	  began	  studying	  the	  flow	  of	  Euphrates	  
water.	  These	  measuring	  stations	  eventually	  stretched	  from	  the	  Syrian	  border	  beyond	  
Keban	  up	  the	  Euphrates’	  major	  tributaries,	  the	  Karasu	  and	  the	  Murat.	  In	  1938,	  the	  
Administration	  conducted	  geologic	  and	  topographic	  surveys	  at	  Keban,	  focusing	  on	  the	  
site	  as	  the	  most	  probable	  location	  for	  a	  new	  dam.135	  	  
Mehmet	  Turgut,	  who	  worked	  at	  the	  Electric	  Works	  Study	  Administration	  as	  an	  
engineer	  in	  the	  early	  1950s,	  credited	  İbrahim	  Deriner,	  a	  hydraulic	  engineer	  at	  EİE,	  with	  
the	  idea	  for	  a	  Euphrates	  mega	  dam	  at	  Keban.	  Deriner	  himself	  wondered	  if	  the	  idea	  
preceded	  his	  arrival	  in	  1938	  at	  the	  Electric	  Works	  Study	  Administration.	  The	  same	  year	  
Deriner	  arrived,	  renowned	  Swiss	  geologist	  Maurice	  Lugeon	  traveled	  to	  Turkey	  to	  
investigate	  several	  dam	  sites	  in	  Turkey,	  including	  Keban.	  Lugeon	  was	  known	  among	  
geologists	  and	  engineers	  as	  “père	  des	  barrages”	  and	  his	  1933	  publication,	  Barrages	  et	  
géologie,	  chronicled	  his	  rich	  experience	  studying	  dam	  sites.136	  Deriner	  reported	  that	  
Lugeon	  declared	  the	  site	  acceptable,	  though	  at	  that	  time	  the	  Swiss	  geologist	  assessed	  the	  
potential	  of	  an	  installation	  half	  the	  size	  of	  that	  proposed	  by	  Deriner	  some	  fifteen	  years	  
later	  at	  the	  Turkey	  Energy	  Congress.137	  Regardless	  of	  the	  original	  progenitor	  of	  the	  idea,	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  İbrahim	  Deriner,	  "Keban	  Barajı	  Ve	  Hidroelektrik	  Santralı	  Hakkında	  Bazı	  Bilgiler,"	  
Türkiye	  Mühendislik	  Haberleri	  8,	  no.	  92	  (1962):	  5.	  
136	  Edward	  B.	  Bailey,	  "Maurice	  Lugeon.	  1870-­‐1953,"	  Obituary	  Notices	  of	  Fellows	  of	  the	  
Royal	  Society	  9,	  no.	  1	  (1954):	  172.	  
137	  Deriner,	  "Keban	  Barajı,"	  5.	  Mehmet	  Turgut,	  Gap'ın	  Sahipleri	  (Istanbul:	  Boğaziçi	  
Yayınları,	  1995),	  19-­‐21.	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by	  1953	  Deriner	  was	  EİE’s	  General	  Director	  and	  the	  Keban	  project’s	  staunchest	  
proponent.	  	  
About	  the	  same	  time	  as	  the	  Electric	  Works	  Study	  Administration	  was	  founded,	  
the	  Turkish	  government	  created	  Etibank	  (Hittite	  Bank)	  as	  a	  state	  economic	  enterprise	  to	  
develop	  energy	  production,	  particularly	  as	  related	  to	  mineral	  resources.138	  Etibank	  
functioned	  as	  the	  executing	  agency	  for	  all	  manner	  of	  projects	  drawn	  up	  by	  other	  
government	  agencies.	  Power	  projects	  developed	  by	  the	  Electric	  Works	  Study	  
Administration	  or	  mining	  opportunities	  identified	  by	  the	  Mineral	  Research	  and	  
Exploration	  Institute,	  also	  founded	  in	  1935,	  were	  constructed	  and	  operated	  by	  Etibank	  
or	  an	  organization	  established	  by	  it.139	  While	  Etibank	  was	  mainly	  concerned	  with	  power	  
plants,	  it	  would	  later	  be	  tasked	  with	  running	  hydroelectric	  stations.	  In	  addition	  to	  EİE	  
and	  Etibank,	  the	  Turkish	  government	  also	  established	  state	  economic	  enterprises	  in	  
agriculture,	  including	  Sümerbank	  (1932),	  the	  Turkey	  Sugar	  Factories	  Company	  (1935)	  
and	  the	  Seed	  Improvement	  and	  Production	  Company	  (1935).140	  
The	  Second	  World	  War	  interrupted	  these	  developments.	  Despite	  remaining	  
neutral,	  Turkey’s	  historical	  and	  geopolitical	  position	  required	  preparations	  for	  defense.	  
The	  Ministry	  of	  Defense	  allocation	  in	  the	  national	  budget	  rose	  from	  thirty	  to	  fifty	  percent	  
and	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  army	  increased	  from	  120,000	  in	  peacetime	  to	  1.5	  million.	  While	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
138	  Etibank	  was	  founded	  on	  June	  14,	  1935	  by	  Law	  No.	  2805.	  The	  local	  equivalent	  of	  the	  
Etibank,	  responsible	  for	  assisting	  provincial	  governments,	  municipalities	  and	  village	  
administrations,	  was	  founded	  in	  1945	  as	  the	  İller	  Bankası.	  
139	  The	  Maden	  Tetkik	  ve	  Arama	  Enstitüsü	  [MTA]	  was	  founded	  June	  22,	  1935	  by	  Law	  No.	  
2804.	  
140	  Türkiye	  Şeker	  Fabrikaları	  A.Ş.	  and	  Tohum	  İslah	  ve	  Üretme	  A.Ş.,	  respectively.	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Turkey’s	  etatist	  policies	  allowed	  the	  state	  to	  act	  quickly	  to	  mobilize	  the	  economy	  for	  
wartime	  needs,	  the	  strain	  was	  significant	  and	  generated	  public	  resentment	  toward	  the	  
single-­‐party	  system	  under	  the	  Republican	  People’s	  Party.141	  
After	  the	  Second	  World	  War,	  etatism	  came	  under	  attack	  from	  several	  directions,	  
with	  profound	  implications	  for	  the	  way	  the	  Keban	  project	  was	  justified.	  One	  of	  the	  first	  
voices	  raised	  in	  opposition	  to	  the	  single-­‐party	  system	  belonged	  to	  the	  industrialist	  and	  
champion	  of	  free	  enterprise	  Nuri	  Demirağ.	  In	  August	  1945,	  Demirağ	  founded	  the	  
National	  Development	  Party	  (Milli	  Kalkınma	  Partisi),	  the	  first	  organization	  to	  directly	  
challenge	  the	  one-­‐party	  state.142	  İbrahim	  Deriner	  worked	  for	  Nuri	  Demirağ	  in	  the	  1930s	  
before	  joining	  EİE.	  Demirağ	  at	  that	  time	  was	  trying	  to	  establish	  an	  aviation	  industry	  in	  
Turkey	  and	  Deriner	  worked	  in	  the	  aircraft	  manufacturing	  division.143	  	  
Internal	  opposition	  to	  etatism	  joined	  with	  outside	  pressure	  from	  Turkey’s	  
sources	  of	  foreign	  aid,	  namely	  the	  North	  Atlantic	  Treaty	  Organization	  and	  the	  
Organisation	  for	  European	  Economic	  Cooperation	  (later	  the	  Organisation	  for	  Economic	  
Co-­‐operation	  and	  Development	  or	  OECD).	  The	  attractiveness	  of	  the	  Soviet	  model	  
diminished	  also	  as	  a	  result	  of	  Stalin’s	  post-­‐war	  demands	  for	  Turkish	  territory	  in	  the	  east	  
and	  bases	  along	  the	  Dardanelles	  and	  Bosporus.	  Responding	  to	  these	  pressures,	  the	  
ruling	  party	  moved	  to	  liberalize	  the	  economy	  and	  the	  political	  system.	  The	  government	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
141	  See	  Findley,	  Turkey,	  Islam,	  Nationalism,	  274-­‐275;	  Zürcher,	  Turkey,	  199-­‐200.	  
142	  For	  more	  on	  Nuri	  Demirağ,	  see	  Ziya	  Şakir,	  Nuri	  Demirağ	  Kimdir?	  (İstanbul:	  Kenan	  
Matbaası,	  1947).	  
143	  EBASCO,	  Report	  to	  Electric	  Power	  Resources	  Survey	  and	  Development	  Administration	  
for	  Engineering	  and	  Economic	  Feasibility	  of	  Keban	  Dam	  and	  Hydroelectric	  Project	  (New	  
York:	  EBASCO	  Services	  Inc.,	  1963),	  B-­‐1,	  2.	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slowly	  gave	  private	  capital	  a	  greater	  lead,	  tabled	  the	  next	  Five-­‐Year	  Plan,	  and	  scheduled	  
multi-­‐party	  elections.144	  
	   These	  elections	  brought	  Prime	  Minister	  Adnan	  Menderes	  and	  the	  Democrat	  Party	  
(Demokrat	  Parti)	  to	  power	  in	  1950.	  Menderes	  and	  his	  party	  believed	  that	  economic	  
growth	  could	  be	  achieved	  only	  through	  unfettered	  private	  enterprise	  and	  sought	  ways	  
to	  encourage	  local	  and	  foreign	  investment.	  The	  Democrat	  Party	  sold	  off	  some	  state	  
enterprises	  and	  created	  the	  Industrial	  Development	  Bank	  of	  Turkey	  (Türkiye	  Sınai	  
Kalkınma	  Bankası)	  to	  facilitate	  the	  transfer	  of	  state	  property	  to	  private	  hands.	  Still,	  the	  
Party	  admitted	  that	  state	  involvement	  was	  necessary,	  particularly	  as	  the	  private	  sector	  
was	  still	  unsure	  of	  the	  longevity	  of	  the	  regime	  and	  its	  new	  reforms.	  	  
The	  Democrat	  Party	  consequently	  sought	  a	  new	  pattern	  for	  state	  involvement	  
that	  would	  require	  less	  direct	  intervention.	  Rather	  than	  planting	  new	  enterprises,	  the	  
state	  would	  prepare	  the	  soil,	  so	  to	  speak.	  Muhlis	  Ete,	  the	  Minister	  of	  Management	  and	  
later	  the	  Minister	  of	  Economy	  and	  Commerce	  in	  Menderes’s	  first	  two	  cabinets,	  
commented:	  
Our	  understanding	  of	  étatism	  takes	  more	  the	  form	  of	  ‘organizing	  by	  the	  
state’	  than	  ‘running	  by	  the	  state’;	  the	  state’s	  economic	  policy	  or	  its	  interest	  
in	  the	  economy	  should	  take	  the	  form	  of	  measures	  necessary	  to	  encourage,	  
protect	  and	  co-­‐ordinate	  the	  development	  of	  the	  various	  branches	  of	  the	  
economy…	  Our	  thesis	  is	  that	  the	  state’s	  duty	  is	  not	  to	  be	  inside	  the	  
economy	  but	  above	  it.145	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
144	  Hansen,	  Egypt	  and	  Turkey,	  338-­‐339.	  
145	  Feroz	  Ahmad,	  The	  Turkish	  Experiment	  in	  Democracy	  1950-­‐1975	  (London:	  C.	  Hurst	  and	  
Co.,	  Ltd.,	  1977),	  125-­‐126.	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Ete’s	  comments	  suggested	  a	  change	  of	  emphasis	  and	  degree,	  rather	  than	  a	  wholesale	  
abandonment	  of	  the	  etatist	  project.	  For	  the	  Democrat	  Party,	  the	  aim	  was	  to	  protect	  
individual	  rights,	  at	  least	  of	  the	  property	  owner.	  The	  Democrat	  Party	  therefore	  did	  not	  
abandon	  all	  features	  of	  the	  etatist	  system,	  instead	  focusing	  on	  those	  areas	  it	  believed	  
possible	  to	  facilitate	  economic	  growth.	  Menderes’s	  administration	  concentrated	  on	  
public	  works	  over	  public	  ownership,	  embarking	  on	  an	  infrastructure	  building	  spree	  that	  
the	  opposition	  viewed	  as	  influenced	  more	  by	  politics	  than	  by	  pragmatic	  economic	  
considerations.146	  	  
This	  new	  public	  works	  program	  required	  additional	  bureaucratic	  mechanisms.	  
The	  most	  important	  new	  agency	  was	  the	  State	  Hydraulic	  Works	  (Devlet	  Su	  İşleri).	  The	  
State	  Hydraulic	  Works	  (DSİ)	  was	  established	  in	  1953	  and	  tasked	  with	  building	  flood	  
control	  works,	  irrigation	  systems	  and	  hydroelectric	  stations,	  and	  to	  supervise	  municipal	  
water	  supply	  and	  sewer	  designs,	  among	  other	  things.147	  DSİ	  replaced	  the	  former	  Water	  
Works	  Leadership	  (Su	  İşleri	  Reisliği)	  and	  Waters	  Science	  Committee	  Directorate	  (Su	  Fen	  
Heyeti	  Müdürlüğü),	  both	  of	  which	  had	  operated	  under	  narrower	  mandates.148	  The	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
146	  Ibid.,	  128.	  Ahmad	  notes	  that	  the	  opposition	  Republican	  People’s	  Party	  referred	  to	  the	  
new	  sugar	  and	  cement	  factories	  as	  “election	  factories”	  because	  there	  was	  little	  economic	  
basis	  for	  their	  placement.	  See	  also	  Zürcher,	  Turkey,	  198.	  
147	  Law	  no.	  6200	  established	  the	  agency	  on	  December	  18,	  1953,	  but	  did	  not	  go	  into	  force	  
until	  February	  28,	  1954.	  
148	  A	  series	  of	  laws	  were	  passed	  during	  the	  1930s	  and	  1940s	  related	  to	  flood	  protection,	  
crop	  cultivation	  and	  the	  draining	  of	  swamps.	  These	  broadened	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  state	  
water	  authorities	  and	  served	  as	  a	  precursor	  to	  the	  DSİ.	  See	  DSİ,	  “Tarihçe,”	  Devlet	  Su	  
İşleri	  Genel	  Müdürlüğü,	  accessed	  January	  4,	  2012,	  
http://www2.dsi.gov.tr/kurumsal/tarihce.htm.	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creation	  of	  DSİ	  signified	  a	  reinvigorated	  engagement	  with	  water	  resources	  and	  an	  
emphasis	  on	  new	  technologies	  that	  made	  possible	  larger,	  more	  complicated	  projects.149	  	  
With	  the	  founding	  of	  the	  State	  Hydraulic	  Works	  and	  the	  convening	  of	  a	  Turkey	  
Energy	  Congress	  the	  year	  before,	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  Keban	  dam	  moved	  closer	  to	  reality.	  
Regional	  offices	  of	  the	  State	  Hydraulic	  Works	  opened	  across	  the	  country	  and	  began	  
project	  surveys.	  DSİ	  initiated	  studies	  of	  Turkey’s	  major	  river	  basins	  under	  its	  General	  
Director,	  Süleyman	  Demirel,	  which	  laid	  the	  technical	  foundation	  for	  construction	  of	  new	  
dams	  well	  into	  the	  future.	  In	  addition,	  the	  new	  powers	  and	  finances	  given	  to	  DSİ	  allowed	  
the	  organization	  to	  begin	  building	  new	  facilities,	  including	  new	  dams.	  The	  1950s	  saw	  the	  
construction	  of	  five	  large	  dams	  by	  DSİ,	  though	  none	  were	  close	  to	  the	  scale	  of	  Keban.150	  	  
While	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  State	  Hydraulic	  Works	  laid	  the	  technical	  foundation	  for	  
the	  dam,	  the	  political	  atmosphere	  of	  the	  1950s	  was	  not	  hospitable	  to	  a	  project	  like	  
Keban.	  First	  conceived	  in	  the	  1930s,	  the	  project	  in	  terms	  of	  scale	  and	  cost	  fit	  well	  into	  
the	  etatist	  vision	  of	  a	  state	  highly	  active	  in	  the	  economic	  sphere.	  However,	  it	  was	  
proposed	  publicly	  for	  the	  first	  time	  in	  the	  1950s,	  when	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  Democrat	  Party	  
changed	  the	  government’s	  stance	  toward	  etatism.	  While	  the	  Democrat	  Party	  supported	  
public	  works	  projects,	  they	  were	  generally	  small	  and	  designed	  to	  benefit	  private	  
enterprise	  and	  garner	  public	  acclaim.	  The	  idea	  of	  giving	  a	  state	  enterprise	  like	  Etibank	  
$300	  million	  for	  a	  six-­‐year	  project	  in	  a	  relatively	  unpopulated	  and	  underdeveloped	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
149	  Abdulkadir	  Dursun,	  “Siniraşan	  Sular	  Firat	  Ve	  Dicle	  Nehirlerinin,	  Türkiye,	  Suriye	  Ve	  
Irak	  Ilişkileri	  Üzerine	  Etkileri”	  (Süleyman	  Demirel	  Üniversitesi,	  2006),	  129.	  
150	  These	  dams	  included	  the	  Sarıyar	  (1956),	  Seyhan	  (1956),	  Kemer	  (1958),	  Hirfanlı	  
(1959)	  and	  Demirköprü	  (1960).	  The	  Kemer	  dam,	  at	  108m	  tall,	  is	  only	  half	  the	  height	  of	  
Keban,	  while	  the	  Seyhan	  dam	  is	  less	  than	  half	  the	  volume.	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region	  would	  have	  been	  a	  stretch	  for	  the	  party	  leadership,	  even	  if	  Etibank	  had	  the	  
expertise	  to	  pull	  it	  off.	  	  
Moreover,	  there	  was	  the	  problem	  of	  administration	  in	  the	  first	  decade	  after	  many	  
years	  of	  single-­‐party	  rule.	  Menderes	  was	  suspicious	  of	  the	  bureaucracy	  and	  its	  perceived	  
ties	  to	  the	  opposition.	  This	  as	  well	  as	  the	  Democrat	  Party’s	  general	  resistance	  to	  central	  
planning	  imperiled	  a	  project	  that	  required	  extensive	  coordination	  between	  public	  
agencies,	  the	  political	  leadership,	  foreign	  companies	  and	  donors.151	  Conversation	  about	  
the	  Keban	  project	  therefore	  remained	  at	  lower	  tiers	  of	  the	  government	  and	  was	  not	  
embraced	  by	  President	  Celal	  Bayar	  and	  Menderes	  until	  later	  in	  the	  decade	  and	  only	  in	  
the	  midst	  of	  an	  election	  campaign.	  Even	  then,	  with	  other	  economic	  and	  political	  
problems	  boiling	  over,	  very	  little	  was	  done	  about	  it.152	  	  
Moreover,	  the	  Keban	  project	  was	  public	  works	  on	  an	  altogether	  different	  scale,	  a	  
project	  that	  if	  executed	  would	  connect	  all	  levels	  of	  government,	  all	  of	  the	  new	  agencies	  
created	  from	  the	  1930s	  onward,	  and	  extend	  them,	  influencing	  society	  and	  the	  
environment	  in	  ways	  that	  a	  sugar	  mill,	  cement	  factory	  or	  new	  marina	  could	  not.	  Due	  to	  
the	  erosion	  of	  the	  etatist	  position	  during	  the	  1950s,	  allocating	  immense	  resources	  to	  
construct	  the	  dam	  was	  difficult	  to	  justify	  either	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  laissez-­‐faire	  economic	  
policy	  or	  populism.	  There	  were	  also	  higher	  stakes	  because	  of	  the	  need	  for	  foreign	  
technical	  and	  financial	  assistance.	  New	  justifications	  for	  the	  project	  were	  therefore	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
151	  Ahmad,	  Turkish	  Experiment,	  83-­‐84.	  
152	  Turgut,	  Gap'ın	  Sahipleri,	  25-­‐28.	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needed	  to	  convince	  not	  only	  officials	  in	  Turkey’s	  contentious	  political	  parties	  but	  also	  
stakeholders	  in	  the	  international	  community.	  
	  
The	  1960s:	  A	  New	  Era	  of	  Planning	  
With	  the	  end	  of	  the	  one-­‐party	  state	  in	  1950,	  former	  methods	  for	  building	  
consensus	  and	  reaching	  decisions	  broke	  down,	  both	  within	  the	  Democrat	  Party	  and	  
without.	  Opposition	  to	  the	  left-­‐leaning	  Republican	  People’s	  Party	  and	  the	  single-­‐party	  
system	  seemed	  in	  the	  late	  1950s	  to	  be	  the	  only	  thing	  holding	  the	  Democrat	  Party	  
together.	  As	  a	  result,	  even	  as	  the	  party	  tried	  to	  bring	  more	  openness	  and	  competition	  to	  
the	  country’s	  economy,	  it	  became	  increasingly	  autocratic	  and	  used	  repressive	  
techniques	  to	  curtail	  fair	  competition	  in	  the	  political	  sphere.153	  In	  the	  economic	  realm,	  
the	  Democrat	  Party’s	  laissez-­‐faire	  approach	  led	  to	  some	  years	  of	  growth,	  but	  the	  
inflationary	  policies	  of	  the	  Menderes	  government	  eventually	  resulted	  in	  economic	  
disaster.	  With	  the	  economy	  out	  of	  control	  and	  the	  political	  system	  frozen,	  a	  group	  of	  
military	  officers	  carried	  out	  a	  coup	  on	  May	  27,	  1960,	  and	  overthrew	  the	  Menderes	  
regime.	  One	  of	  their	  first	  priorities	  was	  to	  stabilize	  the	  economy.154	  
The	  military	  junta,	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  “National	  Unity	  Committee”	  (Milli	  Birlik	  
Komitesi),	  announced	  the	  writing	  of	  a	  new	  constitution	  that	  it	  hoped	  would	  put	  an	  end	  to	  
the	  tyranny	  of	  a	  single	  party,	  whether	  ruling	  in	  a	  one-­‐party	  state	  or	  as	  a	  majority	  party	  
with	  broad	  powers	  to	  trample	  the	  minority.	  The	  new	  constitution	  also	  preserved	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
153	  Ahmad,	  Turkish	  Experiment,	  66-­‐67.	  
154	  For	  more	  on	  the	  coup	  d’état,	  see	  ibid.,	  147-­‐211;	  Zürcher,	  Turkey,	  241-­‐250.	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military’s	  rights	  to	  interfere	  in	  political	  affairs	  and	  made	  the	  leader	  of	  the	  National	  Unity	  
Committee,	  Cemal	  Gürsel,	  president	  of	  the	  republic.155	  Turkish	  voters	  approved	  the	  new	  
constitution	  in	  July	  1961.	  	  
Along	  with	  changes	  to	  the	  structure	  of	  parliament	  and	  the	  addition	  of	  a	  judicial	  
check	  on	  legislation,	  the	  new	  constitution	  enshrined	  the	  concept	  of	  a	  planned	  economy	  
in	  the	  fundamental	  law	  and	  even	  called	  for	  an	  institution	  to	  coordinate	  it,	  the	  State	  
Planning	  Organization	  (Devlet	  Planlama	  Teşkilati).	  The	  anti-­‐etatism	  of	  Menderes	  and	  
Demirağ	  perished	  with	  the	  coup.	  The	  State	  Planning	  Organization	  quickly	  set	  about	  its	  
tasks,	  marshaling	  forty	  different	  committees	  of	  analysts	  to	  assess	  the	  entire	  national	  
economy.	  By	  June	  1961,	  the	  government	  had	  agreed	  on	  basic	  principles	  and	  the	  First	  
Five-­‐Year	  Development	  Plan	  was	  eventually	  put	  into	  effect	  on	  January	  1,	  1963.156	  	  
Not	  everyone	  approved	  of	  the	  effort.	  The	  Member	  of	  Parliament	  from	  Urfa,	  Kadri	  
Erogan,	  knew	  that	  his	  ancient	  city,	  an	  important	  pilgrimage	  site	  in	  Mesopotamia,	  would	  
benefit	  greatly	  from	  irrigation	  projects	  that	  required	  the	  construction	  of	  the	  Keban	  dam.	  
On	  the	  parliament	  floor,	  he	  rejected	  the	  “plan	  craze”	  and	  declared,	  “The	  People	  want	  
rice,	  not	  a	  Plan!”157	  Erogan	  gave	  voice	  to	  the	  challenges	  facing	  the	  country	  in	  the	  post-­‐
war	  period,	  with	  several	  provinces,	  particularly	  in	  the	  Kurdish	  east	  and	  southeast,	  
having	  obtained	  few	  benefits	  from	  earlier	  economic	  development,	  planned	  or	  
unplanned.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
155	  Zürcher,	  Turkey,	  240-­‐247.	  
156	  Hershlag,	  The	  Challenge	  of	  Growth,	  187-­‐188.	  
157	  “Millet,	  plân	  değil,	  pilâv	  istiyor!”	  With	  that	  statement,	  Erogan	  earned	  himself	  the	  
nickname	  “Pilâvcı	  Milletvekili”	  or	  “The	  Rice	  Peddling	  MP.”	  Turgut,	  Gap'ın	  Sahipleri,	  38.	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The	  First	  Five-­‐Year	  Development	  Plan	  attempted	  to	  right	  this	  balance,	  at	  least	  
rhetorically,	  by	  placing	  emphasis	  on	  social	  justice,	  pointing	  out	  the	  disparity	  in	  regional	  
economic	  conditions,	  and	  announcing	  a	  break	  with	  the	  political	  practices	  of	  the	  1950s.	  
İsmet	  İnönü,	  the	  former	  lieutenant	  of	  Mustafa	  Kemal	  Atatürk	  and	  leader	  of	  the	  
Republican	  People’s	  Party	  since	  Atatürk’s	  death,	  asserted	  in	  his	  Foreword	  to	  the	  Plan	  
that	  the	  government	  meant	  to:	  
direct	  economic	  and	  social	  life	  to	  the	  pursuit	  of	  standards	  of	  living	  which	  
are	  compatible	  with	  human	  dignity	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  equity	  and	  full	  
employment	  and,	  in	  so	  doing,	  to	  end	  once	  and	  for	  all	  attempts	  at	  
unplanned	  and	  arbitrary	  conduct.158	  	  
These	  words	  indicated	  an	  extension	  of	  the	  etatist	  program.	  Interwar	  policies	  inspired	  by	  
Soviet	  practices	  were	  conceived	  mostly	  as	  economic	  measures,	  such	  as	  investments	  in	  
new	  factories	  and	  the	  promotion	  of	  certain	  industries.	  The	  Turkish	  government	  in	  the	  
1920s	  and	  1930s	  had	  imposed	  a	  number	  of	  policies	  intended	  to	  remake	  the	  social	  life	  of	  
the	  republic,	  but	  these	  had	  never	  been	  directly	  connected	  to	  economic	  development.	  In	  
this	  new	  plan,	  society	  and	  economy	  were	  combined	  as	  targets	  for	  state-­‐driven	  economic	  
development.	  In	  addition,	  the	  Development	  Plan	  associated	  a	  state-­‐directed	  economy	  
and	  social	  sphere	  with	  the	  end	  of	  “unplanned	  and	  arbitrary	  conduct,”	  as	  if	  economic	  
development	  was	  the	  essential	  component	  of	  social	  order	  and	  could	  bring	  about	  the	  end	  
of	  political	  strife.	  This	  attitude	  may	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  section	  introducing	  the	  Plan’s	  targets:	  	  
The	  achievement	  of	  a	  high	  growth	  rate	  and	  the	  consequent	  rise	  in	  incomes	  
is	  not	  the	  ultimate	  aim.	  The	  real	  aim	  is	  to	  promote	  social	  welfare…	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  First	  Five-­‐Year	  Development	  Plan	  1963-­‐1967,	  (Ankara:	  State	  Planning	  Organization,	  
1963),	  iii.	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Development	  on	  these	  lines	  will	  be	  directed	  to	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  
balanced	  social	  order	  consistent	  with	  democratic	  principles.159	  	  
In	  this	  conception	  of	  economic	  planning,	  the	  object	  of	  reform	  and	  of	  centralized	  planning	  
was	  not	  the	  economy	  per	  se,	  but	  the	  society.	  By	  definition,	  development	  projects	  
undertaken	  by	  the	  state	  were	  no	  longer	  sufficient	  if	  they	  only	  delivered	  increased	  
growth.	  Project	  also	  had	  to	  somehow	  improve	  social	  conditions.	  It	  was	  not	  enough	  to	  
inject	  new	  life	  into	  commerce	  or	  industry,	  the	  concept	  of	  a	  “balanced	  social	  order”	  
demanded	  additional	  criteria	  for	  assessing	  the	  promise	  of	  any	  given	  enterprise.	  	  
The	  rhetoric	  about	  democracy	  and	  arbitrary	  conduct	  also	  fed	  into	  greater	  
geopolitical	  concerns.	  Such	  commentary	  was	  undoubtedly	  meant	  to	  temper	  the	  concerns	  
of	  Western	  European	  nations	  and	  the	  United	  States	  about	  the	  recent	  coup.	  The	  Turkish	  
government	  hoped	  these	  nations,	  in	  the	  form	  of	  the	  OECD	  consortium,	  would	  provide	  
funds	  for	  the	  Plan.	  The	  Turkish	  government	  sought	  to	  reassure	  its	  funders	  by	  insisting	  
on	  the	  powers	  of	  the	  elected	  government	  and	  its	  bureaucracy	  to	  produce	  social	  and	  
economic	  development.	  By	  placing	  social	  justice	  at	  the	  forefront	  of	  its	  stated	  goals,	  
rather	  than	  just	  growth,	  the	  Plan	  maintained	  that	  only	  a	  democratic	  order	  could	  bring	  
about	  the	  intended	  outcomes.	  
For	  proponents	  of	  the	  Keban	  project,	  the	  Plan	  was	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  a	  great	  
barrier,	  while	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  it	  also	  served	  as	  a	  guide	  for	  how	  to	  justify	  the	  project	  in	  
this	  new	  political	  context.	  Unlike	  the	  etatist	  era	  of	  the	  1930s,	  technical	  specifications,	  
industrial	  targets	  and	  growth	  projections	  were	  not	  enough.	  Unlike	  the	  Democrat	  Party	  
era	  of	  the	  1950s,	  it	  was	  not	  enough	  to	  simply	  declare	  the	  dam	  a	  “public	  good.”	  To	  situate	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  Ibid.,	  2.	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the	  dam	  within	  the	  national	  economy	  and	  demonstrate	  its	  ability	  to	  produce	  both	  
economic	  and	  social	  development	  required	  a	  new	  framing	  of	  both	  the	  economy	  and	  
society	  and	  new	  justifications	  for	  their	  adjustment	  by	  dam.	  	  
Even	  as	  the	  political	  backing	  for	  the	  project	  remained	  murky,	  the	  project’s	  
supporters	  within	  the	  bureaucracy	  continued	  to	  produce	  the	  data	  necessary	  to	  construct	  
the	  dam.	  In	  1961,	  the	  DSİ	  regional	  office	  in	  Diyarbakır	  opened	  a	  Euphrates	  Planning	  
Authority	  office	  and	  sent	  forty	  engineers	  to	  survey	  both	  the	  Tigris	  and	  Euphrates.160	  
However,	  technical	  readiness	  mattered	  little	  when	  the	  new	  constitution	  placed	  planning	  
in	  such	  prominence.	  Funding	  for	  a	  massive	  public	  works	  project	  could	  only	  be	  obtained	  
if	  it	  was	  included	  in	  the	  Development	  Plan.	  This	  meant	  that	  the	  dam	  had	  to	  transcend	  the	  
technical	  and	  become	  something	  more	  than	  just	  a	  pile	  of	  rocks	  and	  cement.	  	  
To	  that	  end,	  proponents	  of	  the	  dam,	  including	  the	  aforementioned	  MP	  from	  Urfa,	  
Kadri	  Erogan,	  submitted	  a	  proposal	  to	  add	  five	  million	  Turkish	  lira	  (at	  the	  time	  
approximately	  555,000	  USD)	  to	  the	  budget	  for	  the	  Electric	  Works	  Study	  Administration.	  
The	  extra	  monies	  were	  intended	  to	  fund	  a	  foreign	  firm	  in	  the	  preparation	  of	  a	  feasibility	  
report.	  Such	  a	  report	  was	  necessary	  to	  obtain	  credit	  from	  the	  International	  Bank	  for	  
Reconstruction	  and	  Development	  and	  other	  providers	  of	  foreign	  development	  aid.	  While	  
a	  paltry	  sum	  in	  comparison	  to	  the	  overall	  cost	  of	  the	  dam,	  paying	  for	  such	  an	  effort	  by	  a	  
foreign	  firm	  signaled	  a	  larger	  commitment	  and	  gave	  the	  project	  much	  needed	  
momentum.	  Such	  was	  the	  resistance	  to	  the	  proposal	  in	  committee	  that	  Fethi	  Çelikbaş,	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  "Çevre	  Ve	  Orman	  Bakanı	  Sayın	  Prof.	  Dr.	  Veysel	  Eroğlu	  Ile	  Söyleşi,"	  Aktüel	  Arkeoloji	  
Dergisi.	  http://www.aktuelarkeoloji.com.tr/?call=Stories&ID=197	  (accessed	  January	  22,	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under	  whose	  Ministry	  of	  Industry	  the	  Electric	  Works	  Study	  Administration	  operated,	  
declared	  that	  the	  money	  was	  not	  required	  and	  that	  he	  would	  not	  use	  it,	  even	  if	  it	  were	  
appropriated.	  Another	  member,	  Dr.	  Suphi	  Baykam,	  resigned	  from	  the	  committee	  
altogether.	  Still,	  despite	  the	  acrimonious	  debate,	  the	  proposal	  passed	  the	  Parliamentary	  
Budget	  and	  Plan	  Committee	  for	  consideration	  by	  the	  full	  parliament.161	  
Unfortunately	  for	  Erogan	  and	  the	  dam’s	  other	  supporters,	  the	  governments	  that	  
came	  to	  power	  following	  the	  1960	  coup	  were	  unstable.	  In	  trying	  to	  avoid	  the	  dominance	  
of	  a	  single	  party,	  the	  1961	  Constitution	  established	  an	  electoral	  system	  that	  led	  to	  
coalition	  governments	  in	  the	  early	  years.	  Parliament,	  in	  order	  to	  avoid	  the	  fracas	  of	  a	  
debate	  about	  the	  dam,	  tabled	  the	  proposal	  and	  instead	  set	  up	  a	  commission	  to	  assess	  the	  
project:	  The	  Research	  Commission	  on	  Behalf	  of	  the	  National	  Parliament	  Regarding	  the	  
Keban	  Dam	  and	  Lower	  Euphrates	  Basin	  Development	  Project.162	  Each	  party	  serving	  in	  
parliament	  submitted	  one	  member	  to	  constitute	  the	  committee;	  this	  process	  took	  
several	  days	  as	  many	  names	  were	  disqualified	  as	  a	  result	  of	  previous	  work	  with	  the	  
EİE.163	  Eventually,	  four	  MPs	  were	  selected,	  one	  from	  each	  party.	  Each	  of	  the	  government	  
agencies	  involved	  sent	  representatives	  before	  the	  commission	  to	  discuss	  the	  project.	  
Mehmet	  Turgut,	  now	  an	  MP	  from	  the	  city	  of	  Afyon	  in	  Western	  Anatolia,	  wrote	  about	  his	  
experience,	  recalling	  the	  alternate	  projects	  and	  proposals	  suggested	  by	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
161	  Turgut,	  Gap'ın	  Sahipleri,	  38-­‐40.	  
162	  In	  Turkish:	  Keban	  Barajı	  ve	  Aşağı	  Fırat	  Havzası	  Kalkınma	  Projesi	  Hakkında	  Millet	  
Meclisi	  Adına	  Araştırma	  Komisyonu.	  
163	  Millet	  Meclisi	  Tutanak	  Dergisi.	  “Ellisekizinci	  Birleşim,”	  February	  27,	  1962,	  p.	  711.	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representative	  from	  the	  State	  Hydraulic	  Works,	  Senior	  Engineer	  Selahattin	  Kiliç.164	  Kiliç,	  
as	  Head	  of	  the	  Investigations	  and	  Planning	  Division,	  was	  in	  a	  unique	  position	  to	  suggest	  
other	  options.	  To	  Turgut,	  he	  was	  also	  in	  a	  unique	  position	  to	  delay	  the	  committee.	  	  
Six	  months	  of	  deliberations	  passed	  before	  the	  chairman,	  MP	  Sadık	  Kutlay	  of	  the	  
Republican	  People’s	  Party,	  asked	  his	  fellow	  members	  to	  join	  him	  in	  approving	  the	  Keban	  
project.	  Despite	  the	  other	  options	  presented	  by	  Kiliç,	  he	  was	  convinced	  of	  the	  Keban	  
project’s	  ability	  to	  produce	  not	  only	  the	  necessary	  electricity,	  but	  to	  contribute	  to	  the	  
Development	  Plan’s	  aims.	  The	  commission	  report,	  submitted	  in	  early	  September	  1962,	  
established	  the	  project	  within	  the	  economic	  and	  social	  development	  aims	  of	  the	  
Development	  Plan,	  declaring:	  
We	  earnestly	  desire	  the	  benefit	  to	  our	  country	  of	  this	  project	  by	  its	  quick	  
realization.	  This	  project	  will	  play	  a	  large	  role	  in	  the	  social	  and	  economic	  
development	  of	  Southeastern	  and	  Eastern	  Anatolia	  and	  as	  large	  a	  role	  in	  
agricultural	  and	  industrial	  growth	  as	  in	  the	  question	  of	  our	  country’s	  
energy.165	  
The	  commission	  recommended	  that	  the	  dam	  be	  included	  in	  the	  First	  Five-­‐Year	  
Development	  Plan	  and	  concluded	  that	  the	  Keban	  dam	  and	  hydroelectric	  station	  was	  the	  
“key	  project”	  for	  improving	  the	  social	  and	  economic	  conditions	  of	  this	  undeveloped	  part	  
of	  the	  country.166	  With	  this	  report,	  parliament	  allocated	  funds	  to	  EİE	  for	  a	  feasibility	  
report	  and	  by	  December	  a	  contract	  was	  signed	  with	  EBASCO	  Services	  Inc.,	  an	  American	  
engineering	  firm	  headquartered	  in	  lower	  Manhattan.	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  Turgut,	  Gap'ın	  Sahipleri,	  41-­‐42.	  
165	  Millet	  Meclisi	  Tutanak	  Dergisi.	  Keban	  Barajı	  Ve	  Aşağı	  Fırat	  Havzası	  Kalkınma	  Projesi	  
Hakkında	  Millet	  Meclisi	  Adına	  Araştırma	  Komisyonu,	  (Ankara:	  Millet	  Meclisi,	  1962),	  359.	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  Ibid.,	  363.	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The	  Feasibility	  Report:	  EBASCO	  and	  All	  This	  Talk	  of	  Fish	  
	   EBASCO	  Services	  Incorporated	  began	  as	  part	  of	  the	  Electric	  Bond	  and	  Share	  
Company,	  a	  utility	  holding	  company	  founded	  by	  the	  General	  Electric	  Company	  in	  1905.	  
The	  EBASCO	  unit	  provided	  services	  to	  the	  holding	  company’s	  various	  gas	  and	  electric	  
companies.	  Over	  the	  years,	  EBASCO	  began	  designing	  power	  plants	  outside	  the	  United	  
States,	  most	  notably	  for	  the	  Soviets	  and	  Chinese.167	  With	  the	  company’s	  long	  experience	  
working	  on	  power	  plants	  in	  regions	  with	  difficult	  access,	  they	  were	  a	  natural	  choice	  to	  
research	  and	  write	  the	  feasibility	  report.	  	  
Representatives	  from	  EBASCO	  arrived	  in	  Keban	  in	  February	  1963	  and	  engineers	  
from	  the	  company	  continued	  their	  survey	  work	  through	  the	  spring.	  In	  May,	  an	  American	  
representative	  of	  the	  company	  announced	  to	  local	  reporters,	  “There	  is	  no	  reason	  or	  
question	  to	  prevent	  the	  building	  of	  the	  dam	  at	  Keban.	  This	  place	  is	  one	  of	  the	  most	  
important	  dam	  sites	  in	  the	  world.”168	  His	  comment	  in	  the	  local	  press	  foreshadowed	  the	  
conclusions	  of	  EBASCO’s	  feasibility	  report,	  released	  in	  October	  1963.	  In	  the	  “Letter	  of	  
Introduction,”	  EBASCO	  recommended	  the	  construction	  of	  the	  dam.	  To	  support	  this	  
assertion,	  the	  firm	  submitted	  a	  350-­‐page	  document	  that	  demonstrated	  the	  project’s	  
“economic	  feasibility”	  and	  “its	  place	  in	  the	  Electric	  Utility	  Expansion	  Program.”169	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
167	  John	  P.	  Callahan,	  "New	  Fields	  Tested	  by	  Bond	  and	  Share,"	  New	  York	  Times,	  September	  
2	  1945,	  45.	  	  
168	  Elazığ	  Gazetesi,	  “Keban	  Barajı	  Projelerini	  inşa	  edecek	  firmanın	  temsilcisi	  Amerikalı	  
Sibentin	  bugün	  şehrimize	  geliyor,”	  February	  15,	  1963,	  1;	  “Keban’da	  Yeni	  Sondajlar,”	  
March	  12,	  1963,	  1;	  “Ardıçoğlu:	  Baraj	  Alanında	  Tetkiklerde	  Bulundu,”	  May	  26,	  1963,	  1.	  
169	  EBASCO,	  "Letter	  of	  Introduction".	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   What	  exactly	  was	  meant	  by	  economically	  feasible	  and	  the	  dam’s	  “place”	  in	  a	  
government	  program	  becomes	  less	  clear	  when	  one	  examines	  the	  report	  itself.	  While	  
ostensibly	  a	  technical	  document	  with	  many	  details	  about	  the	  design	  of	  the	  dam,	  the	  
report	  was	  also	  a	  political	  document.	  The	  feasibility	  report	  was	  a	  method	  for	  connecting	  
the	  physical	  aspects	  of	  the	  project	  to	  the	  dam’s	  intended	  economic,	  social	  and	  political	  
effects	  as	  articulated	  in	  the	  parliamentary	  commission	  report.	  
EBASCO’s	  engineering	  report	  understandably	  focused	  on	  technical	  details	  such	  as	  
the	  electricity	  industry	  in	  the	  country	  and	  the	  history	  of	  Turkey’s	  electricity	  production.	  
Large	  parts	  of	  the	  report	  dealt	  directly	  with	  the	  dam,	  its	  location	  on	  the	  river,	  the	  
positioning	  of	  the	  electrical	  grid	  and	  the	  choice	  of	  equipment.	  Maps,	  schematics,	  and	  
other	  statistics	  in	  these	  sections	  provided	  all	  the	  technical	  details	  needed	  by	  the	  
engineer	  and	  planner.	  But	  the	  authors	  also	  departed	  from	  these	  matters	  and	  ranged	  
widely,	  touching	  on	  everything	  from	  the	  petroleum	  industry	  to	  the	  local	  wildlife.	  
EBASCO’s	  commentary	  on	  the	  Turkish	  population,	  economy,	  and	  government	  involved	  a	  
set	  of	  decisions	  about	  what	  was	  important	  to	  EBASCO’s	  client,	  the	  Turkish	  government,	  
but	  also	  to	  the	  project’s	  prospective	  backers.	  
The	  report	  reviewed	  various	  sectors	  of	  Turkish	  industry,	  including	  mining,	  forest	  
products	  and	  fishing.	  One	  might	  expect	  that	  these	  sections	  detailed	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  
dam	  on	  an	  expanding	  industrial	  base	  that	  would	  require	  more	  energy.	  Yet,	  the	  report	  
instead	  noted	  the	  location	  of	  Turkey’s	  logging	  industry	  along	  the	  Black	  Sea	  coast	  three	  
hundred	  miles	  north	  of	  Elazığ.	  With	  respect	  to	  the	  fishing	  industry,	  EBASCO’s	  engineers	  
pointed	  out	  that	  mackerel	  and	  bonita	  represent	  seventy	  percent	  of	  the	  yearly	  catch	  for	  a	  
fish-­‐canning	  industry	  based	  in	  Istanbul	  that	  had	  expanded	  in	  recent	  years.	  What,	  one	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might	  ask,	  does	  the	  timber	  industry	  on	  the	  Black	  Sea	  or	  the	  fishing	  industry	  on	  the	  Sea	  of	  
Marmara,	  some	  five	  hundred	  miles	  from	  Keban,	  have	  to	  do	  with	  building	  a	  dam	  on	  the	  
Euphrates	  River?	  Perhaps	  the	  new	  reservoir	  behind	  the	  dam	  could	  become	  the	  locus	  of	  a	  
new	  canning	  operation?	  That	  seemed	  unlikely,	  even	  to	  the	  engineers,	  who	  noted,	  “The	  
fish-­‐canning	  segment	  of	  the	  fishing	  industry	  is	  negligible,	  amounting	  to	  only	  2	  percent	  of	  
the	  total	  production.”170	  	  
All	  this	  talk	  of	  fish	  points	  to	  the	  underlying	  logic	  at	  work	  in	  the	  document.	  The	  
American	  firm	  aimed	  to	  provide,	  in	  the	  space	  of	  three	  hundred	  and	  fifty	  pages,	  an	  
analysis	  of	  what	  was	  important	  among	  an	  array	  of	  issues	  that	  the	  Keban	  project,	  and	  
economic	  development	  in	  general,	  was	  intended	  to	  solve.	  It	  was	  not	  enough	  to	  declare	  
that	  Turkey	  needed	  to	  produce	  more	  electricity.	  In	  order	  to	  bring	  about	  the	  “social	  and	  
economic	  development”	  demanded	  not	  only	  by	  Turkey’s	  own	  government,	  but	  also	  by	  
American	  and	  European	  aid	  institutions,	  the	  American	  engineering	  firm,	  along	  with	  the	  
Turkish	  bureaucrats	  who	  guided	  and	  advised	  them,	  sought	  to	  demonstrate	  the	  dam’s	  
ability	  to	  bring	  about	  change	  in	  broad	  swaths	  of	  the	  national	  economy.	  The	  talk	  of	  fish—
and	  of	  petroleum,	  mining,	  tourism,	  communications,	  etc.—connected	  the	  dam	  as	  idea	  to	  
industries	  across	  the	  country,	  and	  indeed,	  with	  all	  other	  economic	  activities.	  	  
In	  the	  process,	  EBASCO’s	  engineers	  revealed	  some	  of	  their	  assumptions	  about	  
what	  economic	  and	  social	  development	  meant	  and	  whom	  it	  should	  benefit.	  In	  the	  section	  
on	  balance	  of	  payments	  and	  debt,	  EBASCO	  favorably	  compared	  Turkey’s	  debt	  load	  per	  
capita	  to	  the	  United	  States.	  According	  to	  the	  authors,	  this	  statistic	  proved	  Turkey’s	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  Ibid.,	  II-­‐7.	  
	  
	   96	  
solvency.	  However,	  the	  inherent	  problems	  in	  comparing	  the	  debt	  of	  a	  developing	  nation	  
like	  Turkey	  to	  the	  largest	  economy	  in	  the	  world	  and	  its	  reserve	  currency	  was	  not	  
acknowledged.	  Instead,	  the	  report	  implied	  that	  the	  additional	  debt	  to	  be	  taken	  on	  by	  the	  
Turkish	  government	  was	  acceptable	  because	  it	  meant	  that	  Turkey	  was	  following	  the	  
American	  path	  to	  economic	  development.171	  Turkey’s	  specific	  circumstances,	  its	  
economic,	  social	  and	  cultural	  differences	  from	  America,	  were	  not	  important.	  
Another	  feature	  of	  the	  EBASCO	  report	  is	  its	  assertion	  of	  comprehensiveness.	  
From	  the	  range	  of	  topics	  the	  report	  discussed	  to	  its	  survey	  of	  electrical	  loads	  and	  
resources	  that	  included	  “45	  of	  Turkey’s	  67	  provinces”	  and	  “78%	  of	  the	  total	  population,”	  
the	  report	  insisted	  upon	  its	  exhaustive	  scope.172	  However,	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  items	  left	  
out	  is	  revealing.	  Of	  the	  forty-­‐five	  provinces	  chosen	  by	  the	  report	  for	  study,	  only	  one,	  
Diyarbakır,	  lies	  east	  of	  Elazığ.	  The	  EBASCO	  engineers	  totally	  ignored	  the	  cities	  of	  
Trabzon,	  Erzurum,	  Van,	  Mardin	  and	  Kars,	  despite	  the	  parliamentary	  commission	  report	  
asserting	  that	  the	  Keban	  was	  “the	  key	  project”	  for	  the	  development	  of	  “Eastern	  and	  
Southeastern	  Anatolia.”	  Of	  the	  fourteen	  provinces	  making	  up	  the	  Eastern	  Anatolia	  
region,	  only	  two	  were	  part	  of	  the	  study	  area,	  while	  just	  half	  of	  Southeastern	  Anatolia	  was	  
included.173	  Moreover,	  the	  study	  area	  includes	  only	  five	  of	  the	  seventeen	  provinces	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  Ibid.,	  II-­‐13.	  
172	  Ibid.,	  III-­‐1.	  
173	  These	  regional	  distinctions	  were	  decided	  by	  the	  First	  Geography	  Conference	  in	  
Ankara	  in	  1941	  and	  have	  been	  in	  use	  ever	  since.	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considered	  to	  form	  Turkish	  Kurdistan.174	  According	  to	  the	  report,	  nearly	  all	  of	  the	  
electricity	  produced	  by	  the	  dam	  was	  to	  be	  sent	  west	  from	  Keban	  to	  Ankara	  and	  Istanbul	  
to	  fuel	  factories,	  light	  homes	  and	  streets	  and	  contribute	  to	  economic	  development	  in	  that	  
part	  of	  the	  country.	  Through	  these	  omissions,	  it	  becomes	  evident	  that	  the	  Keban	  project	  
was	  less	  about	  the	  development	  of	  Eastern	  and	  Southeastern	  Anatolia	  and	  more	  about	  
the	  social	  and	  economic	  development	  of	  Turkey’s	  largest	  cities	  in	  the	  west.	  
These	  geographical	  distinctions	  were	  mirrored	  in	  the	  distinctions	  the	  report	  
made	  with	  regard	  to	  Turkey’s	  human	  population.	  EBASCO	  analyzed	  every	  aspect	  of	  the	  
Turkish	  bureaucracy	  and	  included	  biographical	  information	  about	  the	  top	  officials	  in	  
several	  different	  agencies.	  Beyond	  the	  bureaucrats,	  EBASCO’s	  engineers	  discussed	  the	  
people	  of	  Turkey	  primarily	  in	  the	  aggregate	  with	  statistics,	  “71	  percent	  of	  the	  people	  still	  
reside	  in	  rural	  areas,”	  or	  in	  other	  generalized	  ways.	  In	  the	  “Other	  Project	  Benefits”	  
section,	  the	  report	  noted	  the	  prohibitive	  cost	  of	  water	  sports	  and	  that	  “recreational	  
activities	  by	  the	  masses	  of	  the	  Turkish	  people	  have	  not	  yet	  reached	  the	  point	  that	  new	  
areas	  for	  outdoor	  activities	  are	  necessary.”175	  	  
Contrast	  this	  with	  the	  very	  specific	  list	  of	  project	  benefits	  touted	  in	  the	  local	  
newspaper.	  For	  the	  citizens	  of	  Keban	  and	  Elazığ,	  the	  dam	  project	  was	  expected	  to	  
resolve	  problems	  related	  to	  drinking	  water,	  employment,	  prices,	  food	  supply,	  health	  and	  
education.	  Yet,	  the	  EBASCO	  engineers	  were	  silent	  about	  local	  issues	  and	  at	  one	  point	  
appeared	  to	  deny	  that	  anyone	  at	  all	  lived	  near	  the	  dam:	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  Th.	  Bois,	  V.	  Minorsky,	  and	  D.N.	  MacKenzie,	  "Kurds,	  Kurdistan,"	  in	  Encyclopaedia	  of	  
Islam,	  ed.	  P.	  Bearman	  et	  al.	  (Brill,	  2012).	  
175	  EBASCO,	  IV-­‐98.	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Construction	  of	  Keban	  Project	  with	  recommended	  reservoir	  El.	  845	  m	  will	  
require	  flooding	  of	  some	  39,000	  hectares	  (95,000	  acres)	  of	  land	  used	  for	  
agriculture,	  plus	  some	  minor	  structures.176	  	  
The	  phrase	  “plus	  some	  minor	  structures”	  apparently	  meant	  the	  more	  than	  five	  thousand	  
families	  in	  over	  two	  hundred	  different	  settlements	  living	  in	  the	  area	  destined	  for	  a	  
reservoir.177	  There	  was	  more	  information	  in	  the	  report	  about	  the	  fish-­‐canning	  industry	  
in	  Istanbul	  than	  about	  the	  people	  whose	  farms	  and	  homes	  were	  to	  be	  drowned	  by	  the	  
dam.	  
Despite	  its	  contentions	  about	  comprehensiveness	  and	  authoritativeness,	  the	  
EBASCO	  report	  generalized,	  created	  connections	  where	  there	  were	  none,	  and	  omitted	  
the	  very	  region	  the	  dam	  was	  ostensibly	  meant	  to	  serve.	  The	  report	  was	  thus	  as	  much	  
about	  defining	  Turkey—the	  economy,	  society,	  and	  government	  that	  the	  dam	  was	  meant	  
to	  transform—as	  it	  was	  about	  defining	  the	  dam’s	  specific	  technical	  characteristics.	  While	  
the	  EBASCO	  report	  may	  be	  viewed	  simply	  as	  a	  method	  whereby	  the	  state	  “sees,”	  it	  was	  
equally	  about	  delineating	  the	  state	  itself.	  The	  feasibility	  report	  was	  produced	  as	  a	  
prospectus	  for	  international	  capital.	  As	  such,	  the	  authors	  attempted	  to	  describe	  the	  
whole	  of	  Turkey,	  including	  the	  components	  and	  function	  of	  the	  state	  itself,	  from	  the	  
structure	  of	  the	  country’s	  bureaucracies	  to	  the	  preferred	  recreational	  pastimes	  of	  the	  
state’s	  citizens.	  In	  doing	  so,	  the	  report	  obscured	  or	  erased	  the	  specificities	  of	  Turkey’s	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
176	  Ibid.,	  IV-­‐58.	  
177	  Turan	  Ersoy,	  Keban	  İskan	  Problemi	  (Ankara:	  Devlet	  Planlama	  Teşkilati,	  1968).	  See	  
also	  Oya	  Silier,	  Keban	  Köylerinde,	  Sosyo	  Ekonomik	  Yapı	  Ve	  Yeniden	  Yerleșim	  Sorunları,	  
O.D.T.U.	  İdar	  İlimle	  Fakültesi	  Yayın	  vol.	  no.	  7	  (Ankara:	  Orta	  Doğu	  Teknik	  Üniversitesi,	  
1976).	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people	  and	  history—these	  were	  not	  deemed	  necessary	  to	  the	  dam	  and	  its	  supposed	  goal	  
of	  economic	  and	  social	  progress.	  
	  
The	  Rule	  of	  the	  Politician	  Expert	  
The	  EBASCO	  report	  analyzed	  and	  arranged	  certain	  kinds	  of	  knowledge	  about	  the	  
Turkish	  state,	  the	  country’s	  economy	  and	  society.	  The	  report	  offers	  a	  technocratic	  vision	  
for	  the	  country,	  a	  positioning	  of	  a	  massive	  engineering	  project	  as	  a	  method	  for	  achieving	  
a	  proper	  economic	  and	  social	  order.	  In	  the	  process,	  much	  was	  omitted	  or	  deemed	  
unimportant	  to	  the	  dam’s	  achievement	  of	  that	  order.	  These	  silences,	  redefinitions	  and	  
peculiar	  connections	  extended	  beyond	  the	  report	  itself.	  The	  dam	  was	  Turkey’s	  foremost	  
public	  works	  project	  and	  a	  demonstration	  of	  a	  particular	  ideological	  orientation	  toward	  
economic	  and	  social	  development.	  Its	  realization	  therefore	  represented	  the	  ascendance	  
of	  a	  new	  kind	  of	  politics	  in	  the	  country.	  
Prior	  to	  1960,	  the	  leaders	  of	  the	  Turkish	  Republic	  were	  drawn	  from	  the	  ranks	  of	  
military	  leaders	  and	  career	  politicians.	  Both	  Mustafa	  Kemal	  Atatürk	  and	  İsmet	  İnönü,	  
Turkey’s	  first	  two	  presidents,	  studied	  at	  military	  schools.	  Mustafa	  Kemal	  was	  a	  hero	  at	  
Gallipoli	  during	  World	  War	  I	  and	  was	  later	  joined	  by	  İsmet	  İnönü	  as	  his	  lieutenant	  
during	  assignments	  in	  the	  Caucasus	  and	  Palestine.	  Both	  commanded	  troops	  during	  the	  
Independence	  War.178	  Celal	  Bayar,	  Turkey’s	  third	  president	  and	  a	  founder	  of	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
178	  There	  are	  any	  number	  of	  books	  about	  these	  two	  figures	  and	  this	  period	  in	  Turkey’s	  
history.	  See	  Martin	  Heper,	  Ismet	  Inönü:	  The	  Making	  of	  a	  Turkish	  Statesman	  (Brill,	  1998);	  
P.B.	  Kinross,	  Atatürk:	  The	  Rebirth	  of	  a	  Nation	  (Phoenix	  Giant,	  1999);	  O.F.	  Loğoğlu,	  Ismet	  
Inönü	  and	  the	  Making	  of	  Modern	  Turkey	  (İnönü	  Vakfı,	  1997);	  A.	  Mango,	  Ataturk:	  The	  
Biography	  of	  the	  Founder	  of	  Modern	  Turkey	  (Overlook,	  2002).	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Democrat	  Party,	  was	  elected	  to	  the	  Ottoman	  parliament	  in	  1919	  but	  left	  to	  join	  the	  
independence	  movement.	  During	  the	  war,	  he	  served	  as	  a	  negotiator	  and	  assistant	  to	  
İnönü	  at	  the	  Lausanne	  peace	  conference.179	  Bayar’s	  Prime	  Minister	  during	  the	  Democrat	  
era,	  Adnan	  Menderes,	  formed	  a	  paramilitary	  band	  near	  Aydın	  and	  fought	  against	  the	  
invading	  Greek	  army,	  winning	  a	  medal	  for	  his	  leadership.180	  	  
However,	  after	  1960,	  Turkish	  politics	  changed.	  A	  new	  generation,	  born	  after	  the	  
First	  World	  War,	  grew	  up	  in	  the	  Turkish	  Republic	  and	  not	  the	  Ottoman	  Empire.	  The	  
pathways	  to	  power	  in	  the	  new	  republic	  changed	  over	  time.	  In	  the	  new	  Turkey,	  the	  path	  
to	  power	  started	  in	  school,	  but	  not	  as	  in	  the	  past	  at	  military	  colleges.	  While	  military	  
leaders	  continued	  to	  rule	  in	  neighboring	  countries,	  Turkey’s	  periods	  of	  direct	  military	  
rule	  were	  comparatively	  short-­‐lived	  and	  power	  was	  returned	  to	  an	  elected	  government	  
(though	  often	  limited	  in	  ways	  meant	  to	  protect	  the	  military	  from	  civilian	  supervision).181	  
Rather	  than	  military	  institutions,	  technical	  colleges	  became	  the	  fertile	  soil	  from	  which	  
sprung	  the	  country’s	  new	  civilian	  political	  leadership.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
179	  George	  Harris,	  "Celal	  Bayar:	  Conspiratorial	  Democrat,"	  in	  Political	  Leaders	  and	  
Democracy	  in	  Turkey,	  ed.	  Martin	  Heper	  and	  Sabri	  Sayari	  (Lanham:	  Lexington	  Books,	  
2002),	  45-­‐64.	  
180	  Sabri	  Sayarı,	  "Adnan	  Menderes:	  Between	  Democratic	  and	  Authoritarian	  Populism,"	  in	  
Heper,	  Political	  Leaders,	  65-­‐86.	  
181	  Iraq’s	  monarch,	  Faysal	  II,	  was	  ousted	  in	  1958	  in	  a	  coup	  led	  by	  General	  ‘Abd	  al-­‐Karim	  
Qasim.	  In	  Greece,	  a	  coup	  in	  1967	  led	  to	  seven	  years	  of	  military	  rule.	  Syria	  endured	  a	  
series	  of	  military	  coups	  both	  before	  and	  after	  its	  union	  with	  Egypt	  and	  the	  formation	  of	  
the	  United	  Arab	  Republic	  (1958-­‐1961),	  until	  Syrian	  Air	  Force	  General	  Hafez	  al-­‐Assad	  
consolidated	  power	  in	  1970.	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One	  man	  in	  particular	  epitomized	  this	  trend,	  a	  man	  who	  became	  known	  in	  the	  
early	  part	  of	  his	  career	  as	  the	  “King	  of	  Dams.”182	  Süleyman	  Demirel	  was	  born	  in	  the	  
Central	  Anatolian	  village	  of	  İslamköy	  on	  November	  1,	  1924,	  and	  grew	  up	  in	  a	  political	  
family.	  His	  father,	  Hacı	  Yahya,	  fought	  in	  World	  War	  I	  with	  the	  Ottoman	  army	  and	  in	  
Turkey’s	  war	  of	  independence	  afterward.	  After	  the	  latter	  conflict,	  Demirel’s	  father	  
settled	  with	  his	  family	  into	  an	  agricultural	  life,	  but	  was	  later	  elected	  headman	  (muhtar)	  
of	  the	  local	  municipality.183	  Hacı	  Yahya’s	  political	  career	  had	  a	  strong	  influence	  on	  his	  
son’s	  understanding	  of	  politics	  and	  patronage,	  knowledge	  that	  would	  serve	  him	  well	  
later	  in	  life.184	  
The	  young	  Demirel	  did	  not	  leap	  directly	  into	  politics,	  however.	  His	  upbringing	  in	  
a	  small	  village	  encouraged	  other	  ambitions.	  Demirel	  attributed	  an	  interest	  in	  
engineering	  to	  working	  on	  the	  family	  farm	  and	  growing	  up	  in	  a	  community	  experiencing	  
a	  drought.	  Meanwhile,	  the	  nearby	  provincial	  center,	  Isparta,	  benefited	  from	  
electrification,	  a	  convenience	  brought	  about	  by	  the	  1930s	  etatist	  state.	  The	  young	  
Demirel	  watched	  and	  was	  inspired	  by	  the	  lights	  flickering	  on	  in	  that	  city	  each	  night.	  As	  a	  
result,	  instead	  of	  pursuing	  a	  career	  in	  the	  military	  or	  working	  with	  his	  father	  in	  local	  
politics,	  Demirel	  traveled	  to	  the	  Gümüşsuyu	  neighborhood	  in	  Istanbul	  to	  study	  hydraulic	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
182	  Yeşim	  Arat,	  "Süleyman	  Demirel:	  National	  Will	  and	  Beyond,"	  in	  Heper,	  Political	  
Leaders,	  98.	  
183	  Ayşegül	  Komşuoğlu,	  Türkiye	  Siyasetinde	  Bir	  Lider:	  Süleyman	  Demirel	  (İstanbul:	  Bengi	  
Yayınları,	  2008),	  98-­‐100.	  	  
184	  Arat,	  "Süleyman	  Demirel,"	  87-­‐88.	  
	  
	   102	  
engineering	  at	  Turkey’s	  most	  prominent	  scientific	  institution,	  Istanbul	  Technical	  
University	  (İstanbul	  Teknik	  Üniversitesi).185	  	  
At	  this	  university,	  Demirel	  made	  contacts	  with	  a	  number	  of	  young	  men	  who	  later	  
went	  on	  to	  play	  significant	  roles	  in	  Turkish	  politics,	  including	  Necmettin	  Erbakan,	  
Turgut	  Özal	  and	  his	  brother	  Korkut.186	  All	  four	  men	  came	  from	  conservative	  families	  and	  
when	  they	  eventually	  turned	  toward	  politics,	  all	  joined	  or	  founded	  right-­‐wing	  parties.	  
Moreover,	  all	  four	  men	  studied	  engineering.	  While	  some	  aspects	  of	  their	  upbringing	  may	  
have	  led	  them	  to	  join	  right-­‐wing	  parties,	  their	  political	  ideas	  were	  also	  fundamentally	  
affected	  by	  their	  technical	  education.	  
After	  university,	  Demirel	  began	  working	  at	  the	  Electric	  Works	  Study	  
Administration	  in	  May	  1949,	  but	  was	  soon	  after	  sent	  to	  the	  United	  States.	  He	  worked	  for	  
nine	  months	  with	  the	  Bureau	  of	  Reclamation	  on	  water	  and	  energy	  projects.	  This	  visit	  
had	  a	  significant	  impact	  on	  Demirel,	  who	  recalled	  spending	  three	  days	  gazing	  at	  the	  
Hoover	  Dam.187	  Upon	  his	  return,	  he	  was	  posted	  to	  the	  Seyhan	  Dam	  near	  Adana,	  the	  first	  
hydro	  project	  built	  entirely	  by	  Turkish	  engineers.	  Recalled	  to	  Ankara	  in	  1954	  to	  work	  as	  
a	  project	  engineer,	  Demirel	  became	  the	  head	  of	  the	  Dams	  Administration	  in	  the	  newly	  
created	  State	  Hydraulic	  Works.	  After	  another	  visit	  to	  the	  United	  States	  on	  an	  Eisenhower	  
Fellowship,	  Demirel	  became,	  at	  the	  young	  age	  of	  thirty-­‐one,	  the	  General	  Director	  of	  the	  
State	  Hydraulic	  Works,	  a	  post	  he	  held	  for	  six	  years.	  While	  there,	  he	  supported	  the	  Keban	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  Ibid.,	  88.	  
186	  Komşuoğlu,	  Süleyman	  Demirel,	  108.	  
187	  Hulusi	  H.	  Turgut,	  Gap	  Ve	  Demirel	  (İstanbul:	  ABC	  Yayınları,	  2000),	  58.	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dam	  project	  as	  critical	  to	  developing	  the	  Euphrates	  river	  basin	  and	  supervised	  the	  
organization’s	  ongoing	  planning	  and	  survey	  works	  in	  Turkey’s	  major	  river	  basins.188	  
After	  the	  military	  coup	  in	  1960,	  Demirel	  left	  the	  State	  Hydraulic	  Works	  and	  joined	  the	  
army	  for	  a	  short	  time.	  Upon	  returning	  to	  civilian	  life,	  he	  worked	  as	  a	  private	  consultant	  
and,	  fittingly,	  a	  representative	  of	  the	  American	  engineering	  and	  construction	  firm,	  
Morrison	  Knudsen,	  one	  of	  the	  six	  companies	  contracted	  to	  build	  the	  Hoover	  Dam.189	  	  
In	  1964,	  Süleyman	  Demirel	  was	  elected	  chairman	  of	  the	  Justice	  Party	  and	  on	  
October	  27,	  1965	  became	  Turkey’s	  youngest	  prime	  minister	  and	  only	  the	  second	  to	  be	  
democratically	  elected.	  With	  impeccable	  timing,	  the	  “King	  of	  Dams”	  arrived	  in	  office	  in	  
time	  to	  lay	  the	  foundation	  stone	  of	  the	  Keban	  Dam	  on	  June	  12,	  1966.	  Demirel	  also	  
rewarded	  two	  engineers	  who	  had	  helped	  to	  shepherd	  the	  Keban	  project	  through	  its	  first	  
parliamentary	  test,	  Gaziantep	  MP	  Mithat	  San	  and	  the	  previously	  mentioned	  Afyon	  MP	  
Mehmet	  Turgut.	  They	  became	  Communications	  Minister	  and	  Energy	  and	  Natural	  
Resources	  Minister,	  respectively,	  in	  Demirel’s	  new	  cabinet.	  As	  a	  result	  of	  Demirel’s	  rise,	  
engineers	  occupied	  the	  highest	  levels	  of	  government.	  While	  the	  military	  retained	  an	  
influence,	  the	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  running	  of	  Turkey’s	  civilian	  government	  was	  dominated	  by	  
technical	  experts.	  
Three	  years	  younger	  than	  Demirel,	  Turgut	  Özal	  benefited	  greatly	  from	  his	  
friendship.	  Özal	  graduated	  from	  university	  in	  1950	  and	  worked	  briefly	  with	  Demirel	  at	  
EİE	  before	  the	  latter	  was	  sent	  to	  the	  United	  States.	  In	  1952,	  Özal	  himself	  was	  sent	  to	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
188	  Turgut,	  Gap'ın	  Sahipleri,	  21.	  
189	  Komşuoğlu,	  Süleyman	  Demirel,	  110-­‐11.	  Arat,	  "Süleyman	  Demirel,"	  88.	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United	  States	  to	  study	  engineering	  economics.	  Upon	  his	  return	  to	  EİE,	  he	  met	  another	  
important	  mentor,	  İbrahim	  Deriner.190	  At	  the	  time	  of	  Demirel’s	  entry	  into	  the	  Justice	  
Party,	  Özal	  served	  as	  his	  technical	  consultant	  and	  then	  as	  his	  deputy.	  When	  Demirel	  
became	  prime	  minister,	  Özal	  became	  his	  technical	  advisor	  and	  in	  1967	  was	  appointed	  by	  
Demirel	  to	  head	  the	  State	  Planning	  Office	  where	  he	  gained	  significant	  power	  over	  the	  
Second	  Five-­‐Year	  Development	  Plan,	  scheduled	  to	  begin	  in	  1968.191	  While	  there	  is	  much	  
more	  to	  the	  story	  of	  Turgut	  Özal,	  it	  is	  enough	  to	  note	  here	  that	  he	  too	  became	  prime	  
minister,	  serving	  from	  November	  1983	  until	  October	  1989,	  at	  which	  point	  he	  became	  
Turkey’s	  eighth	  president.192	  
Necmettin	  Erbakan	  took	  a	  different	  path	  than	  Demirel	  and	  Özal	  after	  graduating	  
with	  a	  degree	  in	  mechanical	  engineering.	  He	  entered	  academia	  and	  then	  left	  Turkey	  to	  
study	  for	  a	  doctoral	  degree	  at	  Aachen	  Technical	  University	  in	  Germany.	  In	  1970,	  
Erbakan	  founded	  the	  National	  Order	  Party	  (Milli	  Nizam	  Partisi).	  Erbakan’s	  party	  and	  its	  
successor,	  the	  National	  Salvation	  Party,	  were	  targets	  of	  secularist	  criticism	  for	  their	  
Islamist	  bent.	  Still,	  Erbakan’s	  party	  remained	  an	  important	  force	  in	  Turkish	  politics	  for	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
190	  EBASCO,	  B-­‐1,	  2.	  
191	  Unlike	  the	  First	  Five-­‐Year	  Development	  Plan,	  which	  did	  not	  contain	  a	  reference	  to	  the	  
Keban	  project,	  but	  for	  the	  parliamentary	  addition	  of	  it	  in	  1962,	  the	  Second	  Five-­‐Year	  
Development	  Plan	  contains	  an	  explicit	  mention	  of	  the	  project.	  
192	  Feride	  Acar,	  "Turgut	  Özal:	  Pious	  Agent	  of	  Liberal	  Transformation,"	  in	  Heper,	  Political	  
Leaders,	  161-­‐167.	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the	  next	  decades.	  His	  party	  even	  joined	  a	  coalition	  with	  the	  left-­‐wing	  Republican	  
People’s	  Party	  in	  the	  1970s.	  Erbakan	  attained	  the	  prime	  ministry	  in	  1996.193	  
Of	  this	  band	  of	  four	  engineers,	  only	  Korkut	  Özal,	  Turgut’s	  younger	  brother,	  never	  
reached	  the	  highest	  office	  in	  the	  land.	  After	  graduating	  from	  Istanbul	  Technical	  
University	  in	  1951,	  Korkut	  Özal	  went	  to	  work	  at	  the	  State	  Hydraulic	  Works,	  first	  in	  the	  
Malatya	  branch	  office	  and	  then	  as	  general	  director	  of	  the	  Ninth	  Regional	  Office	  in	  Elazığ.	  
Özal	  spent	  ten	  years	  at	  DSİ,	  but	  for	  a	  year	  in	  America	  researching	  water	  resources	  
system	  planning.	  In	  1961,	  Özal	  joined	  the	  faculty	  at	  the	  Middle	  East	  Technical	  University	  
(Ortadoğu	  Teknik	  Üniversitesi).	  There,	  he	  built	  upon	  his	  work	  at	  the	  State	  Hydraulic	  
Works	  and	  published	  a	  number	  of	  studies	  on	  the	  Keban	  Dam	  project	  and	  the	  
development	  of	  the	  Euphrates	  basin.194	  Entering	  politics	  in	  1973	  as	  a	  member	  of	  
Necmettin	  Erbakan’s	  party,	  Korkut	  Özal	  served	  in	  the	  cabinets	  of	  three	  coalition	  
governments	  from	  1974-­‐1978.195	  	  
This	  biographical	  survey	  of	  several	  of	  Turkey’s	  important	  political	  luminaries	  
reveals	  the	  depth	  of	  change	  in	  the	  post-­‐1960	  Turkish	  political	  landscape.	  The	  path	  to	  
ultimate	  power	  in	  the	  Turkish	  government	  now	  began	  in	  the	  country’s	  technical	  schools	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
193	  Elizabeth	  Özdalga,	  "Necmettin	  Erbakan:	  Democracy	  for	  the	  Sake	  of	  Power,"	  in	  Heper,	  
Political	  Leaders,	  128-­‐129.	  
194	  See	  Korkut	  Özal,	  The	  Report	  on	  the	  Hydroelectric	  Development	  Possibilities	  in	  the	  
Lower	  Euphrates	  Basin	  in	  Turkey	  (Ankara:	  Elektrik	  İşleri	  Etüt	  İdaresi	  Genel	  Müdürlüğü,	  
1962-­‐1963);	  Keban	  Barajı	  Ve	  Ötesi	  (Ankara:	  Elektrik	  İşleri	  Etüt	  İdaresi	  Genel	  Müdürlüğü,	  
1964);	  Power	  Development	  Possibilities	  in	  the	  Upper	  Euphrates	  Basin	  Upstream	  of	  Keban	  
(Ankara:	  Enerji	  ve	  Tabii	  Kaynaklar	  Bakanlığı,	  1964).	  	  	  
195	  Özal	  served	  as	  Minister	  of	  Agriculture	  under	  Bülent	  Ecevit	  and	  then	  Minister	  of	  
Agriculture	  and	  Minister	  of	  Industry	  under	  Süleyman	  Demirel.	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as	  much	  as	  it	  might	  in	  its	  military	  colleges.	  Working	  one’s	  way	  to	  the	  top	  of	  the	  military	  
hierarchy	  could	  lead	  to	  political	  power,	  but	  only	  as	  the	  result	  of	  a	  coup	  rather	  than	  an	  
election.	  Furthermore,	  the	  Turkish	  technocracy	  was	  not	  simply	  about	  education,	  it	  was	  
about	  a	  certain	  type	  of	  education.	  The	  first	  step	  was	  a	  degree	  at	  an	  engineering	  faculty.	  
The	  next	  involved	  time	  in	  one	  or	  two	  important	  agencies:	  EİE,	  the	  State	  Hydraulic	  
Works,	  or	  the	  State	  Planning	  Organization.	  Academia	  was	  another	  option,	  though	  it	  
could	  slow	  one’s	  progress.	  Education	  or	  work	  experience	  in	  Western	  Europe	  or	  the	  
United	  States	  provided	  a	  final	  component.	  	  
What	  made	  this	  pedigree	  so	  potent	  that,	  during	  most	  of	  the	  years	  between	  1960	  
and	  1990,	  the	  Turkish	  government	  was	  run	  by	  a	  technocracy	  of	  engineers?	  The	  answer	  
lies,	  at	  least	  in	  part,	  with	  the	  Keban	  dam	  project	  and	  the	  process	  by	  which	  it	  was	  planned	  
and	  executed.	  As	  part	  of	  the	  creation	  of	  an	  etatist	  economic	  system,	  Turkey’s	  leaders	  in	  
the	  1930s	  created	  and	  empowered	  a	  series	  of	  new	  bureaucratic	  organs	  designed	  to	  
study	  the	  country’s	  natural	  resources,	  both	  human	  and	  material.	  Of	  course,	  etatism	  was	  
not	  only	  about	  studying	  these	  resources;	  it	  was	  also	  about	  using	  them.	  	  
Turkey’s	  etatist	  program	  created	  a	  new	  kind	  of	  politicsm	  by	  placing	  the	  
utilization	  of	  resources	  in	  the	  public	  sector.	  It	  reordered	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  individuals	  
distinguished	  themselves,	  made	  political	  connections,	  and	  gained	  the	  expertise	  that	  
others	  perceived	  as	  necessary	  to	  govern.	  The	  interruption	  of	  the	  Second	  World	  War	  and	  
its	  aftermath	  obscured	  this	  new	  politics	  somewhat.	  Still,	  the	  attack	  on	  etatism	  in	  the	  
aftermath	  of	  the	  war	  was	  too	  superficial	  to	  overturn	  the	  process,	  as	  only	  those	  
installations	  that	  the	  private	  sector	  could	  easily	  absorb,	  such	  as	  textile	  mills,	  were	  
turned	  over	  to	  private	  hands.	  Meanwhile,	  the	  technical	  elite	  educated	  in	  the	  1930s	  and	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1940s	  were	  busy	  planning	  resource	  exploitation	  projects	  in	  the	  1950s	  on	  an	  
unprecedented	  scale.	  
The	  opportunity	  for	  this	  new	  politics	  to	  surface	  arrived	  in	  1960	  with	  the	  new	  
constitution	  and	  a	  return	  to	  a	  planned	  economy.	  In	  order	  to	  plan	  the	  economy,	  it	  was	  
necessary	  to	  know	  everything	  about	  it,	  and	  so	  the	  triumph	  of	  the	  technocracy	  was	  
enshrined	  in	  the	  state’s	  fundamental	  law.	  The	  battlefield	  of	  statecraft	  was	  no	  longer	  a	  
matter	  of	  soldiers	  and	  horses,	  but	  of	  surveys	  and	  statistics—and	  something	  more.	  	  
It	  was	  not	  just	  plans	  and	  reports	  that	  signified	  a	  new	  politics	  and	  the	  ascendance	  
of	  a	  particular	  understanding	  of	  the	  state’s	  role	  in	  society.	  As	  the	  key	  project	  of	  the	  
planning	  era	  and	  a	  catalyst	  for	  this	  changing	  politics,	  the	  construction	  of	  the	  Keban	  dam	  
became	  the	  physical	  instantiation	  of	  the	  state	  on	  the	  social,	  economic	  and	  natural	  
landscape	  of	  the	  country.	  The	  dam	  brought	  untold	  changes	  to	  a	  remote	  region	  of	  the	  
country,	  a	  region	  whose	  people	  had	  rebelled	  against	  the	  central	  state	  in	  the	  1920s.	  The	  
project	  displaced	  thousands,	  drowned	  agricultural	  lands	  and	  archaeological	  treasures.	  It	  
is	  to	  this	  process	  of	  instantiation	  that	  we	  will	  now	  turn,	  to	  understand	  the	  significance	  
and	  consequences	  of	  answering	  questions	  of	  economic	  and	  social	  development	  with	  
water	  engineering.
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CHAPTER	  THREE	  
Oil,	  Water,	  and	  a	  Plan	  for	  Development	  
	  
While	  Turkish	  politicians	  in	  the	  1940s	  and	  1950s	  argued	  over	  the	  proper	  role	  of	  
the	  state	  in	  the	  economy	  and	  the	  benefits	  of	  a	  dam	  on	  the	  Euphrates	  River,	  Iraq	  faced	  
more	  pressing	  and	  material	  concerns.	  Several	  major	  floods	  marked	  the	  period	  between	  
1946	  and	  1956.	  The	  floods	  caused	  considerable	  dislocation	  and	  disruption	  in	  large	  parts	  
of	  the	  country	  and	  Baghdad	  twice	  came	  close	  to	  complete	  destruction.	  Thousands	  were	  
rendered	  homeless	  in	  these	  natural	  disasters	  and	  the	  destruction	  wreaked	  on	  the	  
agricultural	  sector,	  still	  an	  important	  part	  of	  Iraq’s	  economy,	  was	  severe.	  	  	  
The	  question	  in	  Baghdad	  was	  not,	  as	  in	  Ankara,	  whether	  to	  build	  water	  
infrastructure	  but	  how	  and	  how	  soon.	  The	  floods	  produced	  a	  strong	  impetus	  to	  build	  
engineering	  works	  and,	  for	  the	  first	  time	  in	  decades,	  Baghdad	  had	  the	  wherewithal	  to	  do	  
so.	  Hampered	  for	  years	  by	  financial	  obligations	  to	  Britain	  and	  British	  political	  and	  
military	  interference,	  Iraq	  found	  itself	  in	  the	  post-­‐1945	  era	  with	  a	  measure	  of	  financial	  
means	  and	  independence	  as	  a	  result	  of	  revenue	  from	  oil	  exploitation.	  The	  control	  and	  
exploitation	  of	  water	  resources	  was	  the	  first	  purpose	  to	  which	  the	  Iraqi	  government	  put	  
this	  newfound	  largesse.	  These	  projects	  had	  two	  goals,	  to	  protect	  the	  country	  from	  
flooding	  and	  to	  open	  new	  lands	  to	  irrigation.	  	  	  
There	  were	  several	  important	  political	  effects	  that	  emanated	  from	  these	  efforts,	  
the	  most	  important	  being	  the	  expansion	  of	  the	  water	  infrastructure	  program	  to	  include	  a	  
much	  broader	  range	  of	  activities.	  Under	  British	  pressure,	  the	  Iraqi	  government	  enlarged	  
the	  scope	  of	  its	  flood	  control	  and	  irrigation	  projects	  into	  a	  wide-­‐ranging	  program	  of	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government-­‐funded	  construction.	  The	  new	  economic	  development	  program	  touched	  on	  
a	  range	  of	  social	  and	  economic	  spheres,	  and	  included	  the	  building	  of	  a	  variety	  of	  new	  
structures,	  from	  roads	  to	  factories	  to	  hospitals.	  In	  this	  way,	  a	  vision	  for	  controlling	  the	  
two	  rivers	  through	  modern	  engineering	  became	  a	  vision	  for	  engineering	  a	  modern,	  
economically	  dynamic	  Iraq.	  	  
	   The	  peculiarities	  of	  this	  period	  of	  development,	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  it	  occurred	  
through	  a	  political	  process	  that	  reframed	  environmental	  control	  as	  a	  comprehensive	  
reshaping	  of	  state	  and	  society,	  resulted	  in	  a	  central	  government	  with	  a	  new	  ability	  to	  
exert	  its	  will	  over	  both	  nature	  and	  people.	  However,	  the	  process	  also	  resulted	  in	  a	  very	  
damaged	  claim	  to	  political	  legitimacy.	  As	  a	  result,	  a	  flood	  management	  program	  designed	  
to	  protect	  the	  country	  from	  floods	  and	  enhance	  the	  political	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  state	  
actually	  ended	  up	  undermining	  the	  latter.	  
For	  British	  advisers	  at	  the	  time	  and	  scholars	  since,	  considerable	  fault	  for	  this	  lack	  
of	  legitimacy	  has	  been	  laid	  at	  the	  feet	  of	  the	  development	  program.	  The	  Baghdad	  
government	  was	  not	  able	  to	  bring	  about	  a	  vibrant,	  inclusive	  economy	  that	  dramatically	  
raised	  standards	  of	  living	  for	  the	  majority	  of	  Iraqis.	  Moreover,	  in	  July	  1958,	  a	  violent	  coup	  
d’état	  seemed	  to	  emphasize	  the	  “failure”	  of	  the	  development	  program	  and	  the	  regime.	  On	  
July	  14,	  military	  units	  led	  by	  Colonel	  ‘Abd	  al-­‐Salam	  ‘Arif	  and	  General	  ‘Abd	  al-­‐Karim	  Qasim	  
took	  control	  of	  Baghdad’s	  main	  radio	  broadcasting	  station	  and	  several	  government	  
ministries.	  A	  regiment	  of	  troops	  was	  sent	  to	  al-­‐Rahab	  Palace	  where	  they	  gunned	  down	  
the	  royal	  family.	  The	  prime	  minister	  at	  the	  time,	  Nuri	  al-­‐Said,	  managed	  to	  escape	  but	  was	  
discovered	  a	  day	  later	  and	  shot	  in	  the	  street.	  In	  light	  of	  such	  political	  upheaval,	  it	  is	  
perhaps	  not	  all	  that	  surprising	  that	  scholars	  have	  labeled	  Iraq’s	  economic	  development	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program	  a	  failure.	  The	  regime	  that	  promised	  so	  much,	  that	  was	  spending	  so	  much	  money	  
to	  develop	  the	  country,	  was	  swept	  away	  by	  its	  own	  military	  and	  a	  populist	  tide.	  	  
Still,	  if	  one	  views	  these	  events	  through	  a	  wider	  lens,	  and	  accounts	  for	  what	  
development	  in	  Iraq	  accomplished,	  rather	  than	  judging	  the	  effort	  by	  the	  collapse	  of	  a	  
particular	  regime,	  a	  different	  and	  more	  nuanced	  story	  emerges.	  In	  1956,	  the	  young	  King	  
Faysal	  II,	  at	  that	  time	  twenty-­‐one	  years	  old,	  inaugurated	  the	  Wadi	  Tharthar,	  a	  major	  flood	  
control	  project	  on	  the	  Tigris	  River.	  While	  flooding	  in	  Baghdad	  still	  occurred	  from	  time	  to	  
time,	  the	  project	  prevented	  the	  largest	  disasters.	  The	  Wadi	  Tharthar	  and	  a	  companion	  
project	  on	  the	  Euphrates,	  Lake	  Habbaniyya,	  represented	  the	  power	  of	  the	  central	  
government	  to	  control	  two	  important	  natural	  resources,	  oil	  and	  water,	  and	  to	  use	  them	  
to	  reshape	  the	  country’s	  environment.	  It	  is	  therefore	  worthwhile	  to	  historicize	  the	  
development	  program	  not	  only	  for	  what	  it	  did	  not	  accomplish,	  but	  also	  for	  what	  it	  did.	  
While	  Iraq’s	  development	  program	  in	  the	  1940s	  and	  1950s	  did	  not	  succeed	  in	  providing	  
services	  to	  communities,	  I	  argue	  that	  it	  did	  produce	  certain	  important	  features	  of	  the	  
modern	  state.	  The	  story	  of	  the	  aims	  and	  outcomes	  of	  water	  management	  and	  
development,	  and	  their	  effect	  on	  that	  modern	  state	  are	  the	  preoccupations	  of	  this	  
chapter.	  
	  
Iraq	  and	  the	  Rivers	  in	  the	  1930s	  and	  1940s	  
For	  much	  of	  the	  1930s,	  the	  Tigris	  and	  Euphrates	  Rivers	  were	  relatively	  quiescent.	  Iraq	  
did	  not	  suffer	  the	  same	  devastation	  from	  flooding	  as	  had	  occurred	  in	  the	  1920s.	  The	  only	  
major	  water	  control	  project	  completed	  on	  the	  two	  rivers	  during	  the	  interwar	  period	  was	  
the	  Kut	  Barrage.	  The	  1,500-­‐foot	  barrage	  was	  not	  designed	  for	  flood	  control.	  In	  fact,	  its	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construction	  was	  delayed	  in	  November	  1936	  when	  an	  unexpectedly	  severe	  flood	  on	  the	  
Tigris	  completely	  inundated	  the	  building	  site.	  	  
The	  aim	  of	  the	  barrage	  was	  to	  expand	  irrigation	  and	  agriculture	  in	  southern	  Iraq,	  
primarily	  to	  the	  benefit	  of	  the	  large	  landholders	  in	  the	  area.	  The	  Kut	  Barrage	  raised	  
water	  levels	  in	  the	  Tigris	  such	  that	  irrigation	  water	  could	  be	  diverted	  into	  the	  Gharraf	  
canal.	  Also	  known	  as	  the	  Shaṭṭ	  al-­‐Ḥayy,	  the	  Gharraf	  canal	  runs	  south	  from	  Kut	  to	  
Nasiriyya,	  connecting	  the	  Tigris	  to	  the	  Euphrates	  above	  their	  current	  confluence	  at	  al-­‐
Qurnah.196	  Prior	  to	  the	  construction	  of	  the	  barrage,	  the	  Gharraf	  complex	  of	  irrigation	  
canals	  only	  received	  water	  during	  the	  winter	  and	  spring	  flood	  season.	  The	  new	  barrage	  
raised	  the	  water	  level	  such	  that	  the	  canal	  complex	  received	  water	  year	  round.	  British	  
firms	  were	  involved	  in	  the	  engineering	  and	  construction	  of	  the	  barrage,	  which	  began	  in	  
December	  1934	  and	  employed	  over	  2,500	  local	  workers.	  Despite	  the	  delays	  brought	  
about	  by	  flooding	  and	  high	  summer	  temperatures,	  the	  project	  was	  finally	  completed	  in	  
1938.197	  	  
The	  politics	  of	  the	  country,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  were	  far	  from	  quiescent.	  The	  year	  
1932	  marked	  a	  de	  jure	  change	  in	  Great	  Britain’s	  relationship	  to	  Iraq.	  Through	  a	  
contentious	  process	  at	  both	  the	  domestic	  and	  international	  level,	  the	  country	  acquired	  
nominal	  independence	  and	  joined	  the	  League	  of	  Nations.	  British	  influence	  in	  the	  country	  
did	  not	  come	  to	  an	  end,	  however.	  British	  advisers	  and	  officials	  remained	  at	  their	  posts.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
196	  The	  channel	  was	  once	  the	  main	  channel	  of	  the	  Tigris	  River.	  
197	  “The	  Kut	  Barrage	  Irrigation	  Scheme,”	  Nature	  143	  (1939):	  18.	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The	  state’s	  finances	  did	  not	  appreciably	  improve	  and	  its	  politics	  remained	  highly	  
personalized	  and	  centered	  around	  a	  ruling	  clique.198	  	  
In	  the	  1930s	  and	  early	  1940s,	  an	  increasingly	  assertive	  military	  officer	  corps	  
became	  involved	  in	  politics.	  A	  series	  of	  coups	  d’état	  punctuated	  the	  period	  before	  and	  
during	  World	  War	  II.	  In	  1941,	  the	  anti-­‐British	  government	  of	  Rashid	  ‘Ali	  al-­‐Kailani	  came	  
to	  power	  in	  just	  such	  a	  coup.	  Rashid	  ‘Ali	  replaced	  the	  King’s	  regent,	  ‘Abd	  al-­‐Ilah,	  who	  fled	  
to	  the	  protection	  of	  his	  Hashemite	  brethren	  in	  neighboring	  Transjordan.	  This	  action	  
brought	  the	  new	  Iraqi	  government	  into	  conflict	  with	  Great	  Britain,	  which	  suspected	  
Rashid	  ‘Ali	  of	  nationalist	  sentiments.	  Britain	  landed	  troops	  in	  Basra,	  an	  act	  legitimate	  
under	  its	  treaty	  with	  Iraq,	  and	  when	  Rashid	  ‘Ali’s	  government	  mobilized	  Iraqi	  forces	  to	  
resist	  the	  British	  attacked	  and	  reoccupied	  the	  country.	  Iraq’s	  period	  of	  nominal	  
independence	  lasted	  less	  than	  a	  decade.	  The	  country	  entered	  the	  post-­‐World	  War	  II	  era	  
as	  it	  had	  entered	  the	  post-­‐World	  War	  I	  era:	  under	  military	  occupation.199	  
	   	  The	  post-­‐war	  era	  brought	  a	  change	  in	  Iraq’s	  fortunes	  that	  made	  it	  possible	  to	  
imagine	  an	  end	  to	  the	  most	  devastating	  floods.	  For	  the	  first	  time	  since	  the	  Ottomans	  
ruled	  in	  Baghdad,	  Iraq	  obtained	  the	  resources	  and	  institutional	  wherewithal	  to	  do	  
something	  about	  flood	  disasters.	  Expanded	  oil	  production	  in	  the	  1940s	  increased	  
royalties	  for	  the	  Iraqi	  government.	  As	  a	  result	  of	  the	  Iranian	  nationalization	  of	  the	  Anglo-­‐
Persian	  Oil	  Company	  in	  1950	  and	  changes	  to	  Arabian	  American	  Oil	  Company’s	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
198	  Susan	  Pedersen,	  “Getting	  Out	  of	  Iraq—in	  1932:	  The	  League	  of	  Nations	  and	  the	  Road	  
to	  Normative	  Statehood,”	  American	  Historical	  Review	  115	  (2010):	  975-­‐1000.	  
199	  For	  more	  on	  this	  period	  of	  Iraq’s	  history,	  see	  Mohammad	  A.	  Tarbush,	  The	  Role	  of	  the	  
Military	  in	  Politics:	  A	  Case	  Study	  of	  Iraq	  to	  1941	  (London:	  Routledge	  &	  Kegan	  Paul,	  1982).	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(ARAMCO)	  agreement	  with	  Saudi	  Arabia,	  Iraq	  was	  in	  a	  strong	  position	  to	  put	  pressure	  on	  
the	  British-­‐owned	  Iraq	  Petroleum	  Company	  (IPC)	  for	  a	  similar	  change	  in	  terms.	  After	  
two	  years	  of	  hard	  negotiation,	  Iraq	  signed	  new	  agreements	  with	  the	  IPC	  and	  thereafter	  
revenue	  to	  the	  state	  from	  oil	  production	  swelled.	  In	  the	  1952	  contract,	  Iraq	  obtained	  a	  
half	  share	  of	  all	  profits,	  a	  doubling	  of	  its	  royalty	  payments	  per	  barrel,	  and	  most	  
importantly,	  a	  guarantee	  of	  production.	  The	  guarantee	  was	  an	  important	  change	  from	  
previous	  years	  when	  Britain	  and	  the	  IPC	  refused	  to	  exploit	  Iraq’s	  mineral	  resources	  in	  
order	  to	  keep	  prices	  high	  and	  maintain	  the	  lucrative	  British	  position	  in	  neighboring	  
Iran.200	  
	   With	  the	  oil	  agreement,	  the	  Iraqi	  government	  obtained	  additional	  benefits	  from	  
one	  of	  its	  most	  valuable	  natural	  resources,	  though	  full	  control	  would	  not	  occur	  until	  
nationalization	  in	  1972.	  Still,	  the	  additional	  revenue	  from	  oil	  production,	  and	  the	  
expectation	  that	  these	  revenues	  would	  continue	  and	  grow	  into	  the	  future,	  allowed	  Iraqi	  
officials	  to	  consider	  developing	  the	  country’s	  other	  valuable	  resource,	  the	  Tigris	  and	  
Euphrates	  Rivers.	  To	  that	  end,	  the	  Baghdad	  government,	  like	  the	  Istanbul	  government	  
before	  it,	  commissioned	  a	  prominent	  British	  irrigation	  engineer	  to	  generate	  a	  
management	  plan	  for	  the	  river.	  
	  
Water	  and	  the	  Struggle	  for	  the	  Future	  of	  Iraq	  
	   As	  detailed	  in	  Chapter	  One,	  British	  authorities	  in	  the	  1920s	  abdicated	  
responsibility	  for	  Iraq’s	  environment,	  devolving	  considerable	  power	  over	  water	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
200	  Michael	  Eppel,	  Iraq	  from	  Monarchy	  to	  Tyranny:	  From	  the	  Hashemites	  to	  the	  Rise	  of	  
Saddam	  (Gainesville,	  FL:	  University	  Press	  of	  Florida,	  2004),	  93-­‐95.	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management	  to	  private	  parties.	  Those	  with	  the	  inclination	  and	  capital	  to	  build	  flood	  
control	  and	  irrigation	  pumps	  acquired	  considerable	  power	  over	  natural	  and	  human	  
resources.	  Nearly	  thirty	  years	  later,	  Iraq	  began	  to	  take	  the	  first	  steps	  toward	  a	  state	  
funded	  and	  controlled	  water	  management	  plan.	  	  
The	  plan	  quickly	  expanded	  to	  include	  more	  than	  just	  water	  management.	  While	  
petroleum	  resources	  made	  possible	  a	  program	  of	  water	  management,	  flood	  control	  and	  
irrigation	  provided	  the	  rationale	  and	  basis	  for	  a	  much	  broader	  project	  of	  comprehensive	  
development.	  By	  the	  end	  of	  the	  1940s,	  then,	  the	  transformation	  of	  a	  water	  management	  
plan	  into	  a	  comprehensive	  development	  plan	  had	  become	  a	  struggle	  over	  the	  future	  of	  
the	  Iraqi	  state.	  British	  and	  Iraqi	  officials	  clashed	  over	  the	  aims	  of	  water	  resource	  
development,	  the	  extent	  of	  foreign	  influence,	  and	  the	  appropriate	  administrative	  
structure	  for	  the	  development	  effort.	  These	  struggles	  continued	  even	  after	  the	  creation	  
of	  a	  Development	  Board	  in	  1950	  as	  by	  this	  time	  Iraq’s	  own	  financial	  resources	  made	  it	  
possible	  for	  the	  government	  to	  go	  in	  virtually	  any	  direction	  it	  desired.	  	  
The	  struggle	  over	  water	  management	  and	  development	  began	  in	  April	  1945	  
when	  Prime	  Minister	  Hamdi	  al-­‐Pachachi	  requested	  British	  assistance	  in	  creating	  a	  
central	  planning	  department	  to	  help	  in	  the	  economic	  development	  of	  the	  country.201	  At	  
this	  initial	  stage,	  the	  Iraqis	  wanted	  British	  assistance	  in	  much	  the	  same	  fashion	  as	  the	  
Ottomans	  some	  four	  decades	  earlier.	  Hamdi	  al-­‐Pachachi	  believed	  that	  flood	  control	  and	  
irrigation	  were	  absolutely	  vital	  to	  any	  other	  forms	  of	  economic	  development	  in	  the	  
country.	  As	  a	  result,	  he	  informed	  the	  British	  Ambassador,	  Hugh	  Stonehewer	  Bird,	  that	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  TNA,	  FO	  371/61621,	  British	  Embassy,	  Baghdad	  to	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  Foreign	  
Affairs,	  Despatch	  No.	  110,	  3	  April	  1947.	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the	  Iraqi	  cabinet	  had	  decided	  to	  “recruit	  a	  party	  headed	  by	  some	  eminent	  engineer	  of	  
world-­‐wide	  reputation,	  to	  undertake	  a	  comprehensive	  study	  of	  irrigation	  
conditions…and	  means	  of	  warding	  off	  flood	  damage.”202	  The	  Iraqi	  government	  requested	  
that	  the	  British	  embassy	  recruit	  this	  eminent	  engineer	  and	  assist	  him	  in	  his	  first	  duty	  of	  
assembling	  a	  team	  of	  qualified	  staff	  to	  execute	  the	  survey	  effort.	  	  
The	  Iraqis	  made	  it	  plain	  that	  they	  wanted	  to	  outdo	  the	  Ottoman	  program	  in	  the	  
early	  part	  of	  the	  century.	  Hamdi	  al-­‐Pachachi	  commented,	  “the	  poverty	  stricken	  Turkish	  
Government…had	  been	  able	  to	  spend	  thousands	  of	  pounds	  on	  providing	  Sir	  William	  
Wilcox	  [sic]	  with	  a	  staff	  of	  40	  experts.	  The	  Iraqi	  government,	  with	  its	  healthier	  finances	  
proposed…to	  do	  even	  better.”203	  What	  the	  Ottoman	  government	  had	  started,	  the	  Iraqi	  
government	  intended	  to	  finish	  and	  expand.	  Clearly,	  the	  Iraqi	  prime	  minister	  did	  not	  
want	  an	  incremental	  plan	  of	  small	  works.	  Flush	  with	  optimism	  about	  Iraq’s	  potential	  oil	  
revenue,	  Hamdi	  al-­‐Pachachi	  and	  his	  fellow	  ministers	  imagined	  a	  series	  of	  massive	  works	  
on	  the	  rivers	  that	  would	  require	  twenty	  years	  or	  more	  to	  complete.	  For	  the	  first	  time	  in	  
centuries,	  Iraq	  would	  acquire	  adequate	  flood	  protection	  and	  dramatically	  expand	  its	  
agricultural	  production.	  	  
Bird	  quickly	  warmed	  to	  the	  idea.	  Bringing	  the	  two	  great	  rivers	  of	  Mesopotamia	  
under	  control	  would	  bring	  prestige	  to	  both	  Iraq	  and	  Britain.	  Even	  more	  importantly,	  the	  
Iraqi	  plan	  meant	  “most	  satisfactory	  long-­‐term	  contracts	  for	  a	  number	  of	  British	  firms.”	  
Beyond	  the	  commercial	  angle,	  British	  involvement	  also	  meant	  continued	  relevance	  in	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Iraq	  and	  the	  Middle	  East.204	  Ambassador	  Bird	  worried	  about	  rising	  American	  influence	  
and	  competition	  in	  the	  region:	  	  
If	  we	  miss	  this	  opportunity	  there	  is	  little	  doubt	  that	  the	  Iraq	  Government	  
will	  turn	  to	  America	  and	  even	  less	  that,	  if	  they	  do,	  an	  American	  expert	  will	  
certainly	  be	  found.	  It	  would	  be	  a	  fine	  advertisement	  for	  American	  
engineering	  to	  be	  able	  to	  re-­‐make	  the	  irrigation	  system	  of	  Iraq,	  and	  might	  
profoundly	  affect,	  to	  our	  detriment,	  the	  whole	  balance	  of	  British	  and	  
American	  relationships	  in	  the	  Middle	  East.	  This,	  in	  fact,	  is	  exactly	  the	  type	  
of	  capital	  development	  in	  which	  United	  States	  interests	  would	  wish	  to	  
participate.205	  
American	  interference	  became	  an	  even	  greater	  worry	  when	  the	  King’s	  regent,	  ‘Abd	  al-­‐
Ilah,	  visited	  the	  United	  States	  in	  May	  1945	  and	  toured	  the	  country,	  making	  a	  stop	  at	  the	  
Boulder	  (later	  Hoover)	  dam	  on	  the	  Arizona-­‐Nevada	  border.206	  	  
Britain’s	  diminishing	  presence	  in	  the	  world	  and	  meager	  financial	  resources	  made	  
it	  difficult	  to	  find	  someone	  who	  wanted	  to	  follow	  in	  William	  Willcocks’s	  illustrious	  
footsteps.207	  With	  Britain	  set	  to	  leave	  India,	  there	  were	  few	  options	  on	  the	  subcontinent	  
for	  recruiting	  an	  engineer	  with	  wide	  experience.	  In	  the	  end,	  the	  recruitment	  effort	  
required	  the	  direct	  intervention	  of	  British	  Foreign	  Secretary	  Ernest	  Bevin	  himself.	  In	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
204	  The	  war	  had	  emptied	  the	  British	  exchequer.	  At	  a	  conference	  on	  the	  Middle	  East	  in	  
September	  1945,	  Foreign	  Secretary	  Ernest	  Bevin	  advocated	  maintaining	  British	  primacy	  
in	  the	  Middle	  East	  through	  technical	  assistance.	  See	  Eppel,	  64;	  Paul	  W.	  T.	  	  Kingston,	  
Britain	  and	  the	  Politics	  of	  Modernization	  in	  the	  Middle	  East,	  1945-­‐1958	  (Cambridge:	  
Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1996),	  10-­‐12.	  
205	  TNA,	  FO	  371/45324,	  Hugh	  Stonehewer	  Bird,	  Despatch	  No.	  187,	  3	  May	  1945,	  2.	  
206	  TNA,	  FO	  371/45324,	  Hugh	  Stonehewer	  Bird,	  Despatch	  No.	  266,	  25	  June	  1945.	  
207	  When	  after	  two	  months	  no	  one	  had	  been	  found,	  the	  Minister	  Resident	  in	  Cairo	  sent	  a	  
message	  to	  the	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  Foreign	  Affairs	  requesting	  greater	  attention	  to	  the	  
matter,	  primarily	  because	  of	  continuing	  worries	  of	  American	  influence.	  TNA,	  FO	  
371/45324,	  Sir	  Edward	  Grigg	  to	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  Foreign	  Affairs,	  Telegram	  No.	  633,	  
23	  June	  1945.	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October,	  the	  British	  put	  forward	  a	  candidate:	  Frank	  Fraser	  Haigh,	  the	  Chief	  Engineer	  of	  
the	  Punjab	  Irrigation	  Department.	  Punjab,	  as	  the	  site	  of	  the	  Canal	  Colonies	  and	  extensive	  
works	  on	  the	  Indus	  River,	  was	  one	  of	  the	  places	  in	  the	  British	  Empire	  where	  an	  
irrigation	  engineer	  could	  gain	  considerable	  hands-­‐on	  experience.	  At	  that	  time,	  Haigh	  led	  
one	  of	  the	  largest	  irrigation	  departments	  in	  the	  world.208	  He	  had	  been	  Chief	  Engineer	  
since	  1941,	  but	  planned	  to	  retire	  in	  a	  few	  months	  at	  the	  age	  of	  sixty	  after	  twenty-­‐eight	  
years	  in	  the	  Indian	  Public	  Works	  Department.209	  
Haigh	  arrived	  in	  Iraq	  four	  months	  later	  in	  February	  1946—just	  in	  time	  to	  witness	  
a	  massive	  flood.	  The	  flood	  in	  early	  1946	  was	  the	  highest	  in	  forty	  years	  and	  required	  
opening	  breaches	  in	  the	  Tigris	  floodwalls	  north	  of	  Baghdad.	  The	  deluge	  followed	  its	  
usual	  path	  around	  the	  city	  to	  the	  east.	  This	  particular	  flood	  however	  lasted	  more	  than	  
two	  months,	  with	  the	  river	  above	  flood	  stage	  in	  five	  successive	  waves.	  Baghdad	  
effectively	  became	  an	  island	  surrounded	  by	  floodwater.	  The	  eastern	  part	  of	  the	  city	  was	  
caught	  between	  the	  normal	  Tigris	  riverbed,	  swollen	  with	  floodwater,	  and	  the	  ten	  feet	  of	  
water	  covering	  the	  flooded	  lands	  to	  the	  east.	  Muddy	  river	  water	  oozed	  under	  the	  
embankments	  and	  from	  the	  ground	  itself,	  covering	  streets	  and	  the	  lower	  floors	  of	  
buildings.210	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
208	  Gerwin	  Gerke,	  "The	  Iraq	  Development	  Board	  and	  British	  Policy,	  1945-­‐50,"	  Middle	  
Eastern	  Studies	  27,	  no.	  2	  (1991):	  235.	  
209	  TNA,	  FO	  371/45324,	  Foreign	  Office	  to	  Baghdad,	  Telegram	  No.	  763,	  27	  October	  1945;	  
Pethick-­‐Lawrence	  to	  Bevin,	  1	  November	  1945.	  
210	  Ahmad	  Sousa,	  Faydanat	  Baghdad,	  557-­‐564.	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With	  this	  reminder	  of	  the	  rivers’	  power,	  Haigh	  put	  together	  a	  team	  of	  six	  British	  
engineers	  and	  twenty-­‐five	  Indian	  surveyors	  and	  draftsmen,	  an	  effort	  that	  itself	  took	  
several	  months.	  Haigh’s	  program	  was	  kept	  separate	  from	  Iraq’s	  own	  Irrigation	  
Department.	  For	  the	  second	  time	  in	  less	  than	  three	  decades,	  Iraq	  found	  itself	  with	  an	  
“Indianized”	  administration	  guiding	  its	  irrigation	  policy.	  In	  November,	  Haigh	  submitted	  
a	  preliminary	  plan	  for	  the	  Iraqi	  government’s	  approval.	  The	  plan	  followed	  almost	  exactly	  
Willcocks’	  original	  ideas	  for	  water	  control	  in	  the	  country,	  a	  fact	  that	  left	  some	  members	  
of	  the	  Iraqi	  cabinet	  unhappy	  at	  the	  lack	  of	  imagination.211	  Haigh	  proposed	  two	  large	  
flood	  escapes	  that	  would	  protect	  the	  country	  from	  yearly	  inundation.212	  Both	  projects	  
included	  provisions	  for	  irrigation,	  with	  the	  potential	  to	  bring	  nearly	  7.5	  million	  acres	  of	  
land	  into	  cultivation.	  The	  cost	  of	  the	  works	  was	  estimated	  at	  $111	  million.	  
Haigh’s	  plan,	  however,	  raised	  serious	  concerns	  in	  the	  newly	  founded	  British	  
Middle	  East	  Office	  (BMEO).213	  The	  Director	  of	  the	  BMEO	  worried	  about	  the	  singular	  
focus	  on	  irrigation	  and	  flood	  protection	  schemes:	  	  
It	  seems	  to	  me	  important	  that	  when	  detailed	  schemes	  are	  worked	  out	  
some	  sort	  of	  development	  commission	  or	  planning	  committee	  is	  set	  up	  so	  
that	  irrigation,	  agriculture,	  public	  health	  and	  social	  services	  can	  be	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
211	  There	  was	  apparently	  considerable	  friction	  between	  Haigh	  and	  Nuri	  al-­‐Said,	  who	  
refused	  in	  1949	  to	  renew	  Haigh’s	  contract.	  Sudan	  Archive	  [hereafter	  SA],	  GB	  0033	  SAD,	  
Walter	  Crawford,	  “Trip	  to	  Baghdad	  from	  15/6/49	  to	  25/6/49,”	  25	  June	  1949.	  
212	  TNA,	  FO	  371/61621,	  “Memorandum	  on	  Irrigation	  Proposals	  for	  Iraq,”	  Middle	  East	  
Secretariat,	  16	  January	  1947.	  
213	  Foreign	  Secretary	  Ernest	  Bevin	  created	  the	  BMEO	  in	  1945	  to	  promote	  British	  
technical	  assistance	  programs	  in	  the	  Middle	  East.	  See	  Kingston,	  Politics	  of	  Modernization,	  
1-­‐28.	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planned	  together,	  and	  so	  that	  all	  the	  ramification	  [sic]	  of	  that	  plan	  will	  be	  
ready	  before	  any	  water	  is	  put	  on	  the	  ground.214	  
The	  BMEO	  noted	  that	  Haigh’s	  job	  was	  to	  supply	  water	  “where	  it	  was	  needed,	  [but]	  to	  
other	  scientists	  must	  be	  assigned	  the	  equally	  important	  task	  of	  determining	  how	  best	  
and	  where	  the	  water	  may	  be	  used.”215	  Officials	  at	  the	  BMEO	  focused	  primarily	  on	  
technical	  issues,	  suggesting	  that	  Iraq	  hire	  a	  soil	  chemist	  and	  an	  agriculturalist	  to	  fulfill	  
these	  tasks.	  To	  mitigate	  the	  negative	  effects	  of	  irrigation	  development	  and	  successfully	  
utilize	  the	  new	  waters,	  the	  BMEO	  insisted	  that	  Haigh’s	  report	  become	  part	  of	  a	  broader	  
portfolio	  of	  development	  activities	  focused	  on	  the	  efficient	  use	  of	  land	  and	  water.	  	  
The	  Foreign	  Office	  agreed	  with	  the	  BMEO’s	  assessment	  and	  Bevin	  brought	  up	  the	  
matter	  in	  a	  February	  1947	  meeting	  with	  the	  Iraqi	  Minister	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs,	  
Muhammad	  Fadhil	  al-­‐Jamali.	  Bevin	  emphasized	  that	  the	  plans	  for	  irrigation	  must	  involve	  
some	  kind	  of	  coordinating	  policy,	  perhaps	  through	  a	  “Development	  Planning	  
Committee…to	  consider	  the	  interdependence	  of	  irrigation,	  agriculture,	  public	  health,	  
labor	  policy	  and	  social	  services.”216	  With	  the	  Foreign	  Office’s	  input,	  the	  list	  of	  problems	  
that	  ought	  to	  be	  addressed	  with	  water	  management	  lengthened.	  While	  the	  BMEO	  
critique	  centered	  on	  technical	  issues	  related	  to	  water	  management—its	  relationship	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
214	  TNA,	  FO	  371/61621,	  British	  Middle	  East	  Office	  to	  British	  Embassy,	  Baghdad,	  No.	  117,	  
20	  December	  1946.	  
215	  TNA,	  FO	  371/61621,	  H.R.	  Stewart,	  Memorandum	  on	  Haigh’s	  proposal,	  28	  November	  
1946,	  1.	  
216	  TNA,	  FO	  371/61621,	  “Note	  for	  the	  Secretary	  of	  State’s	  Talk	  with	  the	  Iraqi	  Foreign	  
Minister	  about	  the	  Development	  of	  Irrigation	  in	  Iraq,”	  1	  February	  1947.	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agriculture	  and	  disease—Bevin	  expanded	  the	  scope	  to	  include	  social	  and	  political	  
effects.	  	  
As	  the	  water	  management	  plan	  for	  Iraq	  evolved	  into	  a	  comprehensive	  
development	  program,	  British	  officials	  began	  to	  realize	  the	  consequences	  of	  Britain’s	  
interwar	  policies	  in	  Iraq.	  Should	  the	  state	  created	  by	  the	  British,	  dominated	  as	  it	  was	  by	  
a	  narrow,	  landholding	  cabal,	  move	  forward	  with	  a	  massive	  economic	  development	  plan,	  
British	  officials	  feared	  that	  either	  the	  plan	  would	  fail	  or	  the	  government	  would.	  In	  the	  
case	  of	  the	  former,	  Britain	  worried	  about	  mismanagement	  and	  administrative	  
inefficiencies.217	  Having	  created	  the	  Iraqi	  government,	  British	  officials	  were	  well	  aware	  
of	  its	  capacities.	  With	  respect	  to	  the	  government’s	  viability,	  Britain’s	  representatives	  in	  
the	  Middle	  East	  worried	  about	  the	  country’s	  growing	  social	  and	  political	  problems.	  As	  
Britain	  faced	  threats	  to	  its	  influence	  in	  several	  countries	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  at	  this	  time,	  
British	  officials	  naturally	  wanted	  to	  see	  the	  Iraqi	  government	  survive.	  	  
As	  a	  result	  of	  these	  concerns,	  British	  officials	  seized	  upon	  a	  broad	  expansion	  of	  
Haigh’s	  irrigation	  program	  as	  a	  means	  to	  press	  the	  Iraqis	  for	  extensive	  reforms	  of	  state	  
services.	  Haigh’s	  plan	  could	  no	  longer	  function	  purely	  as	  a	  method	  for	  water	  
management.	  Instead,	  for	  the	  British,	  the	  plan	  became	  a	  means	  to	  shape	  the	  Iraqi	  state	  
into	  a	  sustainable	  vehicle	  for	  British	  interests	  in	  the	  Middle	  East.	  Meanwhile,	  for	  the	  
Iraqis,	  Haigh’s	  plan	  and	  the	  extensions	  suggested	  by	  the	  British	  justified	  a	  massive	  
expansion	  of	  the	  government’s	  influence	  on	  Iraqi	  society	  and	  the	  economy.	  Baghdad	  had	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
217	  Previous	  irrigation	  and	  settlement	  schemes	  at	  Hawija	  and	  Abu	  Ghraib	  had	  failed	  
because	  of	  poor	  management	  and	  insufficient	  study.	  TNA,	  FO	  371/61621,	  British	  
Embassy,	  Baghdad	  to	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  Foreign	  Affairs,	  Despatch	  No.	  110,	  3	  April	  
1947,	  2.	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struggled	  for	  years	  to	  project	  state	  power	  into	  the	  provinces,	  and	  such	  an	  expansion	  of	  
the	  state’s	  reach	  would	  benefit	  those	  at	  the	  reins	  of	  government.	  	  
Moreover,	  the	  British	  saw	  the	  Haigh	  plan	  and	  its	  expansion	  of	  irrigation	  on	  state	  
land	  as	  potentially	  opening	  the	  door	  to	  a	  form	  of	  political	  liberalization	  commensurate	  
with	  British	  aims.	  Bevin’s	  meeting	  with	  Muhammad	  Fadhil	  al-­‐Jamali	  in	  February	  1947	  
included	  recommendations	  regarding	  governance.	  Bevin	  characterized	  the	  newly	  
irrigated	  land	  opened	  up	  by	  Haigh’s	  schemes	  as	  an	  opportunity	  to	  pursue	  “a	  modern	  
democratic	  form	  of	  land	  tenure.”	  British	  officials	  wanted	  not	  only	  to	  remake	  the	  Iraqi	  
economy	  through	  the	  development	  of	  irrigation	  and	  flood	  control,	  but	  also	  to	  change	  the	  
state’s	  foundations,	  the	  bases	  of	  political	  power	  that	  the	  British	  mandate	  had	  originally	  
established.	  Water	  management	  was	  consequently	  the	  means	  chosen	  to	  produce	  a	  new	  
kind	  of	  political	  legitimacy	  in	  Iraq,	  which	  would	  also	  serve	  to	  extend	  the	  government’s	  
lifespan	  and	  preserve	  British	  influence:	  
…the	  energetic	  development	  of	  Iraq’s	  great	  agricultural	  potentialities	  on	  
broad	  democratic	  lines	  should	  provide	  a	  powerful	  answer	  to	  subversive	  
criticism	  of	  the	  present	  regime.	  It	  will	  give	  Iraq	  the	  basis	  for	  that	  economic	  
prosperity	  that	  will	  assist	  her	  to	  achieve	  real	  political	  stability	  and	  
progress.218	  
Never	  mind	  why	  Iraq’s	  great	  agricultural	  potentialities	  had	  languished	  for	  three	  decades.	  
Unfortunately	  for	  the	  Foreign	  Office,	  they	  had	  little	  credibility	  in	  pressing	  this	  matter	  
with	  the	  Iraqis	  because	  of	  their	  own	  complicity	  in	  establishing	  a	  weak,	  narrow	  state	  
dependent	  on	  the	  landed	  classes	  and	  British	  military	  forces	  to	  govern.	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  Ibid.	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Still,	  leaders	  in	  the	  Iraqi	  government	  to	  an	  extent	  shared	  the	  British	  assessment.	  
Prime	  Minister	  Salih	  Jabr	  in	  April	  1947	  noted	  that	  “something	  practical	  must	  be	  done	  to	  
raise	  the	  general	  standard	  of	  living,	  for	  speeches	  and	  threats	  would	  not	  check	  the	  
danger”	  to	  the	  regime.219	  Both	  sides	  agreed	  that	  enacting	  Haigh’s	  plans	  in	  tandem	  with	  a	  
broader	  development	  program	  was	  attractive,	  though	  the	  extent	  of	  political	  change	  
desired	  was	  a	  different	  matter.	  Most	  importantly,	  the	  technique	  for	  achieving	  these	  aims	  
remained	  essentially	  an	  infrastructure	  program.	  There	  was	  no	  direct	  discussion	  of	  land	  
tenure	  policies,	  taxes	  on	  water	  and	  agricultural	  production,	  or	  new	  rights	  for	  Iraq’s	  
landless	  cultivators.	  Instead,	  Iraqi	  and	  British	  leaders	  sought	  to	  create	  a	  “development	  
planning	  committee”	  of	  some	  kind	  out	  of	  a	  water	  management	  scheme.	  This	  committee	  
would	  coordinate	  implementation	  of	  Haigh’s	  plan,	  and	  by	  building	  dams,	  roads	  and	  
schools,	  it	  was	  hoped	  that	  the	  committee	  would	  save	  the	  government	  from	  itself.	  By	  
emphasizing	  works	  over	  policies,	  it	  appeared	  as	  if	  those	  in	  power	  believed	  that	  the	  
country	  could	  simply	  build	  its	  way	  out	  of	  social,	  political	  and	  economic	  problems.	  	  
	   During	  the	  spring	  of	  1947,	  the	  heads	  of	  Iraq’s	  various	  ministries	  met	  with	  British	  
officials,	  technical	  staff	  from	  the	  British	  Middle	  East	  Office,	  and	  representatives	  of	  the	  
British	  engineering	  firm	  Sir	  Alexander	  Gibb	  and	  Partners.	  The	  meetings	  tried	  to	  bring	  
coherence	  to	  the	  various	  proposals	  for	  a	  planning	  and	  development	  committee.	  By	  the	  
end,	  Salih	  Jabr	  and	  his	  cabinet	  had	  agreed	  to	  create	  a	  Central	  Development	  Board	  that	  
would	  use	  information	  from	  various	  ministries	  to	  create	  a	  comprehensive	  development	  
plan	  for	  the	  country.	  Britain	  agreed	  to	  furnish	  expertise	  and	  materials.	  Sir	  Alexander	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  TNA,	  FO	  371/61621,	  “Record	  of	  Meeting	  held	  at	  the	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  Embassy,	  Baghdad,”	  22	  
April	  1947.	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Gibb	  and	  Partners	  signed	  on	  to	  prepare	  “a	  plan	  for	  making	  a	  plan,”	  a	  detailed	  assessment	  
of	  how	  a	  Central	  Development	  Board	  should	  work.220	  All	  involved	  agreed	  that	  the	  Board	  
should	  be	  insulated	  from	  Iraqi	  politics	  and	  its	  frequent	  changes	  in	  leadership.	  	  
The	  Development	  Board	  would	  supposedly	  achieve	  independence	  from	  
“corruptive”	  political	  influences	  by	  remaining	  separate	  from	  other	  government	  
ministries,	  relying	  heavily	  on	  foreign	  experts	  and	  controlling	  its	  own	  budget.	  Just	  as	  
Haigh’s	  Irrigation	  Development	  Commission	  had	  been	  set	  up	  outside	  the	  Irrigation	  
Department,	  Iraqi	  and	  British	  administrators	  thought	  they	  could	  insulate	  the	  
Development	  Board	  from	  the	  politicking	  of	  the	  ministries	  and	  cabinet.	  	  
However,	  independence	  did	  not	  remove	  the	  Board	  from	  politics.	  The	  separation	  
of	  the	  Board	  from	  the	  government	  simply	  resituated	  political	  contestation.	  As	  a	  matter	  
of	  fact,	  British	  officials	  viewed	  administrative	  independence	  as	  quite	  positive	  for	  British	  
interests.	  An	  independent	  board	  “would	  greatly	  strengthen	  the	  hand	  of	  the	  Regent	  in	  
dealing	  with	  his	  Prime	  Ministers	  and	  incidentally	  the	  Ambassador’s	  in	  dealing	  with	  the	  
Regent.”221	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  monarch	  could	  now	  access	  an	  institution	  that	  
centralized	  decisionmaking,	  rather	  than	  influencing	  a	  constantly	  rotating	  group	  of	  prime	  
ministers	  and	  ministry	  heads.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  British	  ambassador	  found	  another	  
entrée	  for	  British	  influence	  through	  the	  technical	  advisers	  assigned	  to	  the	  Board.	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  TNA,	  FO	  371/61621,	  British	  Ambassador	  Hugh	  Stonehewer	  Bird	  to	  Iraqi	  Prime	  
Minister	  Salih	  Jabr,	  25	  April	  1947.	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  TNA,	  FO	  371/61621,	  “Record	  of	  Meeting	  held	  at	  the	  British	  Embassy	  on	  Sunday,	  20th	  
April,	  1947,	  to	  discuss	  the	  economic	  development	  of	  Iraq.”	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   Despite	  the	  consensus	  in	  the	  spring	  of	  1947,	  two	  major	  events	  interrupted	  the	  
creation	  of	  a	  Development	  Board.	  The	  first	  was	  the	  Portsmouth	  Treaty	  of	  January	  15,	  
1948,	  which	  revised	  the	  Anglo-­‐Iraqi	  Treaty	  of	  1930	  and	  negotiated	  the	  exit	  of	  British	  
forces	  that	  had	  occupied	  the	  country	  since	  1941.	  The	  treaty	  also	  created	  a	  joint	  British	  
and	  Iraqi	  defense	  board,	  renewed	  British	  control	  over	  air	  bases	  at	  Habbaniyah	  and	  
Shu’eiba,	  and	  gave	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  rights	  to	  transit	  troops	  and	  warships	  across	  Iraqi	  
territory.222	  The	  signing	  of	  the	  treaty	  precipitated	  several	  months	  of	  unrest	  in	  Iraq,	  a	  
period	  known	  as	  al-­‐Wathbah,	  and	  brought	  down	  the	  government	  of	  Salih	  Jabr.	  The	  
treaty	  made	  plain	  what	  the	  British	  meant	  to	  achieve	  through	  the	  proposed	  Central	  
Development	  Board	  under	  the	  cover	  of	  technical	  assistance:	  British	  influence	  would	  be	  
retained	  in	  Iraq	  and,	  in	  return,	  the	  government	  could	  rely	  on	  British	  support	  in	  
maintaining	  power.	  While	  Britain	  sought	  to	  make	  certain	  facets	  of	  the	  new	  Iraqi	  state	  
responsive	  to	  popular	  demands,	  these	  demands	  should	  not	  extend	  to	  Britain’s	  influence	  
and	  military	  presence.	  The	  fallout	  from	  the	  treaty	  negotiations	  made	  it	  much	  more	  
difficult	  to	  gain	  approval	  for	  a	  program	  of	  economic	  development	  attended	  by	  British	  
advisers.	  
Second,	  there	  was	  the	  problem	  of	  Palestine.	  The	  United	  Nations	  approved	  the	  
partition	  plan	  for	  Palestine	  on	  29	  November	  1947,	  six	  weeks	  before	  the	  signing	  and	  
publication	  of	  the	  Portsmouth	  Treaty.	  The	  al-­‐Wathbah	  demonstrations	  eventually	  
included	  protests	  about	  the	  Palestinian	  situation.	  The	  unrest	  continued	  through	  May	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1948	  when	  martial	  law	  was	  declared	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  war	  in	  Palestine.223	  Iraqi	  troops	  
participated	  in	  the	  Arab	  offensive,	  causing	  a	  significant	  strain	  on	  Iraq’s	  finances.	  Also,	  in	  
response	  to	  Israel’s	  declaration	  of	  independence,	  Baghdad	  shut	  down	  the	  oil	  pipeline	  
running	  from	  Kirkuk	  to	  the	  port	  and	  refineries	  at	  Haifa	  on	  the	  Mediterranean	  Sea.	  Iraq	  
lost	  substantial	  revenue	  and	  the	  Iraq	  Petroleum	  Company	  (IPC)	  refused	  to	  extend	  the	  
government	  a	  loan	  against	  future	  royalties	  until	  the	  pipeline	  reopened.	  
The	  standoff	  also	  affected	  Iraq’s	  application	  for	  aid	  from	  the	  International	  Bank	  
for	  Reconstruction	  and	  Development.	  In	  October	  1948,	  Iraqi	  Prime	  Minister	  Muzahim	  al-­‐
Pachachi	  unilaterally	  created	  a	  Development	  Board	  to	  encourage	  a	  deal	  with	  the	  Bank,	  
but	  not	  in	  the	  format	  agreed	  by	  Salih	  Jabr.	  As	  created	  under	  Muzahim	  al-­‐Pachachi,	  the	  
Board	  did	  not	  have	  an	  independent	  staff	  or	  budget	  and	  the	  British	  embassy	  refused	  to	  
support	  it.	  	  
	   In	  1949,	  Iraq’s	  economic	  fortunes	  and	  the	  stability	  of	  its	  government	  began	  to	  
improve.	  Strongman	  Nuri	  al-­‐Sa’id	  came	  to	  power	  as	  prime	  minister	  and	  served	  most	  of	  
the	  year.	  Oil	  revenues	  also	  picked	  up	  as	  a	  result	  of	  increased	  global	  demand	  and	  post-­‐
war	  reconstruction	  in	  Europe.	  Income	  from	  royalties	  in	  1945	  was	  $9.3	  million,	  nearly	  
doubling	  to	  $16.2	  million	  in	  1949.	  Iraq	  also	  began	  to	  petition	  the	  IPC	  for	  a	  greater	  share	  
of	  the	  revenue	  from	  oil,	  negotiations	  that	  took	  on	  greater	  urgency	  once	  Saudi	  King	  ‘Abd	  
al-­‐Aziz	  ibn	  Sa’ud	  extracted	  a	  fifty	  percent	  share	  of	  the	  profits	  from	  the	  Arabian	  American	  
Oil	  Company.	  Iraq	  obtained	  the	  same	  deal	  from	  IPC	  in	  1952,	  after	  which	  its	  income	  from	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oil	  skyrocketed.224	  In	  1951,	  the	  final	  report	  by	  Frank	  Fraser	  Haigh’s	  Irrigation	  
Development	  Commission	  was	  submitted.225	  The	  additional	  funds	  from	  oil	  and	  the	  
publication	  of	  Haigh’s	  magnum	  opus	  reopened	  the	  debate	  over	  water	  management,	  
development	  and	  economic	  expansion.	  
	   	  By	  May	  1950,	  when	  the	  Iraqi	  government	  under	  Tawfiq	  as-­‐Suwaidi	  finally	  
promulgated	  a	  new	  Development	  Board,	  the	  country	  had	  both	  a	  plan	  and	  the	  revenue	  to	  
put	  it	  into	  action.	  However,	  as	  soon	  as	  the	  law	  creating	  the	  Board	  was	  passed,	  a	  row	  
erupted	  between	  Iraq	  and	  Britain	  over	  the	  membership	  of	  foreign	  advisers.	  Britain	  could	  
hardly	  allow	  pass	  on	  an	  important	  opportunity	  for	  influence	  and	  put	  enormous	  pressure	  
on	  the	  Iraqi	  government	  to	  conclude	  a	  deal.	  The	  impasse	  was	  only	  broken	  once	  Nuri	  al-­‐
Said,	  ever	  the	  savior	  for	  the	  British,	  returned	  to	  the	  prime	  ministry	  in	  September	  1950.	  
He	  pressed	  hard	  for	  a	  Development	  Board	  satisfactory	  to	  outside	  powers	  and	  within	  a	  
few	  weeks,	  an	  agreement	  was	  reached.	  Nuri	  al-­‐Said’s	  Board	  consisted	  of	  the	  Prime	  
Minister,	  the	  Finance	  Minister,	  four	  other	  high-­‐level	  Iraqi	  officials	  and	  two	  foreign	  
experts,	  one	  British	  and	  one	  American.	  The	  British	  nominee,	  Sir	  Eddington	  Miller,	  
became	  the	  Secretary-­‐General.	  Miller	  was	  a	  veteran	  administrator	  of	  irrigation	  
development	  projects,	  having	  worked	  on	  the	  Gezira	  scheme	  in	  Sudan.	  The	  Americans	  
nominated	  a	  former	  military	  official,	  General	  Donald	  B.	  Adams,	  who	  since	  1947	  had	  
acted	  as	  the	  president	  of	  the	  Thompson-­‐Starrett	  Company,	  an	  engineering	  firm	  based	  in	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  also	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New	  York	  City.226	  The	  presence	  of	  foreign	  experts	  on	  the	  Development	  Board	  remained	  
controversial	  throughout	  the	  1950s	  and	  opposition	  groups	  assailed	  the	  administration	  
of	  Nuri	  al-­‐Said	  for	  allowing	  foreigners	  such	  influence	  over	  Iraq’s	  finances.227	  
The	  struggle	  between	  Iraqi	  governments	  and	  the	  British	  that	  began	  in	  1945	  over	  
Iraqi	  irrigation	  and	  flood	  control	  eventually	  ended	  with	  a	  victory	  for	  British	  aims.	  
London	  obtained	  significant	  influence	  over	  Iraq’s	  destiny	  through	  its	  network	  of	  
advisers,	  commercial	  contracts,	  and	  now	  a	  seat	  on	  the	  vaunted	  Development	  Board.	  
Iraqi	  leadership	  succeeded	  in	  harnessing	  oil	  revenue	  for	  a	  massive	  extension	  of	  state	  
power	  and	  a	  bid	  for	  mastery	  over	  the	  environment	  of	  the	  country.	  In	  this	  way,	  the	  
Development	  Board	  was	  not	  simply	  about	  planning	  and	  executing	  economic	  
development,	  it	  was	  also	  about	  planning	  and	  executing	  state	  development.	  The	  British	  
viewed	  this	  facet	  as	  critical,	  as	  they	  more	  and	  more	  urgently	  believed	  that	  their	  power	  in	  
the	  country	  stood	  on	  precarious	  foundations.	  	  
Having	  won	  the	  debate	  over	  the	  Board,	  the	  political	  struggle	  moved	  to	  the	  
Board’s	  activities	  and	  how	  it	  spent	  the	  oil	  revenues.	  What	  British	  and	  Iraqi	  leaders	  alike	  
did	  not	  yet	  understand	  was	  how	  effectively	  the	  Board	  would	  reconfigure	  political	  power	  
during	  its	  eight	  years	  in	  operation	  and	  the	  important	  implications	  of	  the	  Board’s	  
founding.	  Rather	  than	  the	  palace	  or	  the	  various	  ministries,	  the	  Board	  became	  the	  means	  
whereby	  political	  power	  was	  actualized,	  was	  given	  physical	  expression.	  In	  the	  next	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  Politics	  of	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section,	  I	  will	  analyze	  the	  projects	  constructed	  by	  the	  Board,	  demonstrating	  how	  water	  
control	  and	  irrigation	  affected	  the	  evolution	  of	  the	  Iraqi	  state	  through	  the	  1950s.	  	  
	  
‘A	  Plan	  of	  Action’	  :	  Framing	  Development	  in	  Iraq	  
Though	  the	  Development	  Board	  managed	  projects	  in	  all	  sectors,	  from	  road	  
building	  to	  public	  health,	  the	  bulk	  of	  its	  funds	  were	  spent	  on	  irrigation	  and	  flood	  control.	  
From	  1951-­‐1954,	  over	  seventy	  percent	  of	  the	  funds	  allocated	  to	  development	  went	  to	  
this	  budget	  category.	  Actual	  expenditure	  was	  far	  less	  during	  these	  years,	  as	  the	  Board	  
only	  managed	  to	  spend	  half	  of	  its	  allocated	  funds.	  In	  the	  five-­‐year	  program	  beginning	  in	  
1955,	  the	  allocation	  for	  irrigation	  and	  flood	  control	  was	  only	  thirty	  percent	  of	  the	  
budget,	  but	  actual	  expenditures	  increased	  markedly,	  from	  $78	  million	  through	  1954	  to	  
$305	  million	  for	  the	  1955-­‐1960	  period.228	  
	   Virtually	  all	  of	  the	  money	  spent	  by	  the	  Development	  Board	  on	  water	  control	  went	  
to	  the	  two	  mammoth	  flood	  control	  projects	  proposed	  by	  Haigh,	  one	  on	  the	  Euphrates	  
River	  and	  the	  other	  on	  the	  Tigris.	  Both	  projects	  involved	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  flood	  escape	  
with	  a	  barrage	  to	  regulate	  the	  flow	  of	  floodwater	  into	  a	  channel.	  The	  channel	  removed	  
the	  water	  from	  the	  river	  and	  directed	  it	  into	  a	  nearby	  depression.	  On	  the	  Euphrates,	  this	  
depression	  was	  known	  as	  Lake	  Habbaniyah,	  located	  just	  south	  of	  the	  city	  of	  Ramadi.	  On	  
the	  Tigris,	  floodwaters	  were	  destined	  to	  flow	  into	  the	  depression	  of	  Wadi	  Tharthar,	  
some	  thirty	  miles	  southwest	  of	  Samarra.	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   Both	  escapes	  were	  part	  of	  William	  Willcocks’s	  original	  plan	  for	  Mesopotamia.	  
However,	  Willcocks	  had	  only	  made	  detailed	  surveys	  of	  Habbaniyya	  because	  tribal	  unrest	  
in	  the	  vicinity	  of	  Wadi	  Tharthar	  precluded	  a	  detailed	  study.	  Two	  earlier	  attempts	  had	  
been	  made	  to	  construct	  the	  Habbaniyya	  inlet	  channel,	  but	  both	  were	  interrupted	  by	  
global	  conflicts.	  In	  1913,	  the	  Ottomans	  hired	  the	  British	  firm	  of	  J.	  Jackson,	  Ltd.	  to	  start	  
construction.	  Work	  was	  suspended	  with	  the	  beginning	  of	  World	  War	  I.	  In	  1939,	  the	  Iraqi	  
government	  revisited	  the	  channel	  only	  to	  cease	  work	  again	  because	  of	  the	  outbreak	  of	  
World	  War	  II.	  It	  was	  not	  until	  1945	  that	  work	  began	  again,	  though	  at	  a	  different	  location,	  
which	  apparently	  brought	  the	  engineers	  better	  luck.	  With	  the	  founding	  of	  the	  Irrigation	  
Development	  Commission	  in	  1946,	  Frank	  Haigh	  and	  his	  team	  of	  engineers	  considerably	  
increased	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  1945	  project	  by	  adding	  the	  barrage	  near	  Ramadi	  to	  help	  
regulate	  flow	  into	  the	  channel.229	  	  
On	  the	  Tigris,	  Haigh	  again	  followed	  Willcocks’s	  plan	  for	  a	  diversion	  of	  floodwater	  
into	  the	  Wadi	  Tharthar	  depression.	  The	  Tigris	  carries	  a	  great	  deal	  more	  water	  than	  the	  
Euphrates	  and	  the	  engineering	  efforts	  to	  create	  the	  Wadi	  Tharthar	  escape	  were	  larger	  
and	  more	  complicated	  than	  those	  at	  Habbaniyah.	  The	  inlet	  channel	  from	  Samarra	  
required	  digging	  a	  canal	  forty	  miles	  through	  the	  desert.	  Once	  filled,	  the	  Wadi	  Tharthar	  
became	  a	  lake	  the	  size	  of	  Lake	  Mead	  in	  the	  U.S.	  states	  of	  Nevada	  and	  Arizona.230	  As	  a	  sign	  
of	  British	  predominance	  in	  Iraq,	  major	  contracts	  for	  both	  projects	  went	  to	  London-­‐based	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engineering	  and	  construction	  firm,	  Balfour,	  Beatty,	  and	  Company,	  Ltd.,	  as	  well	  as	  to	  
British	  consulting	  firm	  Coode,	  Wilson,	  Mitchell	  and	  Vaughan-­‐Lee.231	  	  
	   During	  its	  short	  tenure,	  the	  Development	  Board’s	  focus	  on	  long-­‐term,	  large	  scale	  
works	  fueled	  discontent.	  Much	  of	  Iraq’s	  population	  saw	  very	  little	  direct	  benefit	  from	  the	  
increasing	  oil	  revenue	  throughout	  the	  1940s	  and	  1950s.	  In	  response	  to	  the	  criticism	  that	  
the	  Board’s	  program	  was	  lopsided,	  the	  Iraqi	  government	  hired	  James	  Arthur	  Salter	  to	  
assess	  the	  Board’s	  activities.	  Lord	  Salter	  was	  an	  economist	  and	  former	  head	  of	  the	  
economic	  and	  financial	  section	  at	  the	  League	  of	  Nations	  secretariat.	  In	  his	  1955	  report	  
titled,	  “The	  Development	  of	  Iraq:	  A	  Plan	  of	  Action,”	  Salter	  agreed	  that	  the	  Development	  
Board	  was	  too	  focused	  on	  “bricks-­‐and-­‐mortar”	  projects	  and	  needed	  a	  new	  emphasis	  on	  
“human	  capital.”232	  He	  declared	  that:	  
It	  is	  complained	  that	  the	  large	  oil	  revenues	  are	  bringing	  no	  benefit	  to	  the	  
country	  as	  a	  whole;	  and	  it	  is	  no	  effective	  answer	  to	  say	  that	  after	  many	  
years	  the	  water-­‐schemes	  and	  other	  long-­‐term	  projects	  will	  enrich	  the	  
country.	  
There	  is	  therefore	  the	  strongest	  reason	  for	  substantial	  expenditure	  of	  a	  
kind	  which	  will	  bring	  quick	  and	  clearly	  visible	  benefits.233	  
Salter	  insisted	  on	  a	  broader	  scope	  of	  activities	  for	  the	  Development	  Board,	  greater	  
attention	  to	  problems	  of	  public	  health,	  housing	  and	  education,	  and	  a	  substantial	  focus	  on	  
the	  effective	  administration	  of	  completed	  works.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
231	  This,	  along	  with	  the	  appointment	  of	  many	  foreign	  experts,	  proved	  very	  controversial.	  
Kingston,	  Politics	  of	  Modernization,	  108.	  
232	  Salter,	  A	  Plan	  of	  Action,	  116.	  
233	  Ibid.,	  37.	  
	  
	   131	  
However,	  in	  addition	  to	  apparently	  misdirected	  development	  spending,	  the	  
1950s	  was	  also	  a	  decade	  of	  ever-­‐greater	  floods.	  A	  late	  flood	  in	  May	  1950	  found	  a	  weak	  
point	  in	  the	  bunds	  at	  al-­‐Zawiyya.	  The	  breach	  resulted	  in	  the	  destruction	  of	  1,100	  
dwellings,	  rendering	  eight	  thousand	  people	  homeless	  in	  a	  matter	  of	  hours.	  In	  1954,	  both	  
the	  Tigris	  and	  the	  Diyala	  hit	  record	  high	  water	  levels	  and	  remained	  above	  flood	  stage	  for	  
thirty-­‐one	  consecutive	  days,	  over	  250,000	  people	  were	  evacuated	  from	  eastern	  
Baghdad,	  and	  nearly	  5,500	  square	  kilometers	  of	  agricultural	  land	  was	  flooded.234	  One	  
might	  wonder,	  to	  what	  end	  was	  economic	  development	  without	  a	  way	  to	  manage	  these	  
disasters?	  The	  decision	  of	  the	  Development	  Board	  to	  focus	  on	  flood	  control	  becomes	  
more	  understandable	  in	  light	  of	  widespread	  destruction.	  
Though	  Salter	  himself	  refrained	  from	  direct	  criticisms	  of	  the	  Iraqi	  government,	  
later	  historical	  assessments	  of	  Iraq’s	  development	  program	  have	  used	  Salter’s	  criticisms	  
to	  assert	  that	  economic	  development	  in	  Iraq	  failed.	  Scholars	  generally	  note	  that	  the	  
structure	  of	  Iraq’s	  government	  was	  to	  blame.	  Charles	  Tripp	  notes,	  “oil	  revenues	  thus	  
provided	  the	  basis	  for	  a	  growing	  provision	  by	  the	  state,	  but	  crucially	  on	  terms	  dictated	  
by	  those	  who	  controlled	  the	  state	  itself.”	  According	  to	  Tripp,	  the	  crucial	  problem	  for	  the	  
Development	  Board	  and	  the	  Iraqi	  government	  was	  that	  “the	  landed	  interest…gained	  the	  
greatest	  benefits,”	  and	  as	  a	  result,	  “the	  underlying	  social	  and	  economic	  inequality	  
[remained]	  unchallenged.”235	  Edith	  and	  E.	  F.	  Penrose	  agree,	  “there	  is	  also	  no	  doubt	  that	  
the	  political	  structure	  of	  the	  country,	  and	  particularly	  the	  agrarian	  structure,	  was	  an	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impediment	  to	  the	  adoption	  of	  effective	  policies…”236	  For	  Hanna	  Batatu,	  as	  with	  Salter,	  
the	  critical	  fact	  was	  that	  the	  state,	  though	  experiencing	  a	  growth	  in	  “material	  power,”	  
had	  lost	  legitimacy	  through	  “its	  moral	  divorce	  from	  the	  mass	  of	  the	  politically	  conscious	  
strata	  of	  the	  people.”237	  This	  moral	  divorce	  could	  have	  been	  remedied	  had	  the	  
Development	  Board	  focused	  more	  on	  “quick	  and	  clearly	  visible”	  projects	  for	  improving	  
people’s	  lives.	  
While	  it	  is	  true	  that	  “the	  landed	  interest”	  remained	  in	  control	  of	  certain	  state	  
institutions,	  discussions	  of	  economic	  development	  in	  Iraq	  tend	  to	  view	  the	  state	  as	  a	  
static	  impediment	  to	  proper	  development.	  Moreover,	  despite	  what	  appears	  to	  be	  the	  
government’s	  large	  role	  in	  the	  failure	  of	  economic	  development,	  analyses	  of	  the	  changes	  
to	  the	  state	  itself	  wrought	  by	  the	  Development	  Board	  are	  relatively	  superficial.	  Hanna	  
Batatu	  argues	  that	  “the	  state’s	  command	  of	  the	  rivers…increased,	  to	  a	  significant	  degree,	  
its	  ability	  to	  enforce	  its	  will,”	  but	  doesn’t	  elaborate	  on	  the	  relationship	  between	  control	  
of	  the	  rivers	  and	  state	  power.238	  For	  the	  Penroses,	  the	  key	  argument	  is	  that	  the	  
Development	  Board	  included	  foreign	  expertise	  and	  stood	  for	  a	  time	  outside	  the	  
government’s	  structure	  of	  ministries.239	  The	  overall	  impact	  of	  the	  Development	  Board	  
on	  the	  state	  thus	  appears	  quite	  limited.	  Overall,	  political	  histories	  written	  at	  the	  time	  and	  
afterward	  have	  generally	  noted	  what	  the	  Development	  Board	  did	  not	  accomplish,	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namely	  the	  survival	  of	  the	  regime	  that	  initiated	  it.	  The	  overall	  effect	  then	  is	  to	  overlook	  
some	  of	  the	  ways	  that	  the	  Development	  Board’s	  projects	  reconfigured	  the	  Iraqi	  state	  and	  
the	  exercise	  of	  political	  power.	  	  
	   Not	  only	  did	  the	  Development	  Board’s	  flood	  control	  works	  on	  the	  Tigris	  and	  
Euphrates	  increase	  the	  state’s	  capacity	  to	  enforce	  its	  will,	  as	  Batatu	  argues,	  it	  also	  meant	  
a	  significant	  shift	  in	  the	  position	  and	  expression	  of	  political	  power.	  Policies	  enacted	  
during	  the	  British	  mandate	  period	  resulted	  in	  power	  over	  water	  management	  moving	  
from	  public	  institutions	  to	  private	  hands.	  The	  landholders	  who	  controlled	  irrigation	  
through	  pumping	  stations	  and	  who	  became	  ultimately	  responsible	  for	  the	  function	  of	  
Iraq’s	  flood	  control	  protections	  were	  part	  of	  the	  governing	  class.	  They	  had	  direct	  access	  
to	  the	  state	  and	  influenced	  its	  functions,	  though	  they	  could	  easily	  exercise	  power	  outside	  
the	  sanction	  of	  the	  state.	  During	  the	  period	  before	  1956,	  only	  some	  of	  the	  powers	  
exercised	  by	  the	  landed	  classes	  emanated	  from	  the	  government.	  Baghdad	  at	  this	  time	  
never	  held	  a	  monopoly	  on	  violence	  and	  there	  were	  numerous	  instances	  of	  landholders	  
using	  force	  against	  their	  tenant	  farmers	  with	  impunity.	  Also,	  as	  noted	  in	  Chapter	  One,	  
some	  of	  the	  powers	  obtained	  by	  landholders	  occurred	  through	  state	  neglect	  of	  certain	  
policy	  realms	  or	  incapacity,	  rather	  than	  direct	  devolution	  of	  powers	  to	  local	  potentates.	  
	   By	  virtue	  of	  the	  financial	  wherewithal	  provided	  by	  oil	  revenue	  and	  the	  
infrastructure	  projects	  the	  Board	  chose	  to	  build,	  this	  dynamic	  began	  to	  change.	  The	  
central	  government	  in	  Baghdad,	  starved	  for	  decades	  by	  landholders	  unwilling	  to	  pay	  
taxes,	  became	  financially	  independent.	  The	  government	  then	  used	  that	  independence	  to	  
construct	  works	  that	  would	  give	  it	  direct	  control	  over	  the	  rivers.	  After	  flood	  control,	  the	  
Development	  Board	  moved	  to	  the	  next	  stage	  of	  water	  resource	  development:	  the	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provision	  of	  irrigation	  water	  and	  the	  opening	  of	  new	  cultivation.	  Rather	  than	  wealthy	  
landholders	  grabbing	  state	  land	  through	  the	  use	  of	  irrigation	  pumps,	  the	  state	  gained	  the	  
power	  to	  control	  both	  the	  water	  and	  land	  made	  available	  by	  the	  new	  schemes.	  
	   Now,	  as	  Tripp	  contends,	  it	  may	  be	  argued	  that	  this	  shift	  was	  of	  little	  real	  
importance,	  as	  the	  Iraqi	  government	  remained	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  a	  small	  coterie	  of	  wealthy	  
men.	  To	  be	  certain,	  many	  of	  the	  benefits	  accruing	  from	  the	  extension	  of	  water	  and	  
transportation	  infrastructure	  disproportionately	  benefited	  the	  landed	  classes.	  Control	  of	  
the	  rivers	  from	  this	  perspective	  simply	  mitigated	  the	  flood-­‐related	  losses	  experienced	  by	  
the	  landholder	  and	  tightened	  his	  grip	  on	  his	  tenant	  farmers.	  Yet,	  the	  argument	  that	  the	  
state	  was	  nothing	  more	  than	  a	  class-­‐based	  clique	  ignores	  a	  primary	  effect	  of	  the	  
Development	  Board,	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  it	  expanded	  not	  only	  state	  power	  but	  also	  the	  
institutions	  of	  the	  state	  itself.	  Hanna	  Batatu	  in	  particular	  has	  noted	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  
the	  expansion	  in	  state	  institutions	  drove	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  new	  middle	  class,	  with	  a	  
significant	  stake	  in	  the	  development	  of	  the	  Iraqi	  economy	  and	  government.	  240	  
	   Moreover,	  in	  a	  step	  the	  British	  saw	  as	  diminishing	  the	  Board’s	  independence,	  the	  
Iraqi	  government	  created	  a	  Ministry	  of	  Development	  in	  1953	  to	  facilitate	  interaction	  
between	  the	  Board	  and	  other	  government	  agencies.	  The	  Ministry	  included	  five	  technical	  
sections,	  a	  directorate	  general	  for	  tourism	  and	  a	  land	  commission.	  By	  March	  1957,	  the	  
Five	  Year	  Programme	  budget	  for	  1955-­‐1960	  had	  risen	  from	  $851.2	  million	  to	  $1.4	  
billion.241	  This	  figure	  represented	  only	  two-­‐thirds	  of	  Iraq’s	  oil	  revenue,	  which	  means	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that	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  government’s	  budget	  expected	  to	  benefit	  from	  an	  additional	  infusion,	  
on	  top	  of	  other	  revenue,	  of	  nearly	  $600	  million	  over	  five	  years.	  As	  ministries	  expanded,	  
the	  Iraqi	  state	  could	  rely	  on	  foreign	  expertise	  for	  only	  so	  long	  before	  appealing	  to	  local	  
help.	  To	  fill	  the	  innumerable	  administrative	  and	  technical	  positions	  becoming	  available	  
in	  an	  expanding	  government,	  the	  Iraqi	  government	  expanded	  education	  and	  supported	  
the	  professionalization	  of	  the	  bureaucracy.242	  As	  a	  result,	  throughout	  the	  1950s,	  the	  
bureaucracy	  was	  growing	  to	  such	  an	  extent	  that,	  though	  the	  ruling	  clique	  controlled	  
important	  levers	  of	  power,	  the	  public	  sector	  had	  grown	  to	  become	  much	  more	  than	  the	  
fief	  of	  a	  few	  important	  families.	  
	   The	  other	  critical	  shift	  in	  the	  realignment	  of	  power	  involved	  Great	  Britain.	  
Following	  the	  Palestine	  debacle	  and	  the	  failed	  invasion	  of	  Egypt	  in	  1956,	  British	  power	  
in	  the	  Middle	  East	  declined.	  Meanwhile,	  assertions	  of	  Iraqi	  independence,	  embodied	  
most	  definitively	  in	  the	  abandoned	  Portsmouth	  Treaty	  of	  1948,	  lessened	  British	  
influence	  in	  Baghdad.	  Though	  Iraq	  remained	  firmly	  in	  the	  British	  orbit	  with	  its	  
adherence	  to	  the	  Baghdad	  Pact	  in	  1955,	  the	  nature	  of	  Iraq’s	  relationship	  with	  Great	  
Britain	  changed	  considerably	  during	  this	  period.	  The	  British	  faced	  increasing	  
competition	  from	  other	  powers,	  particularly	  the	  United	  States,	  whose	  representative	  on	  
the	  Development	  Board	  from	  1952-­‐1957	  proved	  less	  than	  accommodating	  to	  British	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interests.243	  Iraq’s	  newfound	  oil	  wealth	  also	  highlighted	  British	  financial	  weakness	  in	  the	  
postwar	  period.	  While	  the	  American	  government	  could	  afford	  to	  dole	  out	  aid	  to	  half	  the	  
world,	  Britain	  refused	  to	  release	  Iraq’s	  own	  sterling	  balances.	  The	  British	  government	  
continued	  to	  exert	  considerable	  influence	  on	  the	  Iraqi	  government	  through	  its	  network	  
of	  advisers	  and	  experts,	  but	  the	  balance	  of	  power	  in	  Iraq	  had	  definitively	  moved	  toward	  
Baghdad.	  
	   Changes	  in	  the	  relationship	  of	  the	  older	  power	  bases—the	  landed	  classes	  and	  
Great	  Britain—in	  favor	  of	  a	  much-­‐expanded	  central	  government	  were	  fundamentally	  a	  
result	  of	  Iraq	  gaining	  control	  over	  its	  natural	  resources.	  More	  favorable	  terms	  on	  oil	  
revenue	  freed	  the	  Iraqi	  government	  of	  dependence	  on	  grudging	  loans	  from	  the	  IPC	  or	  
Great	  Britain.	  Control	  over	  its	  water	  resources	  rescued	  the	  country	  from	  disastrous	  
floods	  and	  centralized	  power	  over	  the	  two	  rivers.	  Critically,	  and	  in	  opposition	  to	  those	  
who	  would	  discuss	  development	  in	  Iraq	  as	  solely	  the	  product	  of	  oil,	  it	  was	  precisely	  the	  
importance	  of	  the	  rivers	  and	  their	  water	  that	  drove	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  comprehensive	  
development	  program.	  While	  oil	  revenues	  could	  easily	  have	  been	  disbursed	  through	  the	  
normal	  bureaucracy,	  the	  potential	  for	  irrigation	  and	  water	  management	  to	  radically	  
alter	  social	  and	  political	  development	  provided	  the	  basis	  for	  arguments	  to	  coordinate	  
development	  through	  a	  single	  agency.	  Oil	  was	  the	  critical	  financial	  input,	  but	  water	  was	  
the	  vital	  political	  justification.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
243	  The	  American	  representative	  was	  Wesley	  R.	  Nelson,	  a	  former	  Assistant	  
Commissioner	  of	  the	  U.S.	  Bureau	  of	  Reclamation.	  SA,	  GB	  0033	  SAD,	  Walter	  Crawford,	  
“Trek	  Notes	  –	  Irak,”	  3-­‐13	  January	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Meanwhile,	  the	  government	  itself	  changed,	  even	  if	  the	  same	  men	  occupied	  the	  top	  
rungs,	  expanding	  from	  a	  meager	  slate	  of	  institutions	  headed	  by	  an	  imported	  monarchy	  
to	  a	  professionalizing	  bureaucracy	  with	  a	  reach	  into	  all	  fields	  of	  social	  and	  economic	  
activity.	  The	  end	  result	  of	  these	  changes	  was	  to	  resituate	  political	  power	  in	  Iraqi	  society	  
in	  favor	  of	  a	  centralized	  modern	  state.	  Unlike	  the	  personalized,	  narrow	  politics	  of	  the	  
1930s	  or	  the	  British-­‐dominated	  1920s,	  economic	  development	  in	  the	  1950s	  succeeded	  
in	  making	  the	  state	  valuable	  and	  as	  a	  result,	  control	  over	  it	  became	  the	  central	  focus	  of	  
political	  contestation.	  Economic	  development	  raised	  the	  stakes	  of	  controlling	  the	  state,	  
which	  now	  provided	  more	  than	  just	  preeminence	  in	  the	  capital	  city	  or	  access	  to	  British	  
support,	  but	  the	  actual	  mechanisms	  to	  rule	  over	  Iraq’s	  environment	  and	  its	  people.	  	  
	  
Extraction	  and	  Development	  in	  the	  Formation	  of	  Iraq	  
Iraq’s	  program	  for	  development	  was	  for	  several	  years	  undertaken	  as	  if	  the	  rest	  of	  
the	  government	  did	  not	  exist.	  Iraq’s	  decision	  to	  funnel	  its	  oil	  royalties	  through	  an	  
independent	  Development	  Board	  was	  intended	  to	  stymie	  political	  corruption,	  but	  as	  the	  
Penroses	  have	  asserted:	  
there	  were	  serious	  disadvantages	  in	  insulating	  the	  plans	  for	  the	  spending	  
of	  oil	  revenues	  from	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  government	  administration…	  The	  clear	  
separation	  of	  ‘development’	  from	  other	  government	  expenditures…tended	  
to	  cause	  the	  Board	  to	  confine	  its	  expenditure	  to	  fields	  which	  were	  
qualitatively	  different	  from	  those	  which	  were	  the	  subject	  of	  ‘normal’	  
government	  expenditure,	  and	  which	  were	  often	  very	  short	  of	  funds.244	  
The	  funneling	  of	  revenues	  and	  influence	  through	  the	  Board	  was	  primarily	  a	  result	  of	  
British	  pressure.	  British	  officials,	  recognizing	  the	  grotesqueries	  of	  the	  government	  they	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had	  created	  in	  Iraq	  and	  the	  sliver	  of	  Iraqi	  society	  they	  empowered	  to	  run	  it,	  thought	  that	  
the	  Iraqi	  government	  would	  squander	  its	  resources.	  The	  Development	  Board	  was	  
designed	  in	  such	  a	  way	  as	  to	  facilitate	  British	  and	  American	  oversight	  and	  prevent	  
misuse.	  In	  the	  end,	  though,	  the	  effort	  to	  reduce	  domestic	  corruption	  ignored	  what	  the	  
Penroses	  called	  “things	  that	  money	  could	  not	  buy,”	  namely	  political	  legitimacy.	  The	  
British	  somehow	  imagined	  that	  international	  profiteering	  was	  less	  corrosive	  than	  
internal	  fraud	  and	  that	  Iraq’s	  government	  could	  manufacture	  legitimacy	  by	  building	  
works	  and	  expanding	  the	  economy.245	  	  
The	  Development	  Board’s	  structure	  narrowed	  an	  already	  attenuated	  political	  
base,	  producing	  in	  effect	  the	  basis	  for	  a	  more	  perfect	  authoritarianism.	  Rather	  than	  
allowing	  oil	  revenue	  to	  flow	  through	  the	  existing	  bureaucracy	  and	  working	  to	  produce	  
functioning	  institutions,	  British	  and	  Iraqi	  officials	  sidelined	  and	  starved	  those	  
institutions.	  Even	  after	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  Ministry	  of	  Development,	  decisions	  were	  still	  
taken	  through	  the	  Board.	  New	  forms	  of	  resource	  extraction	  were	  ideal	  for	  reinforcing	  
this	  institutional	  design.	  From	  the	  withdrawal	  of	  floodwater	  from	  the	  rivers	  for	  use	  in	  
irrigation	  to	  the	  pumping	  of	  oil	  from	  derricks	  in	  the	  desert,	  vital	  economic	  resources	  in	  
Iraq	  allowed	  for	  the	  concentration	  of	  political	  power	  and	  the	  easy	  influence	  of	  decisions	  
by	  an	  outside	  power.	  
Though	  Britain’s	  ambitions	  for	  Iraq	  in	  the	  1950s	  may	  have	  involved	  political	  
liberalization,	  this	  was	  not	  the	  “plan	  of	  action.”	  Just	  as	  in	  the	  1920s,	  the	  aims	  articulated	  
in	  public	  bore	  little	  resemblance	  to	  the	  policies	  eventually	  enacted.	  In	  the	  early	  years	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
245	  Ibid.,	  170.	  
	  
	   139	  
Iraq’s	  “tutelage”	  within	  the	  British	  Empire,	  an	  extractive	  order	  had	  already	  been	  
established.	  British	  officials	  envisioned	  Iraq	  as	  an	  agricultural	  colony	  of	  India	  and	  
established	  the	  government	  accordingly.	  When	  British	  policy	  reverted	  to	  indirect	  forms	  
of	  control,	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  extraction	  changed.	  Britain	  sought	  to	  obtain	  its	  interests	  in	  
Iraq	  with	  the	  least	  possible	  investment	  of	  money	  and	  manpower.	  Indirect	  control	  
depended	  not	  on	  creating	  a	  productive	  society	  or	  investing	  in	  human	  development,	  but	  
on	  empowering	  groups	  loyal	  to	  the	  British	  by	  vesting	  them	  with	  control	  over	  the	  
country’s	  resources.	  Reactionary	  elements	  fed	  off	  the	  populace,	  squeezing	  labor	  and	  
produce	  from	  cultivators,	  and	  usurping	  their	  customary	  rights.	  	  
	   When	  it	  became	  possible	  for	  Iraq	  to	  centralize	  power	  over	  the	  country’s	  
resources	  and	  population,	  the	  largesse	  of	  oil	  revenue	  did	  not	  flow	  into	  a	  government	  
designed	  to	  transform	  a	  valuable	  underground	  resource	  into	  widespread	  prosperity	  
above	  ground.	  Salter	  and	  other	  observers	  have	  ascribed	  the	  Iraqi	  government’s	  failings	  
in	  this	  regard	  to	  an	  obsession	  with	  large-­‐scale	  projects	  and	  a	  dismissal	  of	  “human	  
capital”.	  But	  this	  explanation	  places	  the	  sole	  onus	  on	  Iraqi	  politicians	  and	  absolves	  the	  
British	  of	  any	  responsibility	  for	  the	  character	  of	  Iraqi	  politics	  or	  the	  often	  quite	  
understandable	  aims	  of	  Iraqi	  politicians	  to	  rectify	  a	  major	  problem	  of	  human	  and	  
economic	  insecurity.	  Iraq’s	  investment	  in	  water	  control	  was	  in	  fact	  the	  product	  of	  the	  
British	  relinquishment	  of	  central	  government	  responsibility	  for	  managing	  the	  floods.	  
Moreover,	  British	  officials,	  bent	  on	  maintaining	  influence	  in	  Iraq,	  demanded	  a	  
Development	  Board	  sealed	  off	  from	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  Iraqi	  government.	  Though	  
recognizing	  elsewhere	  the	  problem	  of	  Iraq’s	  narrow	  realm	  of	  decisionmaking,	  the	  British	  
perpetuated	  these	  limitations	  when	  it	  suited	  their	  aims.	  That	  the	  Development	  Board	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focused	  its	  energies	  on	  large-­‐scale	  water	  projects	  must	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  response	  to	  British	  
policy	  in	  Iraq,	  while	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  ignored	  the	  immediate	  needs	  of	  the	  population	  in	  the	  
process	  must	  be	  seen	  as	  an	  echo,	  if	  not	  a	  direct	  continuation,	  of	  British	  policies	  in	  the	  
country.	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CHAPTER	  FOUR	  
Building	  a	  Dam,	  Building	  a	  State	  
	  
Over	  the	  course	  of	  several	  decades	  after	  the	  First	  World	  War,	  Iraq,	  Turkey	  and	  
Syria	  established	  institutions	  and	  legal	  frameworks	  to	  manage	  the	  two	  rivers,	  
responding	  to	  issues	  of	  environmental	  change	  or	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  exert	  state	  control	  over	  
water	  resources	  for	  industry	  or	  agriculture.	  Such	  institutions	  and	  legal	  frameworks	  were	  
vital	  to	  achieving	  bureaucratic	  control	  over	  the	  environment	  and	  to	  the	  transformation	  
of	  a	  river	  into	  a	  natural	  resource,	  or	  as	  Richard	  White	  has	  argued,	  “an	  organic	  machine.”	  
The	  formation	  of	  legal	  structures	  and	  institutions	  were	  among	  the	  most	  important	  
means	  for	  the	  state	  to	  convert	  a	  river	  by	  human	  labor	  to	  “do	  work	  other	  than	  its	  own.”246	  
So	  far	  in	  this	  dissertation,	  stories	  of	  legal	  adaptation	  and	  institution	  building	  have	  
centered	  on	  the	  actions	  of	  state	  officials,	  on	  administrative	  methods	  to	  protect	  the	  state’s	  
political	  legitimacy	  from	  natural	  disaster	  or	  to	  use	  water	  management	  as	  a	  way	  to	  justify	  
extensions	  of	  state	  power.	  This	  chapter	  will	  move	  away	  from	  the	  center	  to	  analyze	  local	  
factors.	  
The	  construction	  of	  water	  management	  projects	  and	  the	  work	  of	  new	  institutions	  
involved	  massive	  changes	  to	  the	  local	  environment	  as	  well	  as	  a	  reshaping	  of	  local	  
conceptions	  of	  space	  and	  place.	  When	  moving	  from	  an	  analysis	  of	  central	  government	  
actors	  to	  an	  examination	  of	  local	  history,	  different	  methods	  for	  justifying	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
246	  Richard	  White,	  The	  Organic	  Machine:	  The	  Remaking	  of	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  Columbia	  River	  (New	  York:	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legitimizing	  water	  management	  policies	  and	  projects	  come	  to	  the	  fore.	  Through	  an	  
investigation	  of	  local	  change	  in	  the	  region	  around	  the	  Keban	  dam	  in	  Turkey’s	  eastern	  
Anatolia	  region,	  this	  chapter	  will	  demonstrate	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  state	  physically	  
remade	  the	  environment	  of	  the	  region	  and	  how	  this	  remaking	  was	  supported	  
ideationally	  by	  local	  actors	  and	  visitors.	  
During	  the	  era	  of	  single-­‐party	  rule	  in	  Turkey,	  a	  period	  from	  roughly	  1913-­‐1950,	  
the	  Turkish	  state	  subjected	  eastern	  Anatolia	  to	  a	  series	  of	  policies	  designed	  to	  
homogenize	  or	  “Turkify”	  the	  countryside.247	  Policies	  of	  physical	  extermination	  and	  
deportation,	  as	  well	  as	  cultural	  and	  educational	  policies,	  sought	  to	  eradicate	  or	  suppress	  
those	  groups	  that	  did	  not	  fit	  into	  the	  ideal	  of	  the	  Turkish	  nation.	  The	  most	  significant	  of	  
the	  Kurdish	  deportations	  during	  the	  time	  of	  the	  Turkish	  Republic	  occurred	  in	  the	  mid	  to	  
late	  1930s.	  More	  than	  twenty-­‐five	  thousand	  Kurds	  were	  deported	  from	  eastern	  Anatolia	  
to	  areas	  in	  central	  Anatolia,	  the	  Black	  Sea	  region	  and	  Thrace.	  Ankara	  replaced	  the	  
deported	  Kurdish	  population	  with	  Turkish	  settlers	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  dilute	  
concentrations	  of	  minority	  groups.248	  	  In	  1950,	  with	  the	  liberalization	  of	  the	  country’s	  
politics	  and	  the	  advent	  of	  multi-­‐party	  elections,	  Ankara	  discontinued	  several	  of	  these	  
policies,	  including	  deportation	  and	  resettlement.249	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
247	  This	  story	  is	  chronicled	  by	  Uğur	  Ümit	  Üngör	  in	  his	  book,	  The	  Making	  of	  Modern	  
Turkey:	  Nation	  and	  State	  in	  Eastern	  Anatolia,	  1913-­‐1950	  (London:	  Oxford	  University	  
Press,	  2011).	  
248	  Üngor,	  Modern	  Turkey,	  148-­‐169.	  
249	  However,	  the	  damage	  had	  been	  done.	  “The	  revenge	  of	  the	  past”	  took	  decades	  to	  
appear,	  with	  Kurdish	  and	  Armenian	  groups	  forming	  in	  the	  1970s	  to	  advance	  national	  
claims	  and	  redress	  grievances.	  Claims	  for	  recognition	  were	  expressed	  through	  non-­‐
violent	  protest,	  and	  later,	  through	  political	  violence.	  The	  war	  between	  Kurdish	  groups	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Instead,	  the	  Turkish	  government	  after	  the	  1950s	  undertook	  a	  different	  method	  to	  
pacify	  Anatolia’s	  restive	  east	  and	  southeast.	  The	  dam	  and	  its	  supposed	  benefits,	  as	  well	  
as	  connected	  plans	  for	  economic	  development,	  were	  part	  of	  a	  new	  way	  of	  conceiving	  of	  
the	  state’s	  mission	  in	  eastern	  Anatolia.	  As	  detailed	  in	  Chapter	  Two,	  the	  autarkic	  
imperative	  of	  the	  1920s	  and	  1930s	  to	  maintain	  economic	  independence	  through	  the	  
exploitation	  of	  the	  country’s	  natural	  resources	  engendered	  a	  broad	  expansion	  in	  the	  
bureaucratic	  mechanisms	  of	  the	  state.	  These	  changes	  helped	  bring	  about	  a	  change	  in	  
those	  who	  held	  political	  power,	  shifting	  Turkey	  away	  from	  the	  military	  heroes	  of	  the	  
Young	  Turk	  movement	  toward	  technocratic	  managers	  who	  won	  power	  through	  the	  
bureaucracy.	  The	  Young	  Turk	  effendi	  (well-­‐bred	  gentleman)	  gave	  way	  to	  the	  
technocratic	  mühendis	  (engineer)	  of	  the	  post-­‐Second	  World	  War	  era.	  	  
Though	  discriminatory	  policies	  with	  respect	  to	  religion	  and	  language	  continued	  
in	  eastern	  Anatolia	  after	  1950,	  this	  chapter	  argues	  that	  Ankara’s	  emphasis	  under	  the	  
influence	  of	  new	  technocratic	  managers	  gradually	  shifted	  from	  forced	  homogenization	  
to	  a	  form	  of	  economic	  assimilation	  and	  acculturation.	  Economic	  integration	  was	  not	  just	  
about	  the	  improvement	  of	  economic	  conditions	  in	  eastern	  Anatolia	  through	  
industrialization	  and	  investments	  in	  agriculture.	  Assimilation	  was	  in	  part	  conducted	  
using	  earlier	  methods,	  as	  government	  officials	  attempted	  to	  rally	  the	  populace	  around	  a	  
new	  ideology	  of	  development	  and	  technological	  improvement.	  Assimilation	  was	  also	  
achieved	  through	  the	  state’s	  transformation	  of	  space	  and	  the	  massive	  reshaping	  of	  the	  
landscape	  through	  water	  infrastructure.	  In	  lieu	  of	  resettling	  Kurds	  in	  new	  environments,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
and	  the	  Turkish	  state	  cost	  over	  40,000	  lives.	  Üngör,	  Modern	  Turkey,	  253-­‐262.	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the	  state	  set	  out	  to	  reconfigure	  the	  environment	  in	  which	  they	  already	  lived.	  
This	  chapter	  will	  illuminate	  how	  a	  range	  of	  state-­‐driven	  political	  and	  
technological	  activities	  altered	  the	  landscape	  of	  the	  region	  and	  then	  were	  framed,	  
understood,	  and	  challenged	  by	  local	  actors.	  These	  processes	  worked	  to	  extend	  and	  
legitimatize	  a	  technological	  and	  spatial	  network	  that	  allowed	  the	  Turkish	  state	  to	  
penetrate	  deeper	  into	  social	  and	  economic	  life.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  building	  of	  roads,	  the	  
rebuilding	  of	  a	  village	  for	  foreign	  delegations,	  the	  forcible	  moving	  of	  people	  and	  
factories,	  and	  the	  technical	  and	  cultural	  reframing	  of	  environmental	  phenomena	  all	  
served	  to	  produce	  a	  greater	  “permeation	  of	  stateness”	  into	  everyday	  life.250	  One	  of	  the	  
arguments	  of	  this	  chapter	  is	  that	  state	  interventions	  that	  began	  as	  extraordinary—such	  
as	  the	  massive	  spatial	  changes	  required	  to	  upgrade	  a	  mountain	  road—were	  normalized	  
and	  made	  ordinary	  through	  deliberate	  techniques	  of	  framing	  and	  cultural	  discourse.	  The	  
creation	  of	  the	  “ordinary”	  is	  in	  effect	  a	  process	  of	  legitimization,	  of	  making	  acceptable	  
the	  intrusion	  of	  state-­‐driven	  operations.251	  
By	  drawing	  upon	  a	  collection	  of	  memoirs,	  slogans,	  poetry,	  government	  reports	  
and	  editorials,	  many	  of	  which	  were	  published	  in	  local	  newspapers	  and	  journals,	  it	  is	  
possible	  to	  analyze	  how	  economic	  assimilation	  was	  pursued	  through	  spatial	  changes,	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  Painter,	  “Prosaic	  Geographies,”	  753.	  
251	  Joe	  Painter	  refers	  to	  this	  everyday	  normalization	  as	  the	  “more	  prosaic	  manifestations	  
of	  state	  processes,”	  the	  production	  of	  an	  everyday	  experience	  of	  the	  state	  in	  ordinary	  
social	  realms.	  This	  way	  of	  conceiving	  of	  the	  involvement	  of	  the	  state	  reacts	  against	  
theories	  that	  posit	  the	  state	  as	  a	  reified	  “thing”	  or	  a	  “separate	  sphere”	  of	  action.	  Joe	  
Painter,	  “Prosaic	  Geographies	  of	  Stateness,”	  Political	  Geography	  25	  (2006):	  753-­‐755.	  
Painter’s	  article	  builds	  on	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  “state	  as	  effect,”	  initially	  posed	  by	  Timothy	  
Mitchell,	  “The	  Limits	  of	  the	  State:	  Beyond	  Statist	  Approaches	  and	  Their	  Critics,”	  The	  
American	  Political	  Science	  Review	  85	  (1991):	  77-­‐96.	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technical	  innovation,	  and	  changes	  in	  discourse	  and	  framing.	  A	  large	  part	  of	  this	  chapter	  
is	  drawn	  from	  Elazığ’s	  local	  newspaper,	  the	  Elazığ	  Gazetesi	  or	  Elazığ	  Gazette.	  Necip	  
Bingöl	  began	  publishing	  the	  newspaper	  in	  1950.	  Born	  in	  the	  Armenian	  village	  of	  Perçenç	  
in	  1903,	  Bingöl	  worked	  for	  twenty	  years	  in	  various	  departments	  of	  the	  land	  registry	  
(tapu)	  office.	  After	  some	  problems	  with	  the	  director	  of	  the	  office,	  Bingöl	  left	  in	  1944	  and	  
set	  out	  to	  find	  work	  outside	  the	  bureaucracy.	  In	  1950,	  he	  set	  up	  the	  Bingöl	  Printing	  Press	  
(Basımevi),	  and	  began	  producing	  the	  Elazığ	  Gazetesi.	  He	  remained	  an	  active	  member	  in	  
various	  local	  affairs.	  His	  obituary	  in	  1975	  notes,	  “There	  is	  no	  doubt	  that	  he	  had	  a	  great	  
share	  in	  the	  founding	  of	  the	  university,	  [local]	  associations,	  in	  the	  activities	  of	  
industrialization	  [sanayişleşme	  hareketleri]	  and	  in	  the	  organization	  of	  the	  Keban	  Holding	  
company.”252	  	  
The	  Elazığ	  Gazetesi,	  perhaps	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  its	  publisher	  was	  once	  a	  
bureaucrat,	  consistently	  supported	  the	  policies	  of	  planned	  economic	  development	  
emanating	  from	  Ankara	  and	  the	  major	  infrastructure	  projects	  that	  were	  considered	  vital	  
to	  development.	  The	  paper	  reprinted	  technical	  reports	  and	  government	  memoranda	  
regarding	  the	  Keban	  project,	  rarely	  portraying	  the	  dam	  and	  its	  attendant	  infrastructure	  
in	  a	  negative	  light.	  The	  paper	  never	  directly	  discussed	  the	  most	  problematic	  issue	  of	  
displacement,	  a	  position	  that	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  this	  chapter.	  Still,	  Bingöl’s	  newspaper	  
could	  be	  critical	  of	  government	  policy	  no	  matter	  the	  political	  party	  involved	  when	  
Elazığ’s	  interests	  seemed	  threatened.	  As	  the	  paper	  generally	  published	  material	  that	  was	  
supportive	  of	  the	  government’s	  position	  and	  contributed	  to	  the	  state’s	  goal	  of	  justifying	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
252	  Şükrü	  Kacar,	  “Büyük	  Acımız,”	  Elazığ	  Gazetesi,	  September	  9,	  1975.	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the	  Keban	  project,	  it	  is	  a	  useful	  source	  for	  understanding	  how	  the	  state	  sought	  to	  
legitimize	  and	  frame	  the	  dam	  and	  to	  influence	  interpretations	  of	  the	  dam’s	  effects	  on	  the	  
Elazığ	  region.	  
The	  chapter	  contains	  five	  acts.	  The	  first	  section	  discusses	  changes	  to	  the	  small	  
community	  of	  Keban	  and	  how	  it	  fulfilled	  its	  role	  as	  a	  model	  in	  village	  development	  for	  a	  
new	  Turkey.	  The	  following	  section	  discusses	  how	  conceptions	  of	  the	  dam’s	  benefits	  
relied	  on	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  new	  concept	  of	  the	  Euphrates	  River	  and	  its	  relationship	  to	  
human	  communities.	  The	  third	  part	  of	  this	  chapter	  explores	  the	  construction	  of	  a	  road	  
linking	  the	  Keban	  dam	  worksite	  to	  the	  provincial	  capital,	  Elazığ.	  The	  road	  was	  both	  a	  
device	  for	  framing	  social	  and	  economic	  change	  and	  a	  link	  to	  a	  “normalizing”	  past,	  a	  
representation	  of	  continuity	  in	  both	  history	  and	  architectural	  form.	  The	  final	  two	  
sections	  of	  the	  chapter	  discuss	  the	  dislocations	  created	  by	  the	  dam.	  Act	  Four	  analyzes	  
the	  political	  fight	  over	  a	  sugar	  factory	  located	  on	  land	  that	  would	  be	  inundated	  by	  the	  
dam’s	  reservoir.	  To	  keep	  the	  sugar	  factory	  near	  Elazığ,	  government	  officials	  and	  city	  
boosters	  created	  a	  set	  of	  myths	  about	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  new	  dams	  and	  reservoirs.	  The	  
concluding	  act	  in	  this	  chapter	  contrasts	  the	  very	  open	  political	  fight	  over	  a	  factory	  with	  
the	  silence	  surrounding	  the	  displacement	  of	  the	  thirty	  thousand	  people	  affected	  by	  the	  
dam’s	  construction.	  	  
While	  the	  first	  four	  sections	  of	  this	  chapter	  involve	  an	  analysis	  of	  materials	  
produced	  from	  1963-­‐1966,	  the	  four	  years	  prior	  to	  the	  beginning	  of	  construction	  on	  the	  
dam,	  the	  final	  section	  on	  displacement	  analyzes	  governmental	  and	  academic	  reports	  
produced	  during	  and	  after	  the	  dam’s	  construction	  in	  the	  late	  1960s	  and	  1970s.	  These	  
documents	  produced	  specific	  forms	  of	  knowledge	  about	  the	  process	  of	  expropriation	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and	  resettlement,	  delineating	  in	  that	  process	  what	  may	  be	  known	  about	  the	  people	  
living	  in	  the	  areas	  to	  be	  drowned.	  Advantaging	  certain	  forms	  of	  knowledge	  over	  others	  
produced	  a	  particular	  historical	  emphasis,	  a	  valuing	  of	  one	  history	  over	  another,	  
expressed	  through	  an	  international	  archaeological	  rescue	  effort.	  The	  dam’s	  reservoir	  
became	  a	  way	  to	  emphasize	  the	  ancient	  roots	  of	  the	  Turkish	  nation	  while	  diminishing	  
the	  history,	  culture	  and	  politics	  of	  those	  who	  had	  resisted	  the	  state’s	  identity	  policies.	  
	  
The	  Village:	  Keban	  as	  Place	  and	  Project	  
Elazığ	  is	  a	  roughly	  rectangular	  province	  about	  150	  kilometers	  in	  length	  and	  
approximately	  sixty-­‐five	  kilometers	  wide	  (north-­‐south)	  located	  in	  Turkey’s	  Eastern	  
Anatolia	  Region.253	  The	  province	  is	  surrounded	  on	  three	  sides	  by	  the	  Taurus	  Mountains.	  
The	  city	  of	  Elazığ	  is	  the	  provincial	  capital	  and	  sits	  on	  a	  high,	  dry	  plain	  at	  an	  elevation	  of	  
1,020	  meters	  above	  sea	  level.	  The	  village	  of	  Keban	  occupies	  a	  ridge	  about	  fifty	  
kilometers	  west	  of	  Elazığ	  and	  functions	  as	  the	  center	  of	  its	  own	  district.	  By	  the	  early	  
1960s,	  Keban	  was	  already	  a	  relatively	  prosperous	  community	  of	  2,760	  people,	  the	  result	  
of	  a	  nearby	  Etibank	  mining	  concern	  founded	  in	  1952.	  The	  Etibank	  Simli	  Kurşun	  (Silver	  
Lead)	  Company	  employed	  four	  hundred	  people	  in	  Keban	  and	  nearly	  all	  of	  the	  working	  
age	  men.254	  Prior	  to	  the	  beginning	  of	  dam	  construction	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1960s,	  a	  poor	  
mountain	  road	  connected	  Keban	  east	  to	  Elazığ	  and	  northwest	  to	  Arapkir.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
253	  The	  population	  of	  the	  province	  in	  1970	  was	  roughly	  370,000.	  Peter	  O.	  Way,	  Turkey	  
(Washington,	  DC:	  Bureau	  of	  the	  Census,	  1980),	  32.	  
254	  Sait	  Bilgin,	  Dünden	  Bugüne	  Keban	  (İstanbul:	  Tatlıdil	  Matbaacılık	  San.	  ve	  Tic.	  Ltd.,	  
2007),	  6.	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Most	  vehicles	  traveling	  the	  road	  between	  Arapkir	  and	  Elazığ	  did	  not	  stop	  at	  
Keban.	  This	  was	  not	  Keban’s	  fault.	  The	  road	  had	  been	  built	  with	  little	  consideration	  of	  
the	  community's	  location.	  In	  the	  early	  1960s,	  however,	  traffic	  increased	  and	  the	  road	  
brought	  a	  great	  many	  foreign	  visitors.	  Some	  stopped	  at	  the	  small	  town,	  but	  most	  were	  
interested	  in	  a	  destination	  just	  beyond	  Keban.	  A	  little	  ways	  up	  the	  road	  toward	  Arapkir,	  
the	  Euphrates	  River	  became	  the	  Euphrates	  River.	  In	  a	  broad	  alluvial	  plain	  a	  short	  
distance	  north	  of	  Keban,	  the	  Euphrates’	  parent	  rivers,	  the	  Murat	  Nehri	  and	  the	  Karasu,	  
joined	  to	  create	  the	  Fırat	  Nehri,	  the	  Turkish	  name	  for	  the	  Euphrates.	  Below	  this	  
confluence,	  the	  unruly	  child	  of	  the	  Murat	  and	  Karasu	  plunged	  into	  an	  ever-­‐narrowing	  
and	  increasingly	  deep	  gorge	  that	  ran	  unbroken	  until	  the	  river	  cleared	  the	  Tarsus	  
Mountains	  and	  entered	  the	  Syrian	  Desert.	  Prior	  to	  the	  construction	  of	  the	  dam,	  the	  area	  
above	  the	  gorge	  was	  a	  wide	  plain,	  an	  area	  eminently	  suitable	  for	  settlement	  and	  
agriculture	  in	  the	  rich	  alluvial	  deposits	  of	  the	  two	  merging	  rivers.	  Today	  the	  valley	  
contains	  an	  inland	  sea	  with	  a	  surface	  area	  of	  260	  square	  miles,	  containing	  over	  seven	  
cubic	  miles	  of	  water.255	  	  
By	  virtue	  of	  the	  Euphrates’	  topography,	  the	  nearby	  village	  of	  Keban	  was	  destined	  
to	  lend	  its	  name	  and	  its	  environs	  to	  the	  construction	  of	  a	  massive	  new	  dam.	  As	  the	  
nearest	  "village"	  to	  a	  showcase	  international	  development	  project,	  it	  was	  important	  for	  
Keban	  to	  also	  become	  an	  exemplar	  in	  rural	  development.	  The	  aims	  of	  köy	  kalkınması	  or	  
“village	  development”	  were	  spelled	  out	  in	  the	  local	  paper	  in	  an	  article	  calling	  for	  a	  new	  
cadre	  of	  “village	  leaders	  in	  village	  development”:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
255	  For	  more	  technical	  data	  on	  the	  Keban	  dam,	  see	  the	  Devlet	  Su	  İşleri	  (State	  Water	  
Works)	  fact	  sheet	  at	  http://www.dsi.gov.tr/projeler/keban-­‐baraj.	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The	  realization	  of	  the	  necessary	  cooperation	  between	  the	  state	  and	  the	  
people	  is	  one	  of	  the	  aims	  of	  the	  efforts	  to	  develop	  society.	  In	  villages,	  the	  
better	  use	  of	  human	  strengths	  and	  talents	  will	  help	  in	  bringing	  about	  
productive	  results,	  both	  in	  developing	  society	  and	  also	  in	  the	  working	  of	  
natural	  resources.	  If	  the	  majority	  of	  citizens	  are	  not	  aware	  of	  the	  efforts…	  
then	  it	  is	  impossible	  to	  realize	  benefit	  from	  the	  Development	  Plan	  to	  the	  
extent	  that	  is	  desired.	  From	  this	  standpoint,	  the	  most	  important	  issue	  that	  
has	  emerged	  is	  to	  instill	  a	  feeling	  of	  social	  and	  cultural	  responsibility	  in	  the	  
villager,	  to	  awaken	  a	  will	  and	  decision	  for	  a	  better	  life.256	  
Embodied	  in	  this	  formulation	  is	  a	  new	  concept	  of	  economic	  cooperation	  between	  the	  
state	  and	  the	  people.	  It	  is	  only	  through	  popular	  acceptance	  of	  the	  state’s	  vision	  for	  
development,	  a	  “feeling	  of	  cultural	  and	  social	  responsibility”	  toward	  that	  vision,	  that	  
society	  may	  be	  developed.	  The	  two	  components,	  state	  and	  people,	  are	  seen	  as	  separate.	  
Productive	  “development”	  depends	  on	  their	  working	  together	  to	  develop	  two	  objects,	  
society	  and	  the	  environment.257	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Keban	  and	  its	  dam,	  the	  goal	  was	  to	  bring	  
about	  acceptance	  of	  the	  state’s	  role	  in	  radically	  reframing	  and	  reorganizing	  space.	  To	  
accomplish	  this,	  the	  state	  attempted	  to	  reformat	  life	  and	  behavior	  in	  Keban,	  “to	  awaken	  
a	  will	  and	  decision	  for	  a	  better	  life”	  in	  order	  to	  “bring	  about	  productive	  results.”	  In	  other	  
words,	  to	  produce	  from	  the	  reformatting	  a	  citizenry	  and	  a	  nature	  in	  eastern	  Anatolia	  
that	  would	  be	  submissive	  to	  state	  goals.	  
Keban	  underwent	  significant	  changes	  as	  preparations	  commenced	  for	  the	  new	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
256	  Baha	  Oral,	  “Köy	  Kalkınmasında	  Köy	  Önderleri,”	  Elazığ	  Gazetesi,	  May	  29,	  1963.	  
257	  Such	  distinctions,	  impossible	  though	  they	  may	  be	  to	  define	  in	  practice,	  are	  part	  of	  the	  
creation	  of	  a	  particular	  order,	  a	  method	  whereby	  certain	  forms	  of	  power	  gain	  primacy	  in	  
arranging	  spaces,	  functions	  and	  behaviors.	  Timothy	  Mitchell	  has	  noted,	  “The	  appearance	  
that	  state	  and	  society	  are	  separate	  things	  is	  part	  of	  the	  way	  a	  given	  financial	  and	  
economic	  order	  is	  maintained.	  …One	  can	  examine	  how	  it	  is	  that	  the	  state	  seems	  to	  stand	  
apart	  from	  society	  and	  yet	  see	  this	  distinction	  as	  an	  internal	  arrangement…	  It	  is	  not	  the	  
border	  of	  an	  actual	  object.”	  See	  Mitchell,	  “Limits	  of	  the	  State,”	  90.	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dam,	  with	  the	  construction	  of	  new	  roads,	  irrigation	  canals,	  institutions	  and	  expectations.	  
By	  1965,	  before	  construction	  on	  the	  dam	  even	  began,	  it	  had	  become	  clear	  that	  the	  Keban	  
community,	  its	  name	  and	  identity	  were	  now	  part	  of	  a	  broader	  enterprise.	  As	  a	  result	  of	  
the	  dam	  building	  project,	  Keban	  was	  to	  be	  remade	  in	  an	  endeavor	  to	  produce	  in	  Anatolia	  
a	  new	  modern	  political	  order	  that	  would	  facilitate	  centralized	  control	  over	  the	  local	  
population	  and	  environment.258	  	  Through	  the	  creation	  of	  new	  institutions	  and	  
regulations,	  the	  dissemination	  of	  ideas	  and	  myths,	  the	  visits	  of	  high-­‐ranking	  delegations	  
in	  fleets	  of	  motorcars,	  and	  the	  building	  of	  new	  spaces	  and	  infrastructure,	  Keban	  was	  to	  
become	  a	  model	  for	  a	  “developing	  society.”	  	  
Indeed,	  Keban	  residents	  appeared	  to	  greet	  news	  of	  the	  dam	  positively	  and	  with	  
high	  expectations.	  They	  believed	  that	  the	  dam	  would	  bring	  great	  benefits	  to	  the	  region.	  
Soaring	  expectations	  for	  the	  dam	  were	  fed	  by	  editorials	  and	  stories	  that	  predicted	  that	  
the	  project	  would	  bring	  a	  “new	  world”	  and	  “be	  remembered	  as	  the	  greatest	  affair	  in	  the	  
last	  centuries	  of	  Turkish	  history.”259	  The	  dam	  would	  remake	  the	  whole	  province—was	  it	  
possible	  that	  Elazığ	  could	  become	  “a	  new	  Paris”?260	  Even	  the	  older	  generation	  seemed	  
excited.	  Keban's	  Osman	  Doğan,	  reputed	  to	  be	  the	  oldest	  person	  (at	  130!)	  in	  Elazığ	  
province	  announced	  that	  he	  “had	  no	  intention	  of	  dying	  without	  seeing	  the	  dam.”	  He	  had	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  For	  an	  interesting	  discussion	  of	  village	  development	  in	  general	  during	  this	  period,	  see	  
Nick	  Cullather,	  "'The	  Target	  is	  the	  People':	  Representations	  of	  the	  Village	  in	  
Modernization	  and	  U.S.	  National	  Security	  Doctrine,"	  Cultural	  Politics	  2	  (2006):	  29-­‐48.	  For	  
more	  on	  rural	  development	  in	  Turkey,	  see	  John	  Kolars,	  "The	  Integration	  of	  the	  Villager	  
into	  the	  National	  Life	  of	  Turkey,"	  in	  Social	  Change	  and	  Politics	  in	  Turkey:	  A	  Structural-­‐
Historical	  Analysis,	  ed.	  Kemal	  H.	  Karpat	  (Leiden:	  E.	  J.	  Brill,	  1973),	  182-­‐202.	  
259	  “Barajın	  Getireceği	  Yeni	  Dünya,”	  Elazığ	  Gazetesi,	  May	  26,	  1963.	  
260	  Hasan	  Alkan,	  “Keban	  Barajı	  Hakkında,”	  Elazığ	  Gazetesi,	  July	  11,	  1963.	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already	  outlived	  his	  son,	  who	  had	  drowned	  in	  the	  Euphrates	  at	  the	  age	  of	  seventy	  while	  
collecting	  firewood.261	  Unfortunately	  for	  Doğan,	  the	  dam	  was	  still	  a	  long	  time	  coming;	  he	  
would	  have	  had	  to	  live	  to	  142	  to	  witness	  its	  completion.	  The	  state’s	  attempts	  to	  justify	  
the	  dam,	  to	  “instill”	  and	  “awaken”	  in	  Keban	  residents	  the	  necessary	  cooperative	  spirit	  
soon	  ran	  into	  problems,	  however,	  and	  led	  to	  questions	  about	  the	  benefits	  of	  the	  state’s	  
“productive	  results.”	  
The	  town	  of	  Keban	  received	  quite	  a	  shock	  in	  early	  1963,	  a	  shock	  that	  emphasized	  
the	  importance	  of	  the	  dam	  project.	  The	  local	  mining	  company	  announced	  that	  it	  was	  
suspending	  its	  current	  operations	  pending	  further	  study	  because	  it	  had	  exhausted	  local	  
resources.262	  The	  announcement	  spelled	  catastrophe	  for	  the	  town,	  which	  had	  recently	  
experienced	  a	  decade-­‐long	  downturn	  during	  the	  Second	  World	  War.263	  	  The	  increasing	  
number	  of	  foreign	  visitors	  now	  seemed	  that	  much	  more	  important.	  Without	  mining,	  the	  
town's	  survival	  could	  depend	  on	  the	  economic	  development	  promised	  by	  the	  state	  in	  its	  
justifications	  for	  building	  the	  dam.	  
1963	  brought	  considerable	  activity	  in	  preparation	  for	  the	  upcoming	  project	  on	  
the	  Euphrates	  River.	  Construction	  began	  on	  a	  new	  road	  to	  Elazığ,	  though	  residents	  
worried	  about	  its	  routing.	  During	  the	  early	  years	  of	  the	  Republic	  when	  a	  permanent	  
bridge	  had	  been	  built	  to	  connect	  Arapkir	  to	  Elazığ,	  the	  road	  had	  bypassed	  the	  town,	  
which	  was	  then	  “deprived	  of	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  material	  earnings.”	  Residents	  hoped	  that	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
261	  “Çevremizin	  en	  yaşlı	  adamı	  Keban'da,”	  Elazığ	  Gazetesi,	  June	  11,	  1963.	  
262	  “Keban	  simli	  kurşun	  işletmesi	  kalkıyor	  mu?”	  Elazığ	  Gazetesi,	  February	  23,	  1963.	  
263	  Bilgin,	  Dünden	  Bugüne	  Keban,	  5.	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new	  road,	  with	  its	  new	  bridge,	  would	  connect	  Keban	  to	  the	  outside	  world	  and	  bring	  new	  
prosperity.264	  Foreign	  engineers	  were	  coming	  and	  going.	  Just	  before	  a	  high-­‐ranking	  
delegation	  from	  Ankara	  visited	  Keban,	  workers	  drilling	  a	  200-­‐meter	  borehole	  for	  the	  
dam	  project’s	  geological	  survey	  struck	  oil.	  Local	  commentators	  wondered	  at	  that	  point	  if	  
Keban	  needed	  a	  dam	  or	  mineral	  processor,	  what	  with	  the	  energy	  potential	  of	  the	  newly	  
discovered	  petroleum.265	  There	  was	  great	  hope	  that	  the	  new	  natural	  resources—water	  
and	  oil—would	  replace	  the	  minerals	  that	  the	  townspeople	  feared	  were	  depleted,	  “An	  
energy	  source	  will	  make	  the	  dam	  easier	  to	  build	  and	  in	  addition	  right	  next	  to	  it	  a	  petrol	  
industry	  will	  be	  founded.”266	  	  
Visits	  by	  high-­‐ranking	  state	  officials	  from	  Germany,	  with	  all	  the	  pomp	  and	  
circumstance,	  made	  the	  small	  town	  of	  Keban	  famous	  throughout	  Turkey.	  The	  most	  
important	  delegation	  arrived	  in	  Elazığ	  province	  at	  9:30	  in	  the	  morning	  on	  July	  13,	  1963.	  
Special	  vehicles	  were	  sent	  from	  Ulukent	  to	  pick	  up	  the	  thirty-­‐five-­‐member	  committee	  
led	  by	  German	  Economic	  Cooperation	  Minister	  Walter	  Scheel.	  Accompanying	  Scheel	  
were	  four	  ministers	  in	  the	  Turkish	  cabinet	  including	  native	  son	  Nürettin	  Ardıçoğlu,	  the	  
Minister	  for	  Media	  and	  Tourism.267	  The	  local	  newspaper	  welcomed	  the	  city’s	  visitors	  
with	  a	  banner	  headline	  in	  German,	  the	  sentiment	  partially	  marred	  by	  poor	  spelling:	  
“Unsere	  Evige	  Deusche	  Freunde!!!	  Seien	  sie	  willkommen!!”	  Our	  eternal	  German	  friends,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
264	  Yaşar	  Durgun	  Kederi,	  “Keban'lıların	  Dilekleri,”	  Elazığ	  Gazetesi,	  March	  12,	  1963.	  
265	  “Keban’da	  petrol	  çıktı!!!”	  Elazığ	  Gazetesi,	  June	  14,	  1963.	  
266	  “Vilayet	  bu	  işi	  ciddiyetle	  takıp	  etmektedir,”	  Elazığ	  Gazetesi,	  June	  15,	  1963.	  
267	  “Ulukent	  Köyü	  özel	  vasıtalarıyla	  Hava	  Alanına	  gitmek	  için	  hazırlıklarını	  tamamladı!”	  
Elazığ	  Gazetesi,	  July	  12,	  1963.	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they	  are	  welcome!	  In	  what	  became	  a	  common	  theme	  for	  such	  visits,	  Elazığ's	  urban	  
residents	  were	  not	  impressed.	  The	  grand	  delegation	  from	  Ankara	  considerably	  
outnumbered	  the	  airport	  welcoming	  committee,	  a	  fact	  that	  apparently	  embarrassed	  city	  
officials:	  “it	  is	  a	  detrimental	  behavior	  on	  behalf	  of	  our	  country	  that	  we	  appear	  to	  act	  
disinterested	  toward	  our	  problems	  in	  front	  of	  foreigners.”268	  
Such	  was	  not	  the	  case	  at	  the	  delegation’s	  final	  destination,	  the	  small	  town	  of	  
Keban.	  	  A	  throng	  of	  Keban	  residents,	  including	  some	  who	  had	  traveled	  from	  nearby	  Ağın,	  
gathered	  to	  hear	  the	  German	  minister’s	  comments	  and	  consider	  how	  this	  European	  
might	  change	  their	  lives.269	  Scheel,	  who	  would	  later	  become	  a	  foreign	  minister,	  a	  vice	  
chancellor,	  acting	  chancellor	  and	  then	  the	  president	  of	  the	  Federal	  Republic	  of	  Germany,	  
offered	  little	  in	  the	  way	  of	  detail:	  
I	  hope	  that	  we	  will	  work	  together,	  in	  cooperation	  with	  Turks,	  in	  a	  free	  
world.	  We	  are	  friends	  on	  good	  days	  and	  bad...	  I	  am	  convinced	  that	  we	  will	  
cooperate	  with	  you.	  If	  you	  will,	  please	  accept	  my	  greetings	  in	  the	  name	  of	  
the	  German	  nation….	  
A	  later	  statement	  from	  the	  German	  delegation	  simply	  reiterated	  what	  the	  villagers	  
already	  knew—the	  dam	  project	  was	  under	  study	  and	  potentially	  could	  be	  completed	  
some	  seven	  years	  hence.270	  Still,	  though	  the	  negotiations	  and	  signing	  ceremonies	  
happened	  later	  in	  the	  Turkish	  capital,	  a	  group	  of	  foreign	  dignitaries	  had	  traveled	  many	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
268	  “Misafirler	  heyecanla	  karşılandı,”	  Elazığ	  Gazetesi,	  July	  14,	  1963.	  
269	  The	  villagers	  were	  said	  to	  have	  watched	  Scheel	  with	  “the	  light	  of	  hope	  in	  their	  eyes”	  
because	  “the	  dam	  was	  their	  and	  all	  future	  generations’	  gate	  to	  prosperity.”	  See	  
“Misafirleri,	  Baraj	  yerinde,	  Keban	  ve	  Ağın	  halkı	  karşıladi,”	  Elazığ	  Gazetesi,	  July	  14,	  1963.	  
270	  “Alman	  Nazırı'nın	  yemek	  sırasından	  verdikleri	  beyanat,”	  and	  “Şehrimizi	  ve	  Keban	  
Baraj	  yerini	  ziyaret	  eden	  B.	  Almanya	  Nazırı,	  Herr	  Walter	  Schell'ın	  (sic)	  Baraj	  hakkında	  
söyledikleri,”	  Elazığ	  Gazetesi,	  July	  14,	  1963.	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hours	  to	  a	  small	  hamlet	  in	  the	  remote	  mountains	  of	  eastern	  Anatolia	  in	  the	  middle	  of	  the	  
summer’s	  heat.	  For	  a	  few	  hours	  at	  least	  in	  the	  summer	  of	  1963,	  Keban	  became	  the	  center	  
of	  official	  and	  media	  attention.	  
This	  sort	  of	  attention	  brought	  benefits	  and	  costs.	  All	  of	  these	  foreign	  visitors,	  
engineers,	  and	  state	  officials	  could	  not	  be	  hosted	  properly	  in	  a	  tiny	  mining	  town.	  Soon,	  
Keban	  itself	  was	  a	  hive	  of	  construction	  activity.	  The	  most	  significant	  spatial	  change	  
involved	  the	  road,	  which	  will	  be	  discussed	  at	  greater	  length	  below.	  Within	  the	  town,	  a	  
new	  park	  was	  inaugurated,	  to	  which	  "everyone	  may	  come,	  but	  only	  with	  their	  families."	  
Keban’s	  new	  public	  space	  was	  not	  to	  be	  filled	  with	  the	  unemployed	  in	  the	  day	  and	  
workers	  from	  the	  nearby	  work	  sites	  at	  night.	  It	  was	  instead	  to	  be	  a	  place	  “to	  instill	  a	  
feeling	  of	  social	  and	  cultural	  responsibility,”	  where	  the	  behavior	  of	  a	  developed	  society	  
might	  receive	  public	  attention.	  Such	  behavior	  would	  go	  well	  with	  the	  new	  clubhouse	  "of	  
unmatched	  beauty	  and	  modernness"	  that	  was	  built	  next	  to	  the	  park.271	  	  
In	  August,	  the	  municipality’s	  new	  auto	  garage	  opened	  in	  anticipation	  of	  
additional	  traffic	  on	  the	  new	  road.	  It	  was	  also	  a	  symbol	  of	  the	  rising	  popularity	  of	  new	  
forms	  of	  transportation.	  The	  township	  also	  announced	  a	  new	  hamam	  (public	  bathhouse)	  
would	  be	  built.	  As	  for	  the	  older	  parts	  of	  Keban,	  the	  municipality	  sought	  to	  spruce	  things	  
up	  and	  instituted	  fines	  for	  disorderly	  storefronts.272	  Taken	  altogether	  these	  new	  
structures	  and	  spaces,	  funded	  by	  the	  state,	  announced	  the	  modern	  priorities	  and	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
271	  "Keban'da	  modern	  ve	  örnek	  bir	  klüp	  açıldı,"	  Elazığ	  Gazetesi,	  June	  9,	  1963;	  and	  
"Keban'da	  Açılan	  Gazino	  Rağbet	  Gördü,"	  Elazığ	  Gazetesi,	  June	  20,	  1963.	  
272	  Shopkeepers	  complained	  that	  the	  municipality	  itself	  was	  doing	  a	  poor	  job	  of	  
maintaining	  its	  own	  properties.	  "Keban	  Belediyesi	  tezat	  içinde,"	  Elazığ	  Gazetesi,	  June	  25,	  
1963.	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notions	  of	  a	  "developed	  society"	  emanating	  from	  Turkey's	  elite,	  urban	  centers.273	  
However,	  behind	  these	  new	  additions	  and	  arrangements	  of	  the	  Keban	  landscape	  
were	  problems	  that	  belied	  the	  state’s	  assertions	  of	  modern	  development.	  The	  Keban	  
municipality	  contracted	  a	  modern	  rehabilitation	  of	  Keban's	  main	  irrigation	  canal	  in	  June	  
1963.274	  More	  than	  a	  year	  later,	  local	  residents	  discovered	  that	  the	  new	  canal	  was	  in	  the	  
wrong	  place	  and	  would	  not	  be	  able	  to	  provide	  water	  to	  a	  large	  part	  of	  the	  area	  
required.275	  In	  addition,	  the	  construction	  of	  the	  new	  road,	  planned	  by	  a	  central	  
administration	  based	  in	  Ankara,	  had	  not	  taken	  into	  account	  small-­‐scale	  irrigation	  
schemes,	  which	  were	  vital	  to	  the	  "local	  public"	  who	  were	  "making	  a	  livelihood	  alongside	  
it	  [the	  road].”	  The	  road	  shut	  down	  or	  cut	  through	  many	  of	  these	  canals,	  threatening	  local	  
agriculture.276	  Meanwhile,	  the	  problems	  with	  the	  water	  supply	  and	  questions	  about	  
modernizing	  government	  were	  epitomized	  in	  the	  inferno	  that	  engulfed	  the	  town	  hall	  on	  
January	  6,	  1964,	  the	  result	  of	  a	  chimney	  fire.	  It	  took	  two	  hours	  to	  control	  the	  blaze	  
because,	  though	  there	  was	  a	  fire	  valve	  nearby,	  there	  was	  no	  hose.277	  
Keban’s	  townsfolk	  also	  faced	  an	  increasing	  level	  of	  uncertainty	  when	  it	  was	  
learned	  that	  the	  town	  might	  be	  relocated	  to	  accommodate	  dam	  construction.	  Before	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
273	  Sibel	  Bozdoğan,	  Modernism	  and	  Nation	  Building:	  Turkish	  Architectural	  Culture	  in	  the	  
Early	  Republic	  (Seattle:	  University	  of	  Washington	  Press,	  2001),	  97-­‐105.	  
274	  "Keban	  Merkez	  Kanalı	  islahı	  ihaleye	  çıkarılıyor,"	  Elazığ	  Gazetesi,	  June	  19,	  1963.	  
275	  "Keban'da	  sulama	  suyu	  kanalı	  yanlıs	  yerden	  açılıyor,"	  Elazığ	  Gazetesi,	  August	  18,	  
1964.	  
276	  "Kebanın	  sulama	  su	  derdine	  olacak,"	  Elazığ	  Gazetesi,	  April	  14,	  1964.	  
277	  "Keban'da	  yangın	  çıktı,"	  Elazığ	  Gazetesi,	  January	  7,	  1964;	  and	  "Keban	  Hükumet	  
Konağında	  yangın	  çıktı,"	  Elazığ	  Gazetesi,	  January	  9,	  1964.	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residents	  learned	  that	  the	  order	  only	  applied	  to	  certain	  areas,	  the	  municipality	  halted	  
construction	  of	  several	  buildings.	  The	  possible	  relocation	  also	  threatened	  livelihoods.	  
Local	  residents	  saved	  meager	  wages	  from	  the	  mining	  company	  to	  build	  houses	  over	  time	  
as	  funds	  allowed.	  There	  was	  concern	  about	  what	  would	  become	  of	  their	  efforts.	  Who	  
would	  pay	  for	  relocation	  and	  how	  it	  would	  be	  accomplished?278	  
As	  a	  whole,	  efforts	  to	  remake	  Keban,	  successful	  and	  unsuccessful,	  suggest	  the	  
kind	  of	  “village	  development”	  taking	  place.	  As	  a	  model	  of	  development,	  the	  town	  was	  to	  
become,	  in	  some	  sense,	  a	  portable	  representation	  of	  rural	  development	  to	  match	  the	  
model	  of	  water	  development	  up	  the	  road.	  The	  actual	  inhabitants	  of	  Keban	  seemed	  not	  to	  
matter	  much,	  as	  evidenced	  by	  the	  errors	  in	  the	  kinds	  of	  investments	  that	  would	  have	  
made	  a	  significant	  difference	  to	  the	  livelihood	  of	  residents.	  What	  in	  fact	  mattered	  most	  
in	  the	  model	  of	  development	  was	  Keban’s	  relationship	  to	  the	  dam	  and	  its	  presence	  along	  
the	  route	  that	  government	  delegations	  and	  foreign	  workers	  had	  to	  take	  to	  reach	  the	  
worksite.	  Such	  proximity,	  more	  than	  anything	  else,	  determined	  Keban’s	  fate	  and	  the	  
nature	  of	  its	  spatial	  reorganization.	  The	  superficial	  nature	  of	  the	  changes	  in	  Keban,	  when	  
compared	  to	  the	  problems	  with	  essential	  infrastructure,	  led	  to	  unfriendly	  local	  
assessments	  of	  the	  dam	  project.	  One	  observer	  noted	  that	  the	  mining	  facility	  was	  what	  
really	  sustained	  Keban.	  As	  for	  the	  dam,	  “it	  was	  not	  beneficial.”279	  	  
	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
278	  “Keban	  Ilçesi	  Yer	  Degistirecek,”	  Elazığ	  Gazetesi,	  August	  16,	  1963;	  and	  “Keban	  ziraat	  
bankası	  inşaatına	  başlanmadı,”	  Elazığ	  Gazetesi,	  October	  29,	  1963.	  
279	  Sait	  Bilgin,	  Dünden	  Bugüne	  Keban,	  24.	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The	  Road:	  Connecting	  the	  Past	  to	  the	  Future	  
The	  Turkish	  word	  for	  transportation,	  ulaşım,	  comes	  from	  the	  verb	  ulaşmak,	  to	  
reach	  or	  arrive.	  Fundamentally,	  the	  dam	  project	  allowed	  the	  Turkish	  state	  to	  reconfigure	  
where	  people	  could	  reach	  and	  how	  they	  could	  arrive.	  For	  heavy	  machinery	  and	  
materials	  to	  reach	  the	  dam	  site,	  the	  Turkish	  government	  had	  to	  improve	  Elazığ’s	  road	  
system.	  However,	  with	  the	  filling	  of	  the	  reservoir,	  a	  greater	  number	  of	  roads	  were	  
drowned	  than	  were	  improved.	  As	  a	  result	  of	  the	  massive	  reservoir,	  significant	  
connections	  across	  the	  Euphrates	  River	  were	  lost.	  The	  Turkish	  state	  replaced	  some	  of	  
these	  connections	  with	  ferries	  or	  built	  much	  longer	  routes	  around	  the	  reservoir.	  By	  
reducing	  the	  number	  of	  access	  points	  and	  forcing	  people	  onto	  ferries,	  the	  state	  obtained	  
greater	  powers	  of	  surveillance.	  It	  was	  much	  easier	  to	  monitor	  individuals	  on	  a	  ferry	  than	  
a	  winding	  mountain	  road.	  The	  improved	  roads	  also	  expanded	  the	  state’s	  ability	  to	  
project	  power.	  There	  were	  now	  fewer	  roads	  to	  monitor	  and	  the	  improved	  infrastructure	  
enhanced	  the	  movement	  of	  state	  officials	  and	  military	  units.	  	  
Roads	  also	  functioned	  on	  a	  social	  and	  cultural	  level,	  supporting	  various	  forms	  of	  
association,	  and	  acting	  as	  a	  framing	  device	  that	  ordered	  the	  way	  in	  which	  a	  place	  was	  
experienced.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  road’s	  positioning,	  its	  demarcation	  of	  a	  bounded	  space,	  
its	  structuring	  of	  one’s	  view,	  all	  functioned	  to	  produce	  a	  certain	  experience	  of	  Elazığ	  
province	  as	  a	  place.	  In	  addition,	  the	  road	  itself	  could	  be	  given	  meaning.	  Its	  capacity	  to	  
convey	  an	  individual	  to	  a	  place	  could	  be	  construed	  as	  a	  claim	  on	  that	  place.	  	  
The	  improvement	  of	  the	  road	  between	  Elazığ	  city	  and	  the	  small	  town	  of	  Keban	  
functioned	  in	  all	  of	  these	  ways.	  The	  new	  route	  demonstrated	  the	  power	  of	  the	  state	  to	  
remake	  the	  environment	  and	  its	  promise	  to	  create	  economically	  advantageous	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connections.	  The	  road	  also	  functioned	  as	  a	  claim	  of	  ownership	  and	  legitimacy,	  a	  way	  of	  
connecting	  the	  dam	  project	  to	  a	  deeper,	  authentic	  past.	  By	  structuring	  outsiders’	  
experiences	  of	  Elazığ,	  the	  road	  also	  reinforced	  a	  particular	  conception	  of	  the	  province	  as	  
a	  place	  in	  need	  of	  development.	  The	  Elazığ	  province	  as	  seen	  from	  the	  road	  could,	  and	  
should,	  be	  remade	  through	  infrastructure.	  
To	  provide	  access	  to	  the	  Keban	  dam	  site,	  the	  Turkish	  government	  upgraded	  the	  
road	  between	  Elazığ	  and	  Keban,	  a	  stretch	  of	  about	  fifty	  kilometers,	  and	  the	  road	  between	  
Elazığ	  and	  Malatya,	  another	  one	  hundred	  kilometers.	  Though	  the	  dam	  project	  meant	  
“improvements”	  to	  these	  roads,	  it	  meant	  the	  loss	  of	  others.	  A	  highway	  bridge	  connecting	  
Elazığ	  and	  Arapkir	  was	  in	  the	  same	  location	  as	  the	  dam	  site.	  It	  had	  to	  be	  torn	  down	  and	  
replaced	  farther	  downstream.	  Roads	  connecting	  Elazığ	  to	  villages	  on	  the	  other	  side	  of	  
the	  Euphrates	  were	  severed	  by	  the	  dam’s	  massive	  reservoir.	  A	  rail	  line	  to	  Bingöl,	  the	  
provincial	  capital	  east	  of	  Elazığ,	  had	  to	  be	  relocated	  and	  new	  bridges	  built	  to	  reconnect	  
Elazığ	  to	  the	  east.	  Connections	  to	  the	  north	  were	  drowned	  in	  the	  rising	  waters	  of	  the	  
reservoir.	  A	  ferry	  replaced	  the	  road	  to	  Tunceli,	  a	  far	  less	  convenient	  and	  “free”	  way	  to	  
travel.	  The	  government	  ferries	  plying	  these	  routes	  were	  much	  easier	  to	  monitor	  than	  
traffic	  along	  the	  roads	  (see	  Illustrations	  5	  and	  6	  at	  the	  end	  of	  this	  chapter).280	  	  
	   As	  much	  as	  the	  roads	  meant	  access	  and	  connection,	  they	  could	  also	  mean	  division	  
and	  dislocation.	  For	  communities	  along	  this	  route,	  the	  dislocation	  could	  be	  considerable.	  
Winding	  through	  the	  mountains	  and	  very	  steep	  and	  narrow	  in	  some	  areas,	  the	  road	  to	  
Elazığ	  and	  the	  dam	  site	  required	  straightening	  and	  widening.	  In	  June	  1963,	  eight	  million	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  Robert	  Hatem	  and	  Mark	  Dohrmann,	  “Turkey’s	  Fix	  for	  the	  ‘Kurdish	  Problem,’:	  
Ankara’s	  Challenges,”	  Middle	  East	  Quarterly	  20	  (2013):	  49-­‐58.	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lira	  were	  allocated	  for	  study	  and	  construction,	  and	  that	  same	  month	  expropriation	  of	  
land	  began.	  In	  the	  village	  of	  Çalıp,	  the	  road	  sliced	  through	  the	  market	  neighborhood	  and	  
destroyed	  valuable	  gardens.	  As	  mentioned	  earlier	  in	  the	  section	  about	  Keban,	  the	  
highway	  included	  no	  provision	  to	  accommodate	  local	  irrigation	  canals	  and	  disrupted	  
agriculture	  along	  its	  route.281	  
For	  outsiders,	  the	  roads	  provided	  not	  only	  access	  to	  Elazığ	  and	  Keban,	  but	  also	  
structured	  their	  experience	  of	  the	  place.	  The	  newly	  improved	  roads	  provided	  ways	  into	  
and	  out	  of	  Elazığ	  province.	  Initially,	  outsiders	  visiting	  town	  came	  by	  airplane	  into	  Elazığ	  
and	  then	  traveled	  by	  car	  to	  Keban	  along	  that	  new	  section	  of	  road.	  However,	  as	  
construction	  activities	  expanded,	  the	  road	  became	  busy	  with	  vehicles	  carrying	  
construction	  materials	  from	  Malatya,	  where	  materials	  were	  offloaded	  at	  the	  rail	  
connection	  to	  coastal	  ports.	  The	  road	  also	  became	  the	  link	  through	  which	  workers	  
arrived	  from	  other	  parts	  of	  Turkey	  to	  join	  the	  crews	  building	  the	  dam.	  	  
The	  road	  was	  also	  important	  in	  its	  function	  as	  a	  frame	  for	  understanding	  Elazığ	  
province.	  Several	  visitors	  wrote	  about	  their	  impressions	  of	  this	  region,	  host	  to	  Turkey’s	  
greatest	  public	  works	  project.	  Their	  perceptions	  were	  shaped	  very	  much	  by	  the	  road	  
itself.	  Its	  presence	  is	  ubiquitous	  in	  their	  stories	  and	  critical	  to	  structuring	  their	  concept	  
of	  Elazığ’s	  place	  and	  people.	  As	  a	  reporter	  for	  the	  newspaper	  Yeni	  İstanbul,	  poet	  and	  
advocate	  Yavuz	  Bülent	  Bâkiler	  traveled	  to	  Keban	  in	  the	  company	  of	  the	  German	  
delegation	  that	  visited	  the	  dam	  site	  in	  1963.	  He	  described	  his	  arrival	  in	  Elazığ	  and	  the	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  “Elazığ-­‐Keban	  Yolunun	  Etüdü	  Başladı,”	  Elazığ	  Gazetesi,	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  6,	  1963;	  and	  “Kara	  
Yolları	  Keban'da	  istimlaka	  başladı,”	  Elazığ	  Gazetesi,	  September	  24,	  1963.	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excitement	  in	  the	  main	  square	  as	  people	  gathered	  to	  hear	  word	  of	  the	  Keban	  project.282	  
The	  delegation	  then	  traveled	  by	  car	  to	  the	  village	  of	  Keban,	  “The	  roads	  were	  dust	  and	  
dirt.	  The	  cars	  went	  in	  the	  manner	  of	  convoy	  and…we	  had	  to	  cover	  a	  distance	  inside	  a	  
dust	  storm.”	  The	  dust	  reminded	  Bâkiler	  of	  another	  poet’s	  work,	  Ahmet	  Kutsi,	  whose	  
verses	  “began	  to	  be	  scattered	  inside	  me…”:	  
There	  is	  a	  road	  in	  the	  distance.	  
That	  road	  is	  our	  road.	  
If	  we	  were	  not	  to	  visit,	  if	  we	  were	  not	  to	  ride	  it,	  
That	  road	  is	  our	  road.	  
For	  Bâkiler,	  the	  route	  to	  Keban	  was	  a	  road	  that	  belonged	  to	  Turkey,	  no	  matter	  whether	  
Turks	  visited.	  “What	  does	  Elazığ	  mean?”	  he	  asked,	  “…middle,	  east,	  and	  southeast	  
Anatolia	  are	  all	  connected	  to	  the	  Keban	  dam.”	  It	  did	  not	  matter	  whether	  these	  Anatolians	  
traveled	  the	  road	  or	  not,	  the	  road	  belonged	  to	  and	  connected	  all	  of	  them.	  The	  road	  was	  
consequently	  a	  metaphor	  for	  the	  nation,	  and	  where	  it	  went	  the	  nation,	  as	  defined	  by	  
elites	  from	  Istanbul,	  followed.	  
The	  dust	  storm	  in	  Bâkiler’s	  story,	  which	  “does	  not	  know	  to	  end	  and	  die	  out,”	  hid	  
and	  revealed.	  Gazing	  through	  the	  car	  window,	  the	  writer	  caught	  glimpses	  of	  villages	  
“with	  small	  mud	  houses”	  along	  the	  road	  and	  “the	  village	  women	  with	  white	  skirts	  and	  
summer	  wares	  who	  gathered	  on	  top	  of	  the	  roofs	  and	  watched	  us	  like	  a	  sculpture,	  silent	  
and	  motionless.”	  Bâkiler	  also	  noted	  the	  small	  differences	  in	  the	  villagers’	  accents,	  how	  
the	  “k”	  sound	  became	  a	  “g”	  in	  the	  Elazığ	  province.	  “Keban”	  was	  thus	  “Geban”	  and	  
“Ankara”	  was	  “Angara.”	  The	  road	  helped	  to	  delimit	  not	  just	  a	  physical	  but	  also	  a	  cultural	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  Yavuz	  Bülent	  Bâkiler,	  “Keban	  Notları,”	  Elazığ	  Gazetesi,	  August	  9,	  1963.	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differentiation.	  	  
From	  the	  road,	  Bâkiler	  also	  viewed	  the	  river.	  The	  Euphrates,	  like	  the	  people	  of	  
Keban,	  required	  reshaping.	  From	  high	  above,	  the	  Euphrates	  was	  “flowing,	  dirty	  in	  color.	  
It	  flows	  silent	  and	  calm	  as	  if	  clogged	  by	  earth,	  as	  if	  dead,	  as	  if	  offended	  at	  something.”	  
The	  river	  was	  so	  disappointing	  to	  Bâkiler	  that	  he	  decided	  to	  change	  it,	  “I	  make	  the	  
Euphrates	  larger	  and	  with	  a	  heightened	  roar,	  make	  it	  drop	  from	  waterfalls	  and	  crash	  
against	  rocks,	  the	  foamy	  Euphrates,	  the	  crazy	  Euphrates.”	  A	  magnificent	  project	  like	  the	  
Keban	  dam	  surely	  deserved	  a	  magnificent	  river,	  not	  a	  dead,	  offended	  one.	  The	  heat	  of	  
summer	  pervaded	  the	  story	  and	  Bâkiler’s	  driver	  called	  the	  place	  “Geban	  cehennemi”	  or	  
“the	  hell	  of	  Keban.”	  In	  the	  summer,	  the	  driver	  recounted,	  “those	  who	  pass	  along	  this	  road	  
burn.”	  Bâkiler	  admitted	  surprise	  at	  Keban—why	  did	  this	  hellish	  place	  with	  its	  “well-­‐
behaved	  and	  reasonable”	  river	  deserve	  so	  much	  attention,	  so	  much	  investment?283	  
Bâkiler’s	  road	  to	  Keban	  was	  all	  dust	  and	  heat,	  framing	  a	  sluggish,	  brown	  river	  and	  
villagers	  frozen	  both	  metaphorically	  in	  time	  and	  physically	  like	  pieces	  of	  art.	  The	  people	  
were	  somehow	  alien,	  with	  their	  traditional	  clothing	  and	  strange	  speech.	  As	  Bâkiler	  
neared	  his	  destination,	  the	  people	  of	  Keban	  ran	  alongside	  the	  vehicles	  “in	  ineffable	  joy”	  
as	  the	  “dust	  cloud…passes	  over	  and	  above	  us.”	  The	  story	  ends	  with	  a	  question,	  “Are	  you	  
from	  Ankara?”	  To	  which	  Bâkiler	  replied	  simply,	  “Yes,	  we	  came	  from	  Ankara!”	  The	  
denizens	  of	  the	  capital	  arrived	  to	  save	  the	  place,	  to	  make	  something	  new	  of	  a	  landscape	  
so	  languid,	  so	  hot,	  and	  so	  still,	  “The	  leaves	  of	  the	  willow	  and	  cypress	  trees	  that	  stretched	  
from	  time	  to	  time	  along	  the	  road	  did	  not	  even	  stir.”	  In	  the	  end,	  the	  reader	  learns	  nothing	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of	  what	  occurred	  off	  the	  road;	  Bâkiler’s	  transit,	  the	  power	  of	  the	  road’s	  technical	  
achievement	  and	  his	  movement	  along	  it,	  told	  the	  whole	  story	  of	  Elazığ	  and	  Keban,	  of	  the	  
torpid	  and	  inhospitable	  environment	  that	  would	  be	  mastered	  by	  the	  dam.	  
When	  the	  highway	  was	  finished	  in	  the	  autumn	  of	  1965,	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  road	  as	  a	  
claim	  was	  repeated.	  In	  Yıldırım	  N.	  Gençosmanoğlu’s	  multi-­‐part	  description	  of	  the	  road,	  
he	  began	  with	  a	  quote	  from	  a	  worker	  involved	  in	  its	  construction,	  “‘The	  place	  you	  cannot	  
go	  is	  not	  yours.’”	  For	  Gençosmanoğlu,	  the	  road	  was	  a	  symbol	  of	  ownership	  and	  
belonging,	  “The	  day	  after…a	  road	  to	  Keban	  was	  opened	  Keban	  became	  ours.”	  
Gençosmanoğlu	  hearkened	  back	  to	  the	  start	  of	  construction,	  when	  the	  first	  “murmurs	  of	  
a	  motor,	  squeaks	  of	  steal,	  informed	  Keban	  of	  its	  destiny,	  which	  was	  to	  be	  conquered	  
again.”	  The	  reason	  for	  the	  conquest	  was	  plain	  enough,	  “it	  means	  that	  the	  dam	  will	  be	  
built.”	  The	  road	  was	  the	  prerequisite	  because	  “it	  certainly	  made	  the	  rest	  easier,”	  though	  
not	  only	  in	  terms	  of	  physics,	  of	  the	  need	  to	  bring	  material	  and	  men	  to	  a	  remote	  mountain	  
gorge.	  The	  road	  also	  served	  to	  legitimate	  the	  social	  and	  political	  claims	  to	  build	  the	  dam.	  
Part	  of	  these	  claims	  in	  Gençosmanoğlu’s	  story	  depended	  on	  tracing	  the	  road’s	  
history.	  Through	  this	  history	  Gençosmanoğlu	  normalized	  the	  route,	  legitimized	  its	  
construction	  and	  made	  it	  a	  natural	  outcome	  of	  the	  landscape.	  To	  accomplish	  this,	  the	  
author	  reminisced	  about	  “a	  map	  of	  the	  Sultan’s	  empire,”	  which	  only	  came	  to	  include	  
Keban	  because	  of	  the	  area’s	  valuable	  mineral	  deposits.	  The	  metal	  mined	  from	  Keban’s	  
beds	  of	  ore	  was	  used	  in	  the	  Sultan’s	  seal;	  this	  “corner	  of	  a	  nation”	  had	  a	  direct	  
connection	  to	  the	  great	  empire	  and	  its	  ruler.	  To	  obtain	  the	  ore,	  the	  Sultan	  ordered	  the	  
building	  of	  a	  road,	  which	  Gençosmanoğlu	  noted	  was	  perfectly	  suitable	  for	  “the	  vehicles	  
of	  that	  day…horse,	  mule,	  camel…carriage,	  oxcart.”	  The	  road,	  built	  by	  “shovel,	  [the	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technological]	  equivalent	  to	  today’s	  bulldozers	  and	  graders,”	  was	  rough	  and	  winding.	  
Progress	  was	  made	  “step	  by	  step…in	  some	  places	  inch	  by	  inch”	  in	  a	  struggle	  with	  the	  
mountain.	  Dry	  masonry	  walls	  held	  back	  the	  great	  ridges	  and	  peaks	  and	  allowed	  access	  to	  
the	  great	  quantities	  of	  ore	  contained	  within.	  	  
The	  evocation	  of	  the	  Ottoman	  route	  into	  the	  mountains	  was	  about	  more	  than	  a	  
lesson	  in	  technical	  progress.	  It	  was	  about	  producing	  a	  form	  of	  legitimacy	  for	  the	  new	  
road	  builders.	  A	  route	  into	  the	  mountains	  was	  the	  natural	  outcome	  of	  a	  powerful	  and	  
thriving	  state.	  It	  was	  the	  process	  by	  which	  the	  Elazığ	  region	  had	  become	  part	  of	  
something	  greater.	  The	  twentieth-­‐century	  engineers	  and	  their	  machines	  were	  no	  
different	  from	  the	  Sultan’s	  shovelers	  who	  “inch	  by	  inch”	  sought	  mineral	  riches	  from	  the	  
Keban	  hills.	  They	  were	  simply	  technological	  “giants”	  in	  comparison,	  using	  their	  “teeth	  of	  
steel”	  to	  “dissolve”	  the	  mountainside.	  	  
The	  connection	  to	  the	  Ottoman	  era	  also	  diminished	  the	  newness	  and	  
incomparability	  of	  the	  twentieth-­‐century	  force	  of	  intervention,	  the	  particular	  pattern	  of	  
economic	  and	  political	  power	  that	  was	  required	  to	  finance	  and	  build	  a	  road	  using	  
modern	  machinery	  in	  rugged	  terrain.	  The	  road	  was	  not	  the	  extension	  of	  a	  modern	  
economic	  order,	  but	  the	  natural	  progression	  from	  padishah	  to	  mühendis,	  from	  sultan	  to	  
engineer.	  Unlike	  the	  old	  road,	  though,	  Gençosmanoğlu	  announced,	  this	  one	  would	  not	  
fall	  into	  disrepair.	  Unlike	  the	  sultan,	  whose	  road,	  seal	  and	  empire	  had	  all	  disappeared,	  
the	  engineer	  “will	  deliver	  the	  Keban	  road	  to	  eternity.”284	  This	  road	  was	  meant	  to	  be	  
permanent,	  an	  irrevocable	  form	  in	  the	  landscape.	  For	  Gençosmanoğlu,	  this	  was	  a	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  Yıldırım	  N.	  Gençosmanoğlu,	  “Keban	  Baraj	  Yolu,”	  Elazığ	  Gazetesi,	  September	  16,	  1965.	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positive	  aspect,	  a	  declaration	  that	  the	  Turkish	  Republic	  would	  not	  decline	  as	  the	  
Ottoman	  Empire	  had.	  The	  road	  would	  facilitate	  economic	  connection	  and	  vitality	  for	  
years	  to	  come,	  providing	  the	  essential	  link	  to	  the	  riches	  of	  Keban’s	  resources.	  The	  road	  
also	  achieved	  something	  else.	  It	  had	  been	  and	  would	  be	  the	  vital	  construction	  necessary	  
for	  the	  application	  of	  state	  power	  to	  the	  region.	  
	  
The	  River:	  Producing	  a	  "New	  Euphrates"	  
In	  1962,	  as	  Ankara	  sought	  international	  financing	  for	  the	  Keban	  dam,	  the	  arts	  and	  
culture	  journal	  Yeni	  Fırat	  (New	  Euphrates)	  began	  publication.	  The	  purpose	  of	  the	  
journal	  was	  "to	  benefit	  from	  written	  work	  in	  order	  to	  learn	  about	  history,	  geography	  and	  
folklore."	  The	  journal's	  creators	  asserted	  that	  "by	  collecting	  information	  from	  our	  own	  
environment,"	  the	  journal	  might	  present	  such	  benefits	  to	  others.	  The	  magazine’s	  title,	  
Yeni	  Fırat,	  was	  chosen	  for	  two	  reasons.	  First,	  to	  acknowledge	  the	  journal's	  debt	  to	  
another	  publication,	  called	  simply	  Fırat,	  which	  began	  its	  short-­‐lived	  publication	  history	  
in	  1918.285	  Second,	  "to	  describe	  the	  effulgence	  that	  remains	  today	  of	  the	  metaphor	  of	  the	  
Euphrates,	  the	  source	  of	  life	  for	  our	  environment	  and	  perhaps	  for	  all	  of	  Turkey."286	  
The	  metaphor	  of	  the	  Euphrates	  changed	  during	  the	  1960s	  in	  the	  pages	  of	  this	  
journal	  and	  the	  local	  newspaper,	  transforming	  from	  a	  symbol	  of	  nature's	  beauty	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
285	  Journals	  with	  this	  title	  were	  popular	  along	  the	  Euphrates.	  The	  earliest	  printed	  journal	  
in	  the	  Levant	  was	  entitled,	  Gadîr-­‐i	  Firat	  (Source	  of	  the	  Euphrates).	  It	  was	  the	  official	  
gazette	  of	  Aleppo	  province	  beginning	  in	  1864.	  Keith	  David	  Watenpaugh,	  Being	  Modern	  in	  
the	  Middle	  East:	  Revolution,	  Nationalism,	  Colonialism,	  and	  the	  Arab	  Middle	  Class	  
(Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  2006),	  41.	  
286	  "Yeni	  Fırat,"	  Yeni	  Fırat	  1	  (1962):	  3.	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bounty	  to	  a	  destructive	  phenomenon	  that	  must	  be	  mastered.	  One	  could	  not	  irrevocably	  
alter	  "the	  source	  of	  life	  for	  our	  environment	  and	  perhaps	  for	  all	  of	  Turkey"	  without	  
showing	  that	  this	  source	  somehow	  needed	  to	  be	  changed	  and	  that	  life	  would	  benefit	  as	  a	  
result.	  These	  two	  periodicals	  worked	  together	  to	  remake	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  Euphrates,	  to	  
show	  that	  the	  river	  would	  benefit	  from	  the	  dam	  as	  much	  as	  the	  people	  of	  Elazığ	  
province.	  In	  addition,	  the	  reframing	  of	  the	  Euphrates	  produced	  an	  image	  of	  a	  river	  that	  
belonged	  to	  the	  entire	  country.	  Rather	  than	  a	  metaphor	  of	  the	  Euphrates	  that	  
emphasized	  local	  identity	  and	  distinctiveness,	  the	  river	  was	  made	  into	  a	  source	  of	  
prosperity	  and	  identity	  for	  a	  nation.	  
In	  the	  early	  1960s,	  the	  Elazığ	  Gazetesi	  presented	  poems	  that	  described	  the	  river	  
as	  a	  vital	  part	  of	  the	  region’s	  identity,	  a	  natural	  phenomenon	  that	  brought	  life	  and	  
prosperity.	  One	  of	  these	  poems	  was	  titled	  simply,	  "Fırat,"	  or	  Euphrates.	  The	  poet	  Arif	  
Nihat	  Asya	  described	  a	  river	  that	  flowed	  from	  "blue	  mountains	  far	  away,"	  giving	  its	  
name	  to	  a	  folk	  song	  beloved	  by	  the	  narrator.	  The	  river	  "flows	  into	  the	  flavor	  of	  the	  song.”	  
Asya	  used	  the	  word	  “türkü,”	  a	  designation	  that	  not	  only	  denoted	  a	  folk	  ballad	  but	  also	  
the	  language	  and	  the	  people	  who	  sing	  it.	  Asya's	  narrator	  went	  on	  to	  express	  a	  hope,	  
crying	  out	  at	  the	  end,	  "Ve	  senden	  doğacak	  kızımın	  /	  Adı	  "Fırat"	  olsun!"	  "And	  my	  
daughter	  who	  will	  be	  born	  from	  you	  /	  Let	  her	  name	  be	  'Euphrates!’”287	  As	  with	  the	  first	  
issue	  of	  Yeni	  Fırat,	  the	  poem	  evoked	  the	  life-­‐giving	  quality	  of	  the	  river,	  such	  that	  its	  name	  
befits	  a	  newborn	  child.	  The	  river	  in	  this	  poem	  also	  provided	  an	  identity,	  bringing	  
something	  vital	  to	  the	  folk	  song	  and	  imparting	  that	  same	  quality	  to	  the	  newborn	  child.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
287	  Arif	  Nihat	  Asya,	  “Fırat,”	  Elazığ	  Gazetesi,	  June	  11,	  1963.	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Later	  poems	  published	  in	  the	  newspaper	  and	  Yeni	  Fırat	  described	  a	  very	  different	  
river.	  Yıldırım	  Gençosmanoğlu,	  the	  same	  writer	  who	  evoked	  the	  history	  of	  the	  Keban	  
road,	  wrote	  the	  poem	  “Fırat’la	  hesaplaşma”	  (Reckoning	  with	  the	  Euphrates),	  in	  which	  he	  
took	  the	  river	  to	  task.288	  “You	  split	  my	  valleys,	  you	  swallowed	  my	  plains,”	  the	  narrator	  
accuses,	  “You	  scattered	  the	  ashes	  of	  many	  hearths;	  you	  gave	  them	  to	  the	  wind!”	  The	  
river	  was	  a	  destructive	  and	  unfriendly	  force,	  “You	  raged	  and	  frothed,	  you	  gave	  my	  
country	  to	  salt	  /	  Neither	  a	  road	  for	  my	  caravans	  nor	  a	  ford	  for	  travelers	  /	  We	  depended	  
on	  you;	  you	  gave	  us	  suffering.”	  The	  Euphrates	  in	  this	  account	  “resented”	  the	  nation	  and	  
betrayed	  all	  hopes	  without	  a	  trace	  of	  remorse,	  jealously	  reserving	  its	  bounty.	  Instead	  of	  a	  
life-­‐giving	  force,	  the	  river	  made	  the	  life	  of	  the	  nation	  more	  difficult.	  
The	  nation	  in	  Gençosmanoğlu’s	  poem	  must	  tame	  the	  river	  in	  order	  to	  prosper	  
from	  it.	  “Oh	  lion	  who	  roars	  down	  from	  the	  Palandöken	  [mountains]	  /	  We	  will	  put	  a	  chain	  
around	  your	  mane	  /	  And	  forget	  the	  past;	  and	  you,	  me,	  shoulder	  to	  shoulder,	  /	  We	  will	  
found	  a	  nation	  that	  rises	  with	  prosperity.”	  The	  personal	  quality	  of	  Asya’s	  Euphrates	  gave	  
way	  to	  collective	  demands	  in	  Gençosmanoğlu.	  What	  the	  river	  was	  in	  the	  past—the	  
narrator	  likens	  the	  Euphrates	  to	  an	  oppressive	  sultan—can	  be	  forgotten.	  The	  Euphrates	  
may	  not	  act	  like	  an	  Ottoman	  despot	  in	  the	  new	  Turkish	  Republic.	  While	  the	  untamed	  
river	  split	  fertile	  valleys	  and	  swallowed	  the	  plains	  with	  flood,	  producing	  nothing	  for	  the	  
nation	  but	  salt,	  a	  river	  in	  chains	  may	  found	  a	  prosperous	  nation.	  
Cenani	  Dökmeci	  was	  less	  explicit	  about	  controlling	  the	  river	  in	  his	  poem,	  “Fırat’la	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  Yıldırım	  N.	  Gençosmanoğlu,	  “Fırat’la	  hesaplaşma,”	  Elazığ	  Gazetesi,	  July	  13,	  1963.	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söyleşme”	  (Dialogue	  with	  the	  Euphrates),	  published	  in	  1966.289	  Dökmeci’s	  version	  of	  
control	  is	  less	  vehement	  than	  Gençosmanoğlu,	  but	  he	  reached	  even	  farther	  back	  into	  the	  
history	  of	  Euphrates.	  Rather	  than	  a	  reckoning,	  Dökmeci’s	  “Dialogue”	  beseeched	  the	  river,	  
“Stop	  Euphrates!	  …Don’t	  flow	  and	  burst	  forth	  into	  the	  deserts,	  stop,	  no	  more.”	  The	  river	  
should	  instead	  become	  “an	  inland	  sea	  in	  the	  nation’s	  breast.”	  As	  a	  sea	  rather	  than	  a	  river,	  
the	  Euphrates	  will	  be	  more	  productive.	  “Urfa	  Elaziz	  is	  very	  thirsty,”	  the	  narrator	  noted,	  
“…let	  your	  shore,	  your	  contour	  be	  painted	  in	  greens.”	  Rather	  than	  watering	  empty	  
wastes,	  a	  dammed	  river	  could	  bring	  relief	  to	  the	  pilgrims	  of	  Urfa	  and	  bring	  forth	  new	  
agriculture.	  Keban	  was	  mentioned	  specifically	  in	  the	  poem,	  “Tell	  me	  of	  Keban,”	  Dökmeci	  
wrote,	  asking	  the	  river	  to	  slow	  down	  and	  learn	  of	  the	  human	  communities	  along	  its	  
banks.	  The	  poet	  presented	  the	  dam	  as	  “a	  new	  legend”	  (yeni	  bir	  destan)	  that	  may	  be	  told	  
by	  the	  ancient	  river,	  a	  legend	  as	  important	  to	  Turks	  as	  Seljuq	  sultan	  Alp	  Arslan’s	  defeat	  
of	  the	  Byzantine	  Empire	  at	  the	  Battle	  of	  Manzikert.	  Just	  as	  Alp	  Arslan’s	  conquests	  
heralded	  an	  Anatolia	  dominated	  by	  Turkish	  tribes,	  the	  dam	  at	  Keban	  heralded	  the	  
construction	  of	  “an	  enlightened	  nation,”	  capable	  of	  dominating	  Anatolia	  in	  an	  entirely	  
new	  way.	  
Poetry	  was	  not	  the	  only	  method	  for	  imagining	  a	  new	  Euphrates.	  Legends	  and	  
stories	  were	  also	  brought	  to	  bear	  in	  shaping	  novel	  conceptions	  of	  the	  environment	  
around	  Elazığ.	  One	  story,	  told	  by	  Bahattin	  Senemoğlu,	  tells	  of	  an	  American	  who	  arrived	  
in	  Elazığ	  shortly	  after	  the	  foundation	  of	  the	  Republic.290	  In	  Senemoğlu’s	  account,	  one	  day	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
289	  Cenani	  Dökmeci,	  “Fırat’la	  Söyleşme,”	  Yeni	  Fırat	  28	  (1966):	  7.	  
290	  Bahattin	  Senemoğlu,	  “Fırat	  ve	  Baraj,”	  Elazığ	  Gazetesi,	  July	  19,	  1963.	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the	  American	  “went	  down	  to	  the	  shores	  of	  the	  Euphrates.”	  After	  wandering	  a	  bit,	  he	  
asked	  a	  villager	  about	  the	  river,	  “Does	  it	  always	  flow	  like	  this?”	  The	  villager	  confirmed	  
the	  American’s	  observation	  but	  thought	  nothing	  of	  it.	  Senemoğlu	  claims	  that	  “the	  
American	  had	  discovered	  a	  great	  treasure	  imprisoned	  in	  the	  river,”	  a	  treasure	  that	  was	  
not	  recognized	  until	  much	  later.	  Only	  when	  “Turkey	  entered	  the	  age	  of	  planned	  
development”	  did	  the	  people	  of	  Elazığ	  recognize	  what	  lay	  hidden.	  With	  the	  coming	  of	  the	  
Keban	  dam,	  “the	  eyes	  of	  the	  entire	  Turkish	  nation	  are	  turned	  toward…the	  promise	  of	  the	  
shining	  sun	  that	  will	  rise	  with	  the	  construction	  of	  the	  dam.”	  
The	  massiveness	  of	  the	  Keban	  dam	  and	  the	  vastness	  of	  its	  reservoir	  required	  
conceiving	  of	  the	  environment	  around	  the	  river	  in	  a	  completely	  different	  way.	  From	  a	  
natural	  force	  that	  brought	  forth	  life	  on	  its	  own,	  the	  river	  became	  a	  destroyer	  and	  
betrayer	  that	  could	  only	  be	  useful	  if	  controlled.	  The	  river’s	  “treasure”	  was	  not	  its	  water,	  
but	  its	  flow,	  its	  movement,	  which	  if	  stilled	  and	  harnessed	  by	  the	  dam	  could	  not	  only	  
produce	  great	  fertility	  “painted	  in	  greens,”	  but	  another	  kind	  of	  prosperity.	  The	  river	  was	  
no	  longer	  important	  in	  its	  relationship	  to	  the	  individual.	  The	  river,	  its	  water	  and	  its	  
power,	  now	  belonged	  to	  a	  nation.	  
	  
The	  Sugar	  Factory:	  Making	  the	  Myth	  of	  the	  Green	  Peninsula	  
On	  February	  6,	  1964,	  a	  disturbing	  headline	  in	  the	  Elaziğ	  newspaper	  declared,	  
“There	  is	  a	  new	  problem	  for	  our	  city!!!”	  With	  the	  completion	  of	  a	  new	  report	  on	  the	  
Keban	  dam,	  Elazığ’s	  civic	  leaders	  were	  informed	  that	  the	  rising	  waters	  of	  the	  Euphrates	  
would	  inundate	  the	  city’s	  beloved	  sugar	  factory.	  The	  sugar	  factory	  therefore	  had	  to	  be	  
relocated	  and	  the	  central	  government	  set	  aside	  a	  fund	  of	  seventy	  million	  lira	  for	  the	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purpose.	  It	  was	  not	  clear,	  however,	  that	  the	  sugar	  factory	  would	  be	  relocated	  
somewhere	  in	  the	  Elazığ	  province.	  The	  neighboring	  provinces	  of	  Diyarbakır	  and	  Bingöl	  
were	  already	  vying	  for	  the	  facility.291	  	  
The	  sugar	  factory	  was	  a	  state	  economic	  enterprise,	  established,	  owned	  and	  
operated	  by	  a	  state	  agency,	  the	  Turkey	  State	  Factories	  Corporation	  (Türkiye	  Şeker	  
Fabrikaları	  A.Ş.).	  An	  advantageous	  location	  had	  not	  figured	  heavily	  into	  its	  original	  
positioning.	  The	  factory	  was	  located	  more	  than	  fifty	  kilometers	  from	  Elazığ	  itself,	  along	  
the	  Euphrates	  in	  a	  small	  town	  known	  as	  İçme.	  In	  a	  campaign	  to	  save	  the	  sugar	  factory	  for	  
the	  province,	  Elazığ’s	  boosters	  estimated	  that	  moving	  the	  factory	  closer	  to	  the	  city	  would	  
“prevent	  the	  squander	  of	  vehicles	  and	  unnecessary	  fuel	  of	  about	  500,000	  lira	  each	  year.”	  
In	  addition,	  the	  factory	  had	  been	  built	  to	  a	  capacity	  of	  120,000	  tons,	  but	  was	  producing	  
just	  half	  that	  each	  year.	  Though	  everyone	  knew	  that	  “political	  influences	  far	  away”	  had	  
decided	  on	  the	  construction	  of	  the	  sugar	  factory,	  it	  was	  only	  now,	  many	  years	  later,	  that	  
one	  could	  declare	  that	  “no	  economics	  were	  taken	  into	  consideration	  in	  its	  founding.”	  The	  
factory	  was	  a	  boondoggle,	  an	  outcome	  of	  the	  worst	  kind	  of	  state-­‐directed	  
industrialization.	  Elazığ	  was	  determined	  to	  keep	  it.292	  
	  The	  city’s	  Chamber	  of	  Commerce	  and	  Industry	  hastily	  called	  a	  meeting	  with	  the	  
presidents	  of	  the	  various	  syndicates	  and	  unions,	  and	  the	  leaders	  of	  the	  major	  political	  
parties.	  On	  February	  10,	  a	  commission	  formed	  to	  discuss	  the	  issue	  and	  produced	  a	  
document	  detailing	  Elazığ’s	  plans.	  Though	  the	  group	  argued	  about	  the	  best	  location	  near	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
291	  “Şehrimizin	  için	  yeni	  bir	  mesele	  oluyor!!!”	  Elazığ	  Gazetesi,	  February	  6,	  1964.	  
292	  “Başyazı:	  Şeker	  Fabrikası,”	  Elazığ	  Gazetesi,	  February	  9,	  1964.	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Elazığ	  for	  the	  factory,	  they	  all	  agreed	  that	  the	  city	  must	  head	  off	  the	  worst	  result:	  an	  
“order	  from	  on	  high”	  to	  move	  the	  factory	  to	  a	  different	  province.	  The	  factory’s	  poor	  
performance	  was	  a	  significant	  problem,	  however.	  Elazığ’s	  mayor,	  Rasim	  Küçükel,	  
emphasized	  the	  mediocre	  quantity	  of	  sugar	  beets	  utilized	  by	  the	  factory	  and	  told	  the	  
commission	  that,	  “if	  we	  lose	  the	  factory,	  it	  will	  be	  because	  of	  this	  reason.”293	  	  
The	  Elazığ	  area	  did	  not	  produce	  enough	  sugar	  beets	  to	  feed	  the	  factory	  because	  of	  
a	  combination	  of	  poor	  land	  use	  policies,	  problems	  obtaining	  necessary	  water	  and	  the	  
mismanagement	  of	  fertilizer	  supplies.294	  In	  order	  to	  solve	  these	  myriad	  problems,	  
Elazığ’s	  leaders	  produced	  the	  myth	  of	  the	  green	  peninsula.	  The	  planned	  reservoir	  of	  the	  
Keban	  dam	  would	  effectively	  surround	  the	  province	  with	  water	  on	  the	  north	  and	  east,	  
while	  another	  dam	  still	  in	  the	  planning	  stages,	  the	  Karakaya,	  would	  produce	  a	  reservoir	  
to	  the	  west.	  Elazığ	  would	  at	  that	  point	  “take	  the	  form	  of	  a	  peninsula”	  and	  “wrap	  itself	  in	  a	  
damp,	  green	  climate.”	  Civic	  leaders	  imagined	  the	  vast	  reservoir	  would	  make	  “it	  possible	  
to	  plant	  more	  land	  without	  water	  shortage.”	  More	  than	  that,	  the	  abundance	  of	  water	  
would	  create	  an	  entirely	  new	  climate	  with	  an	  entirely	  new	  agriculture.295	  Never	  mind	  
that	  the	  Keban	  dam	  was	  a	  power	  station,	  not	  an	  irrigation	  project.	  If	  the	  water	  could	  not	  
be	  piped	  from	  the	  reservoir,	  the	  electricity	  produced	  by	  the	  dam	  could	  be	  used	  to	  pump	  
water	  from	  underground	  sources.	  The	  same	  electricity	  could	  be	  put	  to	  use	  in	  a	  fertilizer	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
293	  “Ş.	  Fabrikanın	  yer	  değiştirmesi	  halkı	  harekete	  geçirdi,”	  Elazığ	  Gazetesi,	  February	  11,	  
1964.	  
294	  These	  problems	  are	  summarized	  in	  Gürbüz	  Şenkal	  and	  Sadık	  Bingöl,	  “Elazığ	  Şeker	  
Fabrikası	  Göçüyor!”	  Elazığ	  Gazetesi,	  April	  21,	  1964.	  
295	  “Başyazı:	  Şeker	  Fabrikası.”	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factory	  that	  would	  mitigate	  local	  supply	  problems.	  
The	  trope	  of	  a	  green	  peninsula,	  surrounded	  on	  three	  sides	  by	  a	  dammed	  
Euphrates	  sea,	  was	  a	  utopian	  vision	  of	  an	  Elazığ	  free	  from	  the	  limitations	  of	  the	  past.	  The	  
myth	  took	  on	  a	  life	  of	  its	  own,	  even	  after	  bureaucrats	  in	  Ankara	  set	  about	  deflating	  it.	  
Though	  cabinet	  member	  and	  Elazığ’s	  representative	  in	  parliament	  Nürettin	  Ardıçoğlu	  
had	  reportedly	  said,	  “If	  the	  sugar	  factory	  goes,	  we	  go	  together	  to	  my	  grave,”	  engineers	  in	  
April	  1964	  began	  packing	  up	  one	  of	  the	  factory’s	  three	  processors.	  One-­‐third	  of	  the	  
factory	  had	  been	  ordered	  northwest	  to	  Amasya,	  roughly	  five	  hundred	  kilometers	  from	  
İçme.296	  	  
Elazığ’s	  journalists	  rushed	  to	  İçme	  to	  learn	  more.	  “It	  seemed	  as	  if	  the	  beet	  fields	  
becoming	  green	  on	  the	  side	  of	  the	  road	  were	  hoping	  for	  help	  from	  us,”	  they	  wrote.	  Such	  
hopes	  were	  dashed	  a	  moment	  later	  when	  “a	  fast	  black	  taxi	  of	  the	  latest	  model”	  zoomed	  
past	  bearing	  “an	  Amasya	  license	  plate.”	  The	  car	  carried	  the	  İçme	  municipal	  president	  
Tahir	  Küçükel,	  who	  explained	  that	  the	  factory’s	  move	  was	  just	  a	  “loan.”	  Elazığ’s	  
journalists	  were	  dubious.	  Surely,	  the	  “cost	  of	  the	  roundtrip	  to	  Amasya	  of	  facilities	  that	  
weighed	  100,000	  tons”	  was	  far	  greater	  than	  simply	  shipping	  the	  beets	  produced	  there	  to	  
İçme	  for	  processing.	  After	  “four	  hours”	  of	  questions,	  the	  journalists	  were	  no	  closer	  to	  a	  
clear	  answer.	  They	  reported	  that	  “each	  answer	  was	  roundabout	  and	  shadowy,”	  though	  
the	  general	  theme	  seemed	  to	  be	  the	  factory’s	  poor	  economic	  performance.	  The	  
journalists	  noted	  that	  responses	  about	  the	  factory’s	  productivity	  “revealed	  years	  of	  
neglect.”	  State	  officials	  who	  ran	  the	  factory	  were	  supposed	  to	  have	  supported	  the	  sugar	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
296	  “Elazığ	  Şeker	  Fabrikası	  sökülmeye	  başlandı,”	  Elazığ	  Gazetesi,	  April	  19,	  1964.	  
	  
	   172	  
factory	  by	  distributing	  fertilizer	  to	  beet	  farmers.	  They	  had	  apparently	  failed	  to	  deliver	  
the	  necessary	  supplies	  in	  time.	  Frustration	  at	  the	  state’s	  inefficiencies	  was	  apparent:	  
If	  the	  splendid	  precision	  that	  is	  shown	  in	  the	  prominent	  decoration	  that	  is	  
given	  to	  [official]	  buildings	  were	  devoted	  to	  providing	  fertilizer	  in	  time	  to	  
the	  cultivated	  fields	  and	  to	  the	  expansion	  of	  [agricultural]	  areas,	  not	  a	  
single	  screw	  would	  be	  lifted	  from	  the	  factory.297	  
The	  lack	  of	  “precision”	  meant	  that	  the	  half-­‐functioning	  factory,	  if	  not	  drowned	  by	  the	  
dam,	  was	  destined	  to	  be	  slowly	  dismembered	  before	  their	  eyes.	  	  
Despite	  the	  factory’s	  demise,	  the	  myth	  of	  the	  green	  peninsula	  did	  not	  disappear.	  
Instead,	  it	  was	  repurposed	  in	  the	  battle	  against	  Elazığ’s	  perennial	  water	  shortages.	  In	  
1964,	  the	  problem	  was	  particularly	  acute.	  There	  had	  been	  little	  rain	  and	  aboveground	  
resources	  were	  running	  dry.	  The	  stream	  feeding	  the	  city	  had	  dropped	  to	  half	  of	  its	  
normal	  output.	  Though	  the	  State	  Water	  Works	  (Devlet	  Su	  İşleri)	  had	  investigated	  
underground	  sources	  and	  submitted	  a	  plan	  for	  semi-­‐artesian	  wells	  and	  a	  pump	  system,	  
financing	  had	  been	  delayed.	  A	  delegation	  was	  even	  sent	  to	  Ankara	  to	  plead	  for	  
immediate	  assistance.298	  
Though	  there	  were	  no	  existing	  plans	  to	  pump	  Keban	  reservoir	  water	  to	  Elazığ,	  it	  
seemed	  impossible	  that	  the	  vast	  collection	  of	  Euphrates	  water	  behind	  two	  large	  dams	  
would	  not	  be	  used	  to	  resolve	  Elazığ’s	  water	  shortage.	  The	  myth	  of	  the	  green	  peninsula	  
was	  used	  in	  lieu	  of	  detailed	  blueprints.	  Discussions	  of	  the	  dams’	  benefits	  invariably	  
declared	  that	  Elazığ	  would	  “be	  covered	  in	  vegetation	  on	  all	  sides”	  and	  that	  the	  “province	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
297	  Gürbüz	  Şenkal	  and	  Sadık	  Bingöl,	  “Elazığ	  Şeker	  Fabrikası	  Göçüyor!”	  
298	  “Su	  kifayetsizliği	  şehrimiz	  için	  büyük	  tehlike	  oluyor!!!”	  Elazığ	  Gazetesi,	  February	  8,	  
1964;	  Naci	  Akyol,	  “Su	  Davamız,”	  Elazığ	  Gazetesi,	  April	  2,	  1964.	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will	  be	  wrapped	  in	  the	  color	  green.”299	  	  
Older	  legends	  were	  repurposed	  to	  fit	  the	  new	  myth.	  The	  dam	  was	  linked	  to	  
Ferhat	  in	  the	  oft-­‐told	  story	  of	  Ferhat	  and	  Şirin.	  In	  the	  story,	  Ferhat,	  an	  expert	  craftsman	  
in	  sugar	  factory-­‐stealing	  Amasya,	  falls	  in	  love	  with	  the	  beautiful	  Şirin,	  the	  sister	  of	  
Sultana	  Mehmene	  Banu.	  The	  queen,	  however,	  disapproves	  of	  the	  match.	  The	  sultana	  
orders	  Ferhat	  to	  build	  an	  aqueduct	  through	  the	  mountains	  to	  bring	  water	  to	  the	  city.	  In	  
the	  legend,	  Ferhat	  is	  told,	  mistakenly,	  that	  Şirin	  has	  died.	  Overcome	  with	  grief,	  he	  
commits	  suicide	  before	  finishing	  the	  channel.300	  In	  the	  new	  interpretation	  for	  Elazığ,	  
though,	  the	  Ferhat	  of	  Keban	  reaches	  his	  beloved,	  indicating	  that	  he	  also	  succeeded	  in	  
bringing	  water	  through	  the	  mountains	  to	  the	  thirsty	  city.301	  
The	  myth	  of	  the	  green	  peninsula	  represented	  a	  new	  geographic	  and	  
“environmental	  imaginary”	  of	  the	  Elazığ	  region,	  born	  out	  of	  a	  political	  and	  economic	  
struggle	  over	  scarce	  state	  resources.	  The	  myth	  was	  originally	  designed	  to	  build	  a	  case	  
for	  Elazığ’s	  economic	  viability	  as	  a	  home	  to	  a	  major	  state	  economic	  enterprise.	  However,	  
the	  conceptualization	  of	  the	  province	  as	  an	  inland	  peninsula	  eventually	  became	  a	  way	  to	  
counter	  the	  problems	  of	  legitimacy	  arising	  from	  Elazığ’s	  ongoing	  water	  shortages.	  The	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
299	  Raul	  Akçay,	  “Barajın	  Faydaları,”	  Elazığ	  Gazetesi,	  October	  11,	  1964.	  
300	  The	  story	  originates	  from	  a	  Persian	  legend	  and	  was	  appropriated	  into	  Ottoman	  
Turkish.	  It	  has	  been	  told	  over	  the	  years	  in	  many	  different	  ways.	  In	  a	  well-­‐known	  version	  
relating	  to	  Amasya,	  the	  still	  living	  Şirin	  discovers	  the	  body	  of	  Ferhat	  and	  kills	  herself	  in	  
grief.	  Once	  buried,	  the	  two	  lovers’	  mingled	  tears	  feed	  springs	  that	  provide	  water	  to	  
Amasya.	  "Farhād	  u	  S̲h̲īrīn."	  Encyclopaedia	  of	  Islam,	  First	  Edition	  (1913-­‐1936).	  Edited	  by	  
M.	  Th.	  Houtsma,	  T.W.	  Arnold,	  R.	  Basset,	  R.	  Hartmann.	  Brill	  Online,	  2014.	  	  
301	  The	  repurposing	  may	  be	  found	  in	  a	  poem	  by	  Yıldırım	  N.	  Gençosmanoğlu,	  reprinted	  in	  
“Keban	  Barajı	  Yolu,”	  Elazığ	  Gazetesi,	  September	  16,	  1965.	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contradiction	  between	  the	  allocation	  of	  vast	  resources	  for	  an	  immense	  dam	  and	  
reservoir	  and	  the	  delay	  in	  funding	  for	  Elazığ’s	  own	  water	  supply	  could	  not	  be	  more	  
apparent.	  The	  myth	  worked	  to	  allay	  questions	  about	  the	  state’s	  priorities	  and	  helped	  to	  
justify	  the	  deprivations	  and	  dislocations	  produced	  by	  the	  dam	  and	  its	  reservoir.	  
	  
The	  Displaced:	  The	  Silence	  Beneath	  the	  Sea	  
In	  1966,	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Development	  and	  Housing	  (İmar	  ve	  İskan	  Bakanlığı)	  and	  
the	  Village	  Works	  Ministry	  (Köy	  İşleri	  Bakanlığı)	  completed	  the	  Keban	  Socioeconomic	  
Research	  Project.	  The	  project’s	  goal	  was	  to	  analyze	  the	  socioeconomic	  structure	  of	  the	  
areas	  that	  would	  be	  affected	  by	  the	  construction	  of	  the	  dam	  and	  the	  filling	  of	  its	  
reservoir.	  In	  the	  process,	  the	  two	  ministries	  not	  only	  identified	  the	  number	  of	  
“settlement	  areas”	  in	  danger	  of	  inundation	  (212),	  but	  also	  the	  number	  of	  families	  in	  
these	  areas	  (7,264)	  as	  well	  as	  the	  number	  of	  people	  directly	  affected	  (30,414)	  and	  the	  
number	  that	  would	  be	  forced	  to	  relocate	  (23,236).	  The	  Keban	  Socioeconomic	  Research	  
Project	  was	  a	  composition	  of	  numbers	  designed	  to	  make	  the	  “resettlement	  problem”	  
legible	  to	  state	  agencies.302	  
That	  same	  year,	  another	  research	  project	  began	  in	  the	  same	  river	  valley,	  
specifically	  designed	  to	  record	  and	  save	  the	  history	  that	  would	  be	  inundated	  by	  the	  
reservoir.	  This	  history,	  though,	  was	  not	  that	  of	  the	  displaced.	  The	  Keban	  Dam	  Rescue	  
Project	  was	  an	  international	  effort	  to	  catalog	  and	  record	  archaeological	  sites	  in	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
302	  “Keban	  Baraj	  Gölü	  Altında	  Kalacak	  Köy	  ve	  Mahallerin	  Anket	  Çalışması	  Sonucu,”	  
Ankara:	  İmar	  ve	  İskan	  Bakanlığı,	  1966.	  See	  also	  Turan	  Ersoy,	  Keban	  İskan	  Problemi	  
(Ankara:	  Devlet	  Planlama	  Teşkilati,	  1968)	  and	  “Keban	  Barajının	  İnşası	  Dolayısıyla	  Açıkta	  
Kalan	  Halkın	  İskan	  ve	  İstihdami,”	  Sosyal	  Siyaset	  Konferansları	  Dergisi	  21	  (1970):	  23-­‐36.	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Upper	  Euphrates	  region.	  The	  initial	  survey	  was	  conducted	  by	  a	  group	  of	  students	  from	  
Ankara’s	  Middle	  East	  Technical	  University	  under	  the	  guidance	  of	  Cevat	  Erder.	  Later	  
surveys	  included	  teams	  from	  three	  foreign	  countries—the	  United	  States,	  Britain,	  and	  
Germany—and	  were	  funded	  through	  government	  grants,	  including	  one	  from	  the	  
American	  National	  Science	  Foundation.303	  
The	  Turkish	  and	  foreign	  archaeologists	  hired	  local	  labor	  to	  help	  in	  manual	  tasks	  
such	  as	  digging	  and	  laying	  out	  a	  grid.	  The	  archaeological	  reports	  rarely	  mention	  them	  by	  
name,	  usually	  referencing	  local	  workers	  as	  a	  numerical	  quantity,	  just	  as	  in	  the	  research	  
project	  about	  displacement.	  Some	  aspects	  of	  the	  local	  population	  were	  related	  in	  the	  
project’s	  reports.	  Local	  knowledge	  was	  often	  instrumental	  in	  finding	  sites.	  The	  
archaeological	  survey	  also	  led	  to	  some	  small	  side	  projects	  of	  a	  mostly	  personal	  nature	  to	  
record	  the	  contemporary	  history	  of	  the	  valley.	  However,	  virtually	  all	  of	  the	  effort	  and	  
financing	  went	  to	  preserving	  the	  ancient	  past.304	  	  
The	  two	  projects’	  documents	  represent	  the	  few	  extant	  sources	  providing	  any	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
303	  Keban	  was	  known	  from	  the	  period	  of	  the	  Hittites	  (1500-­‐1200	  B.C.)	  as	  a	  rich	  source	  of	  
minerals.	  The	  Iron	  Age	  civilization	  of	  the	  Urartu,	  centered	  around	  Lake	  Van	  in	  modern	  
Turkey’s	  far	  east,	  mined	  gold	  and	  silver	  in	  the	  area.	  Keban	  and	  the	  surrounding	  
communities	  were	  later	  subject	  to	  a	  series	  of	  invasions	  from	  virtually	  every	  direction:	  
Arabs	  from	  the	  south,	  Byzantine	  Greeks	  from	  the	  west,	  Seljuk	  Turks	  and	  Mongolians	  
from	  the	  north	  and	  east.	  These	  invasions	  left	  a	  rich	  archaeological	  history	  in	  the	  
surrounding	  hills.	  See	  Doomed	  by	  the	  Dam:	  A	  Survey	  of	  the	  Monuments	  Threatened	  by	  the	  
Creation	  of	  the	  Keban	  Dam	  Flood	  Area	  (METU	  Faculty	  of	  Architecture,	  Dept.	  of	  
Restoration,	  1967).	  
304	  The	  work	  of	  the	  Keban	  Dam	  Rescue	  Project	  has	  been	  collected	  in	  a	  number	  of	  activity	  
reports	  published	  by	  the	  Middle	  East	  Technical	  University.	  A	  very	  useful	  analysis	  of	  
these	  reports	  may	  be	  found	  in	  Laurent	  Dissard,	  “Submerged	  Stories	  from	  the	  Sidelines	  of	  
Archaeological	  Science:	  The	  History	  and	  Politics	  of	  the	  Keban	  Dam	  Rescue	  Project	  
(1967-­‐1975)	  in	  Eastern	  Turkey,”	  PhD	  diss.,	  University	  of	  California,	  Berkeley,	  2011.	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detail	  whatsoever	  about	  the	  people	  living	  in	  the	  way	  of	  the	  reservoir.	  They	  therefore	  
constitute	  the	  primary	  basis	  for	  understanding	  what	  happened	  to	  the	  displaced.	  The	  
forms	  of	  knowledge	  contained	  in	  both	  reports	  structure	  all	  later	  analyses	  of	  social	  and	  
political	  change.	  In	  this	  way,	  the	  project	  delineated	  what	  is	  and	  could	  be	  known	  about	  
the	  displaced.	  They	  are	  known	  in	  aggregate,	  as	  numbers	  in	  a	  set	  of	  tables,	  and	  according	  
to	  certain	  socioeconomic	  values.	  	  
Moreover,	  these	  variables—occupation,	  categories	  of	  land	  ownership,	  number	  of	  
tractors	  and	  farm	  animals—were	  almost	  always	  situated	  in	  some	  relation	  to	  the	  
socioeconomics	  of	  the	  dam	  itself.	  In	  one	  text,	  the	  chapter	  on	  “Housing	  and	  Expropriation	  
Issues”	  includes	  a	  short	  introduction	  pointing	  out	  the	  two	  major	  problems	  facing	  
displaced	  families—housing	  and	  work—before	  moving	  directly	  into	  a	  discussion	  of	  
Turkey’s	  energy	  needs.	  This	  section,	  titled	  “The	  Socioeconomic	  Issues	  That	  Led	  to	  the	  
Keban	  Dam,”	  notes	  how	  only	  forty	  percent	  of	  the	  Turkish	  population	  used	  electricity.	  In	  
terms	  of	  per	  capita	  energy	  production,	  Turkey	  is	  shown	  to	  be	  at	  the	  bottom	  of	  a	  list	  
including	  Norway,	  the	  United	  States,	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  France.	  According	  to	  these	  
statistics,	  the	  dam	  was	  a	  natural	  outcome	  of	  socioeconomic	  needs	  and	  in	  this	  way	  the	  
socioeconomics	  of	  dam	  and	  displaced	  merged.	  Through	  the	  socioeconomics	  of	  Turkish	  
electricity	  use	  and	  local	  village	  tractor	  ownership,	  the	  dam	  and	  the	  displaced	  became	  a	  
single	  apolitical	  entity.	  Numbers	  and	  the	  socioeconomic	  narrative,	  framed	  by	  the	  
authority	  of	  social	  science,	  obscured	  other	  salient	  connections	  such	  as	  the	  dam’s	  
destruction	  of	  generations-­‐old	  family	  homes,	  cultural	  meanings	  and	  history.305	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
305	  Oya	  Silier,	  Keban	  köylerinde	  sosyo	  ekonomik	  yapı	  ve	  yeniden	  yerleşim	  sorunları	  
[Problems	  of	  resettlement	  and	  socioeconomic	  structure	  in	  Keban	  villages]	  (Ankara:	  Orta	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This	  stands	  in	  marked	  contrast	  to	  the	  open	  political	  fight	  over	  another	  
displacement,	  the	  removal	  of	  a	  sugar	  factory.	  While	  the	  local	  newspaper	  covered	  this	  
dislocation,	  the	  displacement	  of	  families	  apparently	  produced	  no	  controversy	  and	  
engendered	  no	  media	  coverage.	  With	  the	  sugar	  factory,	  charges	  of	  bias	  and	  the	  influence	  
of	  “political	  considerations”	  were	  raised	  in	  public	  fora.	  The	  most	  conspicuous	  aspect	  of	  
the	  forced	  migration	  of	  thirty	  thousand	  people—Turkey’s	  largest	  internal	  dislocation	  to	  
date—was	  the	  silence.	  While	  the	  newspaper	  was	  filled	  with	  articles	  on	  the	  dam’s	  
benefits,	  those	  who	  would	  suffer	  most	  by	  its	  construction	  were	  rarely	  mentioned.	  The	  
silence	  is	  telling.	  The	  displaced	  were	  the	  most	  potent	  raconteurs	  of	  the	  dam’s	  costs,	  a	  
group	  with	  an	  immediate	  legitimacy	  to	  contradict	  the	  many	  pronouncements	  about	  the	  
dam’s	  benefits,	  from	  its	  potential	  to	  provide	  employment	  to	  its	  climatological	  effects.	  
The	  silence	  also	  indicated	  the	  extent	  of	  the	  central	  state’s	  problems	  in	  this	  rebellious	  
part	  of	  the	  country.	  Any	  printed,	  public	  criticism	  of	  the	  government’s	  plans	  was	  
unacceptable.	  
The	  displaced	  may	  be	  detected,	  though,	  as	  a	  social	  effect	  if	  not	  a	  public	  political	  
issue.	  Since	  many	  of	  the	  displaced	  ended	  up	  moving	  to	  the	  provincial	  center	  of	  Elazığ,	  
their	  presence	  may	  be	  discerned	  in	  stories	  about	  rising	  prices,	  long	  lines	  at	  the	  
unemployment	  office	  and	  the	  rising	  cost	  of	  housing.	  In	  fact,	  in	  some	  places,	  the	  reports	  
produced	  on	  the	  displaced	  relied	  on	  the	  local	  newspaper	  as	  a	  source	  of	  information	  for	  
their	  socioeconomic	  analyses.306	  Even	  then,	  only	  in	  the	  institutional	  reports	  was	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Doğu	  Teknik	  Üniversitesi,	  1976),	  155-­‐160.	  
306	  To	  describe	  the	  kinds	  of	  problems	  faced	  by	  displaced	  people	  in	  Elazığ,	  Oya	  Silier	  
turned	  to	  stories	  in	  the	  Elazığ	  paper.	  Oya	  Silier,	  Keban	  köylerinde,	  154.	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“social	  effect”	  of	  the	  displaced	  attributed	  to	  their	  agency.	  In	  the	  newspaper	  itself,	  the	  
cause	  of	  the	  housing	  shortage	  and	  higher	  prices	  was	  never	  attributed.	  The	  paper	  at	  
times	  suggested	  that	  there	  was	  an	  influx	  of	  “workers”	  from	  villages,	  but	  never	  noted	  the	  
specific	  circumstances	  of	  their	  arrival.	  Vociferous	  in	  its	  championing	  of	  Elazığ	  in	  the	  fight	  
over	  a	  displaced	  sugar	  factory,	  the	  paper	  was	  muzzled	  when	  it	  came	  to	  the	  displacement	  
of	  human	  beings.	  
The	  local	  history	  and	  way	  of	  life	  in	  the	  Keban	  villages	  could	  be	  a	  private	  topic	  of	  
study,	  but	  to	  bring	  public	  attention	  to	  such	  losses	  would	  undermine	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  
dam	  project.	  As	  a	  result,	  in	  order	  to	  measure	  village	  history	  and	  culture	  against	  the	  
social	  and	  economic	  needs	  expressed	  in	  the	  Five-­‐Year	  Development	  Plan,	  the	  Turkish	  
state	  produced	  specific	  kinds	  of	  knowledge	  that	  could	  be	  compared:	  the	  number	  of	  
tractors	  to	  kilowatt-­‐hours	  of	  electricity,	  the	  size	  of	  farms	  to	  the	  size	  of	  industry.	  Other	  
kinds	  of	  knowledge,	  such	  as	  how	  to	  weave	  traditional	  rugs	  or	  the	  proper	  place	  to	  cross	  
the	  Euphrates	  on	  a	  raft,	  were	  lost	  in	  the	  uprooting	  and	  dislocating,	  in	  the	  muteness	  of	  
newspaper	  and	  report,	  in	  the	  silence	  beneath	  the	  inland	  sea	  that	  formed	  behind	  the	  
Keban	  dam.	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Chapter	  Four	  Illustrations	  
	   	  
Illustration	  5.	  Road	  map	  of	  Elazığ	  province,	  1964307	  
	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
307	  Excerpted	  from	  “Road	  Map	  of	  Turkey,”	  General	  Directorate	  of	  Highways,	  1964.	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Chapter	  Four	  Illustrations	  (continued)	  
	  
Illustration	  6.	  Road	  map	  of	  Elazığ	  province,	  2012308
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
308	  Excerpted	  from	  “Türkiye	  Haritası,”	  Karayolları	  Genel	  Müdürlüğü,	  2012.	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CHAPTER	  FIVE	  
Mesopotamia	  and	  the	  International	  Order	  
	  
In	  1965,	  Turkey	  began	  construction	  of	  the	  Keban	  dam	  on	  the	  Euphrates	  River.	  
Ankara	  obtained	  funding	  for	  the	  dam	  from	  the	  United	  States	  and	  several	  West	  European	  
countries	  led	  by	  West	  Germany	  and	  contracted	  a	  consortium	  of	  West	  European	  
companies	  to	  complete	  the	  dam.	  A	  few	  years	  later,	  in	  1968,	  the	  Syrian	  government	  
proceeded	  with	  construction	  of	  another	  massive	  dam	  downstream	  of	  Keban.	  	  The	  Soviet	  
Union	  funded,	  designed	  and	  built	  Syria’s	  dam	  at	  a	  location	  known	  as	  al-­‐Tabqa.	  Both	  
dams	  were	  meant	  to	  produce	  cheap	  electricity	  for	  industrial	  development	  and	  to	  expand	  
agriculture.309	  	  
As	  has	  been	  amply	  demonstrated	  in	  the	  literature	  on	  water	  infrastructure,	  
massive	  water	  projects	  also	  served	  to	  augment	  the	  power	  and	  reach	  of	  the	  centralizing	  
state.	  For	  these	  two	  Middle	  Eastern	  states,	  the	  dams	  also	  served	  another	  function,	  one	  
vital	  to	  the	  international	  and	  regional	  politics	  of	  the	  era.	  In	  their	  enhancement	  of	  state	  
power	  and	  each	  country’s	  economy,	  the	  projects	  were	  meant	  to	  undergird	  the	  political	  
and	  economic	  sovereignty	  of	  Syria	  and	  Turkey.	  The	  doctrine	  of	  independence	  through	  
development	  in	  these	  two	  states	  was	  not	  simply	  a	  post-­‐colonial	  or	  post-­‐Second	  World	  
War	  concept	  emanating	  from	  Truman’s	  Point	  IV	  promises.	  Such	  ideas	  were	  part	  of	  
Ottoman	  efforts	  to	  resist	  European	  encroachment	  in	  the	  nineteenth	  century	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
309	  Though	  the	  Keban	  dam	  included	  no	  provision	  for	  irrigation,	  the	  project	  was	  critical	  to	  
regulating	  the	  Euphrates	  for	  future	  irrigation	  projects.	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continued	  to	  play	  a	  role	  in	  Turkish	  and	  Syrian	  views	  on	  the	  role	  of	  economic	  
development	  in	  the	  post-­‐1945	  period.310	  
The	  two	  dam	  projects	  therefore	  produced	  something	  of	  a	  conundrum.	  While	  on	  
the	  one	  hand	  built	  to	  enhance	  economic	  power	  and	  independence,	  the	  projects	  also	  
were	  a	  hazard	  to	  that	  independence.	  By	  the	  1960s,	  when	  construction	  began	  on	  these	  
two	  projects,	  the	  conundrum	  inherent	  in	  major	  foreign-­‐funded	  infrastructure	  projects	  
had	  been	  amply	  demonstrated.	  In	  1956,	  American	  and	  European	  governments	  canceled	  
an	  aid	  package	  for	  Egypt’s	  Aswan	  High	  Dam	  as	  a	  response	  to	  several	  Egyptian	  policies	  
favorable	  to	  communist	  states.311	  In	  response,	  Egyptian	  President	  Gamal	  ‘Abd	  al-­‐Nasir	  
nationalized	  the	  Suez	  Canal	  and	  set	  in	  motion	  events	  that	  led	  to	  a	  British,	  French	  and	  
Israeli	  invasion	  of	  Egypt.	  Though	  the	  United	  States	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  both	  
condemned	  the	  invasion,	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  soon	  overtook	  American	  and	  West	  European	  
influences	  in	  Egypt.	  The	  Soviets	  supplied	  Egypt	  not	  only	  with	  diplomatic	  support	  and	  
arms	  but	  also	  a	  new	  dam	  at	  Aswan,	  and	  held	  sway	  in	  Egypt	  until	  the	  early	  1970s.	  For	  
Syria	  and	  Turkey,	  then,	  the	  post-­‐1945	  development	  aid	  offered	  by	  “the	  West”	  and	  “the	  
East”	  created	  a	  tension.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  each	  country	  was	  loathe	  to	  accept	  the	  political	  
strings	  attached	  to	  the	  funding	  and	  expertise	  offered	  to	  construct	  the	  massive	  projects,	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  Nathan	  J.	  Citino,	  “The	  Ottoman	  Legacy	  in	  Cold	  War	  Modernization,”	  International	  
Journal	  of	  Middle	  East	  Studies	  40	  (2008):	  579-­‐597.	  
311	  These	  included	  a	  rejection	  of	  the	  Baghdad	  Pact	  in	  1955,	  an	  arms	  deal	  with	  
Czechoslovakia	  that	  same	  year	  and	  recognition	  of	  the	  People’s	  Republic	  of	  China	  in	  May	  
1956.	  For	  more	  on	  the	  Suez	  Crisis,	  see	  Guy	  Laron,	  Origins	  of	  the	  Suez	  Crisis:	  Postwar	  
Development	  Diplomacy	  and	  the	  Struggle	  over	  Third	  World	  Industrialization,	  1945-­‐1956	  
(Baltimore:	  The	  Johns	  Hopkins	  University	  Press,	  2013).	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but	  strongly	  attracted	  to	  the	  projects’	  potential	  to	  produce	  the	  economic	  and	  political	  
power	  necessary	  to	  maintain	  independence.	  	  
Recent	  analyses	  of	  water	  infrastructure	  and	  politics	  (international	  and	  domestic)	  
in	  science	  and	  technology	  studies	  as	  well	  as	  in	  geography	  and	  anthropology	  focus	  
heavily	  on	  the	  relationship	  of	  political	  and	  economic	  goals	  to	  technical	  expertise.312	  
These	  studies	  are	  quite	  useful	  to	  understanding	  such	  topics	  as	  state	  formation	  or	  state	  
building,	  and	  have	  fertilized	  many	  aspects	  of	  this	  study.	  Still,	  there	  has	  been	  much	  less	  
discussion	  about	  how	  water	  projects	  helped	  structure	  state	  behavior	  within	  the	  post-­‐
war	  international	  system.	  As	  geographer	  Chris	  Sneddon	  noted	  in	  2012,	  “the	  diverse	  
literature	  in	  STS	  has	  had	  surprisingly	  little	  to	  say	  about	  dams	  as	  technological	  or	  
political	  objects,”	  particularly	  with	  respect	  to	  international	  politics.313	  Sneddon	  and	  
others	  have	  done	  some	  important	  work	  in	  this	  regard,	  analyzing	  dams	  and	  dam	  
proposals	  in	  other	  parts	  of	  Asia	  and	  situating	  these	  within	  the	  post-­‐1945	  international	  
order.	  However,	  these	  studies	  have	  generally	  focused	  on	  the	  problems	  and	  tensions	  
involved	  with	  American	  bureaucracies	  and	  companies	  producing	  technical	  knowledge	  
for	  particular	  political	  purposes.	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  See,	  for	  instance,	  Leila	  M.	  Harris,	  “State	  as	  Socionatural	  Effect:	  Variable	  and	  Emergent	  
Geographies	  of	  the	  State	  in	  Southeastern	  Turkey,”	  Comparative	  Studies	  of	  South	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Africa	  and	  the	  Middle	  East	  31	  (2012):	  25-­‐39;	  Leila	  M.	  Harris	  and	  Samer	  Alatout,	  
“Negotiating	  Hydro-­‐Scales,	  Forging	  States:	  Comparison	  of	  the	  Upper	  Tigris-­‐Euphrates	  
and	  Jordan	  River	  Basins,”	  Political	  Geography	  29	  (2010):	  148-­‐156;	  and	  Chris	  Sneddon	  
and	  Coleen	  Fox,	  “The	  Cold	  War,	  the	  US	  Bureau	  of	  Reclamation,	  and	  the	  Technopolitics	  of	  
River	  Basin	  Development,	  1950-­‐1970,”	  Political	  Geography	  30	  (2011):	  450-­‐460;	  
313	  Chris	  Sneddon,	  “The	  ‘Sinew	  of	  Development,’:	  Cold	  War	  Geopolitics,	  Technical	  
Expertise,	  and	  Water	  Resource	  Development	  in	  Southeast	  Asia,	  1954-­‐1975,”	  Social	  
Studies	  of	  Science	  42	  (2012):	  566.	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This	  chapter	  seeks	  to	  tackle	  another	  aspect	  of	  the	  role	  of	  dams	  within	  the	  
international	  system	  by	  further	  explicating	  the	  conundrum	  facing	  Turkish	  and	  Syrian	  
officials	  in	  their	  pursuit	  of	  development	  aid.	  Rather	  than	  concentrating	  on	  the	  
problematic	  political	  implications	  involved	  with	  the	  production	  of	  technical	  knowledge,	  
this	  chapter	  examines	  the	  political	  and	  diplomatic	  approaches	  Turkey	  and	  Syria	  adopted	  
to	  obtain	  financial	  assistance.	  From	  this	  analysis	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  make	  two	  connected	  
arguments	  about	  the	  position	  of	  these	  massive	  projects	  in	  international	  politics.	  First,	  
with	  respect	  to	  European	  and	  American	  powers,	  it	  becomes	  clear	  that	  these	  projects	  
were	  not	  simply	  about	  safeguarding	  relatively	  narrow	  foreign	  policy	  interests,	  such	  as	  
containment	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  or	  the	  extension	  of	  communist	  ideology.	  Rather,	  the	  
dams	  were	  a	  key	  component	  in	  producing	  a	  particular	  economic	  order,	  not	  only	  in	  the	  
form	  of	  opening	  overseas	  markets	  to	  exports,	  but	  also	  in	  maintaining	  a	  specific	  technical	  
and	  industrial	  base	  in	  the	  donor	  country.	  Second,	  with	  respect	  to	  Turkey	  and	  Syria,	  this	  
analysis	  emphasizes	  how	  economic	  aid	  required	  an	  awkward	  political	  balancing	  act	  that	  
involved	  trading	  some	  measure	  of	  political	  independence	  for	  economic	  sovereignty.	  
While	  security	  concerns	  and	  other	  foreign	  policy	  goals	  at	  times	  trumped	  these	  factors	  in	  
defining	  these	  states’	  relationships	  to	  larger	  powers,	  the	  Suez	  Crisis	  of	  1956	  functions	  as	  
a	  reminder	  that	  these	  projects	  had	  the	  power	  to	  structure	  political	  relations,	  no	  less	  in	  
Syria	  and	  Turkey	  than	  in	  Egypt.	  
	  
This	  chapter	  works	  to	  bring	  two	  bodies	  of	  scholarship	  into	  conversation.	  One	  is	  
the	  aforementioned	  work	  on	  water	  infrastructure	  and	  its	  importance	  in	  the	  execution	  of	  
state	  goals	  and	  in	  the	  shaping	  of	  both	  the	  state	  itself	  and	  society.	  The	  other	  is	  the	  recent	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work	  in	  what	  may	  be	  termed	  “Cold	  War	  studies.”	  Recent	  reconsideration	  of	  the	  Cold	  
War,	  benefiting	  from	  new	  sources,	  has	  criticized	  earlier	  notions	  of	  the	  competition	  
between	  the	  United	  States	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  their	  allies.	  Rather	  than	  
foregrounding	  the	  motives	  and	  actions	  of	  the	  larger,	  more	  powerful	  actors,	  these	  studies	  
analyze	  the	  agency	  of	  smaller	  actors	  in	  shaping	  international	  affairs	  and	  the	  actions	  of	  
superpowers.	  In	  this	  scholarship,	  the	  Cold	  War	  policies	  of	  large	  and	  small	  actors	  are	  
seen	  as	  push	  and	  pull.	  While	  at	  times	  dictated	  by	  the	  desires	  and	  designs	  of	  Washington	  
and	  Moscow,	  policy	  was	  often	  the	  product	  of	  events	  internal	  to	  small	  states	  or	  small	  
powers’	  conscious	  manipulation	  of	  the	  bipolar	  international	  system.314	  	  
At	  stake	  in	  this	  new	  interpretation	  of	  the	  historical	  context	  of	  Cold	  War	  politics	  is	  
not	  only	  the	  dynamism	  of	  the	  international	  system,	  seen	  in	  earlier	  interpretations	  as	  
zero	  sum	  and	  relatively	  static,	  but	  also	  the	  particular	  histories	  of	  states	  and	  peoples.	  On	  
the	  one	  hand,	  massive	  infrastructure	  projects	  function	  in	  the	  earlier	  interpretations	  as	  
bargaining	  chips,	  as	  products	  of	  the	  competition	  and	  ideology	  emanating	  from	  the	  two	  
major	  powers.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  story	  of	  two	  dominant	  superpowers	  and	  the	  slow	  
erosion	  of	  a	  multi-­‐polar	  system	  diminishes	  the	  importance	  of	  earlier	  historical	  
trajectories.	  These	  trajectories	  are	  subsumed	  into	  the	  battle	  of	  titans,	  upon	  which	  all	  
outcomes	  depend.	  Based	  on	  these	  new	  understandings	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  in	  the	  Middle	  
East,	  it	  is	  no	  longer	  possible	  to	  see	  economic	  development	  projects	  simply	  as	  products	  of	  
Cold	  War	  competition.	  The	  multivalent	  and	  contingent	  history	  that	  led	  to	  a	  “Western-­‐
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  These	  studies	  include,	  for	  instance,	  Rashid	  Khalidi,	  Sowing	  Crisis:	  The	  Cold	  War	  and	  
American	  Dominance	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  (Boston:	  Beacon	  Press,	  2009);	  Odd	  Arne	  Westad,	  
The	  Global	  Cold	  War:	  Third	  World	  Interventions	  and	  the	  Making	  of	  Our	  Times	  (Cambridge:	  
Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2007);	  and	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  Origins.	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built”	  dam	  at	  Keban	  and	  an	  “Eastern-­‐built”	  dam	  at	  al-­‐Tabqa	  would	  be	  lost	  in	  viewing	  
these	  projects	  through	  a	  bipolar	  lens.	  	  
The	  Keban	  and	  al-­‐Tabqa	  dams	  are	  in	  fact	  part	  of	  a	  state	  building	  project	  with	  a	  
larger	  and	  longer	  history,	  as	  previous	  chapters	  have	  illustrated.	  In	  light	  of	  this	  history,	  
Turkey,	  Iraq	  and	  Syria	  were	  faced	  with	  a	  problem,	  well	  illustrated	  by	  the	  Egyptian	  case.	  
These	  massive	  projects	  needed	  considerable	  expertise	  and	  financing,	  requiring	  these	  
Middle	  Eastern	  states	  to	  rely	  on	  larger	  powers.	  Yet,	  these	  facilities	  clearly	  functioned	  in	  
the	  postwar	  era	  as	  a	  means	  for	  larger	  powers	  to	  exert	  influence	  on	  smaller	  states;	  they	  
were	  effective	  levers	  to	  bend	  these	  states	  to	  the	  patron’s	  will.	  Yet,	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  
smaller	  powers	  viewed	  these	  dams	  as	  a	  way	  to	  grow	  their	  economies,	  industrialize	  and	  
thereby	  obtain	  greater	  economic	  independence.	  The	  rivalry	  between	  the	  United	  States	  
and	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  offered	  smaller	  states	  an	  opportunity	  to	  obtain	  a	  patron	  and	  
produced	  the	  leverage	  Middle	  Eastern	  governments	  used	  to	  obtain	  their	  desires.	  Still,	  
the	  relationship	  with	  the	  superpowers	  often	  subjected	  these	  smaller	  states	  to	  dangers	  
that	  they	  otherwise	  may	  not	  have	  faced,	  an	  obvious	  example	  being	  the	  emplacement	  of	  
Jupiter-­‐class	  nuclear	  missiles	  in	  western	  Anatolia.	  Diplomacy	  by	  dam	  was	  therefore	  a	  
high-­‐stakes	  game,	  requiring	  small	  states	  to	  walk	  a	  tightrope	  between	  the	  opportunities	  
presented	  by	  economic	  sovereignty	  and	  the	  perils	  of	  giving	  up	  too	  much	  political	  
independence	  in	  that	  pursuit.	  
The	  year	  1945	  has	  been	  viewed	  as	  a	  break,	  as	  the	  decisive	  moment	  of	  
globalization	  when	  it	  becomes	  possible	  to	  realize	  “Third	  World	  development,”	  in	  the	  
parlance	  of	  the	  time.	  However,	  a	  new	  globalized	  trend	  toward	  development	  after	  1945	  
should	  be	  understood	  as	  an	  intensification	  rather	  than	  a	  new	  phenomenon.	  Even	  the	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“new”	  ideas	  of	  modernization	  were	  old	  ideas.	  Practices	  of	  import	  substitution,	  
industrialization	  and	  state-­‐led	  economic	  development	  were	  concepts	  from	  an	  earlier	  
age,	  practiced	  by	  governments	  in	  a	  diverse	  range	  of	  places,	  from	  Egypt	  to	  Japan,	  Mexico	  
to	  Germany.315	  The	  history	  of	  development	  had	  by	  this	  time	  made	  clear	  the	  relationship	  
between	  political	  independence	  and	  economic	  sovereignty.	  The	  year	  1945	  may	  have	  
marked	  the	  beginning	  of	  a	  new	  order	  of	  juridically	  equal	  nation-­‐states,	  making	  possible	  
the	  concept	  of	  a	  “Third	  World,”	  but	  the	  kinds	  of	  political	  and	  economic	  subordination	  
inherent	  in	  concepts	  of	  modernization	  were	  nothing	  new.	  	  
The	  dam	  was	  in	  fact	  the	  place	  where	  a	  method	  of	  economic	  subordination	  met	  a	  
program	  of	  economic	  reinvigoration.	  While	  large-­‐scale	  water	  engineering	  projects	  
provided	  a	  means	  for	  European	  powers—including	  the	  Soviet	  Union—and	  the	  United	  
States	  to	  secure	  economic	  and	  political	  advantage	  in	  the	  Middle	  East,	  they	  also	  produced	  
ways	  for	  Middle	  Eastern	  states	  to	  expand	  their	  productive	  base	  and	  enhance	  their	  
economies.	  By	  accepting	  financing	  from	  outside	  powers	  and	  the	  strings	  attached	  to	  such	  
assistance,	  Middle	  Eastern	  states	  traded	  political	  independence	  for	  the	  promise	  of	  
economic	  sovereignty	  through	  resource	  exploitation,	  with	  the	  idea	  that	  enhanced	  
economic	  self-­‐determination	  would	  eventually	  lead	  to	  greater	  political	  flexibility.	  	  
The	  dual	  nature	  of	  these	  projects	  as	  avenues	  of	  interference	  and	  independence	  is	  
the	  subject	  of	  this	  chapter,	  which	  is	  divided	  into	  three	  parts.	  The	  first	  part	  will	  detail	  
Turkey’s	  progression	  as	  an	  ally	  of	  the	  West	  and	  the	  pressures	  and	  opportunities	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
315	  See	  Jean	  Batou,	  ed.,	  Between	  Development	  and	  Underdevelopment	  /	  Entre	  
développement	  et	  sous-­‐développement	  (Geneva:	  Centre	  of	  International	  Economic	  
History,	  1991),	  xi-­‐xviii	  and	  143-­‐218.	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afforded	  by	  the	  Keban	  dam	  project	  in	  Turkey’s	  relations	  with	  both	  global	  and	  regional	  
actors.	  This	  section	  demonstrates	  how,	  for	  a	  time,	  the	  politics	  of	  the	  Black	  Sea	  flowed	  
into	  the	  Euphrates.	  The	  second	  part	  of	  the	  chapter	  analyzes	  the	  Syrian	  case,	  detailing	  the	  
country’s	  struggle	  to	  find	  a	  patron	  for	  its	  Euphrates	  dam	  project	  that	  would	  not	  demand	  
complete	  obedience	  to	  repellent	  political	  aims.	  The	  final	  section	  examines	  how	  the	  
history	  of	  funding	  these	  projects	  influenced	  later	  developments,	  including	  attempts	  to	  
negotiate	  a	  basin-­‐wide	  agreement	  to	  share	  water	  and	  to	  secure	  funding	  for	  additional	  
projects	  in	  a	  unipolar	  world	  dominated	  by	  the	  United	  States.
	  
Diplomacy	  by	  Dam:	  Turkey	  and	  Foreign	  Aid	  
This	  discussion	  of	  Turkey’s	  financing	  of	  two	  major	  dam	  projects—the	  Seyhan	  
near	  Adana	  and	  the	  Keban	  on	  the	  Euphrates—conveys	  two	  connected	  arguments.	  The	  
first	  is	  with	  respect	  to	  writings	  about	  Turkey,	  the	  western	  alliance	  and	  NATO	  after	  1945,	  
which	  often	  take	  the	  country’s	  orientation	  toward	  the	  west	  as	  a	  given,	  a	  product	  of	  a	  
single	  factor:	  Stalin’s	  rapacious	  expansionism.	  Though	  this	  is	  certainly	  salient	  to	  
Turkey’s	  post-­‐war	  policies,	  the	  first	  part	  of	  this	  section	  seeks	  to	  add	  some	  nuance	  by	  
emphasizing	  not	  only	  the	  important	  place	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  in	  providing	  aid	  to	  the	  
nascent	  Republic,	  but	  also	  by	  reaching	  deeper	  into	  the	  history	  of	  Turkey’s	  relationship	  
with	  its	  neighbor	  to	  the	  north.	  Second,	  many	  of	  the	  writings	  about	  the	  political	  context	  of	  
foreign	  assistance	  to	  Turkey	  from	  the	  1950s	  through	  the	  1980s	  address	  the	  major	  
“bumps”	  in	  Turkey’s	  inevitable	  move	  toward	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Western	  Europe,	  
including	  problems	  with	  stabilization	  programs,	  the	  Cuban	  Missile	  Crisis	  and	  the	  Cyprus	  
conflict.	  Less	  attention	  has	  been	  paid	  to	  the	  very	  real	  ways	  aid	  for	  major	  projects	  was	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used	  to	  affect	  Turkish	  policies,	  how	  this	  affected	  the	  financing	  of	  major	  projects,	  and	  to	  
what	  extent	  this	  “assistance”	  was	  in	  fact	  to	  support	  the	  donor’s	  own	  economy.	  This	  
section	  on	  Turkey	  therefore	  argues	  that	  dam	  projects	  became	  a	  method	  for	  foreign	  
powers	  to	  manipulate	  Ankara	  and	  to	  support	  their	  own	  development.	  
At	  the	  Turkish	  Republic’s	  first	  economic	  congress	  in	  1923,	  the	  hero	  of	  the	  
Republic,	  Mustafa	  Kemal	  ,	  declared	  to	  the	  gathered	  delegates	  in	  Izmir:	  	  
To	  propel	  our	  new	  Turkey	  forward	  to	  the	  level	  of	  evolution	  of	  which	  she	  is	  
worthy	  we	  are	  obliged…whatever	  happens,	  to	  put	  the	  economy	  first…	  
However	  great	  may	  be	  the	  political	  and	  military	  victories,	  the	  success	  
achieved	  cannot	  last	  unless	  it	  is	  crowned	  with	  economic	  victories,	  and	  will	  
soon	  vanish.316	  
To	  preserve	  Turkish	  military	  victories	  in	  Anatolia	  and	  the	  political	  independence	  that	  
came	  with	  them,	  Ankara	  adopted	  foreign	  investment	  policies	  designed	  to	  allow	  private	  
foreign	  investors	  to	  support	  specific	  projects,	  but	  to	  avoid	  the	  indebtedness	  that	  had	  led	  
to	  significant	  constraints	  on	  Ottoman	  sovereignty.317	  Still,	  outside	  investment	  was	  quite	  
limited.	  With	  the	  advent	  of	  the	  Great	  Depression	  a	  half-­‐decade	  later,	  and	  the	  enactment	  
of	  investment	  controls	  in	  the	  largest	  economies,	  the	  Turkish	  Republic	  could	  no	  longer	  
expect	  outside	  monies	  and	  turned	  definitively	  toward	  a	  statist	  approach	  to	  economic	  
development	  and	  industrialization.318	  During	  this	  period,	  the	  Turkish	  Republic	  accepted	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
316	  The	  full	  text	  of	  this	  speech	  is	  available	  in	  A.	  Gündüz	  Ökçun,	  Türkiye	  İktisat	  Kongresi,	  
1923	  —	  İzmir	  (Ankara	  University,	  Political	  Science	  Faculty,	  1968),	  243-­‐256.	  This	  passage	  
quoted	  from	  William	  Hale,	  The	  Development	  of	  Modern	  Turkey	  (New	  York:	  St.	  Martin’s	  
Press,	  1981),	  35.	  
317	  Hale,	  Modern	  Turkey,	  39-­‐61.	  See	  also	  Z.	  Y.	  Hershlag,	  The	  Contemporary	  Turkish	  
Economy	  (London:	  Routledge,	  1988),	  ix-­‐15.	  
318	  See	  Chapter	  2.	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only	  one	  grant	  of	  foreign	  assistance:	  an	  eight	  million	  dollar	  loan	  from	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  to	  
support	  the	  country’s	  industrialization	  plan.	  
During	  the	  Second	  World	  War,	  Turkey	  was	  offered	  several	  grants	  of	  assistance	  
from	  other	  European	  powers	  eager	  for	  her	  support.	  The	  British,	  French	  and	  Soviets	  
granted	  Ankara	  credits	  totaling	  a	  considerable	  sum	  for	  that	  period,	  over	  $300	  million.	  
The	  country’s	  total	  debt	  rose	  from	  about	  $236	  million	  in	  1938	  to	  $439	  million	  by	  
December	  1945.	  These	  debts	  played	  a	  significant	  role	  in	  the	  country’s	  foreign	  assistance	  
needs	  after	  the	  war	  and	  will	  feature	  significantly	  later	  in	  this	  story.	  
The	  offers	  of	  aid	  and	  the	  détente	  established	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  did	  not	  last	  
long	  after	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Second	  World	  War.	  Studies	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  and	  Turkey’s	  post-­‐
1945	  foreign	  policy	  often	  begin	  by	  discussing	  Soviet	  demands	  and	  Stalin’s	  renunciation	  
of	  the	  1925	  Treaty	  of	  Friendship	  between	  the	  two	  nations,	  implying	  in	  this	  
contextualization	  that	  Stalin’s	  actions	  were	  unprovoked	  and	  radical.	  In	  the	  same	  
instance,	  it	  appears	  from	  Turkey’s	  post-­‐war	  circumstances	  as	  if	  an	  alliance	  with	  the	  
West	  was	  a	  foregone	  conclusion.	  A	  broader	  view	  of	  Turkish	  relations	  with	  its	  northern	  
neighbor	  and	  Western	  powers	  suggests	  a	  more	  contingent	  process.	  
The	  dispute	  with	  Stalin	  after	  1945	  centered	  on	  the	  two	  narrow	  straits—the	  
Bosporus	  and	  the	  Dardanelles—that	  connect	  the	  Mediterranean	  to	  the	  Black	  Sea	  via	  the	  
Sea	  of	  Marmara.	  The	  geography	  of	  the	  straits	  and,	  by	  extension,	  the	  ability	  of	  states	  to	  
project	  power	  from	  the	  Black	  Sea	  into	  the	  eastern	  Mediterranean	  and	  vice-­‐versa	  had	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been	  an	  important	  structural	  factor	  in	  international	  affairs	  for	  centuries.319	  In	  the	  
nineteenth	  century,	  the	  Ottoman	  Sultan	  Mahmud	  II	  met	  the	  threat	  of	  Mehmet	  Ali’s	  Egypt	  
by	  calling	  on	  assistance	  from	  Russia’s	  Tsar	  Nicholas	  I.	  The	  alliance	  between	  Istanbul	  and	  
St.	  Petersburg	  alarmed	  the	  British	  and	  French	  who	  eventually	  interceded.	  Even	  with	  the	  
promise	  of	  British	  and	  French	  assistance,	  Mahmud	  II	  agreed	  to	  the	  1833	  Treaty	  of	  
Hünkâr	  İskelesi.	  The	  treaty	  obligated	  the	  Ottoman	  Empire	  to	  close	  the	  straits	  and	  access	  
to	  the	  Black	  Sea	  upon	  the	  request	  of	  the	  Russian	  government.	  Russo-­‐Ottoman	  relations	  
deteriorated	  later	  in	  the	  nineteenth	  century	  and	  the	  Ottomans	  increasingly	  relied	  on	  the	  
intercession	  of	  the	  British	  and	  French	  in	  their	  struggle	  with	  St.	  Petersburg.	  A	  new	  straits	  
regime	  promulgated	  in	  the	  1840s	  had	  the	  effect	  of	  barring	  the	  Russian	  fleet	  from	  the	  
Mediterranean.320	  
During	  the	  First	  World	  War,	  the	  straits	  became	  a	  site	  of	  violent	  conflict	  between	  
the	  Ottomans	  and	  their	  erstwhile	  allies,	  the	  British	  and	  French.	  The	  Ottoman	  victory	  at	  
Gallipoli	  in	  1916	  over	  Entente	  forces	  saved	  the	  Ottoman	  capital	  from	  occupation	  until	  
the	  1918	  armistice.	  With	  the	  1923	  Lausanne	  Treaty,	  the	  straits	  were	  demilitarized	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
319	  It	  may	  be	  argued	  that	  this	  has	  continued	  even	  into	  the	  twenty-­‐first	  century,	  as	  Russia	  
vies	  with	  the	  United	  States	  and	  other	  European	  powers	  for	  primacy	  in	  Syria	  and	  the	  
Crimea	  peninsula.	  
320	  In	  1840,	  the	  Convention	  of	  London	  barred	  all	  warships	  from	  the	  straits	  except	  during	  
wartime.	  In	  1841,	  the	  London	  Straits	  Convention	  established	  the	  rights	  of	  Ottoman	  allies	  
to	  use	  the	  straits	  during	  time	  of	  war.	  As	  Britain	  was	  the	  primary	  ally	  of	  the	  Ottoman	  
Empire	  at	  this	  time,	  British	  naval	  forces	  benefited	  most	  from	  this	  arrangement.	  For	  
more,	  see	  Caroline	  Finkel,	  Osman’s	  Dream:	  The	  History	  of	  the	  Ottoman	  Empire	  (New	  
York:	  Perseus,	  2005),	  443-­‐446.	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placed	  under	  League	  of	  Nations	  supervision.321	  However,	  because	  of	  growing	  Italian	  
expansionism	  in	  the	  Mediterranean	  in	  the	  1930s,	  Turkey	  pushed	  for	  a	  revision	  of	  the	  
Lausanne	  terms.	  The	  Montreux	  Convention,	  signed	  in	  the	  Swiss	  city	  in	  1936,	  allowed	  the	  
Turks	  to	  fortify	  the	  straits	  and	  close	  them	  to	  wartime	  belligerents.	  This	  change	  had	  
almost	  immediate	  significance,	  as	  Turkey	  was	  able	  to	  limit	  the	  entrance	  of	  Axis	  ships	  
into	  the	  Black	  Sea,	  reducing	  pressure	  on	  the	  Soviet	  Union’s	  southern	  flank.	  Meanwhile,	  
the	  Convention	  confirmed	  Soviet	  naval	  supremacy	  in	  the	  Black	  Sea,	  but	  still	  limited	  
Soviet	  access	  to	  the	  Mediterranean,	  a	  continuing	  goal	  of	  the	  British.322	  	  
The	  key	  point	  here	  is	  that	  the	  Turkish	  orientation	  toward	  a	  “Western”	  alliance	  or	  
an	  “Eastern”	  one	  had	  for	  centuries	  been	  contingent	  and	  not	  particularly	  comfortable.	  
Turkey,	  in	  both	  its	  Republican	  and	  Ottoman	  forms,	  had	  often	  been	  more	  inclined	  to	  seek	  
a	  balance,	  a	  fact	  amply	  represented	  in	  the	  public	  works	  projects	  it	  pursued	  in	  the	  latter	  
half	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century.	  In	  any	  case,	  Soviet	  Premier	  Iosif	  Stalin	  launched	  a	  salvo	  in	  
March	  1945	  that	  drove	  Turkey	  decisively	  toward	  the	  West—at	  least	  for	  a	  time—by	  
renouncing	  the	  1925	  Treaty	  of	  Friendship.	  A	  few	  months	  later	  Stalin	  demanded	  bilateral	  
negotiations,	  with	  the	  aim	  of	  an	  unconditional	  opening	  of	  the	  Bosporus	  and	  Dardanelles	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
321	  Woodrow	  Wilson	  included	  the	  straits	  in	  his	  “Fourteen	  Points”	  of	  January	  8,	  1918.	  
Point	  Twelve	  reads:	  “The	  Turkish	  portion	  of	  the	  present	  Ottoman	  Empire	  should	  be	  
assured	  a	  secure	  sovereignty,	  but	  the	  other	  nationalities	  which	  are	  now	  under	  Turkish	  
rule	  should	  be	  assured	  an	  undoubted	  security	  of	  life	  and	  an	  absolutely	  unmolested	  
opportunity	  of	  autonomous	  development,	  and	  the	  Dardanelles	  should	  be	  permanently	  
opened	  as	  a	  free	  passage	  to	  the	  ships	  and	  commerce	  of	  all	  nations	  under	  international	  
guarantees.”	  
322	  For	  more	  on	  this	  period,	  see	  Selim	  Deringil,	  Turkish	  Foreign	  Policy	  During	  the	  Second	  
World	  War:	  An	  ‘Active’	  Neutrality	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1989),	  71-­‐
91;	  Erik	  Zürcher,	  Turkey,	  200-­‐205.	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to	  Soviet	  vessels.	  Moscow	  also	  demanded	  the	  establishment	  of	  Soviet	  military	  bases	  
along	  the	  straits	  and	  the	  restitution	  of	  two	  Ottoman	  provinces—Kars	  and	  Ardahan—that	  
Russia	  had	  won	  in	  the	  1877-­‐78	  Ottoman-­‐Russian	  War	  but	  returned	  to	  Turkey	  in	  1921.	  
To	  the	  Turks,	  these	  demands	  represented	  an	  existential	  threat;	  Turkish	  leaders	  knew	  
very	  well	  what	  was	  happening	  in	  Eastern	  Europe	  and	  had	  no	  desire	  for	  Turkey	  to	  
become	  a	  Soviet	  satellite.323	  
As	  a	  result,	  from	  a	  position	  of	  neutrality	  during	  the	  Second	  World	  War,	  the	  
Turkish	  Republic	  sought	  greater	  ties	  with	  the	  West	  to	  counterbalance	  the	  Soviet	  threat.	  
United	  States	  policy	  was	  vital	  in	  Turkey’s	  progress	  from	  neutral	  power	  to	  NATO	  ally.324	  
Turkey	  was	  included	  in	  the	  “Truman	  Doctrine”	  in	  1947	  and	  won	  its	  first	  allotment	  of	  
American	  economic	  aid.	  A	  year	  later	  the	  country	  was	  included	  in	  the	  Marshall	  Aid	  
program	  and	  joined	  the	  Organization	  for	  European	  Economic	  Cooperation	  (OEEC,	  later	  
the	  Organization	  for	  Economic	  Cooperation	  and	  Development	  or	  OECD).	  This	  eventually	  
led	  to	  Turkey’s	  1949	  admission	  into	  the	  Council	  of	  Europe	  and	  1951	  negotiations	  to	  join	  
the	  North	  Atlantic	  Treaty	  Organization	  (NATO),	  with	  official	  approval	  in	  February	  1952.	  
The	  move	  toward	  alliance	  with	  Western	  powers	  entailed	  a	  comprehensive	  shift	  
in	  Turkey’s	  interwar	  doctrine	  of	  political	  and	  economic	  self-­‐sufficiency.	  The	  Young	  Turk	  
goals	  of	  political	  independence	  and	  economic	  sovereignty	  that	  had	  guided	  policy	  since	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
323	  Bruce	  R.	  Kuniholm,	  The	  Origins	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  in	  the	  Near	  East:	  Great	  Power	  Conflict	  
and	  Diplomacy	  in	  Iran,	  Turkey	  and	  Greece	  (Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  1980),	  
359-­‐382;	  Deringil,	  Turkish	  Foreign	  Policy,	  178-­‐183;	  and	  Khalidi,	  Sowing	  Crisis,	  40-­‐69.	  
324	  Other	  European	  powers,	  particularly	  the	  British,	  viewed	  Turkey	  as	  solely	  a	  Middle	  
Eastern	  power	  and	  important	  to	  maintaining	  British	  influence	  in	  the	  Middle	  East.	  See	  
William	  Hale,	  Turkish	  Foreign	  Policy,	  1774-­‐2000	  (London:	  Frank	  Cass,	  2000),	  111-­‐121.	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before	  World	  War	  I	  did	  not	  easily	  give	  way	  to	  the	  pursuit	  of	  security	  and	  development	  
through	  political	  integration	  and	  foreign	  aid.	  Ankara’s	  preference	  for	  independent,	  state-­‐
driven,	  internally	  oriented	  economic	  growth	  complicated	  its	  relations	  with	  outside	  
powers	  and	  the	  nature	  of	  foreign	  assistance	  the	  country	  received.325	  	  
For	  a	  time,	  this	  preference,	  and	  the	  complications	  it	  would	  produce,	  was	  not	  
entirely	  evident.	  In	  1950,	  the	  one-­‐party	  state	  led	  by	  İsmet	  İnönü’s	  Republican	  People’s	  
Party	  (RPP)	  lost	  in	  parliamentary	  elections	  to	  Adnan	  Menderes’s	  Democrat	  Party	  (DP).	  
Menderes	  and	  his	  party	  advocated	  a	  broad	  liberalization	  of	  the	  economy	  and	  initiated	  a	  
broader	  embrace	  of	  Western	  economic	  models	  and	  influence.	  Whereas	  Turkey’s	  
interwar	  leaders	  sought	  to	  independently	  mimic	  Western	  development,	  the	  Democrat	  
Party	  amplified	  the	  relations	  of	  dependence	  and	  used	  Cold	  War	  geopolitics	  to	  secure	  
ever-­‐increasing	  aid	  packages	  from	  the	  United	  States.	  In	  return,	  Ankara	  liberalized	  
economic	  policies	  and	  embarked	  on	  a	  spree	  of	  public	  works	  that	  were	  touted	  as	  
investments	  in	  the	  rural	  population	  that	  had	  brought	  the	  Democrat	  Party	  to	  power.326	  It	  
was	  not	  long	  before	  the	  DP	  discovered	  that	  Western	  influence	  could	  in	  fact	  cut	  both	  
ways,	  that	  an	  ideological	  affinity	  and	  the	  opening	  of	  Turkey’s	  economy	  did	  not	  mean	  that	  
aid	  would	  not	  be	  used	  as	  leverage.	  
The	  first	  such	  encounter	  involved	  the	  Seyhan	  dam	  project.	  On	  January	  10,	  1952,	  a	  
British	  delegation	  headed	  by	  the	  British	  ambassador	  to	  Turkey,	  Sir	  Knox	  Helms,	  met	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
325	  Hershlag,	  Contemporary	  Turkish	  Economy,	  7.	  
326	  Çağlar	  Keyder,	  “Economic	  Development	  and	  Crisis,	  1950-­‐1980,”	  in	  Turkey	  in	  
Transition:	  New	  Perspectives,	  eds.	  İrvin	  Schick	  and	  Ertuğrul	  Tonak	  (New	  York:	  Oxford	  
University	  Press,	  1987),	  293-­‐308.	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Ankara	  with	  their	  Turkish	  counterparts	  to	  discuss	  £32	  million	  in	  outstanding	  armament	  
credits	  provided	  to	  Turkey	  in	  1938	  and	  1939.	  The	  loans	  had	  been	  used	  to	  pay	  for	  
matériel	  and	  military	  experts	  to	  assist	  in	  Turkish	  preparedness.	  The	  Turkish	  
government	  stopped	  payment	  on	  the	  loans	  in	  July	  1951	  after	  disbursing	  nearly	  £9	  
million	  in	  capital	  and	  nearly	  £8	  million	  in	  interest.327	  Ankara	  asked	  that	  the	  remaining	  
payment	  on	  the	  British	  credits	  be	  canceled	  as	  an	  act	  of	  generosity	  between	  two	  allies,	  or	  
at	  the	  most	  that	  the	  British	  accept	  a	  token	  amount.	  Turkey	  also	  requested	  the	  same	  of	  
the	  French,	  who	  had	  extended	  similar	  credits	  early	  in	  the	  Second	  World	  War.328	  
The	  British,	  suffering	  from	  their	  own	  economic	  distress	  as	  a	  result	  of	  post-­‐war	  
reconstruction	  and	  the	  rearmament	  required	  by	  the	  Cold	  War,	  found	  it	  impossible	  to	  
agree	  to	  such	  a	  request.	  Moreover,	  the	  Turkish	  government	  had	  sent	  an	  underling	  to	  
negotiate	  with	  Ambassador	  Helms,	  Fatin	  Rüştü	  Zorlu,	  the	  Head	  of	  Economic	  Affairs	  in	  
the	  Turkish	  Foreign	  Ministry,	  leading	  one	  Treasury	  official	  to	  exclaim	  that	  “the	  Turks	  
have	  behaved	  outrageously.”329	  A	  later	  meeting	  between	  Helms	  and	  the	  Minister	  of	  
Foreign	  Affairs,	  Mehmet	  Fuat	  Köprülü,	  yielded	  no	  results.	  The	  British	  were	  left	  with	  two	  
options.	  They	  could	  accept	  the	  cancellation	  or	  a	  token	  payment	  and	  set	  a	  bad	  precedent	  
for	  their	  other	  debtors,	  or	  recall	  the	  delegation	  and	  wait	  for	  a	  more	  advantageous	  time	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
327	  A	  full	  listing	  of	  British	  claims	  may	  be	  found	  at	  TNA,	  FO	  371/101874/1152/1.	  
328	  TNA,	  FO	  371/101874/1152/12,	  Helms	  to	  Eden,	  January	  14,	  1952;	  M.	  Zorlu’s	  speech,	  
January	  10,	  1952.	  See	  also	  FO	  371/101874/1152/16	  for	  the	  French	  communiqué.	  
329	  TNA,	  FO	  371/101874/1152/17,	  Copleston	  to	  Harrison,	  February	  6,	  1952.	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to	  press	  their	  claims.	  London	  chose	  the	  latter	  tactic	  and	  decided	  not	  to	  immediately	  
publish	  a	  Turkish	  default	  so	  as	  not	  to	  embarrass	  Ankara.330	  
It	  did	  not	  take	  long	  to	  find	  an	  advantageous	  time.	  Treasury	  officials	  wrote	  to	  
British	  representatives	  in	  Washington	  to	  find	  out	  when	  the	  International	  Bank	  for	  
Reconstruction	  and	  Development	  (IBRD),	  now	  known	  as	  the	  World	  Bank,	  would	  
consider	  a	  twenty	  million	  dollar	  loan	  for	  the	  Seyhan	  dam	  project.331	  While	  
acknowledging	  that	  Bank	  representatives	  were	  likely	  to	  recommend	  the	  loan,	  the	  letter	  
to	  Washington	  noted	  that	  the	  Turks	  were	  “in	  a	  strong	  position”	  because	  of	  the	  situation	  
in	  the	  Middle	  East,	  “and	  the	  only	  way	  we	  might	  bring	  them	  [the	  Turkish	  government]	  to	  
reason	  at	  the	  present	  time	  is	  through	  the	  IBRD.”332	  	  
The	  Treasury	  Department’s	  tactic	  alarmed	  the	  British	  Foreign	  Office,	  which	  
responded	  that	  “the	  course	  proposed	  by	  the	  Treasury	  may	  well	  gain	  nothing,	  but	  may	  
merely	  intensely	  irritate	  one	  of	  our	  best	  friends,	  particularly	  as	  the	  Seyhan	  dam	  project	  
is	  apparently	  a	  very	  good	  one	  and	  worth	  support	  on	  merit.”333	  American	  officials	  also	  
responded	  with	  some	  apprehension,	  suggesting	  that	  the	  Bank	  should	  not	  be	  used	  as	  a	  
“collecting	  agency”	  and	  that	  it	  would	  be	  unethical	  to	  hold	  up	  a	  development	  loan	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
330	  The	  Treasury	  chose	  instead	  to	  tell	  the	  British	  parliament	  that	  Turkey	  had	  
“discontinued	  service	  on	  these	  loans.”	  TNA,	  FO	  371/101874/1152/17,	  brief	  by	  Sir	  
Herbert	  Brittain,	  January	  29,	  1952.	  
331	  The	  Seyhan	  dam	  near	  Adana	  was	  the	  first	  of	  several	  hydroelectric	  plants	  funded	  by	  
the	  IBRD.	  The	  project	  was	  supervised	  by	  Süleyman	  Demirel,	  who	  would	  later	  become	  
Turkey’s	  prime	  minister.	  
332	  TNA,	  FO	  371/101874/1152/19,	  Egger	  to	  Christelow,	  February	  20,	  1952.	  
333	  TNA,	  FO	  371/101874/1152/21,	  Strang	  to	  Bridges,	  March	  20,	  1952.	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because	  of	  wartime	  debts.334	  The	  World	  Bank	  president,	  Eugene	  Black,	  noted	  that	  a	  veto	  
or	  abstention	  by	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  would	  make	  the	  Seyhan	  dam	  project	  the	  first	  
development	  loan	  to	  be	  voted	  down	  by	  the	  Bank’s	  Board	  of	  Directors.335	  To	  give	  the	  two	  
sides	  more	  time,	  the	  Bank	  agreed	  to	  hold	  up	  the	  loan	  on	  some	  “technical	  hitches”	  in	  the	  
hope	  that	  a	  delay	  would	  encourage	  the	  resumption	  of	  negotiations.336	  
The	  Turkish	  government	  responded	  that	  connecting	  the	  armament	  credits	  
dispute	  to	  the	  development	  loan	  was	  unacceptable.	  Turkey	  had	  fulfilled	  all	  other	  
agreements	  and	  “there	  had	  never	  been	  any	  question	  of	  default	  on	  the	  commercial	  debt	  
and	  that	  armament	  credits	  were	  in	  a	  separate	  category.”	  While	  willing	  to	  entertain	  
negotiations	  with	  no	  pre-­‐conditions,	  the	  Turkish	  Council	  of	  Ministers	  stood	  by	  its	  
position	  that	  cancellation	  of	  such	  credits	  was	  appropriate	  because	  the	  monies	  had	  been	  
spent	  on	  common	  defense.337	  Moreover,	  Ankara	  was	  incensed	  by	  the	  use	  of	  an	  
international	  development	  forum	  to	  bring	  pressure	  on	  a	  bilateral	  matter,	  and	  stated	  that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
334	  TNA,	  FO	  371/101874/1152/24,	  Christelow	  to	  Egger,	  March	  18,	  1952.	  The	  British	  
later	  worked	  to	  obtain	  American	  support	  through	  the	  US	  Ambassador	  to	  Ankara,	  George	  
McGhee.	  See	  TNA,	  FO	  371/101874/1152/37,	  Helms	  to	  McGhee,	  May	  12,	  1952	  and	  May	  
13,	  1952;	  and	  1152/45,	  Fox	  to	  Cheetham,	  May	  22,	  1952.	  
335	  TNA,	  FO	  371/101874/1152/29,	  telegram	  from	  Washington	  to	  Foreign	  Office,	  April	  
28,	  1952.	  
336	  TNA,	  FO	  371/101874/1152/36,	  Christelow	  to	  Eggers,	  April	  28,	  1952.	  
337	  TNA,	  FO	  371/101874/1152/38,	  telegram	  from	  Ankara	  to	  Foreign	  Office,	  May	  18,	  
1952.	  
	  
	   198	  
Turkey	  “would	  leave	  the	  Bank	  if	  it	  were	  going	  to	  lend	  itself	  to	  political	  interference	  in	  
such	  a	  way.”338	  
Unfortunately	  for	  Turkey,	  Ankara	  had	  not	  in	  fact	  convinced	  the	  IBRD	  Board	  of	  its	  
position.	  In	  a	  closed	  meeting	  that	  excluded	  representatives	  of	  France,	  Britain	  and	  
Turkey,	  the	  other	  members	  of	  the	  Board	  indicated	  that	  Turkey	  must	  settle	  its	  wartime	  
debts	  before	  negotiating	  the	  Seyhan	  loan	  with	  the	  Bank.	  Only	  the	  Pakistani	  and	  
American	  representatives,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  Bank’s	  president,	  Eugene	  Black,	  agreed	  with	  the	  
Turkish	  position	  that	  the	  war	  debts	  were	  in	  a	  different	  category	  from	  ordinary	  debts	  and	  
that	  British	  tactics	  in	  fact	  prejudiced	  the	  so-­‐called	  “merit-­‐based”	  system	  of	  development	  
assistance.339	  
The	  Americans’	  intercession	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  Turkish	  position	  proved	  decisive.	  
After	  learning	  of	  the	  tenor	  of	  the	  IBRD	  meeting,	  Ankara	  called	  the	  British	  bluff,	  
demanding	  that	  the	  Board	  bring	  up	  the	  Seyhan	  loan	  as	  soon	  as	  possible	  and	  vote	  up	  or	  
down	  on	  its	  merits.	  The	  brinksmanship	  would	  have	  had	  the	  effect	  of	  forcing	  the	  British	  
and	  French	  to	  veto	  the	  Seyhan	  dam	  project	  loan,	  effectively	  sending	  the	  signal	  that	  the	  
Bank	  would	  enforce	  disputed	  loan	  agreements	  on	  behalf	  of	  its	  members	  and	  against	  less	  
developed	  nations.	  The	  Bank’s	  vice	  president,	  Robert	  Garner,	  was	  complicit	  in	  the	  Turks’	  
efforts,	  removing	  the	  delay	  of	  “technical	  hitches”	  and	  bringing	  the	  loan	  package	  to	  the	  
Board	  for	  a	  vote	  on	  June	  18,	  1952,	  as	  requested	  by	  Turkey.	  Left	  with	  little	  time	  for	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
338	  TNA,	  FO	  371/101874/1152/43,	  telegram	  from	  Ankara	  to	  Foreign	  Office,	  May	  28,	  
1952.	  
339	  TNA,	  FO	  371/101874/1152/51,	  telegram	  from	  Washington	  to	  Foreign	  Office,	  June	  
11,	  1952.	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further	  maneuvers,	  the	  British	  and	  French	  representatives	  managed	  to	  include	  an	  
exhortation	  for	  a	  “mutually	  satisfactory	  solution”	  in	  the	  Board’s	  record.	  The	  two	  
countries	  then	  voted	  with	  the	  other	  representatives	  for	  the	  loan	  package.340	  
Throughout	  the	  remainder	  of	  the	  year,	  Ankara	  and	  London	  negotiated	  the	  terms	  
of	  a	  loan	  settlement.	  The	  British	  were	  not	  able	  to	  achieve	  what	  they	  wanted,	  and	  ended	  
up	  settling	  for	  a	  mere	  £3	  million	  out	  of	  a	  requested	  £16	  million.	  The	  Seyhan	  dam	  dispute,	  
meanwhile,	  demonstrated	  to	  Ankara	  that	  development	  assistance	  was	  not	  simply	  about	  
producing	  “a	  type	  of	  economic	  development	  and	  political	  development	  which	  is	  
harmonious	  with	  the	  long-­‐range	  interests	  of	  the	  aid-­‐giving	  country.”341	  Rather,	  foreign	  
aid	  for	  projects	  such	  as	  dams	  and	  bridges,	  which	  Ankara	  viewed	  as	  critical	  to	  Turkey’s	  
economic	  development,	  could	  be	  used	  as	  political	  weapons	  and	  opened	  the	  country	  to	  
foreign	  manipulation.	  The	  Turkish	  government	  therefore	  sought	  to	  limit	  that	  risk,	  
severing	  ties	  with	  the	  IBRD	  in	  1954.342	  
Ankara	  instead	  sought	  aid	  through	  bilateral	  or	  multi-­‐lateral	  negotiations	  rather	  
than	  through	  international	  fora.	  The	  Menderes	  government	  was	  quite	  masterful	  at	  
obtaining	  such	  assistance,	  particularly	  from	  the	  United	  States,	  and	  such	  bilateral	  aid	  
agreements	  kept	  the	  country	  afloat	  for	  much	  of	  the	  1950s.	  However,	  over	  time,	  these	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
340	  TNA,	  FO	  371/101874/1152/61,	  telegram	  from	  Washington	  to	  Foreign	  Office,	  June	  
19,	  1952;	  see	  also	  1152/52,	  telegram	  from	  Ankara	  to	  Foreign	  Office,	  June	  12,	  1952,	  for	  
Ankara’s	  demand	  and	  1152/54,	  Scott-­‐Fox	  to	  Cheetham,	  June	  9,	  1952,	  for	  American	  
reaction.	  
341	  Baran	  Tuncer,	  “External	  Financing	  of	  the	  Turkish	  Economy	  and	  its	  Foreign	  Policy	  
Implications”	  in	  Turkey’s	  Foreign	  Policy	  in	  Transition,	  1950-­‐1974,	  ed.	  Kemal	  H.	  Karpat	  
(Leiden:	  E.	  J.	  Brill,	  1975),	  208.	  
342	  Tuncer,	  “External	  Financing,”	  212.	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bursts	  of	  aid	  failed	  to	  meet	  the	  country’s	  balance	  of	  payments,	  and	  by	  the	  late	  1950s	  
Menderes	  attempted	  to	  rally	  the	  Turkish	  public	  around	  the	  idea	  that	  Western	  powers	  
were	  taking	  advantage	  of	  Turkey	  in	  order	  to	  cover	  up	  his	  own	  government’s	  foundering	  
economic	  policies.	  The	  reason	  for	  the	  failing	  economy	  was	  thus	  not	  the	  result	  of	  
government	  decisions,	  but	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  United	  States	  and	  its	  allies	  to	  sufficiently	  
appreciate	  the	  importance	  of	  Turkey.	  343	  When	  these	  politics	  failed	  to	  move	  the	  United	  
States,	  Menderes	  reneged	  on	  his	  free	  trade	  policies,	  adopted	  import	  controls	  and,	  in	  the	  
end,	  was	  forced	  to	  adopt	  policies	  of	  devaluation	  and	  austerity	  promoted	  by	  the	  
International	  Monetary	  Fund.344	  
As	  a	  result	  of	  the	  economic	  woes	  and	  increased	  political	  infighting,	  the	  military	  
deposed	  Menderes	  in	  1960	  and	  imposed	  a	  very	  different	  economic	  regime	  on	  the	  
country.	  Military	  leaders	  returned	  to	  the	  tenets	  of	  the	  statist	  1930s,	  creating	  a	  new	  
planning	  organization	  and	  developing	  a	  series	  of	  five-­‐year	  development	  plans.	  Turkey	  
did	  not,	  however,	  revert	  back	  to	  1930s	  autarky.	  The	  development	  plans	  were	  in	  part	  a	  
means	  to	  reassure	  the	  country’s	  foreign	  donors	  that	  the	  free	  spending	  of	  the	  Menderes	  
era	  was	  over.	  Even	  as	  Turkey	  was	  creating	  a	  development	  plan	  that	  included	  specific	  
amounts	  of	  expected	  aid,	  the	  nature	  of	  foreign	  assistance	  changed	  in	  the	  1960s.	  Donors	  
became	  more	  apt	  to	  fund	  particular	  projects	  as	  opposed	  to	  broad	  programs.	  Turkey	  
therefore	  found	  it	  difficult	  to	  fund	  the	  Five-­‐Year	  Development	  Plans	  and	  was	  forced	  back	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
343	  For	  more	  information	  on	  this	  period	  and	  Menderes’	  politicization	  of	  aid,	  see	  George	  S.	  
Harris,	  Troubled	  Alliance:	  Turkish-­‐American	  Problems	  in	  Historical	  Perspective,	  1945-­‐
1971	  (Washington,	  DC:	  American	  Enterprise	  Institute,	  1972),	  71-­‐76.	  
344	  İrvin	  C.	  Schick	  and	  E.	  Ahmet	  Tonak,	  “The	  International	  Dimension:	  Trade,	  Aid	  and	  
Debt”	  in	  Schick	  and	  Tonak,	  Turkey	  in	  Transition,	  333-­‐338.	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to	  requesting	  aid	  from	  international	  organizations.	  In	  1961	  Turkey	  requested	  a	  NATO	  
aid	  consortium.	  When	  that	  was	  not	  forthcoming,	  Ankara	  turned	  toward	  the	  European	  
Community	  and	  the	  Organization	  for	  Economic	  Cooperation	  and	  Development	  
(OECD).345	  
The	  problem	  with	  the	  OECD	  consortium	  was	  that,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  it	  reduced	  
Turkey’s	  leverage	  with	  any	  given	  donor,	  a	  factor	  that	  had	  initially	  led	  the	  Menderes	  
regime	  toward	  bilateral	  agreements.	  In	  addition,	  the	  consortium	  of	  thirteen	  countries	  
strongly	  resembled	  the	  Ottoman	  Debt	  Administration	  and	  was	  therefore	  reminiscent	  of	  
European	  control	  over	  Turkey’s	  economic	  destiny.346	  Not	  only	  was	  the	  consortium	  
awkward	  for	  Turkey.	  It	  apparently	  produced	  confusion	  for	  other	  governments	  with	  
regard	  to	  the	  real	  goals	  of	  financial	  assistance	  to	  Ankara.	  In	  1963,	  Robert	  Komer,	  later	  to	  
become	  the	  American	  ambassador	  to	  Turkey,	  wrote	  the	  following	  memorandum	  for	  
assistant	  secretary	  of	  state	  Phillips	  Talbot:	  
We	  have	  never	  really	  decided	  in	  our	  own	  minds	  whether	  to	  treat	  Turkey	  
primarily	  as	  a	  NATO	  partner	  (whose	  main	  need	  was	  military	  aid	  for	  the	  
defense	  of	  Europe)	  or	  as	  an	  underdeveloped	  country	  whose	  primary	  need	  
was	  to	  become	  a	  going	  concern.	  As	  a	  result	  we	  have	  pursued	  both	  aims—
and	  fully	  succeeded	  at	  neither.347	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
345	  Ferenc	  A.	  Váli,	  Bridge	  Across	  the	  Bosporus:	  The	  Foreign	  Policy	  of	  Turkey	  (Baltimore:	  
The	  Johns	  Hopkins	  Press,	  1971),	  331.	  
346	  The	  countries	  comprising	  the	  consortium	  included:	  Austria,	  Belgium,	  Canada,	  France,	  
Germany,	  Italy,	  Luxembourg,	  the	  Netherlands,	  Norway,	  Sweden,	  Switzerland,	  the	  United	  
Kingdom	  and	  the	  United	  States.	  
347	  “Memorandum	  for	  Phllips	  Talbot	  from	  Robert	  Komer,	  February	  19,	  1963,	  John	  F.	  
Kennedy	  Library,	  quoted	  in	  Kuniholm,	  “Turkey	  and	  the	  West”,	  59.	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The	  British	  reached	  something	  of	  the	  same	  conclusion.	  A	  report	  on	  the	  OECD	  
consortium	  for	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Overseas	  Development	  described	  the	  problematic	  
relationship	  of	  Turkey	  toward	  the	  foreign	  aid	  regime:	  
It	  is	  sometimes	  said	  by	  people	  concerned	  with	  Turkey	  that	  the	  Turks	  want	  
to	  have	  it	  both	  ways.	  As	  a	  member	  of	  the	  western	  alliance,	  Turkey	  wants	  
to	  be	  treated	  as	  an	  equal	  partner.	  As	  an	  underdeveloped	  country,	  Turkey	  
claims	  the	  right	  to	  fulfillment	  of	  all	  its	  needs	  on	  concessionary	  terms.	  
There	  is	  some	  truth	  in	  this,	  but	  what	  is	  said	  less	  often	  is	  that	  the	  Turkish	  
attitude	  is	  the	  mirror	  image	  of	  the	  attitude	  of	  the	  western	  powers,	  who	  
also	  want	  to	  have	  it	  both	  ways.	  As	  a	  member	  of	  the	  western	  alliance,	  
Turkey	  is	  required	  to	  show	  all	  the	  sophistication	  and	  responsiveness	  to	  
change	  that	  was	  expected,	  for	  instance,	  of	  Britain	  during	  the	  sterling	  crisis	  
of	  1964-­‐65.	  As	  an	  underdeveloped	  country,	  Turkey	  is	  required	  to	  accept	  
all	  the	  paraphernalia	  of	  investigation	  and	  review,	  the	  unending	  stream	  of	  
admonition	  and	  advice,	  that	  is	  heaped	  upon	  the	  “real	  underdeveloped	  
countries”	  of	  Asia	  and	  Africa.	  In	  the	  field	  of	  economic	  aid,	  what	  this	  means	  
is	  that	  the	  western	  powers	  have	  set	  up	  all	  the	  machinery	  for	  attacking	  a	  
long-­‐term	  problem,	  while	  protesting	  all	  the	  time	  that	  from	  their	  point	  of	  
view	  no	  long-­‐term	  problem	  exists,	  and	  that	  it	  is	  therefore	  unnecessary	  for	  
them	  to	  enter	  into	  any	  open-­‐ended	  commitment.348	  
Subject	  to	  both	  expectations	  and	  investigations,	  part	  of	  an	  alliance	  but	  also	  outside	  it,	  
Turkey	  found	  it	  increasingly	  difficult	  to	  reach	  acceptable	  terms	  with	  the	  consortium.	  
Development	  aid	  was	  always	  seen	  in	  some	  ways	  as	  an	  adjunct	  to	  the	  military	  aid	  
necessary	  to	  maintain	  NATO	  deterrence,	  producing	  a	  situation	  where,	  as	  recognized	  
even	  in	  London	  and	  Washington,	  the	  sums	  were	  insufficient	  on	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  ledger.	  
As	  a	  result,	  Ankara	  decided	  to	  create	  its	  own	  consortia	  in	  order	  to	  finance	  large	  
projects.	  The	  Keban	  dam	  was	  funded	  in	  this	  way,	  as	  a	  “syndicate”	  of	  donor	  countries	  that	  
pooled	  funds	  with	  the	  Turkish	  government	  to	  build	  the	  dam.	  The	  syndicate	  for	  the	  
Keban	  project	  included	  several	  banks	  including	  the	  European	  Industrial	  Bank	  and	  the	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  TNA,	  FO	  957/273,	  John	  White,	  “A	  Pledge	  for	  Development,”	  III-­‐5,	  January	  4,	  1966.	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IBRD	  (which	  Turkey	  rejoined	  after	  the	  1960	  coup)	  and	  the	  American,	  West	  German,	  
French	  and	  Italian	  governments.	  The	  total	  aid	  for	  the	  project	  totaled	  some	  $135	  million,	  
of	  which	  $40	  million	  was	  provided	  by	  the	  United	  States.349	  
Much	  of	  the	  aid	  money	  that	  was	  spent	  on	  the	  Keban	  dam	  went	  to	  pay	  for	  the	  
services	  of	  American	  and	  European	  companies,	  either	  in	  the	  form	  of	  expertise	  or	  
equipment.	  United	  States	  Agency	  for	  International	  Development	  funds	  were	  funneled	  to	  
EBASCO	  Services,	  Inc.,	  the	  engineering	  firm	  that	  produced	  preliminary	  designs	  and	  
supervised	  construction.350	  The	  US	  government	  also	  paid	  for	  its	  own	  Corps	  of	  Engineers	  
to	  complete	  an	  assessment	  of	  the	  project	  that	  was	  then	  used	  to	  obtain	  additional	  funds	  
from	  the	  IBRD.	  French	  and	  Italian	  funds	  were	  tied	  to	  the	  financing	  of	  the	  construction	  
company	  that	  undertook	  the	  work,	  SCI-­‐Impreglio,	  a	  Franco-­‐Italian	  consortium	  made	  up	  
of	  Compagnie	  de	  Constructions	  Internationales,	  Impresit-­‐Girola-­‐Lodigiani,	  Compagnie	  
Français	  d’Enterprises,	  and	  ARI	  Construction.351	  
The	  granting	  of	  foreign	  aid	  certainly	  helped	  in	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  Turkish	  
hydroelectric	  station,	  which	  benefited	  Turkish	  industry.	  One	  of	  the	  arguments	  in	  
support	  of	  foreign	  assistance	  to	  large	  infrastructure	  projects,	  set	  forth	  at	  the	  time	  and	  
reiterated	  (and	  disputed)	  long	  after,	  was	  that	  foreign	  assistance	  helped	  the	  donor	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
349	  Another	  group	  of	  banks	  and	  governments	  covered	  the	  costs	  of	  a	  massive	  project	  in	  
Istanbul,	  the	  building	  of	  the	  first	  Istanbul	  bridge.	  Tuncer,	  “External	  Financing,”	  214-­‐215	  
and	  Harris,	  Troubled	  Alliance,	  176-­‐177.	  
350	  “Milletvekilimiz	  Nurettin	  Ardıçoğlu	  Keban	  Barajı	  mevzuu	  için	  Cemal	  Gürsel'e	  bir	  
muhtıra	  verdi,”	  Elazığ	  Gazetesi,	  December	  24,	  1963,	  1.	  
351	  Elena	  Calandri,	  “Italy’s	  Foreign	  Assistance	  Policy,	  1959-­‐1969,”	  Contemporary	  
European	  History	  12	  (2003):	  521-­‐522.	  See	  also	  John	  F.	  Kolars	  and	  William	  A.	  Mitchell,	  
The	  Euphrates	  River,	  27-­‐28.	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country	  by	  creating	  a	  better	  and	  more	  lucrative	  foreign	  market	  for	  trading	  purposes.	  
Another	  argument	  was	  that	  the	  financing	  was	  designed	  to	  produce	  a	  certain	  economic	  
order	  in	  the	  target	  state.352	  But	  the	  credits	  offered	  Ankara	  were	  just	  as	  important	  in	  
maintaining	  foreign	  companies,	  in	  building	  expertise	  and	  industry	  in	  the	  donor	  country.	  
Turkey’s	  dam	  projects	  produced	  a	  broad	  range	  of	  benefits	  to	  the	  donors.	  The	  dams	  could	  
be	  used	  as	  leverage	  against	  Ankara	  in	  bilateral	  disputes.	  They	  allowed	  for	  opportunities	  
to	  investigate	  and	  advise	  the	  Turks	  on	  how	  to	  develop	  their	  economy.	  Finally,	  the	  dams	  
could	  be	  used	  to	  promote	  a	  certain	  economic	  order	  at	  home,	  not	  just	  (and	  perhaps	  in	  
lieu	  of)	  creating	  it	  elsewhere.	  	  
This	  last	  point	  is	  driven	  home	  by	  another	  event	  that	  occurred	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1960s	  as	  
construction	  began	  on	  the	  Keban	  dam.	  In	  March	  1967,	  Turkey	  signed	  an	  agreement	  for	  a	  
$200	  million	  loan	  to	  establish	  new	  industrial	  plants.	  Ankara’s	  creditor	  was	  her	  old	  
enemy,	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  So	  while	  the	  United	  States	  and	  its	  allies	  built	  a	  dam	  in	  Keban,	  
the	  Soviets	  constructed	  a	  petroleum	  factory	  near	  Izmir.	  From	  one	  perspective	  it	  appears	  
as	  if	  Ankara	  was	  simply	  rebalancing	  relations	  after	  encountering	  “technical	  hitches”	  in	  
the	  western	  alliance.	  From	  another	  perspective,	  it	  appears	  as	  if	  all	  industrialized	  powers	  
had	  a	  common	  need:	  the	  recycling	  of	  government	  spending	  back	  into	  their	  own	  
economies	  through	  the	  mechanism	  of	  development.	  For	  Turkey,	  the	  politics	  of	  such	  
recycling	  became	  too	  much	  to	  bear	  and	  so	  Ankara	  chose	  to	  build	  its	  third	  and	  largest	  
dam	  on	  the	  Euphrates	  on	  its	  own,	  a	  story	  to	  which	  this	  chapter	  will	  turn	  after	  
considering	  the	  case	  of	  Syria.
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
352	  This	  argument	  may	  be	  seen	  in	  Calandri,	  “Italy’s	  Foreign	  Assistance,”	  521,	  and	  in	  
Tuncer,	  “External	  Financing,”	  207.	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A	  Diplomatic	  Dance:	  The	  Syrian	  Struggle	  for	  a	  Euphrates	  Dam	  
Syria	  won	  its	  independence	  from	  France	  after	  the	  Second	  World	  War;	  the	  last	  
French	  troops	  departed	  the	  country	  in	  April	  1946.	  Syria	  soon	  thereafter	  became	  a	  
battleground	  for	  a	  political	  tug-­‐of-­‐war	  between	  the	  Hashemite	  monarchs	  of	  Iraq	  and	  
Jordan	  and	  the	  non-­‐Hashemite	  powers	  of	  Saudi	  Arabia	  and	  Egypt.	  In	  1949,	  as	  a	  result	  of	  
the	  Arab	  defeat	  in	  Palestine,	  the	  army	  entered	  politics	  for	  the	  first	  time	  with	  the	  
overthrow	  of	  President	  Shukri	  al-­‐Quwatli.	  This	  initial	  coup	  proved	  destabilizing	  and	  the	  
country	  suffered	  another	  two	  coups	  d’état	  as	  its	  domestic	  politics	  were	  tugged	  one	  way	  
and	  another	  by	  foreign	  powers.353	  With	  the	  intensification	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  in	  the	  1950s,	  
the	  “struggle	  for	  Syria”	  intensified	  as	  well,	  with	  Egypt	  in	  conflict	  with	  a	  pro-­‐Western	  Iraq	  
for	  preeminence	  in	  the	  Arab	  World.	  Damascus	  generally	  leaned	  toward	  Cairo	  during	  this	  
time,	  though	  Iraq’s	  offer	  of	  union	  in	  January	  1954	  intensified	  the	  struggle	  between	  Cairo	  
and	  Baghdad	  for	  preeminence	  in	  Syria.	  	  
The	  two	  superpowers	  were	  as	  involved	  in	  Syria’s	  politics	  as	  its	  Arab	  neighbors.	  	  
The	  Eisenhower	  Doctrine	  of	  1957	  and	  American	  propaganda	  regarding	  Syria’s	  socialist	  
leanings	  led	  to	  fear	  of	  US	  military	  intervention	  and,	  indeed,	  American	  marines	  arrived	  in	  
Beirut,	  roughly	  fifty	  miles	  from	  Damascus,	  in	  July	  1958.354	  Political	  “stability”	  during	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
353	  The	  United	  States	  helped	  to	  engineer	  this	  initial	  coup,	  but	  its	  client,	  General	  Husni	  al-­‐
Za’im	  lost	  power	  after	  only	  five	  months.	  See	  David	  W.	  Lesch,	  Syria	  and	  the	  United	  States:	  
Eisenhower’s	  Cold	  War	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  (Boulder:	  Westview	  Press,	  1992),	  17-­‐28.	  For	  a	  
comprehensive	  review	  of	  the	  parties	  interested	  in	  Syria’s	  disposition	  at	  this	  time,	  see	  
Lesch,	  Syria,	  3-­‐4.	  
354	  The	  American	  misreading	  of	  Syria’s	  politics	  had	  significant	  long-­‐term	  consequences	  
for	  both	  Lebanon	  and	  Syria.	  See	  Khalidi,	  Sowing	  Crisis,	  193-­‐196.	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1950s	  was	  often	  measured	  in	  months	  or	  half-­‐years	  and	  remained	  elusive	  until	  1958	  
when	  a	  resurgent	  Ba’th	  overcame	  an	  exhausted	  Syrian	  political	  class	  and	  sought	  union	  
with	  Egypt.355	  During	  the	  period	  of	  the	  United	  Arab	  Republic,	  Syria’s	  politics	  were	  less	  
unified	  with	  Cairo	  than	  dominated	  by	  it.	  Egypt	  under	  Gamal	  ‘Abd	  al-­‐Nasir	  subordinated	  
Syrian	  institutions	  and	  eventually	  relied	  on	  a	  repressive	  police	  apparatus	  to	  maintain	  
control.	  	  
Another	  military	  coup	  in	  September	  1961	  rescued	  Syria	  from	  the	  tyranny	  of	  
Cairo	  but	  did	  not	  save	  it	  from	  continued	  instability	  and	  intervention.	  1962	  brought	  
about	  three	  more	  coups;	  the	  perpetrators	  often	  benefited	  from	  Egyptian	  assistance.	  The	  
battle	  lines	  in	  the	  1960s	  were	  again	  between	  Iraq	  and	  Egypt,	  but	  Egyptian	  hostility	  in	  
the	  aftermath	  of	  Syria’s	  secession	  from	  the	  United	  Arab	  Republic	  (UAR)	  resulted	  in	  
Syrian	  détente	  with	  Baghdad,	  at	  least	  for	  a	  time.356	  The	  Ba’th	  party	  came	  to	  power	  in	  a	  
coup	  in	  1963,	  but	  did	  not	  consolidate	  its	  hold	  on	  Syria	  until	  another	  coup,	  Syria’s	  
thirteenth	  in	  eighteen	  years,	  in	  1966	  brought	  a	  left-­‐wing	  element	  to	  power.	  
Within	  the	  economic	  realm,	  and	  in	  large	  part	  in	  contradiction	  to	  the	  commotion	  
on	  the	  political	  level,	  Syria	  moved	  steadily	  toward	  greater	  integration	  with	  the	  world	  
economy.	  Due	  to	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  state	  of	  Israel,	  Syria	  after	  1948	  became	  an	  important	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  Though	  Syrian	  politics	  after	  the	  1949	  coups	  was	  essentially	  the	  tool	  of	  a	  Syrian	  
general,	  Adib	  al-­‐Shishakli,	  the	  military	  leader	  presided	  over	  seven	  different	  civilian	  
cabinets	  before	  claiming	  preeminent	  power	  for	  himself	  in	  late	  1951.	  Shishakli	  was	  never	  
able	  to	  organize	  a	  real	  political	  following	  and	  was	  removed	  from	  power	  in	  early	  1954.	  
For	  more	  on	  this	  period,	  see	  Tabitha	  Petran,	  Syria,	  (New	  York:	  Praeger,	  1972),	  80-­‐127	  
and	  Patrick	  Seale,	  The	  Struggle	  for	  Syria:	  A	  Study	  of	  Post-­‐War	  Arab	  Politics	  (Oxford:	  
Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1966).	  
356	  See	  Malcolm	  Kerr,	  The	  Arab	  Cold	  War:	  Gamal	  ‘Abd	  al-­‐Nasir	  and	  His	  Rivals,	  1958-­‐1970	  
(Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1971).	  
	  
	   207	  
entrepôt	  for	  goods	  shipped	  via	  the	  eastern	  Mediterranean	  bound	  for	  other	  Arab	  
countries.	  Petroleum	  flowed	  the	  other	  direction,	  from	  Iraqi	  oilfields	  through	  a	  pipeline	  
across	  Syria	  to	  the	  terminal	  at	  Tripoli	  in	  Lebanon.	  This	  transit	  trade	  was	  a	  vital	  
component	  of	  Syria’s	  economic	  development	  and	  brought	  with	  it	  increasing	  
prosperity.357	  In	  developing	  the	  country’s	  water	  and	  other	  resources,	  Syrian	  officials	  
sought	  assistance	  from	  foreign	  powers,	  but	  the	  country’s	  increasing	  entanglement	  in	  
broader	  regional	  and	  global	  disputes	  made	  Syrian	  officials	  wary	  of	  too	  much	  foreign	  
influence.	  While	  a	  broader	  study	  examining	  Syria’s	  postcolonial	  politics	  and	  the	  
influence	  on	  a	  broad	  range	  of	  development	  projects	  is	  sorely	  needed,	  this	  section	  will	  
focus	  on	  Syria’s	  goal	  of	  building	  a	  dam	  on	  the	  Euphrates	  River.	  	  
Though	  both	  Turkey	  and	  Syria	  were	  required	  to	  seek	  external	  financing	  for	  their	  
dam	  projects,	  each	  state	  arrived	  at	  that	  financing	  in	  a	  different	  way.	  Turkey	  sought	  room	  
within	  its	  existing	  alliance	  relationships	  to	  construct	  a	  dam	  without	  constraint	  and	  
potential	  political	  infringements.	  Syria,	  functioning	  within	  a	  framework	  of	  enormous	  
external	  intervention,	  struggled	  to	  find	  a	  partner	  that	  would	  not	  interfere	  politically	  or	  
economically.	  As	  a	  result	  of	  both	  internal	  and	  external	  pressures,	  Syria	  moved	  toward	  a	  
partner	  with	  sufficient	  power	  to	  both	  secure	  the	  country’s	  political	  independence	  and	  
invest	  in	  its	  long-­‐term	  economic	  viability.	  	  
Because	  of	  Turkey’s	  position	  within	  the	  western	  alliance	  and	  Syria’s	  eventual	  
position	  as	  a	  “Soviet	  satellite,”	  there	  is	  a	  tendency	  to	  view	  these	  massive	  projects	  as	  
products	  of	  ideological	  affinity	  and	  political	  subordination,	  but	  this	  explanation	  is	  not	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  Petran,	  Syria,	  82-­‐84.	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completely	  satisfactory.	  So,	  even	  as	  Syria’s	  dance	  from	  one	  partner	  to	  another	  may	  be	  
viewed	  as	  political	  expediency,	  from	  another	  perspective	  the	  range	  of	  willing	  partners	  
suggests	  that	  these	  projects	  held	  a	  particular	  value,	  no	  matter	  the	  ideology	  at	  work	  in	  
their	  creation.	  A	  vital	  aspect	  of	  these	  projects	  was	  their	  capacity	  to	  produce	  the	  power	  
and	  practice	  of	  statehood,	  a	  goal	  that	  linked	  east	  and	  west,	  north	  and	  south.	  An	  ally	  was	  
only	  as	  useful	  as	  its	  ability	  to	  enhance	  the	  patron’s	  status.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  from	  Syria’s	  
perspective,	  the	  best	  partner	  was	  one	  who	  offered	  the	  country	  the	  most	  room	  for	  
maneuver.	  The	  dam	  was	  viewed	  as	  an	  integral	  and	  uncontested	  part	  of	  the	  country’s	  
pursuit	  of	  economic	  sovereignty,	  a	  project	  that	  one	  historian	  noted	  was	  “isolated	  from	  
national	  opinion,”358	  indelibly	  tied	  as	  it	  was	  to	  the	  achievement	  of	  a	  more	  convincing	  
political	  autonomy.	  
After	  1946,	  Damascus	  initially	  sought	  the	  support	  of	  the	  British	  and	  the	  British	  
Middle	  East	  Office	  (BMEO)	  Development	  Division,	  based	  at	  the	  time	  in	  Cairo.	  Shortly	  
after	  independence	  in	  1946,	  Damascus	  contracted	  a	  British	  engineering	  firm,	  Sir	  
Alexander	  Gibb	  and	  Partners,	  to	  conduct	  a	  survey	  of	  agriculture	  and	  irrigation.	  In	  1947,	  
the	  Syrian	  government	  asked	  the	  firm	  to	  analyze	  the	  potential	  of	  building	  a	  dam	  near	  the	  
village	  of	  Yusuf	  Pasha,	  approximately	  fifty	  kilometers	  south	  of	  the	  Turkish	  border.	  The	  
company’s	  report	  built	  on	  earlier	  French	  investigations	  and	  analyzed	  both	  the	  
hydroelectric	  and	  irrigation	  possibilities	  of	  the	  site.	  Syrian	  officials	  were	  apparently	  
impressed	  with	  the	  British	  firm	  and	  asked	  for	  additional	  technical	  experts.	  There	  was	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even	  discussion	  of	  establishing	  a	  development	  commission	  similar	  to	  the	  one	  being	  
debated	  at	  the	  same	  time	  in	  Iraq.359	  
The	  British,	  however,	  were	  not	  able	  to	  translate	  their	  studies	  into	  reality,	  a	  fact	  
that	  irked	  officials	  at	  the	  BMEO.	  After	  the	  Arab	  defeat	  in	  the	  1948	  war	  with	  Israel	  Syria	  
looked	  more	  toward	  the	  modernization	  of	  its	  military	  than	  its	  water	  infrastructure.	  Nor	  
was	  Damascus	  particularly	  interested	  in	  British	  assistance.	  The	  head	  of	  the	  BMEO	  
Development	  Division	  W.	  F.	  Crawford	  thought	  the	  country’s	  push	  for	  matériel	  was	  
misguided:	  	  
It	  is	  heartbreaking	  to	  think	  that	  £50	  million	  would	  develop	  the	  country	  so	  
that	  it	  could	  be	  independant	  [sic]	  and	  stable.	  In	  the	  meantime	  who	  knows	  
what	  is	  going	  in	  arms?	  (Some	  at	  least	  seems	  to	  be	  not	  much	  better	  than	  
scrap).	  The	  vanity	  of	  human	  wishes	  on	  the	  part	  of	  a	  colonel.360	  
Crawford	  explicitly	  connected	  Syria’s	  political	  independence	  to	  the	  country’s	  ability	  to	  
develop	  economically.	  In	  the	  same	  report,	  though,	  the	  BMEO	  official	  made	  a	  remark	  that	  
highlighted	  the	  problem	  that	  Syria	  faced	  in	  accepting	  foreign	  aid.	  Crawford	  noted	  the	  
dismal	  failure	  of	  the	  British	  to	  translate	  development	  work	  into	  political	  influence	  in	  
Syria,	  revealing	  the	  underlying	  goal	  driving	  British	  encouragement	  of	  such	  assistance.	  
The	  British	  were	  losing	  development	  contracts	  in	  the	  country	  to	  the	  French	  who,	  he	  
complained,	  “must	  be	  supported	  by	  the	  metropolitan	  government.”	  On	  top	  of	  French	  
competition,	  Syria’s	  security	  issues	  threatened	  the	  exertion	  of	  British	  influence	  through	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  SA,	  GB	  0033	  SAD,	  504/5/1,	  Walter	  Ferguson	  Crawford,	  “Visit	  of	  Sir	  A.	  Overton	  and	  
W.F.	  Crawford	  to	  Syria	  and	  Lebanon,”	  November	  30,	  1946,	  .	  
360	  SA,	  GB	  0033	  SAD,	  504/5/1,	  Walter	  Ferguson	  Crawford,	  “Syria	  Jan	  1952,”	  Trek	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technical	  assistance,	  pointing	  to	  how	  arms	  and	  experts	  were	  becoming	  increasingly	  
linked	  in	  the	  Middle	  East:	  
So	  far	  as	  we,	  the	  Development	  Division,	  is	  concerned	  Syria	  is	  in	  a	  mess.	  
British	  Council	  is	  practically	  closed	  down.	  Members	  of	  the	  Legation	  are	  
allowed	  to	  contact	  the	  Directors	  General	  only	  through	  the	  [Syrian]	  
Ministry	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs.	  ...If	  we	  can	  sell	  them	  military	  
equipment…everything	  will	  change.	  The	  Foreign	  Office	  expect	  too	  much	  of	  
the	  Syrians.	  They	  won't	  sell	  them	  military	  equipment	  which	  they	  want,	  we	  
have	  no	  economic	  assistance	  to	  give	  and	  yet	  we	  expect	  miracles	  of	  
friendship	  and	  obedience	  from	  them.361	  
While	  Great	  Britain	  remained	  an	  important	  trading	  partner	  for	  Syria	  during	  much	  of	  the	  
Cold	  War,	  Crawford’s	  Development	  Division	  was	  never	  able	  to	  make	  substantial	  inroads.	  
Syria	  eschewed	  foreign	  economic	  assistance	  during	  this	  period	  because	  much	  of	  what	  
was	  offered	  by	  western	  countries	  sought	  to	  produce	  a	  solution	  to	  the	  Palestinian	  refugee	  
crisis	  and	  the	  conflict	  with	  Israel.362	  
A	  rise	  in	  revenue	  from	  agriculture	  in	  the	  1950s	  helped	  to	  mitigate	  the	  lack	  of	  
foreign	  investment.	  Partly	  a	  result	  of	  war	  on	  the	  Korean	  peninsula,	  the	  increased	  
revenue	  from	  agricultural	  exports	  provided	  capital	  for	  technological	  improvements.	  
Three	  decades	  after	  the	  innovation	  appeared	  in	  Iraq,	  Syrian	  farmers	  began	  installing	  
diesel	  irrigation	  pumps	  along	  their	  stretch	  of	  the	  Euphrates	  River.	  In	  1950,	  Damascus	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  Walter	  Ferguson	  Crawford,	  “Syria	  Jan	  1952.”	  
362	  Damascus	  had	  rejected	  the	  offer	  of	  considerable	  American	  aid,	  in	  the	  form	  of	  Point	  
Four	  assistance,	  in	  1950	  because	  of	  American	  support	  of	  Israel	  and	  demands	  for	  
adherence	  to	  a	  regional	  security	  agreement.	  The	  three	  major	  western	  powers	  in	  Syria—
France,	  Britain	  and	  the	  United	  States—were	  also	  bound	  by	  the	  Tripartite	  Declaration	  of	  
1950,	  wherein	  they	  agreed	  not	  to	  become	  complicit	  in	  an	  arms	  race	  between	  Israel	  and	  
the	  Arab	  states.	  For	  more	  on	  American	  attempts	  to	  secure	  an	  aid	  agreement	  with	  Syria,	  
under	  both	  the	  Truman	  and	  Eisenhower	  administrations,	  see	  Lesch,	  Syria,	  19-­‐39	  and	  
Petran,	  Syria,	  101.	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invited	  the	  IBRD,	  which,	  as	  an	  international	  technical	  organization,	  seemed	  to	  offer	  
expertise	  rather	  than	  encroachment.	  The	  IBRD	  in	  1955	  made	  a	  survey	  of	  several	  
potential	  development	  projects	  in	  the	  country,	  including	  another	  study	  of	  the	  Yusuf	  
Pasha	  dam	  site,	  confirming	  Gibb’s	  cost	  estimate	  of	  $200	  million.	  The	  Bank	  declared	  that	  
additional	  study	  was	  necessary	  to	  determine	  both	  irrigation	  possibilities	  and	  power	  
demands.363	  	  
However,	  while	  the	  Bank	  was	  completing	  its	  survey,	  a	  left-­‐leaning	  government	  
came	  to	  power	  under	  the	  leadership	  of	  Khalid	  al-­‐‘Azm.	  The	  government	  professed	  
neutrality	  and	  explicitly	  asserted	  that	  it	  would	  not	  commit	  to	  exclusive	  arrangements	  
with	  the	  United	  States	  or	  its	  allies.	  Instead,	  the	  new	  Syrian	  government	  signed	  a	  military	  
and	  economic	  agreement	  with	  Egypt	  in	  March	  1955,	  an	  action	  that	  brought	  the	  threat	  of	  
Iraqi	  and	  Turkish	  military	  intervention.	  This	  saber	  rattling	  by	  the	  Iraqis	  and	  Turks,	  along	  
with	  aggressive	  actions	  by	  Israel	  in	  Gaza,	  effectively	  pushed	  Syrian	  foreign	  policy	  toward	  
deeper	  integration	  with	  Egypt	  and	  cooperation	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  The	  latter	  for	  the	  
first	  time	  articulated	  an	  interest	  in	  protecting	  Syria	  from	  outside	  interference.	  Moscow’s	  
statement	  of	  support	  declared	  that	  the	  threat	  to	  Syria:	  	  
…comes	  not	  from	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  but	  from	  those	  powers	  which,	  on	  the	  
pretext	  of	  ‘guaranteeing	  security,’	  are	  creating	  aggressive	  blocs	  in	  the	  Near	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  Ferguson	  Crawford,	  “Syrian	  Development,”	  Trek	  
Notes—Syria,	  June	  27,	  1950.	  See	  also	  Jean	  R.	  de	  Fargues	  and	  Neil	  Bass,	  “Preliminary	  
Report	  on	  the	  Youssef	  Pasha	  Dam	  for	  Production	  of	  Electrical	  Power	  and	  for	  Irrigation	  of	  
the	  Euphrates	  Valley,”	  Report	  no.	  T.O.	  112,	  International	  Bank	  for	  Reconstruction	  and	  
Development,	  April	  1956.	  For	  more	  on	  the	  relationship	  between	  agriculture,	  peasant	  
farmers	  and	  politics	  in	  Syria,	  see	  Hanna	  Batatu,	  Syria’s	  Peasantry,	  the	  Descendants	  of	  Its	  
Lesser	  Rural	  Notables,	  and	  Their	  Politics	  (Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  1999);	  
and	  Raymond	  E.	  Hinnebusch,	  Peasant	  and	  Bureaucracy	  in	  Ba’thist	  Syria:	  the	  Political	  
Economy	  of	  Rural	  Development	  (Boulder:	  Westview	  Press,	  1989).	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and	  Middle	  East	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  convert	  the	  countries	  of	  this	  area	  into	  
their	  military	  and	  strategic	  springboards	  and	  to	  reduce	  them,	  
economically,	  to	  the	  status	  of	  colonies	  or	  dependent	  territories.364	  	  
This	  statement	  pointed	  to	  a	  broader	  and	  bourgeoning	  relationship	  with	  the	  Soviet	  
Union.	  An	  arms	  shipment	  from	  Czechoslovakia	  via	  Egypt	  arrived	  later	  that	  year,	  with	  a	  
delegation	  from	  Syria	  traveling	  to	  Moscow	  in	  July.	  Syria	  signed	  a	  trade	  agreement	  with	  
the	  Soviet	  Union	  in	  November	  1955.	  The	  International	  Fair	  in	  Damascus,	  started	  in	  
1954,	  featured	  a	  number	  of	  countries	  from	  the	  Soviet	  bloc,	  and	  eventually	  led	  to	  the	  
signing	  of	  trade	  agreements	  with	  many.365	  In	  addition,	  the	  unfolding	  of	  the	  1956	  Suez	  
crisis	  seemed	  in	  many	  ways	  to	  confirm	  the	  Soviet	  statement,	  corroborating	  Syrian	  
suspicions	  that	  development	  aid	  could	  be	  used	  as	  a	  weapon.	  The	  invasion	  of	  Egypt	  by	  
Britain,	  France	  and	  Israel	  demonstrated	  to	  what	  extent	  Western	  powers	  were	  willing	  to	  
protect	  the	  prevailing	  political	  and	  economic	  order,	  substantiating	  Syrian	  reluctance	  to	  
accede	  to	  economic	  aid	  that	  involved	  onerous	  conditions.	  The	  crisis	  also	  propelled	  
Egypt’s	  president,	  Gamal	  ‘Abd	  al-­‐Nasir,	  to	  the	  height	  of	  popularity.	  
	  In	  1957,	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  took	  the	  IBRD’s	  place	  and	  offered	  to	  finance	  and	  
conduct	  a	  fuller	  study	  of	  the	  management	  of	  the	  Euphrates	  River.	  The	  USSR	  extended	  a	  
credit	  to	  the	  Syrian	  government	  and	  in	  1960,	  after	  Syria	  had	  joined	  Egypt	  to	  create	  the	  
United	  Arab	  Republic,	  completed	  a	  $1.3	  million	  study.	  The	  survey	  was	  quite	  extensive,	  
occupying	  twelve	  volumes,	  and	  recommended	  that	  the	  Syrians	  abandon	  the	  Yusuf	  Pasha	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  Statement	  published	  in	  Pravda,	  April	  17,	  1955.	  Translation	  quoted	  from	  Pedro	  
Ramet,	  The	  Soviet-­‐Syrian	  Relationship	  Since	  1955	  (Boulder:	  Westview	  Press,	  1990),	  15-­‐
16.	  For	  more	  on	  the	  implications	  of	  Middle	  Eastern	  alliance	  making,	  see	  Khalidi,	  Sowing	  
Crisis,	  175-­‐183.	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site	  in	  favor	  of	  an	  emplacement	  farther	  downstream	  at	  al-­‐Tabqa.	  The	  Soviet	  study	  
suggested	  that	  this	  site	  held	  greater	  potential	  for	  irrigation,	  nearly	  1.5	  million	  acres,	  and	  
increased	  electricity	  production.	  The	  Soviets,	  however,	  bowed	  out	  of	  the	  project	  in	  
March	  1960,	  reacting	  to	  the	  inability	  of	  the	  three	  basin	  states	  to	  reach	  an	  agreement	  
over	  the	  sharing	  of	  Euphrates	  water.	  At	  the	  same	  time	  that	  Soviet	  leaders	  were	  
attempting	  to	  court	  Syria	  with	  the	  Euphrates	  project,	  they	  extended	  to	  Iraq	  a	  $137.5	  
million	  credit	  in	  1959.	  In	  addition,	  Cairo,	  which	  dominated	  Syria	  through	  the	  UAR,	  was	  
not	  at	  this	  time	  friendly	  in	  its	  relations	  to	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  Rather	  than	  aggravate	  its	  
budding	  relationship	  with	  Iraq	  by	  supporting	  Syria’s	  ambition,	  the	  Soviets	  pulled	  out.	  
This	  action	  was,	  as	  the	  US	  Central	  Intelligence	  Agency	  noted	  several	  years	  later,	  the	  
“only	  major	  aid	  commitment	  to	  a	  less	  developed	  nation	  on	  which	  the	  USSR	  has	  ever	  
reneged.”366	  
In	  lieu	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  the	  UAR	  settled	  on	  an	  economic	  aid	  agreement	  with	  
the	  government	  of	  the	  Federal	  Republic	  of	  Germany	  (FRG)	  in	  1961.	  In	  some	  important	  
ways,	  West	  Germany	  was	  a	  perfect	  partner	  for	  the	  Syrians	  and	  the	  relationship	  survived	  
the	  split	  between	  Damascus	  and	  Cairo.	  Though	  firmly	  in	  the	  Western	  camp,	  the	  Bonn	  
government	  had	  not	  recognized	  the	  state	  of	  Israel	  and,	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  First	  and	  Second	  
World	  Wars,	  was	  forbidden	  from	  projecting	  military	  power	  abroad.	  West	  Germany	  
therefore	  played	  no	  part	  in	  supplying	  weapons	  to	  the	  region	  (at	  least	  directly)	  and	  was	  
not	  in	  a	  position	  to	  demand	  concessions	  of	  a	  military	  nature.	  Instead,	  both	  the	  Federal	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  Central	  Intelligence	  Agency,	  “Euphrates	  River	  Development,”	  Current	  Intelligence	  
Weekly,	  May	  13,	  1966,	  1.	  Declassified	  Documents	  Reference	  System	  (CK3100337117).	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Republic	  and	  its	  eastern	  counterpart,	  the	  German	  Democratic	  Republic	  (GDR),	  sought	  to	  
exert	  influence	  on	  the	  world	  stage	  through	  technical	  assistance	  and	  capital	  transfer.	  	  
The	  1961	  agreement	  included	  provision	  of	  500	  million	  marks	  ($120	  million)	  for	  
the	  execution	  of	  the	  Euphrates	  dam	  at	  al-­‐Tabqa.	  The	  UAR’s	  Damascus	  bureaucracy	  at	  
this	  stage	  took	  concrete	  action,	  creating	  a	  new	  agency,	  the	  General	  Organization	  for	  the	  
Euphrates	  Dam.	  This	  agency	  proceeded	  to	  negotiate	  contracts	  with	  companies	  in	  smaller	  
states:	  a	  German	  company	  for	  electrical	  facilities,	  a	  Dutch	  firm	  for	  agricultural	  
improvements,	  and	  an	  Italian	  company	  for	  detailed	  maps	  of	  the	  river	  basin.	  All	  was	  
moving	  forward	  until	  September	  of	  that	  year	  when	  a	  revolt	  by	  Syrian	  army	  officers	  
sundered	  the	  Egyptian-­‐Syrian	  union.	  Cairo	  refused	  to	  recognize	  the	  government	  in	  
Damascus	  as	  a	  legitimate	  successor	  to	  the	  United	  Arab	  Republic,	  which	  effectively	  
voided	  the	  dam	  financing	  agreement	  with	  West	  Germany.	  367	  
The	  German-­‐Syrian	  relationship	  survived,	  but	  it	  took	  two	  more	  years	  for	  
Damascus	  to	  secure	  a	  new	  arrangement	  with	  Bonn.	  In	  February	  1963,	  the	  FRG	  offered	  
the	  Syrian	  government	  a	  smaller	  loan	  of	  350	  million	  marks	  ($87.5	  million).	  By	  
September,	  though,	  only	  twenty	  million	  marks	  had	  been	  forwarded	  for	  a	  feasibility	  
study.	  Damascus,	  upset	  at	  German	  procrastinations,	  threatened	  to	  send	  a	  delegation	  to	  
Moscow	  to	  see	  about	  reviving	  Soviet	  interest.	  The	  Federal	  Republic	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  
worried	  that	  a	  Syria	  without	  the	  Egyptian	  economy	  could	  not	  afford	  its	  portion	  of	  the	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  André	  Bourgey,	  “Le	  barrage	  de	  Tabqa	  et	  l'aménagement	  du	  bassin	  de	  l'Euphrate	  en	  
Syrie.”	  Revue	  de	  géographie	  de	  Lyon,	  49	  (1974):	  346.	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expenses	  and	  looked	  to	  France	  to	  join	  as	  another	  partner.368	  Several	  months	  later,	  Bonn	  
sought	  to	  secure	  another	  new	  agreement	  with	  Damascus	  that,	  in	  return	  for	  certain	  
guarantees	  against	  expropriation,	  would	  allow	  for	  the	  transfer	  of	  capital	  from	  Syrian	  
expatriates	  living	  abroad.	  German	  officials	  were	  obviously	  attempting	  to	  make	  sure	  that	  
Damascus	  did	  not	  attempt	  to	  nationalize	  the	  assets	  of	  German	  companies	  in	  the	  Egyptian	  
style,	  in	  order	  to	  finance	  the	  dam	  project.369	  
In	  1964,	  relations	  between	  Damascus	  and	  Bonn	  continued	  to	  degrade.	  On	  
February	  21	  Syrian	  police	  arrested	  a	  translator	  for	  the	  German	  embassy	  on	  charges	  of	  
fomenting	  dissent	  against	  the	  Ba’thist	  regime	  in	  the	  press.	  Later	  in	  the	  year	  experts	  from	  
the	  German	  Bank	  for	  Reconstruction	  and	  Development	  visited	  Syria	  to	  examine	  the	  dam	  
site	  and	  Syria’s	  ability	  to	  produce	  the	  necessary	  resources	  to	  build	  the	  dam.	  Damascus,	  
on	  the	  other	  hand,	  appeared	  to	  be	  holding	  out	  the	  possibility	  of	  giving	  a	  concession	  to	  a	  
German	  company	  for	  petroleum	  exploration	  in	  order	  to	  obtain	  more	  funding	  for	  the	  
dam.370	  
It	  was	  not	  expropriations	  or	  concessions	  however	  that	  caused	  a	  rift	  between	  
Syria	  and	  the	  FRG.	  Under	  pressure	  from	  the	  United	  States	  the	  West	  German	  government	  
established	  diplomatic	  relations	  with	  Israel	  on	  May	  13,	  1965.	  Embassies	  were	  founded	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  Centre	  des	  Archives	  diplomatiques	  de	  Nantes	  [hereafter	  CADN],	  188PO/B/2,	  Jean	  
Fleury,	  dispatch	  no.	  1295,	  “Projets	  allemands	  en	  Syrie,”	  September	  26,	  1963.	  
369	  CADN,	  188PO/B/2,	  M.	  Pierre	  Sébilleau,	  dispatch	  no.	  808,	  “Projet	  d'accord	  germano-­‐
syrien	  sur	  la	  protection	  des	  investissements,”	  October	  17,	  1963.	  
370	  CADN,	  188PO/B/2,	  M.	  Pierre	  Sébilleau,	  dispatch	  no.	  235/AL,	  “La	  Syrie	  et	  la	  
République	  Fédérale	  d'Allemagne,”	  February	  26,	  1964;	  and	  François	  Charles-­‐Roux,	  
dispatch	  no.	  634/DE,	  “Octroi	  d'un	  crédit	  privé	  allemand	  à	  la	  Syrie,”	  July	  2,	  1964.	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in	  Tel	  Aviv	  and	  Bonn,	  and	  the	  Germans	  offered	  Israel	  technical	  and	  economic	  aid.	  While	  
these	  measures	  angered	  Arab	  capitals,	  it	  was	  the	  financing	  of	  arms	  purchases	  that	  was	  
the	  greatest	  irritant.	  While	  Bonn	  did	  not	  send	  arms	  directly,	  the	  Federal	  Republic	  
financed	  an	  American	  purchase.	  The	  majority	  of	  Arab	  states,	  including	  Syria,	  broke	  ties	  
with	  Bonn.371	  
Still,	  West	  Germany	  was	  Syria’s	  most	  important	  trading	  partner	  throughout	  the	  
early	  1960s	  and	  the	  two	  countries	  cooperated	  on	  several	  fronts.372	  Even	  with	  the	  break	  
in	  official	  relations	  the	  Federal	  Republic’s	  status	  in	  Syrian	  trade	  remained	  significant	  and	  
the	  Syrian	  government	  seemed	  reluctant	  to	  completely	  split	  with	  Bonn.	  Germany’s	  
consulate	  in	  Aleppo,	  as	  well	  as	  several	  technical	  institutes	  and	  agriculture	  technology	  
centers	  in	  Damascus	  and	  Aleppo,	  remained	  open.	  The	  West	  German	  government	  set	  up	  
its	  yearly	  pavilion	  at	  the	  International	  Fair	  in	  Damascus,	  welcoming	  several	  Syrian	  
ministers.	  Most	  importantly,	  Germany’s	  representative	  announced	  that	  the	  May	  1963	  
credit	  offered	  for	  construction	  of	  the	  dam	  was	  “still	  considered	  valid	  on	  the	  German	  
side.”373	  
The	  diplomatic	  dance	  between	  the	  Federal	  Republic	  and	  Syria	  continued	  for	  two	  
more	  years,	  with	  the	  dam	  project	  playing	  an	  increasingly	  important	  role.	  West	  German	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
371	  “Memorandum	  of	  Conversation	  Between	  President	  Johnson	  and	  Chancellor	  Erhard,”	  
June	  12,	  1964,	  Foreign	  Relations	  of	  the	  United	  States,	  1964-­‐68,	  vol.	  XV,	  doc.	  49,	  pp.	  111-­‐
115.	  
372	  CADN,	  188PO/B/2,	  Alain	  Grenier,	  dispatch	  no.	  956,	  “Quelques	  informations	  sur	  les	  
relations	  économiques	  et	  tèchniques	  entre	  l'Allemagne	  Fédérale	  et	  la	  Syrie,”	  May	  27,	  
1965.	  
373	  CADN,	  188PO/B/2,	  Paul-­‐Henry	  Manière,	  dispatch	  no.	  950/AL,	  “Participation	  
allemande	  à	  la	  Foire	  de	  Damas,”	  September	  16,	  1965.	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officials	  continued	  to	  reiterate	  Bonn’s	  interest	  in	  the	  project	  and	  the	  viability	  of	  the	  
original	  offer	  throughout	  1965.	  Damascus,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  entertained	  other	  suitors	  
in	  an	  attempt	  to	  press	  Bonn	  for	  a	  greater	  commitment.	  One	  of	  the	  most	  direct	  methods	  
of	  applying	  pressure	  involved	  overtures	  to	  the	  GDR.	  West	  Germany	  had	  been	  fighting	  a	  
smaller-­‐scale	  Cold	  War	  with	  its	  eastern	  neighbor	  for	  years,	  attempting	  to	  isolate	  Berlin	  
and	  deny	  it	  international	  recognition.	  As	  a	  result,	  Damascus	  could	  easily	  signal	  its	  
discontent	  over	  German	  policies	  by	  courting	  East	  Germany	  and,	  by	  extension,	  the	  Soviet	  
Union.	  
In	  mid-­‐July,	  the	  Syrians	  sent	  their	  Minister	  of	  Agrarian	  Reform,	  ‘Abd	  al-­‐Karim	  al-­‐
Jundi,	  to	  East	  Berlin	  for	  meetings	  with	  GDR	  leader	  Walter	  Ulbricht.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  
Damascus	  entered	  negotiations	  with	  East	  German	  representatives	  on	  an	  array	  of	  
commercial	  and	  technical	  agreements,	  which	  were	  signed	  in	  Damascus	  on	  August	  2.	  The	  
GDR	  opened	  a	  consulate	  general	  in	  Damascus	  on	  August	  23	  and	  signed	  a	  credit	  
agreement	  of	  $25	  million	  on	  October	  23.	  The	  East	  Germans	  had	  broken	  through	  some	  of	  
their	  isolation	  and	  moved	  toward	  a	  great	  role	  in	  Syrian	  affairs.374	  
Still,	  the	  Bonn	  government	  held	  out	  financing	  for	  the	  dam	  as	  a	  way	  to	  bring	  
Damascus	  back	  to	  the	  table.	  According	  to	  French	  documents	  the	  Germans	  “repeatedly	  
reaffirmed”	  their	  commitment	  to	  the	  Euphrates	  project.	  Bonn	  stressed	  that	  the	  offer	  was	  
three	  times	  the	  amount	  offered	  by	  officials	  from	  East	  Berlin.	  On	  the	  Syrian	  side	  Bonn’s	  
offer	  was	  debated.	  While	  some	  in	  the	  government	  emphasized	  Syria’s	  commitment	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
374	  CADN,	  188PO/B/2,	  François	  Charles-­‐Roux,	  dispatch	  no.	  763/AL,	  “Activités	  
allemandes	  en	  Syrie,”	  July	  22,	  1965.	  See	  also	  Massimiliano	  Trentin,	  Engineers	  of	  Modern	  
Development:	  East	  German	  Experts	  in	  Ba’thist	  Syria:	  1965-­‐1972	  (Padova:	  CLEUP,	  2010),	  
86-­‐87.	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shoulder	  its	  share	  of	  the	  expenses	  and	  the	  country’s	  determination	  to	  “pay	  to	  execute	  
the	  Euphrates	  dam,”	  others	  found	  a	  partnership	  with	  the	  West	  Germans	  “illogical”	  and	  
pointed	  to	  the	  “dilatory	  policy”	  that	  Bonn	  had	  pursued.	  Syria’s	  Minister	  of	  Foreign	  
Affairs	  Ibrahim	  Makhus	  appeared	  on	  German	  television	  in	  October	  1965	  and	  contended	  
that	  the	  Syrian	  government	  was	  not	  using	  the	  dam	  as	  “an	  opportunity	  for	  political	  
bargaining”	  and	  that	  Syria	  was	  “trying	  to	  generate	  for	  the	  Euphrates	  dam	  project	  the	  
interest	  of	  all	  states	  without	  exception	  and	  to	  encourage	  bids	  from	  where	  they	  come.”	  
The	  dam,	  of	  course,	  had	  been	  an	  opportunity	  for	  political	  bargaining	  all	  along.	  	  
Syria’s	  courtship	  of	  the	  East	  Germans	  was	  a	  maneuver	  designed	  to	  prod	  the	  
Federal	  Republic	  toward	  a	  more	  significant	  outlay.	  Damascus	  sent	  several	  signals	  to	  
Berlin	  over	  the	  course	  of	  1965,	  including	  a	  delay	  in	  the	  appointment	  of	  a	  lead	  official	  to	  
Syria’s	  Consulate	  General	  in	  East	  Berlin.	  Damascus	  continued	  to	  do	  business	  with	  
German	  companies	  and	  experts,	  renewing	  technical	  cooperation	  contracts	  and	  accepting	  
German	  tenders.	  Though	  Damascus	  closed	  the	  Goethe	  Institute	  in	  Aleppo,	  the	  move	  
seemed	  timed	  to	  curtail	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  Soviet	  cultural	  center	  in	  that	  city.375	  
After	  nearly	  seven	  months	  of	  such	  signals	  Damascus	  decided	  to	  try	  another	  tack.	  
On	  December	  17,	  the	  Director	  General	  of	  the	  Agency	  for	  the	  Euphrates	  Dam,	  Ibrahim	  
Farhoud,	  traveled	  to	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  Information	  about	  his	  trip	  was	  very	  limited;	  the	  
press	  simply	  stated	  that	  he	  was	  “visiting	  Soviet	  dams	  that	  offer	  some	  analogy	  to	  the	  
work	  projected	  on	  the	  Euphrates.”	  After	  three	  weeks	  Farhoud	  returned	  to	  Syria	  without	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
375	  CADN,	  188PO/B/2,	  François	  Charles-­‐Roux,	  dispatch	  no.	  1053/AL,	  “Déclarations	  
syriennes	  et	  allemandes	  au	  sujet	  du	  barrage	  de	  l'Euphrate,”	  October	  21,	  196	  and	  
dispatch	  no.	  1322/AL,	  “Relations	  entre	  la	  République	  Fédérale,	  Israêl	  et	  le	  monde	  
arabe,”	  December	  28,	  1965.	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fanfare	  or	  announcement.	  Sources	  at	  the	  Syrian	  Ministry	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs	  refused	  to	  
say	  anything	  but	  it	  seemed	  that	  the	  sticking	  point	  was	  still	  the	  tripartite	  agreement	  
between	  Turkey,	  Iraq	  and	  Syria	  over	  an	  equitable	  sharing	  of	  Euphrates	  water.	  Months	  
passed,	  and	  it	  appeared	  as	  if	  nothing	  had	  come	  of	  Farhoud’s	  visit.	  However,	  in	  February	  
1966	  a	  coup	  by	  left-­‐wing	  Ba’thist	  leaders	  paved	  the	  way	  for	  closer	  relations	  with	  the	  
Soviet	  Union.	  In	  April	  a	  Syrian	  delegation,	  including	  Hafiz	  al-­‐Assad	  as	  Defense	  Minister,	  
traveled	  to	  Moscow	  and	  secured	  military	  and	  economic	  aid,	  including	  a	  $150	  million	  
loan	  for	  the	  construction	  of	  the	  Euphrates	  dam.376	  
Still,	  the	  West	  German	  government	  did	  not	  immediately	  rescind	  its	  offer	  to	  
provide	  support	  for	  the	  dam.	  In	  fact,	  the	  German	  commercial	  counselor	  at	  the	  French	  
embassy	  admitted	  to	  trying	  to	  meet	  with	  the	  Syrian	  president	  just	  before	  the	  February	  
1966	  coup	  in	  order	  to	  talk	  about	  the	  dam,	  and	  also	  commented	  that	  “some	  simultaneous	  
participation	  of	  the	  USSR	  and	  West	  Germany	  for	  the	  construction	  of	  the	  Aswan	  Dam	  had	  
been	  considered	  for	  a	  moment.”	  The	  French	  ambassador	  to	  Syria	  wondered:	  
Should	  we	  conclude	  that	  certain	  officials	  in	  Bonn	  do	  not	  exclude	  the	  
possibility	  of	  a	  German-­‐Russian	  collaboration	  on	  the	  Euphrates?	  One	  can	  
ask	  moreover	  whether	  Syrian	  leaders	  themselves,	  while	  condemning	  a	  
posteriori	  the	  German	  offer,	  would	  not	  basically	  want	  to	  use	  it	  at	  the	  same	  
time	  as	  the	  Russian	  offer,	  or	  at	  least	  maintain	  the	  opportunity	  to	  again	  
appeal	  to	  the	  Germans	  if	  the	  Soviets	  were	  to	  impose	  difficult	  to	  accept	  
conditions.377	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
376	  CADN,	  188PO/B/2,	  François	  Charles-­‐Roux,	  dispatch	  no.	  61/AL,	  “Financement	  du	  
barrage	  de	  l’Euphrate:	  ouvertures	  syriennes	  en	  direction	  de	  l’U.R.S.S.,”	  January	  20,	  1966;	  
dispatch	  no.	  103/AL,	  “Projet	  de	  barrage	  sur	  l’Euphrate,”	  February	  27,	  1966;	  dispatch	  no.	  
461/AL,	  “Publication	  du	  Protocole	  d'accord	  syro-­‐soviétique	  sur	  le	  barrage	  de	  
l'Euphrate,”	  May	  5,	  1966.	  
377	  CADN,	  108PO/B/2,	  François	  Charles-­‐Roux,	  dispatch	  no.	  500/AL,	  “La	  RFA	  et	  le	  
barrage	  sur	  l’Euphrate,”	  May	  12,	  1966.	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The	  speculation	  points	  to	  several	  important	  facts	  about	  the	  Syrian	  relationship	  to	  the	  
Soviet	  Union	  and	  other	  foreign	  powers.	  The	  French	  ambassador	  recognized	  that	  Syria’s	  
primary	  motivation	  in	  finding	  technical	  and	  financial	  assistance	  for	  the	  dam	  was	  to	  avoid	  
foreign	  entanglements,	  difficult	  conditions,	  or	  political	  subordination.	  Moreover,	  the	  
continued	  openness	  toward	  the	  Germans	  indicates	  the	  extent	  to	  which,	  even	  in	  mid-­‐
1966,	  Damascus	  was	  not	  yet	  committed	  to	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  Only	  the	  military	  disaster	  of	  
the	  1967	  war	  with	  Israel	  made	  stronger	  ties	  with	  the	  Soviets	  necessary.	  Finally,	  the	  
willingness	  of	  Germany	  to	  perhaps	  enter	  into	  collaboration	  on	  the	  dam	  suggests	  the	  
extent	  to	  which	  these	  projects	  had	  been	  placed	  outside	  a	  particular	  ideology	  or	  mode	  of	  
development.	  Though	  they	  combined	  vast	  amounts	  of	  accumulated	  capital,	  technical	  
knowledge	  and	  labor—and	  could	  be	  politicized	  and	  used	  as	  leverage—in	  an	  instant	  they	  
might	  become	  devoid	  of	  politics	  and	  simply	  represent	  “the	  historic	  defiance	  of	  man…to	  
overcome	  his	  secular	  dependence	  on	  natural	  phenomena.”378	  	  
	  
A	  People	  Freed	  from	  Need:	  Security	  and	  Sustainability	  in	  Southeast	  Anatolia	  
	  In	  1967,	  American	  President	  Lyndon	  Johnson’s	  White	  House	  organized	  an	  
International	  Conference	  on	  Water	  for	  Peace	  in	  Washington,	  D.C.	  	  The	  conference	  was	  
quite	  an	  affair.	  Thirty-­‐five	  hundred	  delegates	  from	  eighty-­‐five	  nations	  attended	  the	  
meeting,	  which	  received	  seven	  hundred	  papers	  and	  included	  a	  motion	  picture	  festival.379	  
While	  the	  conference	  title	  might	  suggest	  an	  emphasis	  on	  reconciliation	  in	  international	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  Petran,	  Syria,	  214.	  
379	  ”Water	  for	  Peace:	  The	  U.S.	  Shifts	  Gears,”	  Environmental	  Science	  and	  Technology	  1	  
(1967),	  345.	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relations,	  this	  was	  not	  the	  aim.	  Instead,	  the	  conference	  focused	  on	  relief	  from	  water	  
insecurity,	  on	  humanity’s	  new	  technical	  power	  to	  shape	  the	  use	  of	  water.	  President	  
Johnson’s	  signing	  statement	  for	  the	  bill	  authorizing	  the	  conference	  declared:	  	  
In	  the	  past,	  many	  of	  man's	  efforts	  to	  solve	  his	  water	  problems	  failed	  
because	  he	  did	  not	  possess	  the	  tools,	  the	  technology,	  or	  the	  understanding	  
to	  do	  the	  job.	  That	  is	  no	  longer	  the	  case.	  The	  question	  now	  is	  whether	  the	  
competence	  he	  possesses	  can	  be	  translated	  into	  action	  where	  it	  is	  
needed.380	  
As	  a	  demonstration	  of	  such	  competence,	  Turkey’s	  Korkut	  Özal	  presented	  a	  report	  
detailing	  his	  ideas	  for	  developing	  the	  Euphrates	  basin.381	  
Korkut	  Özal’s	  presentation	  at	  the	  international	  conference	  was	  a	  hydrological	  
assessment	  of	  the	  Euphrates	  only.	  In	  the	  late	  1960s,	  the	  State	  Hydraulic	  Works	  managed	  
the	  Tigris	  and	  Euphrates	  separately,	  with	  most	  of	  the	  focus	  on	  the	  latter.	  The	  Euphrates,	  
as	  the	  smaller	  of	  the	  two	  rivers,	  was	  easier	  to	  control.	  Throughout	  the	  1960s,	  as	  work	  on	  
the	  Keban	  dam	  commenced,	  a	  collection	  of	  high-­‐ranked	  Turkish	  officials—including	  
Süleyman	  Demirel,	  another	  prime	  minister-­‐to-­‐be	  and	  electrical	  engineer	  Turgut	  Özal	  
and	  his	  younger	  brother	  Korkut—conceived	  of	  additional	  dams	  on	  both	  the	  Euphrates	  
and	  Tigris	  Rivers	  to	  generate	  electricity	  and	  provide	  irrigation.	  In	  1980,	  a	  project	  larger	  
than	  either	  the	  Keban	  or	  the	  Karakaya,	  the	  Keban	  dam’s	  neighbor	  to	  the	  south	  and	  still	  
under	  construction,	  entered	  its	  final	  planning	  stages.	  The	  Karababa,	  later	  Atatürk	  Dam,	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  Lyndon	  B.	  Johnson,	  "Statement	  by	  the	  President	  Upon	  Signing	  Bill	  Authorizing	  the	  
International	  Conference	  on	  Water	  for	  Peace,"	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  Online	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  The	  American	  Presidency	  Project,	  
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=28008.	  
381	  Korkut	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  al.,	  “Development	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  Euphrates	  Basin	  in	  Turkey—A	  Case	  Study,”	  
Water	  for	  Peace:	  Planning	  and	  Developing,	  vol.	  6	  (Washington,	  DC:	  U.S.	  Government	  
Printing	  Office,	  1967),	  100-­‐109.	  
	  
	   222	  
generated	  plenty	  of	  political	  controversy.382	  In	  response,	  the	  Turkish	  state	  began	  to	  see	  
the	  two	  rivers	  as	  a	  single	  basin	  and	  their	  development	  was	  combined	  into	  the	  
Güneydoğu	  Anadolu	  Projesi	  (GAP)	  or	  “Southeast	  Anatolia	  Project.”	  Three	  years	  later,	  
construction	  began	  on	  the	  Atatürk	  Dam,	  one	  of	  the	  world’s	  largest	  construction	  projects.	  	  
The	  conceptual	  work	  of	  seeing	  the	  two	  rivers	  as	  one	  and	  the	  real	  labor	  on	  this	  
immense	  dam	  laid	  both	  the	  intellectual	  and	  infrastructural	  foundation	  for	  another	  kind	  
of	  mega	  project:	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  regional	  development	  program	  of	  enormous	  scope.	  
Connecting	  a	  major	  piece	  of	  water	  infrastructure	  to	  regional	  development	  was	  not	  of	  
course	  unprecedented;	  the	  GAP	  may	  be	  compared	  to	  other	  projects	  of	  its	  type,	  such	  as	  
the	  Tennessee	  Valley	  Authority	  (TVA)	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  As	  with	  the	  TVA,	  the	  
Southeast	  Anatolia	  Project	  envisioned	  a	  series	  of	  hydroelectric	  power	  stations	  that	  
would	  provide	  the	  necessary	  energy	  infrastructure	  for	  industrial	  development,	  while	  the	  
availability	  of	  water	  and	  irrigation	  facilities	  would	  increase	  and	  intensify	  agricultural	  
production.	  This	  combination	  of	  industrial	  and	  agricultural	  development	  was	  at	  the	  
heart	  of	  Turkey’s	  new	  GAP.	  At	  its	  completion,	  the	  project	  will	  include	  twenty-­‐two	  dams	  
and	  nineteen	  hydraulic	  power	  plants	  providing	  irrigation	  for	  an	  estimated	  1.82	  million	  
hectares	  of	  land.	  The	  rivers	  will	  supply	  an	  annual	  yield	  of	  twenty-­‐seven	  billion	  kilowatt-­‐
hours	  of	  electricity.	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  Paul	  Williams,	  “Euphrates	  and	  Tigris	  Waters—Turkish-­‐Syrian	  and	  Iraqi	  Relations,”	  in	  
Water	  Resource	  Conflicts	  and	  International	  Security:	  A	  Global	  Perspective,	  ed.	  Dhirendra	  
Vajpeyi	  (Plymouth:	  Lexington	  Books,	  2012),	  41-­‐43	  and	  Özden	  Bilen,	  Turkey	  and	  Water	  
Issues	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  (Ankara:	  Southeast	  Anatolia	  Project	  Regional	  Development	  
Administration,	  1997),	  34-­‐86.	  For	  more	  on	  the	  general	  subject	  of	  large	  dams,	  see	  Cecilia	  
Tortajada,	  Doğan	  Altinbilek	  and	  Asit	  K.	  Biswas,	  eds.,	  Impacts	  of	  Large	  Dams:	  A	  Global	  
Assessment	  (Berlin:	  Springer-­‐Verlag,	  2012).	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To	  administer	  and	  direct	  this	  massive	  project,	  the	  Turkish	  state	  established	  the	  
Southeast	  Anatolia	  Regional	  Development	  Administration	  in	  1989.	  The	  law	  governing	  
the	  Administration	  demonstrated	  how	  the	  Turkish	  government	  saw	  this	  project	  as	  
involving	  more	  than	  simply	  economic	  development.	  The	  GAP	  scheme	  engaged	  the	  entire	  
landscape	  of	  Southeast	  Anatolia,	  including	  political,	  social,	  cultural,	  and	  environmental	  
spheres.	  Law	  decree	  388	  (1989)	  defined	  the	  Administration’s	  duties:	  
To	  conduct,	  guide	  and	  coordinate	  the	  activities	  related	  to	  investments	  
undertaken	  in	  agriculture,	  mining,	  manufacturing	  industry,	  energy,	  
transport,	  communications,	  construction,	  tourism,	  other	  public	  works,	  
human	  resources,	  social	  economy,	  science,	  research,	  development,	  
technology,	  environment,	  urbanism,	  regional	  development	  and	  culture	  in	  
order	  to	  achieve	  rapid	  development	  in	  the	  region	  under	  long-­‐term	  plans	  
and	  annual	  programmes;	  
To	  carry	  out	  regional	  planning	  in	  such	  a	  way	  so	  as	  to	  achieve	  intersectoral	  
integration	  in	  the	  region;	  
To	  conduct	  the	  necessary	  work	  in	  the	  areas	  of	  resource	  utilization,	  foreign	  
economic	  relations,	  financial	  balance,	  credit,	  banking,	  prices	  and	  capital	  
markets;	  
To	  organize	  road,	  water	  and	  power	  supply,	  sewerage,	  housing,	  industry	  
and	  transport	  services;	  
To	  ensure	  coordination	  in	  the	  construction	  of	  all	  types	  of	  buildings	  and	  
facilities	  for	  governmental	  bodies;	  
To	  ensure,	  in	  coordination	  with	  the	  Ministry	  of	  National	  Education	  and	  
other	  concerned	  governmental	  bodies,	  that	  the	  people's	  level	  of	  education	  
in	  all	  areas	  including	  agricultural	  is	  raised	  and	  that	  educational	  
institutions	  at	  all	  levels	  are	  established.383	  
In	  essence,	  the	  Southeast	  Anatolia	  Regional	  Development	  Administration	  was	  given	  
powers	  to	  direct	  nearly	  all	  economic,	  political,	  social	  and	  even	  cultural	  life	  in	  order	  to	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  “Decree-­‐law	  Concerning	  the	  Establishment	  and	  Duties	  of	  the	  Southeastern	  Anatolia	  
Project	  Regional	  Development	  Administration,”	  October	  27,	  1989,	  accessed	  August	  25,	  
2013,	  http://www.gap.gov.tr/gap-­‐rda/law-­‐decree-­‐no-­‐388.	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achieve	  its	  goals.	  A	  recent	  GAP	  publication	  noted	  the	  range	  of	  activities	  being	  
implemented	  in	  the	  project	  area.	  The	  publication	  included	  the	  expected	  topic	  areas	  on	  
agricultural	  and	  industrial	  development,	  but	  also	  noted	  other	  public	  investments	  
including	  the	  construction	  of	  community	  centers,	  youth	  and	  culture	  houses,	  vocational	  
training,	  reading	  rooms,	  a	  maternal	  and	  child	  health	  project,	  sewage	  treatment,	  and	  
landfills.	  The	  report	  also	  included	  a	  section	  titled	  “international	  relations,”	  which	  
indicated	  the	  project’s	  sensitivity	  to	  international	  opinion	  in	  its	  efforts	  to	  secure	  
additional	  international	  funding.384	  	  
Other	  GAP	  publications	  touted	  significant	  accomplishments,	  such	  as	  the	  
construction	  of	  a	  new	  university	  in	  the	  city	  of	  Harran—the	  previous	  incarnation	  of	  
higher	  learning	  in	  the	  city	  having	  disappeared	  for	  one	  thousand	  years—and	  the	  
restoration	  of	  historical	  and	  cultural	  sites	  in	  the	  city	  of	  Mardin.	  So	  comprehensive	  is	  the	  
scope	  of	  the	  Southeast	  Anatolia	  Project	  and	  so	  extensive	  is	  the	  mandate	  of	  the	  Regional	  
Development	  Administration	  that	  one	  might	  see	  it	  as	  its	  own	  statelet,	  though	  one	  firmly	  
under	  the	  control	  of	  the	  Turkish	  central	  government	  and	  its	  military.	  The	  GAP,	  then,	  is	  
much	  more	  than	  a	  series	  of	  dams.	  
As	  a	  technical	  and	  human	  development	  project	  of	  massive	  scope,	  the	  Southeast	  
Anatolia	  Project	  relies	  upon	  a	  set	  of	  justifications	  and	  logics	  to	  vindicate	  its	  program	  and	  
require	  its	  realization.	  Timothy	  Mitchell	  has	  described	  aspects	  of	  this	  process	  in	  his	  
analysis	  of	  the	  construction	  of	  the	  Aswan	  Dam	  in	  Egypt:	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  GAP	  Regional	  Development	  Administration,	  Latest	  Situation	  on	  Southeastern	  Anatolia	  
Project:	  Activities	  of	  the	  GAP	  Administration.	  (Ankara:	  GAP	  Regional	  Development	  
Administration,	  2006).	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Thus	  a	  significant	  reorganization	  and	  concentration	  of	  accounting,	  
calculation,	  description	  and	  knowledge	  accompanied	  the	  concentration	  of	  
hydraulic	  power	  in	  the	  dam.	  	  These	  and	  other	  reorganizations	  were	  the	  
kinds	  of	  processes	  through	  which	  the	  world	  came	  to	  be	  simplified	  into	  
what	  seemed	  nature	  on	  one	  side,	  and	  human	  calculation	  and	  expertise	  on	  
the	  other.385	  
A	  story	  similar	  to	  Mitchell’s	  could	  be	  told	  about	  Turkey’s	  dams	  on	  the	  Euphrates.	  These	  
structures,	  which	  represent	  the	  most	  significant	  physical	  manifestation	  of	  the	  GAP	  are,	  
as	  Mitchell	  pointed	  out,	  a	  “concentration	  and	  reorganization	  of	  knowledge”	  of	  enormous	  
magnitude.	  The	  concentration	  of	  knowledge	  has	  been	  paralleled	  by	  a	  concentration	  of	  
capital,	  and	  the	  practices	  and	  processes	  associated	  with	  the	  deployment	  of	  expertise	  to	  
justify	  these	  concentrations	  of	  capital	  constitute	  what	  Mitchell	  terms	  “techno-­‐
politics.”386	  Mitchell	  suggests	  that	  the	  scale	  of	  these	  technological	  projects,	  the	  
connected	  expertise,	  and	  the	  resulting	  politics	  are	  all	  part	  of	  the	  nation-­‐	  making	  project.	  
In	  the	  case	  of	  Egypt	  under	  British	  rule,	  this	  was	  also	  implicitly	  a	  “colony	  making”	  project.	  
In	  other	  words,	  the	  development	  projects	  sought	  to	  exhibit	  the	  British	  Empire	  as	  “a	  
benign	  and	  effective	  mechanism	  of	  global	  improvement”	  by	  bringing	  modern	  technology	  
and	  expertise	  to	  “underdeveloped”	  regions.387	  
In	  the	  case	  of	  Turkey’s	  GAP,	  as	  with	  the	  Aswan	  Dam	  in	  Egypt,	  the	  magnitude	  of	  
the	  technological	  project	  established	  the	  binary	  of	  human	  and	  nature,	  as	  the	  vast	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  Timothy	  Mitchell,	  Rule	  of	  Experts:	  Egypt,	  Techno-­‐politics,	  Modernity	  (Berkeley:	  
University	  of	  California	  Press,	  2002).	  
386	  Mitchell,	  Rule	  of	  Experts,	  41-­‐42.	  
387	  Priya	  Satia,	  “Developing	  Iraq,”	  213.	  While	  Satia	  locates	  the	  beginnings	  of	  this	  kind	  of	  
development	  thinking	  in	  1920s	  Iraq,	  it	  is	  more	  likely	  a	  product	  of	  earlier	  infrastructure	  
projects	  in	  Egypt	  and	  India.	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concentration	  of	  capital	  and	  expertise	  created	  the	  illusion	  that	  nature	  could	  somehow	  be	  
controlled	  and	  harnessed	  through	  human	  ingenuity.	  Expertise—particularly	  the	  social	  
sciences,	  engineering,	  and	  medicine—creates	  a	  delineation	  between	  the	  human	  realm	  
and	  the	  nonhuman,	  identifying	  human	  agents	  as	  those	  able	  to	  control	  and	  impact	  the	  
latter	  rather	  than	  the	  other	  way	  around.	  In	  Turkey’s	  GAP,	  this	  illusion	  of	  human	  control	  
and	  rationality	  was	  embedded	  in	  a	  development	  program	  that	  sought,	  and	  continues	  to	  
seek,	  not	  only	  to	  reorganize	  capital	  and	  knowledge	  in	  the	  service	  of	  a	  series	  of	  large-­‐
scale	  technological	  projects,	  but	  also	  to	  rearrange	  the	  very	  architecture	  of	  the	  society	  
that	  is	  its	  object.	  	  	  
This	  rearrangement	  has	  been	  accomplished	  through	  a	  broad	  range	  of	  social	  and	  
cultural	  interventions,	  some	  of	  which	  were	  noted	  above	  in	  the	  authorization	  for	  the	  GAP	  
Administration.	  These	  interventions	  were	  viewed	  as	  critical	  components	  of	  an	  overall	  
program	  of	  dam	  building	  and	  the	  digging	  of	  irrigation	  tunnels.	  Project	  documents	  assert	  
that	  the	  technological	  project,	  the	  dam,	  cannot	  be	  successful	  without	  the	  building	  of	  a	  
community	  center	  or	  the	  resettlement	  of	  a	  village.	  The	  logic	  of	  development	  and	  
exploitation	  of	  resources	  that	  created	  a	  need	  for	  the	  dam	  and	  justified	  its	  construction	  
are	  thus	  brought	  to	  bear	  on	  human	  societies.	  The	  target	  society	  is	  rendered	  equivalent	  
to	  a	  nonhuman	  object	  that	  may	  be	  studied	  and	  acted	  upon	  by	  rational	  human	  agents.	  
The	  GAP	  appears	  then	  as	  an	  updated	  and	  more	  virulent	  version	  of	  the	  projects	  arranged	  
around	  and	  brought	  about	  by	  construction	  of	  the	  Aswan	  Dam.	  Not	  only	  has	  nature	  been	  
created	  and	  made	  subject	  to	  human	  expertise,	  but	  entire	  human	  communities	  have	  also	  
been	  objectified,	  ready	  to	  be	  controlled	  and	  harnessed	  to	  the	  nation	  making	  project.	  The	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GAP	  is	  in	  fact	  an	  amalgam	  where	  various	  forms	  of	  expertise	  generate	  two	  binaries,	  one	  
between	  human	  and	  nature	  and	  the	  other	  between	  civilization	  and	  the	  primitive.	  
Both	  binaries	  do	  violence,	  both	  to	  the	  environment	  through	  massive	  adjustments	  
to	  the	  rivers’	  hydrological	  regimes	  and	  to	  human	  communities	  through	  state	  
intervention	  into	  social	  and	  cultural	  affairs.388	  This	  section	  of	  the	  dissertation	  will	  
examine	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  this	  violence	  has	  been	  justified	  to	  a	  skeptical	  international	  
community.	  The	  first	  part	  will	  discuss	  the	  discourse	  around	  “sustainability,”	  its	  
deployment	  as	  a	  means	  of	  activating	  international	  support	  and	  its	  relationship	  to	  
concepts	  of	  culture	  and	  posterity.	  	  The	  second	  part	  will	  examine	  claims	  of	  security	  made	  
by	  various	  groups,	  and	  explore	  the	  way	  that	  the	  concepts	  of	  national,	  economic	  and	  
human	  security	  interact.	  By	  effectively	  deploying	  these	  themes,	  the	  Southeast	  Anatolia	  
Project	  has	  escaped	  outright	  condemnation	  and	  instead,	  like	  its	  ancestor	  the	  TVA,	  
become	  a	  model	  for	  other	  states.	  
	  
In	  its	  initial	  incarnation,	  the	  GAP	  found	  it	  extremely	  difficult	  to	  obtain	  
international	  funding	  for	  dam	  building.	  The	  World	  Bank	  and	  the	  International	  Monetary	  
Fund	  refused	  to	  fund	  any	  part	  of	  the	  GAP	  after	  construction	  of	  the	  Karakaya	  Dam	  due	  to	  
concerns	  over	  social	  and	  environmental	  impacts,	  as	  well	  as	  protests	  from	  governments	  
in	  Iraq	  and	  Syria.389	  Turkey	  therefore	  financed	  much	  of	  the	  dam	  building	  itself,	  including	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
388	  For	  more	  information	  on	  the	  history	  of	  these	  interventions	  in	  southeastern	  Anatolia,	  
see	  Uğur	  Ümit	  Üngör,	  Making	  of	  Modern	  Turkey.	  
389	  Patrick	  MacQuarrie,	  “Water	  Security	  in	  the	  Middle	  East:	  Growing	  Conflict	  over	  
Development	  in	  the	  Tigris-­‐Euphrates	  Basin”	  (Ph.D.	  Diss.,	  Trinity	  College,	  2004),	  29.	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the	  nearly	  four	  billion	  dollars	  required	  to	  construct	  the	  Atatürk	  dam.	  As	  a	  result	  of	  this	  
financial	  outlay,	  the	  GAP	  Regional	  Development	  Administration	  developed	  a	  set	  of	  
limited	  goals	  in	  the	  early	  1990s	  that	  envisioned	  a	  growth-­‐based	  model	  of	  economic	  
development:	  
1.	  generation	  of	  hydroelectric	  power;	  
2.	  development	  of	  regional	  agriculture	  through	  irrigation;	  
3.	  development	  of	  a	  regional	  agro-­‐industrial	  base;	  and	  
4.	  formulation	  of	  a	  mid-­‐	  to	  long-­‐term	  solution	  to	  Kurdish	  ethnic	  
separatism.390	  	  
This	  approach	  represented	  a	  significant	  curtailment	  of	  the	  goals	  outlined	  in	  the	  1989	  
authorization.	  GAP	  projects	  at	  this	  time	  were	  mainly	  limited	  to	  developing	  irrigation	  and	  
industrial	  zones.	  	  However,	  in	  1995,	  the	  GAP	  figured	  out	  how	  to	  tap	  into	  international	  
funds	  now	  that	  the	  controversial	  dams	  had	  been	  built.	  It	  did	  so	  by	  associating	  its	  related	  
projects	  with	  a	  new	  international	  discourse	  around	  “sustainable	  human	  
development.”391	  	  This	  discourse	  provided	  access	  to	  the	  international	  funding—the	  
World	  Bank,	  Food	  and	  Agriculture	  Organization	  (FAO),	  United	  Nations	  Development	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
390	  A.	  Çarkoğlu	  and	  M.	  Eder,	  “Development	  alla	  Turca:	  The	  Southeastern	  Anatolia	  
Development	  Project	  (GAP)”	  in	  Environmentalism	  in	  Turkey:	  Between	  Democracy	  and	  
Development?	  (Burlington,	  VT:	  Ashgate,	  2005)	  177.	  
391	  The	  idea	  of	  sustainable	  development	  was	  first	  introduced	  at	  an	  international	  
conference	  in	  Stockholm,	  Sweden	  in	  1972.	  The	  United	  Nations	  Conference	  on	  the	  Human	  
Environment	  promulgated	  a	  set	  of	  26	  principles	  in	  order	  to	  organize	  “common	  efforts	  
for	  the	  preservation	  and	  improvement	  of	  the	  human	  environment,	  for	  the	  benefit	  of	  all	  
the	  people	  and	  for	  their	  posterity.”	  The	  word	  “sustainable”	  does	  not	  appear	  in	  the	  
Conference	  Declaration,	  but	  was	  taken	  up	  by	  the	  General	  Assembly	  of	  the	  United	  Nations	  
(GA	  Resolution	  38/161)	  in	  1983	  with	  the	  formation	  of	  a	  Commission	  to	  study	  
environmental	  issues	  (United	  Nations	  Environment	  Programme,	  www.unep.org).	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Programme	  (UNDP),	  United	  Nations	  Children’s	  Fund	  (UNICEF)	  and	  the	  European	  Union	  
have	  all	  provided	  monies—and	  legitimacy	  that	  allowed	  the	  GAP	  to	  expand	  from	  purely	  
environmental	  and	  economic	  realms	  into	  new	  social	  spheres.	  This	  shift	  in	  focus	  was	  
consummated	  in	  a	  UNDP-­‐GAP	  Administration	  conference	  from	  March	  27-­‐29,	  2005,	  held	  
at	  GAP’s	  regional	  office	  in	  Şanlıurfa.	  The	  conference	  proceedings	  contain	  a	  joint	  
statement	  from	  the	  UNDP	  and	  the	  GAP	  Administration	  defining	  the	  concept	  of	  
“sustainable	  development”	  as:	  
the	  move	  to	  acquire	  social	  equality	  with	  an	  eye	  towards	  both	  the	  present	  
and	  the	  future;	  toward	  natural	  and	  social	  dynamics	  as	  well	  as	  the	  
economy.	  	  	  
…it	  was	  argued…that	  attaining	  sustainability	  requires	  the	  involvement	  of	  
those	  who	  will	  work	  towards	  it	  and	  reap	  its	  benefits	  [in]	  every	  level	  of	  the	  
decision-­‐making	  process.	  This,	  along	  with	  disseminating	  the	  knowledge,	  
skill	  and	  experience	  needed	  for	  success,	  is	  believed	  to	  be	  as	  necessary	  to	  
sustainability	  as	  effective	  management	  and	  cooperation	  among	  
development	  agencies.	  	  	  	  
…the	  ultimate	  objective	  of	  sustainable	  development	  [is]	  a	  peaceful	  
environment	  in	  which	  people	  are	  freed	  from	  need	  by	  the	  optimal	  use	  of	  
human,	  water,	  and	  soil	  resources…	  it	  means	  hope	  for	  a	  better	  future.392	  
This	  formulation	  of	  sustainable	  development	  legitimated	  and	  made	  possible	  the	  
introduction	  of	  various	  types	  of	  expertise,	  tools	  of	  measurement,	  and	  processes	  of	  
definition	  to	  remake	  “natural	  and	  social	  dynamics.”	  However,	  as	  noted	  in	  the	  statement,	  
these	  “dynamics”	  do	  not	  contain	  a	  history.	  Social	  equality	  that	  is	  sustainable	  must	  
instead	  deny	  whatever	  was	  unequal	  for	  a	  “present	  and	  future”	  that	  is	  and	  will	  be.	  
Instead,	  an	  ahistorical	  “social	  equality”	  must	  be	  defined,	  the	  knowledge	  and	  skills	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
392	  GAP	  Regional	  Development	  Administration,	  Sustainable	  Development	  and	  the	  
Southeastern	  Anatolia	  Project	  Seminar	  Report.	  (Ankara:	  GAP	  Regional	  Development	  
Administration,	  1995).	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“necessary	  to	  sustainability”	  must	  be	  disseminated,	  and	  so	  on.	  The	  aim	  of	  all	  this	  
knowledge	  production	  is	  a	  “people	  freed	  from	  need”	  through	  “the	  optimal	  use”	  of	  
resources.	  The	  assumption	  of	  course	  being	  that	  the	  people’s	  needs	  may	  actually	  be	  freed	  
solely	  through	  the	  sustainable,	  optimal	  use	  of	  resources.	  Meanwhile,	  this	  view	  of	  
sustainability	  clearly	  indicates	  a	  role	  for	  democratic	  politics,	  though	  these	  must	  take	  
place	  within	  this	  framework.	  
In	  this	  enunciation	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  sustainability	  there	  was	  an	  assumed	  
continuity	  between	  the	  present	  and	  the	  future	  and	  an	  elision	  of	  the	  past.	  Previous	  
procedures,	  ways	  of	  organizing	  social	  and	  political	  life	  and	  interacting	  with	  the	  
environment,	  were	  understood	  as	  unsustainable	  prior	  to	  this	  intervention	  and	  that	  
catastrophe	  was	  just	  around	  the	  bend.	  Yet	  there	  was	  little	  acknowledgment	  of	  a	  break	  
with	  former	  structures	  or	  the	  ramifications	  of	  these	  changes.	  Political	  contestation	  was	  
thus	  centered	  on	  the	  future,	  on	  the	  creation	  of	  continuously	  self-­‐producing	  methods	  of	  
“optimal	  use.”	  	  	  
The	  joint	  conference	  led	  to	  a	  set	  of	  projects	  that	  significantly	  broadened	  the	  
engagement	  of	  the	  Southeast	  Anatolia	  Project	  with	  its	  target	  population.	  Conducted	  in	  
partnership	  with	  the	  UNDP,	  these	  projects	  aimed	  to	  promote:	  
1.	  social	  sustainability	  and	  the	  development	  of	  social	  services;	  
2.	  agricultural	  sustainability	  and	  improved	  agricultural	  productivity;	  
3.	  local	  entrepreneurship	  and	  industrial	  development	  for	  economic	  
viability;	  
4.	  human	  settlements;	  and	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5.	  optimal	  and	  sustainable	  utilization	  of	  natural	  resources393	  	  
As	  with	  the	  previous	  statement	  on	  sustainability,	  these	  general	  aims	  were	  quite	  vague	  
and	  relied	  upon	  assumptions	  about	  an	  inherent	  lack	  of	  sustainability	  in	  land	  use	  and	  
even	  societal	  structure.	  To	  fill	  in	  the	  details	  of	  what	  was	  meant	  by	  sustainability,	  the	  GAP	  
called	  on	  numerous	  experts	  to	  produce	  knowledge	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  object	  
society.	  The	  policies	  instituted	  by	  GAP	  ostensibly	  sprang	  from	  the	  findings	  of	  the	  studies	  
of	  these	  experts,	  which	  included	  a	  survey	  on	  the	  “trends	  of	  social	  change,”	  a	  report	  on	  
population	  movements,	  and	  the	  formulation	  of	  a	  “social	  action	  plan.”	  
These	  reports	  characterized	  the	  situation	  of	  the	  human	  population	  of	  Southeast	  
Anatolia,	  which	  according	  to	  the	  GAP,	  lived	  in	  a	  “half	  closed	  economic	  system”	  that	  has	  
“created	  an	  introvert	  social	  structure	  and	  culture.”394	  This	  social	  structure	  was	  
“safeguarded	  by	  various	  control	  mechanisms”	  with	  “traditional	  patterns	  of	  behavior	  
[that]	  have	  ultimately	  formed	  the	  components	  of	  a	  regenerative	  structure	  which	  is	  
resistant,	  if	  not	  completely	  closed	  to	  change.”	  The	  pattern	  of	  human	  settlement	  was	  also	  
a	  problem,	  as	  there	  were	  “too	  many	  settlements	  each	  having	  a	  small	  population.”	  
Residents	  lived	  in	  a	  “rapidly	  degrading	  environment”	  and	  had	  “too	  many	  children.”	  To	  
make	  matters	  worse,	  these	  children	  “do	  not	  speak	  Turkish,”	  resulting	  in	  a	  “low	  demand	  
for	  education.”395	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
393	  Çarkoğlu	  and	  Eder,	  “Development	  alla	  Turca,”	  178.	  
394	  GAP	  Regional	  Development	  Administration,	  Social	  Action	  Plan	  (Ankara:	  GAP,	  1997),	  
5.	  
395	  GAP	  Regional	  Development	  Administration,	  Sustainable	  Development	  and	  the	  
Southeastern	  Anatolia	  Project	  Seminar	  Report	  (Ankara:	  GAP,	  1995).	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  GAP	  documents	  described	  a	  population	  so	  economically	  and	  socially	  backward,	  
so	  cut	  off	  from	  the	  modern	  world,	  that,	  in	  the	  words	  of	  Lord	  Cromer,	  it	  appeared	  to	  be	  
“walking	  on	  its	  head.”396	  The	  communities	  under	  scrutiny	  were	  static,	  “closed	  to	  change”	  
and	  removed	  from	  the	  influence	  of	  broader	  historical	  forces.	  The	  State	  Institute	  of	  
Statistics	  provided	  data	  to	  amplify	  these	  claims—mortality	  and	  literacy	  rates,	  population	  
density,	  value	  of	  agricultural	  production,	  etc.—to	  complement	  the	  questionnaires	  that	  
constituted	  the	  evidentiary	  basis	  for	  these	  objective	  findings.	  
Besides	  their	  problematic	  description	  of	  pre-­‐modern	  conditions,	  the	  GAP	  reports	  
were	  also	  fundamentally	  contradictory.	  While	  at	  once	  placing	  the	  Southeast	  Anatolian	  in	  
an	  unchanging,	  static	  social	  milieu,	  the	  reports	  described	  a	  significant	  process	  of	  
urbanization,	  with	  the	  ratio	  of	  the	  urban	  population	  rising	  from	  47.6%	  in	  1985	  to	  63%	  
in	  2000.397	  An	  increase	  in	  urbanization	  was	  exactly	  what	  the	  GAP	  Regional	  Development	  
Administration	  advocated;	  modern	  health	  and	  education	  services	  were	  considered	  too	  
costly	  to	  provide	  to	  small,	  sparsely	  distributed	  rural	  communities.	  Unfortunately	  for	  this	  
vision	  of	  urbanized,	  educated,	  and	  productive	  southeast	  Anatolians,	  GAP	  reports	  also	  
noted	  the	  problems	  of	  unemployment,	  pollution	  and	  poor	  social	  services	  to	  be	  found	  in	  
the	  cities.398	  Since	  the	  reality	  of	  an	  already-­‐evolving	  and	  changing	  society	  would	  debunk	  
the	  paradigm	  of	  the	  static,	  backward	  society	  established	  by	  social	  science	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methodologies,	  GAP	  reports	  consequently	  suggested	  that	  the	  cities	  were	  “getting	  
ruralized	  as	  the	  percentage	  of	  rural	  born	  population	  increases”	  and	  by	  noting	  that	  new	  
migrants	  do	  not	  move	  to	  the	  city	  with	  any	  hope	  for	  themselves.399	  Rather,	  they	  move	  
because	  they	  see	  the	  economic	  benefits	  for	  their	  children:	  
…out-­‐migration	  to	  the	  city	  is	  for	  the	  future	  of	  the	  children	  rather	  than	  for	  
the	  present	  generation.	  Children	  are	  concrete	  links	  with	  the	  future.	  Since	  
the	  future	  belongs	  to	  the	  cities,	  the	  children	  should	  live	  in	  the	  cities.	  
Viewing	  the	  problem	  from	  this	  perspective	  reveals	  that	  migration	  is	  not	  
simply	  a	  means	  to	  alleviate	  population	  pressure	  by	  educating	  children	  and	  
deploying	  them	  in	  the	  city;	  but	  migration	  is	  the	  linking	  of	  the	  household	  
with	  modernization	  at	  the	  local	  and	  global	  levels.400	  
A	  focus	  on	  children	  is	  a	  focus	  on	  the	  present	  and	  future.	  Children,	  then,	  were	  the	  link	  to	  
the	  modern	  world,	  while	  the	  “ruralizing”	  parents	  meanwhile,	  still	  stuck	  in	  their	  
introverted	  social	  structures,	  must	  be	  left	  behind	  by	  their	  sustainable,	  modernized,	  
globalized	  offspring.	  	  	  
As	  a	  fundamental	  goal	  of	  the	  GAP	  was	  to	  produce	  economic	  results,	  the	  source	  of	  
all	  this	  backwardness	  was	  viewed	  as	  economic,	  “The	  main	  factor	  that	  prohibits	  the	  
creation	  of	  modern	  cities	  and	  a	  contemporary	  urban	  outlook	  in	  the	  Region	  is	  economic	  
backwardness.”401	  GAP	  administrators	  viewed	  the	  sought-­‐after	  cultural	  factor,	  “a	  
contemporary	  urban	  outlook,”	  as	  inherently	  a	  problem	  of	  economics,	  a	  problem	  that	  
could	  be	  solved	  by	  mastering	  the	  natural	  world.	  In	  the	  1994	  GAP	  study	  of	  population	  
movements,	  the	  report	  stated	  that	  “most	  of	  the	  problems	  in	  the	  region	  can	  be	  solved	  by	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the	  irrigation	  and	  development	  projects	  as	  they	  are	  integrated	  and	  planned	  in	  the	  
framework	  of	  the	  Southeastern	  Anatolia	  Project.”402	  Critically,	  this	  “framework”	  in	  the	  
parlance	  of	  international	  development	  organizations	  was	  that	  of	  “sustainable	  
development,”	  but	  focused	  not	  on	  energy	  use	  or	  environmental	  pollution,	  but	  on	  
intervention	  in	  the	  social	  and	  political	  structures	  of	  the	  resident	  population.	  Dr.	  I.H.	  
Olcay	  Ünver,	  the	  president	  of	  the	  GAP	  Regional	  Development	  Administration,	  claimed	  
that	  the	  Southeast	  Anatolia	  Project	  saw	  these	  developments	  in	  terms	  of	  “societal	  
sustainability.”	  According	  to	  Ünver,	  the	  goal	  of	  societal	  sustainability	  was	  that	  
“development	  should	  not	  bring	  about	  such	  easy	  compromises	  as	  implementing	  
‘primitive’	  systems	  to	  escape	  potential	  resistance	  or	  imposing	  values	  on	  people.”403	  
Instead,	  the	  process	  should	  be	  to	  impose	  modern	  forms	  of	  economic	  and	  social	  
organization	  onto	  the	  population,	  even	  though	  the	  GAP	  itself	  declared	  that	  sustainability	  
“requires	  the	  involvement	  of	  those	  who	  will	  work	  towards	  it	  and	  reap	  its	  benefits	  [in]	  
every	  level	  of	  the	  decision-­‐making	  process.”404	  	  
Dr.	  Ünver’s	  comment	  indicated	  a	  fundamental	  aspect	  of	  this	  development	  
discourse:	  societies	  can	  only	  be	  made	  “sustainable”	  if	  they	  are	  made	  modern.	  It	  is	  
impossible	  for	  “primitive”	  and	  unchanging	  systems	  of	  social	  and	  economic	  organization	  
to	  fulfill	  the	  requirements	  of	  sustainability.	  Finally,	  according	  to	  GAP	  documents,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
402	  METU	  Department	  of	  Sociology,	  Population	  Movements	  in	  the	  Southeastern	  Anatolia	  
Project	  Region:	  Executive	  Summary	  (Ankara:	  GAP	  Regional	  Development	  Administration,	  
1994),	  23.	  
403	  I.	  H.	  Ünver,	  Speeches	  and	  Presentations	  on	  Southeastern	  Anatolia	  Project	  (Ankara:	  GAP	  
Regional	  Development	  Administration,	  1999),	  67.	  
404	  GAP	  Regional	  Development	  Administration,	  Sustainable	  Development.	  
	  
	   235	  
attaining	  modernity	  depended	  on	  connecting	  communities	  to	  an	  industrial	  engineering	  
project,	  a	  series	  of	  dams	  and	  irrigation	  works.	  These	  projects	  were	  the	  backbone	  of	  the	  
modernization	  plan,	  while	  the	  educational	  and	  health	  facilities	  were	  meant	  simply	  to	  
facilitate	  the	  connection.	  Through	  this	  set	  of	  delineations,	  primitive	  versus	  modern,	  
history	  versus	  the	  future,	  children	  versus	  parents,	  unsustainable	  versus	  sustainable,	  the	  
state	  created	  the	  “boundaries,	  distinctions,	  exceptions	  and	  exclusions”	  Timothy	  Mitchell	  
sees	  as	  necessary	  to	  the	  establishment	  of	  contemporary	  capitalism.	  The	  implementation	  
of	  these	  aggressive,	  large	  scale	  economic	  development	  projects	  was	  fundamentally	  
about	  integrating	  this	  part	  of	  Turkey	  into	  a	  specific	  cultural,	  social,	  political	  and	  
economic	  program	  centered	  around	  capitalist	  enterprise.	  	  
“The	  economy”	  then	  was	  understood	  as	  the	  panacea	  for	  all	  of	  the	  target	  society’s	  
perceived	  ills	  and	  everything	  must	  be	  done	  to	  enhance	  and	  preserve	  its	  progress.	  
“Sustainability,”	  as	  deployed	  by	  the	  GAP,	  was	  thus	  an	  ideology	  of	  capitalist,	  
interventionist	  modernization.	  It	  was	  supported	  and	  disseminated	  by	  various	  forms	  of	  
expertise	  that	  relied	  upon	  the	  delineation	  of	  certain	  boundaries,	  certain	  binaries	  to	  
create	  a	  field	  within	  which	  this	  modernization	  might	  occur.	  
	  
As	  may	  be	  inferred	  from	  the	  above	  discussion,	  GAP	  documents	  rarely	  mentioned	  
by	  name	  the	  predominant	  ethnic	  group	  in	  the	  region,	  the	  Kurds.	  Any	  type	  of	  group	  
identity	  was	  minimized.	  GAP	  reports	  generally	  referred	  to	  “the	  population,”	  while	  the	  
GAP-­‐UNDP	  joint	  conference	  discussed	  “a	  society	  of	  happy,	  healthy,	  and	  economically	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active	  individuals.”405	  The	  actual	  inhabitants	  of	  the	  region—Armenians,	  Assyrian	  
Christians	  and	  Kurds—were	  rendered	  culturally,	  linguistically	  and	  politically	  
indeterminate.	  Cultural	  sites	  in	  the	  region	  were	  catalogued,	  not	  by	  an	  agency	  for	  cultural	  
preservation,	  but	  by	  a	  GAP	  tourism	  bureau.	  The	  omission	  of	  the	  Kurds	  from	  GAP	  project	  
documents	  was	  blatant,	  but	  with	  widespread	  coverage	  of	  the	  bloody	  struggle	  between	  
the	  Turkish	  state	  and	  Kurdish	  separatist	  groups,	  the	  issue	  could	  not	  be	  completely	  
ignored.	  It	  could	  however	  be	  framed	  in	  ways	  that	  reduced	  its	  importance	  and	  removed	  it	  
from	  consideration	  within	  the	  development	  discourse.	  	  	  
It	  would	  seem	  logical	  that	  any	  human	  development	  project	  would	  have	  to	  take	  
the	  reality	  of	  violent	  conflict	  into	  account.	  However,	  the	  GAP	  and	  other	  organs	  of	  the	  
Turkish	  state	  managed	  to	  shunt	  much	  of	  the	  discussion	  about	  the	  Kurds	  and	  other	  
minority	  groups	  into	  a	  discourse	  about	  domestic	  and	  national	  security.	  Policies	  and	  
actions	  undertaken	  for	  economic	  and	  social	  development	  did	  not	  need	  to	  account	  for	  the	  
conflict	  because	  these	  were	  matters	  for	  security	  experts	  and	  the	  military.	  The	  separation	  
of	  the	  two	  domains—sustainable	  development	  and	  ethnic	  conflict—allowed	  both	  to	  
proceed	  as	  a	  set	  of	  universal	  practices,	  unaffected	  by	  each	  other	  or	  indeed	  by	  any	  other	  
external	  circumstances.	  
What	  is	  more,	  external	  forces	  and	  factors	  reinforced	  this	  dichotomy.	  Syria’s	  Hafez	  
al-­‐Assad	  successfully	  manipulated	  nascent	  Kurdish	  separatist	  groups	  throughout	  the	  
1970s,	  helping	  Kurdistan	  Workers’	  Party	  (PKK)	  leader	  Abdullah	  Öcalan	  establish	  
training	  bases	  in	  Lebanon’s	  Biqā‛	  Valley.	  In	  1987,	  Turkish	  Prime	  Minister	  Turgut	  Özal	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visited	  al-­‐Assad.	  The	  Syrian	  president	  won	  an	  agreement	  for	  a	  minimum	  flow	  of	  water	  in	  
the	  Euphrates	  River	  in	  exchange	  for	  a	  reduction	  of	  support	  for	  the	  PKK.	  The	  filling	  of	  the	  
Atatürk	  dam,	  however,	  caused	  a	  severe	  restriction	  in	  the	  flow	  of	  Euphrates	  water	  into	  
Syria	  and	  al-­‐Assad	  responded	  by	  stepping	  up	  support	  for	  the	  PKK.	  This	  support	  
continued	  until	  the	  late	  1990s,	  when	  direct	  PKK	  attacks	  on	  the	  Turkish	  province	  of	  
Hatay	  (which	  was	  once	  part	  of	  Syria)	  from	  Syrian	  territory	  brought	  a	  massive	  
mobilization	  of	  Turkish	  forces.	  Assad	  was	  forced	  to	  withdraw	  support	  for	  the	  
organization	  and	  much	  of	  the	  PKK	  infrastructure	  was	  then	  transferred	  to	  Iran.406	  
The	  complicity	  between	  Syria	  and	  the	  PKK	  pushed	  the	  question	  of	  Kurdistan	  into	  
the	  geopolitical	  security	  realm.	  No	  longer	  a	  conflict	  between	  an	  indigenous	  minority	  
group	  and	  the	  state,	  Syrian	  support	  for	  the	  PKK	  meant	  that	  Kurdish	  claims	  to	  political	  
and	  cultural	  autonomy	  were	  tied	  to	  interstate	  struggles	  between	  Turkey	  and	  Syria.407	  
The	  same	  happened	  with	  Iraq,	  with	  the	  rise	  of	  a	  Kurdish	  autonomous	  region	  in	  the	  north	  
of	  that	  country,	  and	  cross-­‐border	  attacks	  by	  the	  Turkish	  military	  into	  Iraqi	  territory.	  
The	  relegation	  of	  Kurdish	  political	  claims	  to	  the	  security	  domain	  had	  a	  significant	  
impact	  on	  that	  community’s	  ability	  to	  engage,	  contest	  or	  resist	  the	  GAP’s	  human	  
development	  program.	  A	  Kurdish	  Human	  Rights	  Project	  report	  detailed	  the	  impact	  of	  
the	  GAP	  and	  “the	  security	  situation”	  on	  the	  protection	  of	  Kurdish	  cultural	  sites:	  
[The]	  GAP	  continues	  to	  be	  supported	  by	  a	  structure	  of	  military	  control,	  
which	  has	  grave	  implications	  for	  the	  way	  in	  which	  all	  of	  its	  activities	  –	  
cultural	  and	  social	  projects	  as	  well	  as	  irrigation	  and	  power	  generation	  –	  
are	  carried	  out.	  	  The	  military	  has	  responsibility	  for	  cultural	  property	  in	  all	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  MacQuarrie,	  “Water	  Security	  in	  the	  Middle	  East,”	  34-­‐35.	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of	  the	  areas	  and	  is	  responsible	  for	  the	  maintenance	  of	  heritage	  as	  well	  as	  
permission	  for	  surveys	  and	  excavations.	  It	  is	  not	  credible	  to	  suppose	  that	  
permission	  would	  be	  granted	  for	  surveys	  to	  assess	  possible	  crimes	  by	  the	  
security	  forces	  in	  reservoir	  areas.	  This	  means	  that	  archaeological	  or	  other	  
cultural	  work	  cannot	  meet	  basic	  professional	  standards	  at	  present	  since	  
there	  is	  limited	  freedom	  to	  consult	  with	  local	  people	  or,	  for	  example,	  to	  
investigate	  graves	  of	  the	  disappeared.408	  
The	  “militarization”	  of	  the	  claims	  of	  the	  Kurdish	  community	  had	  the	  effect	  of	  protecting	  
the	  GAP	  and	  its	  discourse	  of	  sustainable	  development	  from	  criticism	  on	  historical	  or	  
cultural	  grounds.	  Any	  arguments	  for	  consideration	  of	  a	  cultural,	  ethnic	  or	  historical	  
claim	  were	  taken	  either	  as	  a	  threat	  to	  Turkey’s	  internal	  and	  external	  security	  or	  as	  
irrelevant	  to	  the	  modern	  project	  of	  “sustainability.”	  	  
In	  addition,	  Turkey’s	  internal	  and	  external	  security	  was	  not	  only	  in	  the	  interest	  of	  
Turkey.	  A	  U.S.	  government	  report	  in	  1999	  noted	  that	  “a	  secure	  and	  stable	  Turkey	  is	  in	  
the	  U.S.	  national	  interest.	  Turkey	  is	  the	  southern	  bastion	  of	  NATO	  and	  it	  borders	  three	  
states	  that	  may	  pose	  a	  threat	  to	  the	  United	  States	  –	  Iraq,	  Syria	  and	  Iran.”409	  The	  report	  
noted	  that	  integrating	  “economically	  empowered	  Kurds	  into	  a	  healthy	  Turkish	  
economy”	  may	  take	  a	  very	  long	  time,	  but	  there	  was	  little	  discussion	  about	  how	  that	  
economic	  empowerment	  was	  supposed	  to	  occur.	  There	  was	  also	  no	  discussion	  about	  
any	  kind	  of	  other	  empowerment,	  such	  as	  in	  the	  political	  or	  cultural	  realms.	  Instead,	  the	  
bulk	  of	  the	  discussion	  about	  the	  Kurds	  involved	  their	  potential	  to	  destabilize	  the	  region.	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In	  the	  same	  way	  that	  the	  deployment	  of	  expertise	  created	  a	  framework	  of	  
definitions	  for	  implementing	  sustainable	  development,	  so	  too	  did	  the	  framing	  of	  Kurdish	  
political	  claims	  within	  the	  discourse	  of	  security	  isolate	  and	  suppress	  these	  claims.	  Both	  
processes	  sought	  to	  mold	  politics	  and	  establish	  the	  terrain	  upon	  which	  political	  claims	  
could	  be	  framed,	  voiced,	  and	  activated.	  Moreover,	  just	  as	  sustainable	  development	  was	  
implicitly	  (and	  sometimes	  explicitly)	  involved	  in	  the	  nation	  making	  project,	  the	  question	  
of	  what	  to	  do	  about	  Kurdistan	  could	  only	  exist	  within	  the	  context	  of	  the	  nation-­‐state.	  The	  
issue	  became	  an	  international	  preoccupation	  because	  of	  its	  connection	  to	  
understandings	  of	  nation,	  sovereignty	  and	  self-­‐determination,	  as	  well	  as	  its	  ability	  to	  
affect	  the	  status	  quo.	  The	  fact	  that	  these	  discourses	  appeared	  to	  run	  parallel	  and	  to	  
complement	  each	  other	  raises	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  they	  are,	  in	  fact,	  aspects	  of	  the	  
same	  overarching	  discourse.	  
Due	  to	  how	  the	  concepts	  of	  sustainability	  and	  security	  can	  rationalize	  and	  
mobilize	  both	  domestic	  and	  international	  resources,	  they	  must	  be	  seen	  equally	  as	  
discourses	  of	  power.	  These	  two	  concepts	  define	  and	  allow	  (or	  overlook	  and	  disallow)	  
political	  contestation	  by	  determining	  who	  can	  speak,	  what	  words	  they	  can	  use,	  and	  how	  
their	  claims	  will	  be	  interpreted.	  Within	  the	  frame	  of	  these	  concepts,	  there	  was	  a	  shaping	  
of	  politics	  that	  was	  accomplished	  not	  only	  through	  a	  legislative	  or	  executive	  process,	  but	  
through	  a	  series	  of	  technical	  processes—whether	  the	  engineers	  digging	  test	  bores	  at	  the	  
dam	  site	  or	  the	  social	  scientists	  deciphering	  the	  quality	  of	  urban	  life—that	  sought	  not	  to	  
discern	  and	  shape	  a	  particular	  type	  of	  citizen	  but	  to	  create	  that	  citizen	  as	  part	  of	  a	  
particular	  type	  of	  community.	  As	  one	  might	  expect	  from	  a	  grand,	  capitalistic	  
modernization	  project,	  these	  efforts	  aimed	  essentially	  at	  individualization.	  Community	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affiliation	  was	  beside	  the	  point.	  The	  state’s	  security	  apparatus	  understood	  the	  citizen	  
according	  to	  certain	  parameters,	  namely	  docility	  and	  an	  acceptance	  of	  the	  authority	  of	  
the	  state,	  which	  was	  actively	  seeking	  to	  erase	  communal	  identity	  and	  fabricate	  a	  national	  
one.	  The	  attaching,	  moreover,	  was	  not	  simply	  ideational,	  it	  was	  physical,	  through	  the	  
sophisticated	  domination	  of	  land	  and	  water.	  An	  entire	  infrastructure	  had	  been	  designed	  
to	  create	  this	  model	  citizen,	  whose	  creation	  was,	  it	  was	  claimed,	  in	  fact	  the	  fulfillment	  of	  
a	  “sustainable”	  natural	  and	  social	  dynamic.	  
Sustainability	  and	  security	  appeared	  as	  part	  of	  an	  overall	  discourse	  of	  state	  
making	  and	  preserving.	  The	  goal	  of	  each	  was	  to	  prepare	  and	  protect	  the	  territory	  of	  the	  
state,	  so	  as	  to	  ensure	  its	  continued	  existence.	  The	  very	  idea	  of	  sustainability	  promoted	  a	  
vision	  of	  the	  future,	  a	  future	  where	  resources	  were	  managed	  for	  the	  continual	  
reproduction	  of	  that	  “sustainable”	  vision.	  Notions	  of	  domestic	  and	  national	  security	  
were	  instituted	  to	  make	  sure	  that	  the	  state’s	  so-­‐called	  self-­‐sustaining	  vision	  of	  its	  own	  
future	  was	  not	  overtaken	  or	  displaced	  by	  some	  other	  vision.	  
One	  only	  needs	  to	  examine	  the	  current	  state	  of	  GAP	  completion	  to	  see	  this	  
process	  at	  work.	  The	  completion	  rate	  for	  GAP	  hydroelectric	  projects	  is	  currently	  eighty-­‐
five	  percent,	  while	  the	  irrigation	  project	  completion	  rate	  is	  only	  twenty-­‐four	  percent.	  
The	  hydro	  projects	  mainly	  benefit	  the	  large	  industrial	  and	  population	  centers	  in	  western	  
Turkey.410	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  most	  productive	  and	  acquiescent	  regions	  of	  the	  state	  have	  
received	  the	  most	  benefit,	  while	  those	  projects	  that	  could	  potentially	  empower	  the	  local	  
population	  are	  still	  under	  construction.	  This	  focus	  on	  dam	  building	  means	  that	  the	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development	  project	  is	  not	  resulting	  in	  unprecedented	  economic	  prosperity	  in	  the	  
region;	  it	  is	  in	  fact	  creating	  massive	  dislocation	  and	  economic	  disruption	  for	  the	  Kurdish	  
population.	  The	  Atatürk	  dam	  flooded	  the	  town	  of	  Samsat	  and	  three	  hundred	  villages.	  
Less	  than	  twenty	  percent	  of	  the	  nearly	  200,000	  people	  displaced	  received	  
compensation.411	  The	  Ilısu	  dam,	  where	  construction	  started	  in	  August	  2006,	  will	  include	  
the	  largest	  hydroelectric	  plant	  of	  the	  project,	  but	  will	  flood	  the	  homes	  of	  78,000	  people	  
and	  completely	  submerge	  Hasankeyf,	  a	  Kurdish	  town	  with	  a	  history	  that	  spans	  nine	  
civilizations.	  The	  dams	  are	  justifiably	  viewed	  as	  debasing	  local	  knowledge	  and	  culture,	  in	  
the	  sense	  that	  they	  are	  destroying	  cultural	  artifacts	  and	  dislocating	  the	  very	  basis	  of	  
knowledge	  and	  culture—the	  human	  population.	  Dams	  have	  been	  a	  useful	  tool	  for	  the	  
Turkish	  state	  in	  their	  ability	  to	  strengthen	  core	  regions	  of	  economic	  production	  and	  
dislocate	  or	  destroy	  the	  cities,	  homes	  and	  cultural	  sites	  of	  a	  troublesome,	  economically	  
“backward”	  minority	  of	  questionable	  loyalty.	  Meanwhile,	  significant	  dislocation	  has	  been	  
coupled	  with	  military	  escalation.	  On	  October	  17,	  2007,	  the	  Turkish	  Grand	  National	  
Assembly	  voted	  507-­‐19	  to	  authorize	  military	  incursions	  to	  attack	  three	  thousand	  PKK	  
members	  based	  in	  northern	  Iraq,	  thus	  demonstrating	  the	  Turkish	  state’s	  willingness	  to	  
use	  military	  force	  against	  those	  who	  might	  resist	  its	  secure	  and	  sustainable	  vision	  for	  
southeastern	  Anatolia.
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The	  original	  impetus	  for	  this	  research	  involved	  a	  question	  about	  how	  the	  Turkish	  
Republic	  arrived	  at	  the	  Southeastern	  Anatolia	  Project,	  a	  development	  program	  based	  on	  a	  
massive	  complex	  of	  dams	  and	  irrigation	  works	  meant	  to	  transform	  the	  Syrian	  Desert.	  After	  
a	  time,	  the	  overall	  project	  came	  to	  include	  a	  broad	  range	  of	  development	  activities	  and	  
facilities,	  including	  new	  hospitals,	  universities,	  airports,	  and	  bus	  stations.	  My	  original	  
motivating	  question	  was	  how	  did	  a	  comprehensive	  development	  program,	  designed	  to	  
integrate	  the	  rebellious	  Kurdish	  region	  of	  the	  country,	  emerge	  from	  and	  continue	  to	  rely	  
upon	  a	  water	  management	  project?	  	  
Preliminary	  investigation	  of	  that	  query	  led	  to	  this	  dissertation,	  a	  broader	  study	  
examining	  how	  water	  and	  water	  management	  shaped	  the	  formation	  of	  the	  three	  new	  states	  
in	  the	  Tigris-­‐Euphrates	  basin	  after	  the	  First	  World	  War.	  The	  primary	  reason	  for	  expanding	  
the	  study	  involved	  two	  related	  issues.	  First,	  I	  began	  to	  see	  similar	  developments	  in	  other	  
parts	  of	  the	  river	  basin.	  Second,	  I	  wanted	  to	  better	  understand	  and	  contextualize	  the	  
political	  and	  social	  effects	  emanating	  from	  Turkish	  development	  of	  the	  upper	  basin.	  I	  also	  
hypothesized	  that,	  as	  the	  modern	  development	  of	  the	  basin	  began	  under	  Ottoman	  rule,	  
there	  would	  be	  a	  significant	  shared	  history	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  exploitation	  of	  water	  
resources.	  This	  connected	  history	  had	  not	  been	  examined,	  likely	  as	  a	  result	  of	  national	  and	  
linguistic	  boundaries.	  There	  has	  been	  relatively	  little	  analysis	  of	  how	  a	  common	  legacy	  of	  
Ottoman	  rule	  may	  have	  influenced	  the	  history	  of	  these	  three	  states	  and	  their	  relationship	  to	  
the	  environment.	  While	  this	  study	  has	  demonstrated	  the	  continuance	  of	  certain	  Ottoman	  
ideas,	  a	  deeper	  examination	  of	  the	  late	  Ottoman	  Empire	  will	  be	  required	  to	  deepen	  and	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broaden	  those	  assertions.	  
Still,	  this	  examination	  of	  the	  Tigris-­‐Euphrates	  basin	  has	  produced	  a	  number	  of	  
important	  findings,	  providing	  a	  fuller	  understanding	  of	  how	  these	  states	  developed	  after	  
the	  First	  World	  War.	  I	  have	  demonstrated	  the	  importance	  of	  water	  management	  in	  shaping	  
political	  legitimacy,	  creating	  different	  institutions,	  and	  justifying	  projects	  to	  expand	  the	  
power	  of	  the	  state.	  Moreover,	  this	  research	  has	  also	  demonstrated	  that	  the	  modern	  
engineering	  works	  of	  the	  latter	  half	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century	  are	  embedded	  in	  a	  deeper	  
history	  of	  engagement	  with,	  and	  framing	  of,	  environmental	  change.	  
In	  particular,	  this	  work	  provides	  a	  corrective	  to	  studies	  of	  Middle	  Eastern	  states	  that	  
understand	  colonial	  rule	  as	  purely	  an	  intellectual	  exercise	  divorced	  from	  the	  particularities	  
of	  space	  and	  place.	  Though	  ignoring	  environmental	  change	  and	  the	  problems	  of	  water	  
management	  would	  be	  unthinkable	  in	  histories	  of	  earlier	  periods	  in	  Mesopotamian	  history,	  
the	  modern	  era	  regards	  the	  Tigris	  and	  Euphrates	  Rivers	  as	  relatively	  unimportant.	  Such	  an	  
attitude	  has	  led	  to	  examinations	  of	  British	  governance	  in	  Iraq	  that	  emphasize	  problems	  of	  
perception,	  cultural	  myopia	  and	  plain	  ignorance	  of	  conditions	  in	  Iraq.	  Though	  these	  studies	  
may	  offer	  useful	  ideas	  about	  the	  formation	  of	  imperial	  officials	  and	  certain	  policy	  choices,	  it	  
is	  equally	  important	  to	  attend	  to	  the	  material	  world,	  particularly	  in	  regard	  to	  policies	  
related	  to	  land	  and	  water.	  In	  two	  chapters	  dealing	  with	  environmental	  change	  (Chapters	  
One	  and	  Four),	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  materiality	  and	  mentality	  function	  in	  relation	  to	  one	  another;	  
one	  should	  be	  careful	  when	  considering	  an	  analytical	  differentiation.	  	  
It	  is	  also	  clear	  from	  this	  research	  that	  the	  concerns	  and	  problems	  that	  animated	  
Ottoman	  officials	  in	  the	  decades	  prior	  to	  the	  First	  World	  War	  reappear	  in	  the	  states	  that	  
emerged	  out	  of	  the	  defunct	  empire.	  The	  importance	  of	  economic	  sovereignty	  as	  a	  guarantee	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of	  political	  independence	  was	  an	  issue	  that	  inspired	  the	  Ottoman	  drive	  to	  exploit	  and	  
develop	  resources.	  For	  Turkey,	  an	  echo	  of	  this	  may	  be	  seen	  immediately	  after	  the	  First	  
World	  War	  during	  the	  period	  of	  autarky.	  However,	  this	  dissertation	  demonstrates	  how	  
similar	  impulses	  drove	  Turkish	  policy	  decades	  later	  during	  the	  Cold	  War.	  For	  Syria,	  the	  
period	  after	  independence	  appears	  as	  a	  struggle	  of	  the	  same	  tenor.	  Syrian	  officials’	  
concerns	  about	  fragmentation	  and	  independent	  action	  motivated	  foreign	  policy	  decisions	  
connected	  to	  the	  al-­‐Tabqa	  dam.	  
Another	  contribution	  of	  this	  research	  is	  its	  examination	  of	  the	  ideas	  and	  
international	  influence	  behind	  the	  expansion	  of	  water	  management	  projects	  into	  holistic	  
development	  programs.	  While	  petroleum	  is	  and	  was	  a	  key	  resource	  factor	  in	  the	  economic	  
development	  of	  Middle	  Eastern	  states,	  there	  has	  been	  less	  recognition	  of	  water	  as	  a	  
political	  and	  physical	  medium	  for	  development.	  Water	  resources	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  
provided	  both	  a	  physical	  justification—water	  as	  a	  vital	  ingredient	  in	  the	  economic	  activities	  
that	  supported	  the	  greatest	  number	  of	  people—and	  an	  ideational	  justification—water	  as	  
the	  tangible,	  everyday,	  and	  potentially	  dangerous,	  necessity—for	  sweeping	  programs	  of	  
development	  in	  both	  oil-­‐rich	  Iraq	  and	  oil-­‐poor	  Turkey.	  
Finally,	  this	  research	  shows	  how	  water	  management	  projects	  became	  complicit	  in	  
programs	  of	  economic	  assimilation,	  as	  a	  remedy	  for	  ethnic	  division	  or	  political	  
fragmentation.	  Though	  this	  argument	  is	  stated	  most	  directly	  with	  regard	  to	  Turkey’s	  
attempts	  to	  assimilate	  and	  acculturate	  the	  Kurdish	  population	  in	  eastern	  and	  southeastern	  
Anatolia,	  there	  is	  also	  evidence	  of	  a	  similar	  process	  at	  al-­‐Tabqa	  in	  Syria,	  where	  Soviet	  
influences	  produced	  an	  egalitarian	  city	  that	  diminished	  the	  kinds	  of	  social	  and	  cultural	  
barriers	  afflicting	  other	  parts	  of	  the	  country.	  In	  both	  cases,	  the	  massive	  dams	  became	  a	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means	  to	  display	  and	  disseminate	  a	  specific	  form	  of	  national	  ideology	  centered	  on	  
economic	  development	  and	  environmental	  control.	  
There	  are	  several	  avenues	  for	  future	  research	  suggested	  by	  these	  findings.	  I	  would	  
like	  to	  highlight	  two	  that	  I	  believe	  would	  be	  most	  fruitful.	  The	  first	  has	  to	  do	  with	  the	  
Ottoman	  era.	  A	  deeper	  investigation	  into	  Ottoman	  ideas	  and	  motivations	  with	  regard	  to	  
Willcocks’s	  program	  will	  be	  important	  in	  tracing	  more	  effectively	  the	  legacy	  of	  Ottoman	  
ideas	  regarding	  Mesopotamia.	  It	  is	  possible	  to	  discern	  the	  fundamental	  concepts	  and	  
rationales	  of	  Ottoman	  development	  in	  later	  programs	  of	  water	  development	  in	  all	  three	  
countries.	  But	  how	  exactly	  did	  the	  Ottoman	  government	  perceive	  Mesopotamia	  and	  its	  
resources?	  What	  precisely	  did	  they	  imagine	  Willcocks’s	  plan	  would	  achieve?	  Uncovering	  
these	  details	  may	  lead	  to	  new	  conclusions	  about	  the	  intentions	  of	  later	  planners	  in	  Iraq	  and	  
Turkey.	  
The	  second	  field	  of	  further	  research	  involves	  the	  elaboration	  of	  the	  Syrian	  case.	  The	  
problem	  is	  manifold.	  First,	  the	  French	  in	  Syria	  concentrated	  more	  heavily	  on	  the	  western	  
part	  of	  Syria	  and	  modern	  works	  on	  the	  Euphrates	  appeared	  later.	  Second,	  the	  fact	  that	  
these	  works	  appeared	  later	  means	  that	  sources	  become	  an	  issue	  as	  the	  French	  archive	  is	  
not	  as	  helpful	  and	  the	  Syrian	  archives	  are	  not	  accessible.	  Third,	  the	  timing	  of	  this	  research	  
project	  coincided	  with	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  Arab	  Spring	  demonstrations	  in	  Syria,	  which	  
made	  it	  impossible	  to	  visit	  the	  country	  and	  experience	  the	  kinds	  of	  luck	  that	  researchers	  
sometimes	  enjoy	  when	  striking	  out	  into	  the	  unknown.	  Still,	  even	  without	  access	  to	  Syrian	  
archives,	  additional	  time	  and	  energy	  spent	  on	  this	  case	  may	  yield	  fresh	  results.	  
Even	  with	  these	  two	  important	  avenues	  left	  to	  explore,	  this	  dissertation’s	  analysis	  of	  
the	  relationship	  between	  water	  management	  and	  state	  formation	  in	  Iraq,	  Syria	  and	  Turkey	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offers	  a	  way	  to	  contextualize	  current	  arguments	  and	  discussions	  regarding	  the	  twenty-­‐first	  
century	  water	  crisis	  and	  its	  role	  in	  generating	  potential	  future	  conflict	  in	  the	  Middle	  East.	  
As	  I	  noted	  in	  the	  Introduction,	  there	  are	  those	  who	  believe	  that	  a	  “water	  crisis”	  afflicts	  the	  
Middle	  East.	  They	  predict	  the	  approach	  of	  “water	  wars”	  over	  scarce	  resources	  and	  suggest	  
a	  wide	  range	  of	  methods	  to	  avoid	  this	  conflict,	  including	  an	  erasure	  of	  the	  past.	  	  
Jan	  Selby,	  in	  his	  article	  “The	  Geopolitics	  of	  Water	  in	  the	  Middle	  East:	  Fantasies	  and	  
Realities,”	  takes	  these	  authors’	  dismissal	  of	  history	  and	  neoliberal	  antidotes	  to	  task,	  noting	  
that	  “it	  is	  to	  the	  political	  economy	  of	  development	  and	  state	  formation	  that	  we	  must	  above	  
all	  attend.”	  However,	  Selby’s	  article	  goes	  on	  to	  dismiss	  the	  importance	  of	  water	  in	  either	  
economic	  development	  or	  state	  formation	  in	  the	  Middle	  East.	  This	  dismissal	  relies	  in	  part	  
upon	  the	  tired	  (and	  oft	  criticized)	  thesis	  of	  Karl	  Wittfogel.	  Selby	  asserts	  that	  “If	  Wittfogel’s	  
river	  basin	  model	  were	  still	  applicable,	  Egypt	  and	  Iraq	  would	  be	  the	  preeminent	  economic	  
powers	  in	  the	  region…”412	  	  
The	  problem	  with	  Selby’s	  analysis	  is	  his	  consideration	  of	  water	  as	  solely	  an	  
economic	  input.	  His	  dismissal	  of	  water	  as	  geopolitically	  consequential	  relies	  on	  the	  fact	  that	  
agriculture	  has	  declined	  in	  importance	  in	  national	  economies,	  water	  may	  now	  be	  imported	  
as	  food,	  and	  oil	  has	  superseded	  water	  in	  economic	  significance.	  The	  framing	  of	  the	  issue	  as	  
solely	  an	  economic	  one	  fails	  to	  attend	  to	  the	  political	  meanings	  attached	  to	  water	  and	  how	  
these	  developed	  historically.	  As	  several	  parts	  of	  this	  dissertation	  have	  demonstrated,	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
412	  Selby,	  “Geopolitics,”	  335.	  Karl	  Wittfogel,	  in	  his	  book	  Oriental	  Despotism:	  A	  Comparative	  
Study	  of	  Total	  Power	  (New	  York:	  Random	  House,	  1957),	  coined	  the	  term	  “hydraulic	  empire”	  
to	  describe	  his	  thesis	  that	  sophisticated	  irrigation	  systems	  gave	  rise	  to	  a	  highly	  
bureaucratized	  societies	  and	  a	  kind	  of	  “oriental	  despotism.”	  Arnold	  Toynbee	  famously	  
called	  the	  book	  “a	  menace.”	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production	  of	  state	  power	  and	  legitimacy	  by	  means	  of	  water	  infrastructure	  has	  had,	  and	  
likely	  will	  continue	  to	  have,	  an	  impact	  on	  relations	  between	  states.	  It	  is	  vital	  to	  consider	  
how	  conflict	  might	  emerge	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  protect	  state-­‐driven	  programs	  of	  social	  
engineering	  that	  rely	  on	  water	  management	  as	  a	  vital	  physical	  and	  political	  input.	  	  
More	  detailed	  histories	  of	  water	  that	  consider	  politics	  and	  economics	  at	  multiple	  
levels	  is	  a	  prerequisite	  of	  such	  a	  consideration.	  This	  in	  fact	  is	  the	  promise	  of	  environmental	  
histories	  of	  water.	  The	  foundation	  of	  environmental	  history’s	  engagement	  with	  water	  
issues	  may	  be	  found	  in	  analyses	  of	  the	  development	  of	  the	  American	  West.413	  These	  
histories	  discuss	  how	  control	  over	  water	  facilitated	  and	  complicated	  the	  movement	  of	  the	  
American	  population	  westward,	  detailing	  the	  expansion	  of	  state	  power	  and	  the	  complex	  
interplay	  of	  humans	  and	  nature	  in	  creating	  the	  landscape	  of	  this	  region.	  From	  this	  
foundation,	  the	  field	  has	  expanded	  to	  consider	  the	  history	  of	  water	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  places,	  
most	  notably	  in	  a	  number	  of	  modern	  histories	  of	  rivers.	  These	  histories	  include	  the	  
Rhine,414	  the	  Mekong,415	  the	  Columbia,416	  the	  Nile,417	  and	  the	  Mississippi.418	  These	  histories	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
413	  These	  include	  Donald	  Worster,	  Rivers	  of	  Empire;	  Mark	  Fiege,	  Irrigated	  Eden:	  The	  Making	  
of	  an	  Agricultural	  Landscape	  in	  the	  American	  West	  (Seattle:	  University	  of	  Washington	  Press,	  
1999);	  John	  Walton,	  Western	  Times	  and	  Water	  Wars:	  State,	  Culture	  and	  Rebellion	  in	  
California	  (Berkeley:	  University	  of	  California	  Press,	  1992);	  Norris	  Hundley,	  Jr.,	  The	  Great	  
Thirst:	  Californians	  and	  Water,	  1770s-­‐1990s	  (Berkeley:	  University	  of	  California	  Press,	  1992).	  
414	  Mark	  Cioc,	  The	  Rhine:	  An	  Eco-­‐Biography	  (Seattle:	  University	  of	  Washington	  Press,	  2002).	  
415	  David	  Biggs,	  Nation-­‐building	  and	  Nature	  in	  the	  Mekong	  Delta	  (Seattle:	  University	  of	  
Washington	  Press,	  2010).	  
416	  Richard	  White,	  Organic	  Machine.	  
417	  Terje	  Tvedt,	  The	  River	  Nile	  in	  the	  Age	  of	  the	  British:	  Political	  Ecology	  and	  the	  Quest	  for	  
Economic	  Power	  (London:	  I.B.	  Tauris,	  2004).	  For	  an	  early	  modern	  history,	  see	  Alan	  Mikhail,	  
Nature	  and	  Empire	  in	  Ottoman	  Egypt:	  An	  Environmental	  History	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	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demonstrate	  that	  water’s	  uses	  and	  meanings	  are	  as	  varied	  as	  scholarly	  approaches.	  
Alongside	  studies	  such	  as	  Mark	  Fiege’s	  Irrigated	  Eden	  and	  Richard	  White’s	  Organic	  
Machine,	  which	  emphasize	  the	  importance	  of	  human	  labor	  and	  technological	  control,	  there	  
are	  the	  studies	  of	  David	  Biggs	  and	  Terje	  Tvedt	  that	  assess	  nation	  building	  and	  diplomacy	  as	  
they	  relate	  to	  water	  resource	  control	  and	  distribution.	  	  
These	  many	  stories	  of	  water	  raise	  a	  final	  question.	  Though	  Selby	  dismisses	  the	  crisis	  
as	  a	  trick	  of	  Malthusian	  logic,	  the	  designation	  should	  still	  make	  us	  pause.	  Why,	  if	  water	  has	  
so	  little	  “political-­‐economic	  value…in	  the	  modern	  capitalist	  world,”	  do	  these	  cries	  of	  crisis	  
continue	  to	  circulate?	  Selby	  blames	  “modern	  environmentalism’s	  insistence	  on	  our	  human	  
dependence	  upon	  the	  biosphere,	  [which]	  meshes	  well	  with	  Orientalist	  images	  of	  deserts	  
and	  camels…”419	  A	  particular	  view	  of	  Middle	  Eastern	  nature	  may	  have	  an	  influence,	  but	  
there	  is	  more	  to	  it.	  The	  framing	  of	  “crisis”	  can	  serve	  several	  other	  ends.	  The	  exigencies	  of	  a	  
crisis	  situation	  are	  a	  useful	  mechanism	  for	  overriding	  opposition	  to	  further	  interventions	  
by	  the	  state	  in	  the	  management	  of	  these	  resources.	  Moreover,	  the	  framing	  of	  environments	  
as	  problematic,	  ruined	  or	  mismanaged	  has	  justified	  various	  forms	  of	  foreign	  
interventionism	  and	  colonialism	  in	  the	  near	  past.420	  One	  should	  not	  dismiss	  the	  assertions	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
University	  Press,	  2011).	  
418	  Christopher	  Morris,	  The	  Big	  Muddy:	  An	  Environmental	  History	  of	  the	  Mississippi	  and	  Its	  
Peoples	  from	  Hernando	  de	  Soto	  to	  Hurricane	  Katrina	  (New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  
2012).	  See	  also	  Walter	  Johnson,	  River	  of	  Dark	  Dreams:	  Slavery	  and	  Empire	  in	  the	  Cotton	  
Kingdom	  (Cambridge,	  MA:	  Belknap	  Press,	  2013).	  
419	  Selby,	  “Geopolitics,”	  344.	  
420	  A	  very	  good	  example	  may	  be	  found	  in	  Diana	  K.	  Davis,	  Resurrecting	  the	  Granary	  of	  Rome:	  
Environmental	  History	  and	  the	  French	  Colonial	  Expansion	  in	  North	  Africa	  (Columbus:	  Ohio	  
University	  Press,	  2007).	  See	  also	  Timothy	  Mitchell,	  “The	  Object	  of	  Development”	  in	  Rule	  of	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of	  “crisis”	  as	  mere	  fantasy,	  to	  be	  remedied	  by	  a	  good	  dose	  of	  reality.	  Calls	  of	  crisis	  can	  have	  
very	  particular	  motives	  and	  when	  connected	  to	  water,	  a	  relationship	  to	  broader	  historical	  
forces	  with	  origins	  in	  a	  deeper	  past.
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Experts,	  209-­‐243.	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